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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
How can different religious groups in Indonesia, notably Muslims and 
Chritians, live together and trust each other? What is the role of religion in 
building trust among and between different groups in Indonesian society? This 
is the general problem of our research.  
This chapter deals primarily with the general problems and questions 
of this study. We shall outline the central idea of this research, namely 
reliiously-inspired generalised trust. Next, we will formulate the objectives of 
our research, the conceptual model, and the operationalisation of variables in 
the empirical part of this study. In the remainder of this chapter we will      
describe the research design and population, sampling and data collection, and 
finally the structure of this dissertation. 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
Since Indonesia’s birth as an independent state on 17 August 1945, several 
conflicts have erupted revolving around ethnicity, religion, race or social 
groups (SARA)
1
. Among these ethno-religious conflicts are the South 
Sulawesian rebellion and the Islamic movement headed by Abdul Kahar 
Muzakkar (1950), the anti-Chinese riots (1963, 1974, 1980), and the 
destruction or burning of churches in several places in the archipelago (137 
cases between 1955 and 1984) (Santoso 2000: 110ff). In the 1990s, ethno-
religious conflicts suddenly burst forth again in violent riots in Jakarta and 
Jember (East Java) in 1992, in Medan (North Sumatra) in 1994, in Pekalongan 
(Central Java) in 1995, and in Surabaya in 1996. Between 1995 and 1999, 370 
churches and 40 mosques were closed, destroyed or burnt. Between 1996 and 
1999, there were serious social and religious conflicts in Java (Situbondo, 
Tasikmalaya, Rengasdengklok, Solo and Jakarta), Kalimantan (Banjarmasin) 
and Sulawesi (Makassar). Between 1999 and 2005 there were very serious 
conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon (Maluku), as well as in 
Poso (Sulawesi). These areas remain unstable, and continue to have regular 
outbursts of violence. Conflict has resulted in many deaths and physical 
injuries, and in the displacement of people (ICG 2000; 2005; 2007; 2011; 
2012; Santoso 2000; Sidel 2006; Subair & Rumra 2008).  
At the beginning of the 21st century, conflict erupted within the Muslim 
community itself in Indonesia, revolving around differences in practice and 
belief between the majority Sunni Muslims on the one hand, and the minority 
                                                 
1
 Issues related to ethnicity, religion, race and intergroup relations are normally 
referred to by the term ‘SARA’ (suku, agama, ras dan antar golongan).  
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Muslim groups of Ahmadiyah and Shi’ah on the other. In addition, there have 
been numerous cases of religious tension between the Muslim majority and the 
Christian minority, expressed through acts of terrorism in places of worship, 
and in the closing down of existing churches or the refusal to allow the 
establishment of churches in several places. According to an investigation by 
the Centre for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) at the Gadjah 
Mada University in Yogyakarta, there were 39 conflicts involving houses of 
worship in 2010 alone (Bagir et al. 2011: 48ff). 
Against this background, we ask the question: Why did and do these 
conflicts between religious groups occur?
2
 Why have religions in Indonesia 
failed to promote more trust between people with different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds? Do religions in Indonesia fail to encourage trust between 
people? Indeed, do they in fact contribute to (religious) conflict? In order to 
find an answer to these questions and to build theory on the notion of trust 
within the Indonesian context, we formulate three theoretical presumptions.  
 First, we presume that religion is not the only source of distrust 
between people. Problems within other societal domains (such as the economy, 
politics, social life and culture) are also important. Economic, political and 
socio-cultural issues often contribute to conflicts that develop along religious 
lines. Lack of job opportunities, lack of education, abuse of power, and failure 
to acknowledge and accept diversity are only few of these. Religious group 
members may feel threatened by members of other religious traditions in terms 
of these societal issues (Section 1.1.1). 
Second, we will discuss several religious intra-group beliefs that may 
induce or reduce trust between people. Religious intra-group beliefs are the 
crucial elements of faith within a particular tradition. More specifically, we 
will discuss religious convictions regarding God, Muhammad and Jesus, the 
interpretation of Holy Scriptures and faith, and the understanding of the Koran 
and the Bible. Religious intra-group beliefs can be exclusive or inclusive. The 
conviction that the Holy Scripture demands solidarity only among believers of 
the same faith (exclusive) seems to oppose the conviction that God teaches 
people to love all mankind (inclusive); nevertheless, both may be found among 
the faithful. Exclusive convictions are likely to induce negative attitudes 
towards believers of other religions, while inclusive convictions are likely to 
contribute to trust (section 1.1.2).  
Third, religious convictions that relate (in)directly to inter-group 
relations are also important for building up trust between ethno-religious 
groups – particularly for building up trust between Muslims and Christians, in 
our Indonesian research context. We believe that these convictions – which we 
will label ‘inter-group beliefs’ – play an important role in behaviour and 
                                                 
2
 In this work we will speak simply of ‘religious conflict’ when referring to conflicts 
between religious groups which may also be economic, political, social or cultural in 
nature. 
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actions towards other religious groups. Intergroup relations depend largely on 
how the respective groups look at religious truth claims in a religiously plural 
context, how they relate positive characteristics to the in-group and negative 
characteristics to the out-group (i.e. religiocentrism), and how they perceive the 
ideal relationship between religion and state (section 1.1.3). 
Perceived threat, religious intra-group beliefs and religious inter-group 
beliefs have been described as sources of ethno-religious conflict; either 
manifest conflict, as in Ambon, or latent conflict, as in Yogyakarta (Van 
Klinken 2001; Stewart 2005; Noorhaidi 2005; Sidel 2006; Sterkens & 
Hadiwitanto 2009; Subagya 2015). From the contribution of these factors to 
(latent) conflict, it follows that it is also likely that they will either induce or 
reduce trust. The partial and differential role of religious convictions in the 
construction of inter-group trust is the main focus of this research. 
 
1.1.1 Perceived threat in different societal domains in Indonesia  
 
People may feel threatened by others in different ways. Perceived threat can 
relate to different societal domains: economy, politics, or social and cultural 
life. These societal domains represent the wider context in which people 
interact with each other, build their understanding of society, and interpret their 
personal situations. Examination of these societal domains is necessary for 
establishing an accurate and specific understanding of our problem. Trust – or 
lack of trust – between members of different (religious) groups must be 
interpreted in the setting of the concrete social interactions within and between 
these groups.  
 
1.1.1.1 Threats in different societal domains 
In what follows, we will show some examples of perceived threat within 
different societal domains in the Indonesian context. We expect these forms of 
perceived threat to have a negative influence on trust between members of 
diverse groups.  
 
Economic domain  
There are two important issues in the economic domain that affect the daily life 
of many Indonesians: low income, and lack of job opportunities.  
Low income levels have been an economic and social problem in Indonesia for 
many years. From the early 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s, Indonesia 
experienced rapid economic growth. Economic growth was also declared to be 
a priority of the Indonesian central government during the so-called New Order 
regime under Indonesia’s second president, Suharto (1965-1998). However, 
since 1997, the Asian economic crisis has reduced the level of economic 
development in Indonesia, and revealed the poor foundation of Indonesia’s 
economy  (Booth 1999).  Indonesia is still a developing country. According to  
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Map 1.1: Religious groups in the Republic of Indonesia 
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World Bank data, in 2013 Indonesia had a gross national income per capita 
(GNI – Atlas method) of US$3,580 per year, positioning it in the lower-middle 
income range ($1,046 to $4,125). Judged on this figure, Indonesia’s economic 
status is poor in comparison to other Asian countries.
3
  
The problems related to low income affect many aspects of life, 
including homelessness, low education, poor nutrition, unstable or broken 
families, and so forth. Labourers insist that the minimum regional salary, such 
as the minimum income levels set by provincial (UMP: upah minimum 
propinsi) or city/regency (UMK: upah minimum kota) governments, is not 
sufficient to cover daily needs (cf. Wibisono 1998; Basri 2002).
4
 Meanwhile, 
not all companies meet the minimum regional salary.
5
 There is an empirical 
relation between low income levels and social conflict or distrust in society. 
Prejudice and injustice arise easily in societies characterised by low income 
levels (Stewart 2005: 175). For instance, in Maluku, Kalimantan and Papua, 
migrants (largely belonging to different ethnic and religious groups to the 
indigenous residents) are perceived to have more economic opportunities, and 
to have higher income levels than the original inhabitants (Suparlan 2002: 
101f). Obviously, this could stimulate the creation of an atmosphere of 
unhealthy competition and jealousy; which in turn may lead to intergroup 
conflict. Conversely, economic growth for all social groups may encourage 
more cohesion and intergroup trust.  
Limited job opportunities are a second big problem in the economic 
domain. According to Indonesia’s national statistics office, in 2013 there were 
7,390,000 (6.25%) unemployed among the 118,190,000 potentially working 
population.
6
 Since unemployment levels reflect the number of persons actively 
looking for work, these figures depend strongly on job availability. The 
percentage unemployment of the labour force in the province of Maluku was 
9.75%; and in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, 3.34%.
7
 Seemingly, 
Yogyakarta – as a centre of education, tourism and industry in central Java – 
                                                 
3
 The 2013 yearly gross national income per capita (GNI) was US$65,520 in Australia; 
US$46,140 in Japan; US$54,040 in Singapore; and US$10,400 in Malaysia; US$5,370 
in Thailand, and US$6,560 in China. But Indonesia’s GNI per capita is higher than that 
of India (US$1,570) and Vietnam (US$1,740). See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries and http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1, accessed 1 
September 2015. Cf. Soekarni & Arifin 2011: 358.  
4
 For example, the minimum regional monthly salary as at January 2013 in the special 
region (province) of Yogyakarta was Rp947,114 (SK Gubernur no. 370/KEP/2012); 
while in the province of Maluku, it was Rp1,275,000 (SK Gubernur no. 173/2012). 
This is a slight increase on the year 2012, when the minimum monthly income levels 
for Yogyakarta and Maluku were Rp892,660 and Rp975,000 respectively. 
5
 See: http://finance.detik.com/read/2013/02/14/163230/2170303/1036/489-perusaha-
an-diizinkan-bayar-gaji-di-bawah-ump. Accessed 1 September 2015.  
6
 http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/973 Accessed on 1 September  2015. 
7
 http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/981 Accessed on 1 September 2015. 
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offers better job possibilities than the province of Maluku. Unemployment 
levels also correspond to education levels. The less developed educational 
system in Maluku contributes to relatively high unemployment levels 
compared to Yogyakarta (cf. Dhanani 2004; Sugiyarto 2005). In a country 
where there are no developed social security or unemployment benefits 
whatsoever, unemployment often implies a life of poverty.  
Economic dissatisfaction can lead to tensions between ethno-religious 
groups. Almost all destructive riots that occurred between 1996 and 1999 in 
Java (such as those in Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Rengasdengklok, Jakarta and 
Solo) targeted business centres and retail buildings associated with ethno-
religious groups different from those of the perpetrators. Apparently, the rioters 
channelled their anger regarding their economic situation into the destruction 
of commercial buildings. These actions were manifestations of the widespread 
feelings of being treated unfairly in terms of policies that were in the interest of 
the socio-economic elite (cf. Röpke 1988). The riots were therefore also partly 
caused by changes in the government’s economic policies.  
At the end of the New Order era, the Indonesian government and the 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association (established by the government 
in 1990, and known by the acronym ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia) worked hard to protect Muslim entrepreneurs from Christian 
(mostly Chinese-Christian) business people (Hefner 1999: 231f). Religious 
sentiments became entangled with the perception that there was more 
economic growth among Christians than among Muslims in Indonesia (cf. 
Hadiz 2001: 273f). This perception partly mirrored the reality. Economic 
growth among Catholics and Protestants in Indonesia was believed to be about 
4.50% or 4.60% per year, while economic growth among Muslims was only 
2.75% per year (Santoso 2000: 119), although these figures are sometimes 
contested. In an unfavourable economic context, the relationship between 
religious groups deteriorated quickly. Some conjectured that economic 
suffering was due to the economic inequality between religious groups, and 
became convinced that economic factors (such as income level and job 
opportunities) were related to religious belonging. In this way, conflict rooted 
in economic disparity was transformed into distrust between religious groups. 
In some conflict areas in Indonesia, perpetrators attacked church buildings 
because they were associated with the (perceived to be unfairly gathered) 
wealth of Christians (cf. Santoso 2000). 
Many problems between religious groups, such as the conflicts in 
Ambon between 1999 and 2005, can be explained partly by economic issues, 
and more specifically by the socio-economic differences between migrants and 
the original inhabitants. In Ambon, there was relatively strong economic 
growth in the 1970s. Economic developments in Ambon brought more 
migrants to the city, many of whom were hired by the New Order regime as 
civil servants in local government. This development in government job 
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opportunities evoked tensions and strained relations between the (mostly 
Muslim) migrants and the original (predominantly Christian) population. These 
tensions – initially caused by the economic situation – became associated with 
the relationship between Muslims and Christians. Later, decreased job 
opportunities quickly led to tensions between religious groups, and even 
segregation. However, when religious groups are able to support a fair 
distribution of jobs and a fair salary system (meaning ‘independent of religious 
belonging’), a wider solidarity that bridges different religious groups can be 
strengthened (cf. Suparlan 2002; Van Dijk 2002; Noorhaidi 2005; Tanamal & 
Trijono 2004; Sidel 2006; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009). 
 
Political domain 
In the political domain, we address two issues: unequal treatment of citizens, 
and discrimination. We show some concrete examples of policies that induce 
inequality or discrimination.  
Unequal treatment in the political domain can easily be found in the 
context of religion/state relationships in Indonesia. Indonesian politics has 
regularly clashed with the interests of religious groups, since the early days of 
Indonesian independence. Some Islamic groups argued for the establishment of 
an Indonesian Islamic state, as Islam is the religion of the vast majority of the 
population. However, secular and non-Islamic nationalist groups did not agree 
to this proposal. The debate concluded with a compromise, in which Indonesia 
became a religiously-engaged state where diverse religions were recognised 
and facilitated by the state under the ministry of religious affairs (Ichwan 2006; 
Intan 2006; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015). 
Although Indonesia is not an Islamic state constitutionally, tensions 
between secular nationalist groups and religious groups are still present. Given 
a population that is approximately 87% Muslim, some Islamic groups argue 
that Indonesia should more strongly stress Islamic values, and should only 
allow the election of Muslim leaders. As mentioned previously, in the process 
of establishing Pancasila as the Indonesian state ideology in 1945, the 
Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence 
(PPKI: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia), after lengthy deliberation, 
decided to omit the implementation of sharia (Islamic law), and left out any 
explicit reference to sharia in the Pancasila, the preamble to the Constitution, 
or the Constitution itself. They also agreed to eliminate the requirement that the 
President must be a Muslim (Ichwan 2006). The final formulation of the 
Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution in 1945 was even called the greatest 
sacrifice by Muslims in favour of secular nationalists by the former Minister of 
Religious Affairs, Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara (Ichwan 2006: 53).  
Indonesia remains a religiously-engaged state and not an Islamic state, 
but the implicit preference for Islam is still alive in many Indonesian people. 
Since the beginning of this century especially, there have been many new laws 
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that imply a factual curtailment of freedom of religion; among them the Child 
Protection Act, the Decree on the Houses of Worship, the so-called ‘Anti-
Ahmadiyah’ Decree, and the proposal for a Religious Harmony Bill.  
The Child Protection Act (no. 23/2002) includes the obligation to 
“protect” the faith of adopted children, or raise them according to the faith of 
the majority religion in the region where the adoptive parents live. This implies 
that in almost all cases, adopted children would be raised as Muslim, even 
when the adoptive parents are Christian.  
The Decree on the Houses of Worship (2006), originally dating from 
1969, advises local governments that “a house of worship may only be built 
with the approval of a regional administrator”. Its revision in 2006 stipulates 
that government leaders in provinces, cities and regencies should establish 
“religious harmony forums” to advise the governor, the mayor or the regent on 
the building of churches and mosques. Although some of these forums 
contribute to mutual understanding between religious groups, in practice these 
rules lead to an obscure tangle of lobby groups that enforce decisions which 
give rise to yet more tensions.  
The so-called ‘Anti-Ahmadiyah’ Decree by the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Attorney General (no. 1/2008) 
ordered the Ahmadiyah community to “stop spreading interpretations and 
activities which deviate from the principal teachings of Islam”.  
And finally, the proposal for a Religious Harmony Bill (2011), which 
continues to be discussed, incorporates existing policies on places of worship, 
religious education, burial practices and religious celebrations. Although this 
law was not passed, the legislature did approve the related Social Conflict Act 
(no. 7/2012), which allows regional or national governments to declare a state 
of emergency in the event of a religious conflict. Referring to earlier conflicts 
in the archipelago, this Act was criticised for potentially encouraging greater 
involvement of the military in such disputes.  
In addition, there are also older laws and regulations that raise 
obstacles to religious freedom in Indonesia, such as the Blasphemy Act of 
1965, and a joint ministerial decree of the ministers of religious affairs and 
home affairs (no. 1/1979) “regulating missionary and foreign aid to religious 
organisations” (cf. Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015). 
Discrimination is another example of abuse of power in the political 
domain. At the beginning of the New Order regime (1966-1980s), the 
respective roles of religion and state tended to be clearly separated; or to be 
more precise, positioned in an exclusionary corporatist framework (Uhlin 
1997; Porter 2002). The role of religious ideologies in the development of 
policy was limited, while at the same time the state tried to use religious values 
for its own interests. In the first period of Suharto’s governance, he promoted 
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the Pancasila
8
 among religious communities, and especially majority Muslims, 
as the sole foundation of the state. Later, Suharto’s regime abandoned its 
neutrality, and adopted a more Islam-friendly attitude in relation to state 
interests, i.e. corporatism (Hefner 1999; Porter 2002). When Suharto’s New 
Order regime collapsed in 1998, the debate about the relationship between 
religion and state came explicitly to the fore again. Some Islamic groups – and 
to a lesser extent, some Christian groups as well – felt there was “room to 
manoeuvre” (Ichwan 2006; cf. Hefner 1999) and to articulate their interests in 
the state (i.e. religious affairs, education and law; cf. Sidel 2006).  
From 1998 onwards (after the New Order Regime), the government 
increasingly lost its grip on religion. This is evidenced by such acts as 
abolishing the requirement for all political and social groups to establish 
Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.
9
 Political liberalisation allowed 
the establishment of Islamic political parties, Muslim-based secular parties, 
religious parties with various ideological backgrounds, and militant Islamic 
movements. Political Islamism started to flourish shortly after Suharto stepped 
down on 21 May 1998. Between May and October 1998, no fewer than 22 
political parties that could be classified as Islamic were established (Musdah 
Mulia 2011: 41). Political decentralisation further strengthened the influence of 
the local religious context on politics, legislation and regulation. This resulted 
in great diversity in local laws and rules, which depend heavily on the 
substantial (religious) convictions that prevail in particular areas. The 
introduction of sharia law in the province of Aceh in North Sumatra is perhaps 
the most well-known and most extreme example.
10
  
But this matched a broader, nationwide development. The Indonesian 
government has given extensive jurisdiction to a national system of Islamic 
courts, concerning (among other issues) marriage and divorce law, inheritance, 
and charitable trusts (Cammack, Donovan & Heaton 2007). Musdah Mulia 
                                                 
8
 ‘Pancasila’ is the state ideology declared in the Preamble of the Constitution. It was 
conceived by the Indonesian founding fathers and the Investigating Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan In-
donesia). During the process of formulating Pancasila and the Indonesian constitution, 
the main concern was the state/religion relationship. There were many discussions, 
arguments, and discourses conducted among secular nationalist and religious (Islamic) 
nationalist groups as to whether Indonesia would be a religiously established state or a 
religiously neutral state. For example, the first version of the first pillar/sila that was 
proposed was: “Belief in God with the obligation for its believers to observe the Is-
lamic sharia (law)”. On 18 August 1945, PPKI declared that Indonesia would not be 
an Islamic-oriented state, and the first pillar of Pancasila became: “Belief in one su-
preme God”, without the phrase “the obligation for its believers to observe the Islamic 
sharia (law)” (Ichwan 2006).  
9
 People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Decision No. VII/MPR/1998. 
10
 Law 18/2001 granted Aceh special autonomy and included permission to introduce 
sharia law as an adjunct to – not a replacement of – national civil and criminal law. 
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(2011: 42) reports 156 measures, at the lower government levels, in the form of 
regional policies, circulars or decrees explicitly based on tenets of Islamic 
morality, which makes them regional regulations influenced by sharia (perda 
sharia).  
Although attempts to Islamise the Constitution failed, and the law 
concerning the presidential election (Law No. 42/2008) does not mention belief 
in any particular religion as a condition for candidacy, religious tension 
between Muslims and other religions remains in the political domain in 
Indonesia. In this type of setting, discrimination and distrust emerge easily (cf. 
Sidel 2006; Mujiburrahman 2006).  
 
Social domain 
Social inequality between groups is very likely to lead to inter-group conflict. 
By contrast, equal treatment of citizens – for instance, giving them equal 
access to education – can promote welfare for all. Within the social domain we 
will limit ourselves to matters related to education; and more specifically, 
segregation in the educational system, and (the lack of) equal access to all 
education levels (cf. Stewart 2005: 179).  
Segregation in education is most directly visible in the fact that there 
are many schools affiliated with particular religious groups. In Indonesia there 
are state schools as well as religiously-affiliated schools. A religiously-
affiliated school is usually a private school that has been established by a 
particular religious affiliation. These schools are popular among religious 
groups, because they promote religion as part of the students’ social identity. 
Many parents register their children in religiously-affiliated schools because 
they see it as important that their children learn about their religious tradition, 
and develop their religious identity together with their academic abilities. Reli- 
giously-affiliated schools are therefore very popular in Indonesia. Madrassas 
or Islamic schools are organized according to Law 20/2003 on the national 
education system and according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs decree 
117/2014 on the Madrassa curriculum. Madrassas provide formal education in 
line with the national curriculum and further include specific education on 
Islam. There are also many Catholic and Protestant schools, many of which 
were established during the Dutch colonial period (cf. Saerozi 2004). Most of 
religiously-affiliated schools are private initiatives, and privately funded by 
religiously-inspired foundations interested in education, except state madrassas 
which are founded by government.  
Although it is difficult to relate the presence of religious schools 
directly to social tensions or a lack of social cohesion, the existence of 
religiously-affiliated schools certainly contributes to segregation in society (cf. 
Titaley 2000; Abddullah 2001; Noorhaidi 2005; Listia et al. 2007: 119, 141ff). 
Further segregation along religious lines in education can be seen in the 
national laws on religious education. In both private and state schools, religious 
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education is organised according to the religious affiliation of the pupils, and 
devotes attention to only that single religious tradition. It is therefore not 
possible to become acquainted with other religious traditions within the formal 
education programmes (cf. Yusuf & Sterkens 2014).  
Equal access to all levels of education is also problematic in Indonesia. 
After the economic crisis in 1998, the Indonesian government established a 
scholarship programme, the Social Safety Net (JPS: Jaring Pengaman Sosial), 
which aims to assure access to education for all citizens. However, the system 
is riddled with problems, such as leakage of benefits to wealthier students, and 
limitations to the scholarship coverage (Sparrow 2007). In fact, citizens must 
still pay considerable amounts for access to education; especially for the higher 
levels of education, and for tertiary education in particular. According to 
Indonesia’s national statistics bureau, in 2013 the school participation rate 
(SPR) – the proportion of people of a certain age attaining their foreseen level 
of education – for 7- to 12-year-olds (elementary school) was 98.42%. This 
rate declined for older children in higher school levels. The SPR for 13- to 15-
year-olds (junior high school) was 90.81%; for 16- to 18-year-olds (senior high 
school) it was 63.84%; and for 19- to 24-year-olds (tertiary education) it was 
only 20.14%.
11
 Unequal access to quality education because of economic 
constraints is a serious problem for those threatened with being left behind on 
the social ladder.  
 
Cultural domain 
In the cultural domain we would like to pay attention to the following issues: 
failure to recognise diverse values, and hedonism.  
Respect for different values is a necessary condition for mutual trust in 
modern society. Some social conflicts in Indonesia occurred because of this 
particular issue. In Maluku in 2000, members of Laskar Jihad went from Java 
to Ambon with the intent of ‘battling for Islam’ (jihad), because they assumed 
that Christians did not respect Islamic values and were oppressing Ambonese 
Muslims. In a more general sense, the desire for a culturally uniform Indonesia 
is a constant threat to Indonesia’s plurality (cf. Panggabean 2004: 49). In a 
monolithic culture, it is expected that the norms of a certain social group will 
be followed by everybody. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s the Indonesian 
government forced Chinese people who had been living in Indonesia for 
generations to assimilate into the national Indonesian culture. Chinese people 
were not allowed to keep their Chinese names, or to use Chinese languages in 
public. These regulations resulted in severe tensions between ethnic Chinese 
and other ethnic groups in Indonesia (Mackie 1976: 132ff; Suryadinata 1997: 
17; Liem 2000: 72).  
                                                 
11
 http://www.bps.go.id/index.php/linkTabelStatis/1527 Accessed on 1 September 
2015. 
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Throughout the New Order period, the government continued to create 
explicitly discriminatory policies for ethnic Chinese, including complicated 
bureaucratic regulations that limited the full participation of Chinese people in 
Indonesian society. Cultural tensions intensified, due to the long-held 
stereotypes that Chinese were rich (economic distinction) and Christian – or at 
least, non-Muslim (religious distinction) (cf. Mackie 1976; Liem 2000). 
Measures that exhibit a monolithic cultural approach can still be seen today. 
Because of democratisation and the decentralisation of politics since the 
beginning of this century, some Islamic religious leaders think now is the right 
time to expand the influence of Islam in politics. Recently, in several regions – 
such as Aceh, South Sulawesi, and some parts of Java – there has been 
growing demand to implement Islamic law (sharia) (Nurdin 2005: 33; Jones 
2012: 174f; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015). In some areas in Java, this is 
compounded by the factual impossibility to build churches in areas where there 
is a Muslim majority (virtually everywhere), just like it is practically 
impossible for Muslims to build Mosques in a Christian majority area like 
Papua or in the Hindu majority area of Bali (Joint Decree of Minister of Home 
Affairs and Minister of Religious Affairs No. 8-9/2006). Another example is 
the prohibition of congratulating Christians at Christmas by means of a fatwa 
promulgated by the Indonesian Islamic Council (MUI: Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia) (Magnis-Suseno 2006: 30, 32). When a local government tried to 
compromise on this demand, they were immediately trapped by a monolithic 
ideology that ignored the existence of other values. Some scholars (e.g. Jones 
2012) label a monolithic ideology that identifies culture with one particular 
religious tradition an ‘authoritarian cultural policy model’ (Jones 2012). 
Obviously, such an authoritarian cultural policy model that refuses to recognise 
diverse values may lead to societal unrest. 
Hedonism is a second much debated cultural issue that has an effect on 
social cohesion in Indonesia. Hedonism refers to an interest in the pursuit of 
pleasure, and spending money on luxury items. Hedonism appears to flourish 
in Indonesia, as many people – notably, the urban youth – spend or have a 
strong desire to spend money on luxury items such as technological gadgets, 
and prefer to visit international franchises and expensive pubs, clubs or 
restaurants. This desire is in sharp contrast to their actual purchasing power, 
and to the limited purchasing power of many poor. There are diverse 
religiously-inspired evaluations of hedonism from both the puritan and the 
more moderate side, among both Muslims and Christians (cf. Mulyadi 2006). 
Puritans usually evaluate hedonism against the dichotomy of spirituality and 
physicality, or a heavenly reality versus this world. As hedonism influences 
people to abandon their spirituality, puritans perceive this lifestyle to be a 
serious transgression. Moderates also disapprove of hedonism, but usually 
relate their disapproval to social ethics. A hedonistic lifestyle, in their view, is 
a threat to core values such as solidarity and justice. This strong disapproval of 
INTRODUCTION 
 
13 
hedonism from all sides may have a negative effect on trust in Indonesian 
society; what has an even greater effect is preference for the values of the 
religious in-group as the ultimate criterion for the evaluation of social realities. 
 
1.1.1.2 Empirical measurements of perceived threat  
How do Christians and Muslim students experience these threats in different 
societal domains in Indonesia? To answer this question we constructed 
empirical measurements, distributed among our research population. We will 
examine whether the different types of perceived threat can be found among 
Muslim and Christian students in Indonesia by means of factor analyses. Next, 
we describe to what extent our respondents agree with these forms of perceived 
threat. How did we measure the perceived threat in the Indonesian context, in 
the different domains we identified – namely, the economic, political, social, 
and cultural? According to the explanation of the Indonesian context above, we 
can find two indicators for each domain. The first indicator in the economic 
domain is fair salary. Do people agree that their income is sufficient for their 
family, or not? The second indicator is about the availability of jobs for family 
members.  
For the political domain, we also have two indicators: unfair use of 
power, and the patronage system. The respondents were asked to what extent 
they feel discriminated against or oppressed by the government (unfair use of 
power), and to what extent their social environment is able to influence public 
policies.  
The two indicators in the social domain relate to education; more 
specifically, to educational segregation, and access to all levels of education. 
For many, religious affiliation is a criterion used to choose a specific school. A 
preference for religiously-affiliated schools is not only a symptom of societal 
segregation along religious lines, but also maintains this segregation. We also 
asked to what extent people have the impression that they have access to all 
levels of education.  
Finally, we distinguish two indicators for perceived threat in the 
cultural domain: respect for different religious values in society, and evaluation 
of a hedonistic lifestyle. 
In the following table, we present all 16 items in our measurement of 
perceived threat in different societal domains in Indonesia. Respondents could 
express their level of agreement with each item using a five-point Likert scale, 
from ‘total disagreement’ (1) to ‘total agreement’ (5).  
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Table 1.1: Operationalisation of perceived threat in Indonesia  
 
Indicator Item
12
 
 Economic 
Fair salary 1. Daily living is too expensive for my family 
9. The income of my family is sufficient 
Job opportunity 2. There are enough job opportunities for my family 
10. It is easy for my family members to find a good job 
 Political 
unfair use power 3.  My family is discriminated by the government. 
11. Members of my family feel oppressed by those who have political power. 
Patronage 4. My family has good relations with people in local government. 
12. I worry about the abuse of political power in my environment. 
 Social 
Segregation in 
education 
5. I prefer to attend confessional schools of my own religious background.   
13. It is the preferred choice of my family to study in confessional schools.  
Education to all levels 6. Members of my family have free  access to all levels of education.  
14. Indonesia has accessible education for everybody.   
 Cultural 
Different values 7. The values of my religion are not enough respected in society. 
15. There is a lack of respect for religious values in our society. 
Tolerance to hedonism 8. Too many people are only interested in what gives them pleasure. 
16. The society is too supportive of a hedonistic lifestyle. 
 
 
Which types of perceived threat in the four societal domains are recognised by 
our Muslim and Christian student respondents? To answer this question, we 
conducted a factor analysis.
13
 Before running the factor analysis, we inverted 
the answering categories on the five-point Likert scale for items 2, 4, 6, 9, and 
10. We used a three-step procedure to construct comparative scales across both 
religious groups involved in our research (Hermans & Sterkens 2014; see also 
chapter 2, section 2.1.2).  
In a first step, we conducted a factor analysis for both groups of 
respondents (Muslims and Christians) together. The second step was to 
examine the two religious groups separately. These separate analyses were in 
order to show whether the overall structure of the first step was valid for each 
group. In the third step, we eliminated the differences found in the second step 
by another factor analysis for both groups. Here, we determined the cross-
religious comparative measurement of perceived threat. In the discussion of the 
                                                 
12
 The scores on the 5 point Likert-scale (from ‘full disagreement’ until ‘full agree-
ment’) for items 2, 4, 6, 9, and 10 were recoded (values of answering categories 
reversed). 
13
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
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empirical results, we shall report only the results of the third-step factor 
analysis. Table 1.2 shows the results of the factor analysis in the third step. 
 
Table 1.2: Factor analysis (Paf, Varimax rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of the perceived threat in Indonesia among Muslim 
and Christian students. 
 
Items Theory Dimension h2 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
8. Too many people are only interested 
in what gives them pleasure. 
Culture: tolerance to hedonism .85    .72 
16. The society is too supportive of a 
hedonistic lifestyle. 
Culture: tolerance to hedonism .73    .53 
5. I prefer to attend confessional 
schools of my own religious 
background.   
Social: segregation in 
education 
 .79   .63 
13. It is the preferred choice of my 
family to study in confessional 
schools.  
Social: segregation in 
education 
 .76   .59 
11. Members of my family feel 
oppressed by those who have political 
power. 
Political: unfair use power   .75  .58 
3.  My family is discriminated by the 
government. 
Political: unfair use power   .73  .54 
2. There are enough job opportunities 
for my family 
Economic: job opportunity    .73 .54 
10. It is easy for my family members 
to find a good job 
Economic: job opportunity    .63 .40 
Cronbach’s Alpha .76 .76 .71 .63  
Number of valid cases 1480 1488 1481 1470  
Total variance explained 56.5%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Culture: tolerating hedonism; F1 = Social: segregation in eduction ; F3 = Political: unfair use of power; 
F4 = Economic: job opportunity 
 
After step 1 and step 2, we had to eliminate items 1, 9 (economic: salary); 
items 4, 12 (politics: patronage); items 6, 14 (education: all levels); items 7, 15 
(culture: different values), due to low commonalities or because they clustered 
in the same factor in both religious groups. The third step revealed four cross-
religious comparative types of perceived threat among both Muslim and 
Christian students: tolerating hedonism (cultural domain); segregation in 
education (social domain); unfair use of power (political domain); job 
opportunity (economic domain). The explained variance is 56.5% (see Table 
1.2). 
 
Table 1.3 provides a summary of the levels of agreement with perceived threat 
in the different societal domains in Indonesia among Muslim and Christian 
students.  
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Table 1.3: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
the perceived threat in Indonesia among Muslim and Christian students 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Economic: job opportunity     
Muslims 773 2.76 .79 .69 
Christians 697 2.77 .79 .69 
Political: unfair use power     
Muslims 784 2.03 .86 2.29* 
Christians 697 1.93 .81 2.29* 
Social: segregation in education     
Muslims 785 3.40 1.10 10.78** 
Christians 703 2.79 1.10 10.78** 
Cultural: tolerant to hedonism     
Muslims 783 3.68 1.02 -3.87** 
Christians 697 3.88 .96 -3.87** 
Scale: 1(Totally disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Not sure), 4 (Agree), 5 (Totally agree) 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
In the economic domain, we asked respondents about (perceived) job 
opportunities for their family members – the scores on these items were 
inverted. In the results we see that respondents are neither optimistic nor 
pessimistic, and have ambivalent expectations. Neither Muslims (m 2.76; s.d 
.79) nor Christians (m 2.77; s.d .79) are really negative about job opportunities 
for their families; but neither are they optimistic. There is no significant 
difference between the two groups (t .69, df 1468, p .49). This indecisive 
answer shows that employability is indeed a problem in Indonesia.  
In the political domain, both Muslims (m 2.03; s.d .86) and Christians 
(m 1.93; s.d .81) disagree that they are victims of an ‘unfair use of power’ by 
the government or other power-holders. The t-test shows the difference 
between Muslims and Christians is significant (t 2.29, df 1479, p .02), with 
Christian students, surprisingly, feeling less oppressed and discriminated 
against than Muslim students. This is a remarkable finding, because as a 
minority, Christians are anything but favoured by the Indonesian government. 
This may indicate that perceived threat in the political domain is lower 
nowadays than it was before.  
In the social domain (segregation in education) too there is a difference 
between Muslims and Christians. Muslims (m 3.40; s.d 1.10) are positively 
ambivalent about religious segregation in education, while Christians (m 2.79; 
s.d. 1.10) are negatively ambivalent about it. Our Muslim respondents are not 
so sure, but tend to prefer religious segregation in education, meaning that they 
would prefer to attend a religiously-affiliated school of their own religious 
tradition. Christian respondents would not necessarily choose a school of their 
own tradition. The t-test shows that this difference is significant (t 10.78, df 
1486, p .00). The relative group size of Muslims (majority) and Christians 
(minority) respectively may influence this perception. Christians may realise 
that educational segregation may have negative side-effects for social 
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integration. But it is striking that there is a relatively high standard deviation 
among both Muslims and Christians on this topic, showing that there are 
differing opinions within the religious groups of respondents.  
Finally, in the cultural domain, Muslims (m 3.68; s.d 1.02) and 
Christians (m 3.88; s.d .96) agree that too many people have a hedonistic 
lifestyle, and that society is too supportive of this lifestyle. The t-test shows 
that there is also a significant difference (t -3.87, df 1478, p .00) between both 
groups, with Christians being more disapproving of a hedonistic life style than 
Muslims.  
 
1.1.2 Religious intra-group beliefs 
 
Religious intra-group beliefs are crucial elements of faith within a particular 
tradition. Intra-group beliefs consist of the religious core convictions of a 
certain tradition. While religious beliefs are not necessarily the main reason – 
let alone the only cause – of conflicts between religious groups, religious 
convictions may nevertheless play a partial and differential role in conflicts. 
The relevance of religious beliefs in conflicts may be explained through the 
identification of religious conviction in daily life. Conflicts in Indonesia are 
often related to or legitimised by religious ideas. However, we also find that in 
a certain way, the idea of trust can relate to the positive outcomes of religious 
conviction.  
In this study, we focus on images of God, Muhammad and Jesus, 
beliefs regarding the interpretation of Holy Scriptures and faith, and general 
understanding of the Koran and the Bible. We assume that relationships 
between members of religious groups are influenced by the specific way in 
which believers hold these religious convictions. We also expect that religious 
intra-group beliefs may influence trust among Muslims and Christians. While 
fundamentalist and/or exclusivist religious convictions are likely to reduce 
trust, we expect that inclusive intra-group beliefs may induce trust in others.  
Images of God are central for both Muslims and Christians. Both 
believe that God is the source of life and truth. This raises a question: to what 
extent do religious convictions regarding God among Muslims and Christians 
induce or reduce trust in the Indonesian context? In Islam, the salvation and 
very existence of humanity is dependent on the conviction that Allah is the 
only God. In Islamic tradition, this is called tawhid. Tawhid is believed to be 
the religious truth, which must be defended and fought for by all true Muslims. 
This particular monotheistic conviction is therefore often the reason for 
radicalism and even violence. Usually, radical groups use the term ‘religious 
defamation’ when they become aware of different notions of God (cf. Bagir et 
al. 2010, 2011, 2012). Christians believe that God is the Creator, who loved 
and saved mankind from sin. They believe that God incarnated Himself in 
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Jesus Christ as a tangible manifestation of God’s love of mankind. But in 
Christianity, the idea of the incarnated God is exclusivist.  
Images of Muhammad (for Muslims) and Jesus (for Christians) are 
also important religious convictions that may influence other convictions, 
attitudes and behaviours of believers. For Muslims, Muhammad is seen as the 
last prophet, who brought God’s message of uncompromising monotheism. 
Muhammad is God’s major representative. Obeying the message of 
Muhammad is therefore equivalent to obeying God’s will (Schimmel 1985: 25, 
167f; Ernst 2003: 80; cf. Lamens 2000b: 179). Muhammad is believed to bring 
the complete and final message from God. This is reflected in the Islamic 
confession (shahada) that proclaims that there is no god but God (Allah), and 
that Muhammad is God’s messenger. The central position of Muhammad in 
Islam is also used by some radical groups to justify violence. For example, the 
Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Indonesia has been suffering rejection and 
violence because they do not see Muhammad as the final prophet. Ahmadiyya 
in Indonesia is seen by some Muslims as a religious defamation movement 
(Bagir et al. 2011).  
For Christians, Jesus is God incarnated as a human person. Jesus is a 
heavenly man who brought righteousness to humanity. Jesus as God incarnated 
could be called the ‘man of heaven’ who led human beings to participate in 
God (Pelikan 1985: 71; Greene 2003: 53). Most Christians believe that only 
through belief in Jesus can all people attain salvation. This particular 
exclusivist conviction can problematic in a religiously plural context. 
Belief in Muhammad (for Muslims) or Jesus (for Christians), who 
carried the message of God, is the source of how Muslims and Christians 
interpret their faith and social experience. In this sense, images of Muhammad 
or Jesus that are more inclusive towards other religious traditions are expected 
to increase trust in social relations (cf. Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009; Capucao 
2010).  
Beliefs regarding the interpretation of Holy Scriptures and faith are the 
next group of convictions we will discuss. Islam and Christianity are both 
religions of the book; Holy Scripture is understood as a main source of 
believers’ faith in God, and a guide to how they should conduct their lives. The 
idea of the exclusiveness of a particular religious group is obviously connected 
to the idea of how they understand Holy Scripture and faith. Interpretation of 
Holy Scripture and faith can be plotted on a continuum, from ‘very literal’ to 
‘very critical’ approaches.  
Problems arise when interpretations are both literal and radical. For 
example, among particular Muslims, an interpretation of the passage in the 
Koran that states “al-’amr bi’l- ma’rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar” (Sura 3:104: 
“And let there be amongst you a group of people who invite to goodness, 
encouraging that which is right and forbidding that which is wrong; it is they 
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who are the winners”; cf. Sura 9:71) was often used as a catchphrase, to 
contend that other religions are wrong, and to legitimise attacks on Christians.  
When some Muslims thought, or realised, that their fellow believers 
were being discriminated against and oppressed in Ambon, they felt it 
necessary to defend them. Their struggle became a religious obligation, or what 
they called a jihad. But in a narrow interpretation, ’jhad’ can be seen as the 
religious obligation to defend Islam and the teachings of the Prophet from the 
enemy (cf. Sidel 2006: 196f). Some radical Islamic groups, such as the Islamic 
Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam) and Indonesian Mujahidin Council 
(Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) promote religious exclusivism, and oppose 
everyone who has different values. For instance, they have protested against 
the construction of church buildings, and have vociferously rejected religious 
books that they consider incompatible with mainstream Islam (Sidel 2006).  
In Ambon, Christians too have legitimised violence with religious 
ideas. They have cited texts from the Bible and have claimed that God will 
destroy the enemies of His children (Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009: 72). 
Christians in Ambon have identified themselves as Christ’s soldiers (Laskar 
Kristus), and some Christian groups, particularly Evangelicals and 
Pentecostals, believe that it is God’s ultimate will to Christianise all people 
(Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 891ff). One could say that every religious 
conflict is more or less influenced by the way scripture and faith are 
understood. Scholars point out that there are texts in the Holy Scriptures that 
speak of war and violence – even the idea of holy war (cf. Juergensmeyer 
1998: 182; Ariarajah 2002: 59f; Steenbrink 2002a: 203ff; McTernan 2003: 
158ff; Collins 2004: 10f, 31ff). Under certain conditions, people will use Holy 
Scriptures and religious convictions as justification for the rejection of other 
groups.  
The general understanding of the Koran and the Bible is not about how 
to interpret Holy Scripture, but about what the Koran and the Bible mean for 
Muslims and Christians respectively, in general. Does the Holy Scripture 
contain the word of God, words of divine inspiration or expressions of human 
culture? Usually the Holy Scriptures are recognized as the Word of God by the 
believers of the related religious tradition. In Islam, the Koran is accepted as 
the prime theophany, consisting of divine speech, the literal and immutable 
word of Allah (cf. Cornell 1997: 69; Akhtar 1997: 108). The Koran is seen as 
the written Word of God that enters the world. In Christianity, the Bible is seen 
as the Word of God spoken in the words of men. The authors of the Bible were 
inspired by God’s spirit to share God’s revelation and His will in our history 
(Martin 1975: 116, 136; Morgan 1998: 116). But one can also perceive the 
Holy Scriptures as merely expressions of human culture. The question that we 
will raise later is: do these general understandings of the Koran and the Bible 
induce or reduce trust?  
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1.1.3 Religious inter-group beliefs 
 
Religious inter-group beliefs refer to those religious convictions that relate 
(in)directly to inter-group relations. Inter-group beliefs express to what extent 
people recognise and understand other religious traditions. In this study, we 
will discuss in more detail attitudes towards religious plurality, religiocentrism, 
the relationship between religion and state, and a religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice. Failure to develop openness towards other faiths will 
obviously lead to more distrust in society. This is already clear in the following 
examples of conflicts in Indonesia. 
Attitudes towards religious plurality are primarily about how religious 
believers relate to the truth claims of other religious traditions, with their own 
(religious) truth claims in mind. Unwillingness to acknowledge the value of 
other religious traditions, and narrow-mindedness with regard to religious truth 
claims, are likely to be responded to with intolerance. Denying value or any 
form of truth in other religious traditions obviously implies seeing others as 
inferior, or even as an enemy that must be defeated. When others are looked at 
with suspicion and feelings of superiority, trust is very difficult to establish. 
But while some believers support exclusivistic truth claims, other believers 
may be more open-minded, and combine religious commitment with openness 
towards others. In chapter 3 we shall elaborate on the classifications found on 
the broad spectrum between exclusivism and pluralism used in the so-called 
‘theology of religions’ (Knitter 2002). Based on these classifications we will 
describe different attitudes towards religious plurality, namely replacement 
monism, fulfilment monism, commonality pluralism, differential pluralism, 
and relativistic pluralism, and will relate them to trusting others (cf. Anthony et 
al. 2005; 2015). 
Religiocentrism is understood as a combination of positive attitudes 
towards the religious in-group, and negative attitudes towards religious out-
groups (cf. Sterkens & Anthony 2008). Religiocentrism (and ethnocentrism) is 
a relevant issue in Indonesia because religion is salient; not only within the 
private sphere of individual believers, but also within the public sphere. 
Religious identity often has considerable overlap with ethnic identity in 
Indonesia. There are several ethnic groups in Indonesia that are identified with 
particular religions. The Sundanese in West Java and Javanese in Central Java 
are assumed to be Muslim, while the Manadonese in North Sulawesi, the 
Ambonese in Ambon Island and the Papuans are assumed to be Christians 
(Chang 2002: 38; Van Klinken 2001: 40; Sterkens et al. 2014; Subagya 2015). 
Ethnocentrism as a form of latent conflict between different ethnic groups is 
therefore often related to religiocentrism and problematic relations between 
religious groups.  
Religion is an important identity marker, with considerable recruitment 
power. It relatively easily involves people who were not part of the conflict 
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originally. In the process of constructing their social identity, there is a 
tendency for certain groups to identify themselves positively and other groups 
negatively (cf. Tajfel 1981). In this situation, each group is involved in social 
inclusion and exclusion, and reinforces an attitude that assumes the superiority 
of certain groups in a society (cf. Sterkens 2001; Sidel 2006; Mujiburrahman 
2006). Trust is often more easily built between people who have the same 
identity (cf. van Dijk 2002: 288).  
The relationship between religion and state is also considered an 
important inter-group belief in this study. In previous research, we found that 
religious conflicts in Indonesia are sometimes related to uncertainty over the 
role of religious identity in governance (cf. Van Klinken 2001; Sidel 2006). 
Preference for a specific religious tradition in governance leads to feelings of 
anxiety among other groups whose societal position is weaker and more 
vulnerable. Anxiety as a result of the shifting policies of the so-called New 
Order government under Suharto (1966-1998) contributed to the expansion of 
religious conflict.  
At the beginning of the New Order regime, Suharto did not abandon 
religion.
14
 He promoted Indonesia as a modern state, while his political party – 
the Party of the Functional Groups (Golkar: Partai Golongan Karya)
15
 – deftly 
played with right-left political polarisation. For almost 32 years, the New Order 
regime facilitated religion in different ways, e.g. by granting religious holidays, 
by involving the government in the facilitation of religious rites (e.g. the hajj), 
and by supporting business and job opportunities for certain religious groups 
(as occurred in Maluku and Papua, where Muslim immigrants from Buton, 
Bugis and Makassar changed the power balance between different ethnic and 
religious groups).  
However, at the same time the New Order government limited the 
public function of religion in a rather authoritarian way. The New Order 
regime did not consider religious concepts, ideas or organisations in 
determining its policies. One could even say that the state controlled religious 
groups and the religious elite to some extent. Hence, religion had limited 
influence in the public sphere. Sidel (2006: 50) illustrates this, mentioning that 
there were no candidates recruited for political elite who had graduated from 
Islamic schools during the first two decades of the New Order. Religious 
groups, therefore, rather had the feeling that they had been marginalised in the 
public domain.  
But from 1995 onwards, the New Order regime began to open up to 
religious groups, particularly the majority Muslims. This introduced an 
                                                 
14
 In fact, all Indonesian governments since Independence have dealt with religious 
groups in their policies (Van Klinken 2001: 42).  
15
 The Golkar party is an authoritarian political party founded in 1964, and led by Su-
harto during the New Order regime. After Suharto resigned the presidency in 1998, 
Golkar lost much of its influence in Indonesian politics.  
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opportunity for Muslims and Islamic organisations, such as the Indonesian 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-
Indonesia) and Islamic political parties (e.g. The United Development 
Party/Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; the Prosperous Justice Party/Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera; the Crescent Star Party/Partai Bulan Bintang, etc.) to 
promote their convictions in the political scene (cf. van Dijk 2002: 279ff). In 
this regard, Islamic convictions became more influential in the political 
domain, and political elites built their networks in relation to Islam, thus 
breeding a new kind of political patronage that contributed to inter-religious 
tensions. We found here the emergence of fragility and vulnerability due to 
religious competition within the state.  
After the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998, the political 
situation in Indonesia deteriorated; the administration could not control the 
political and religious tensions that had accumulated as a result of patronage 
systems and power abuse. This situation became more acute when some 
Islamic organisations replaced the ‘Pancasila’ state ideology with Islamic 
views and Islamic law (sharia) as the basis for their political views (cf. 
Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015). We must therefore pay attention to the 
relevance of views on the relationship between religion and state, and their 
influence on trust between religious groups.  
‘Religious vocation for solidarity and justice’ refers to the personal 
religious conviction that it is God’s will that people should treat others fairly. 
For believers, acts of solidarity and justice may be inspired by their faith 
system. The expectation is that personal religious commitment with principles 
of solidarity and justice will induce higher levels of generalised trust. The 
question that arises is this: Are there religious principles that can bind different 
people together so that they can live as one? Is solidarity a Divine order that 
has actual effect (cf. Hall et al. 2010)?  
Regardless of these issues, relative group size (i.e. majority or minority 
status) also has significant impact on the construction of group identity and 
inter-group relations. From a social psychology perspective, group members 
will act differently depending on their majority or minority status in a 
particular society. Minority-group members will usually have more negative 
out-group attitudes than majority-group members, although perceived threat 
and group status are often more important determinants than relative group size 
(Faruk et al. 1999; Sterkens 2007; Kanas et al. 2015a). Perceptions of 
discrimination often contribute to attitudes towards out-groups among minority 
members, while such perceptions are generally unrelated to interracial attitudes 
among majority members (Alexander et al. 2005). Minority-group members 
are also more inclined to reflect on their underprivileged status than majority 
members, implying that privileged minority groups may be more worried about 
losing in-group advantage, which work as sequential mediators of out-group 
discrimination (Moscatelli et al. 2014). Studies have also mentioned the 
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differential effects of contact among majority and minority groups respectively 
(Stenhouse et al. 1982; Kanas et al. 2015b).  
What about the relative group size for Muslims and Christians in our 
research areas? The vast majority of Indonesians are Muslims. In 2010, 
according to Indonesia’s national statistics bureau,16 87% of the total 
Indonesian population (237,641,326) were Muslim, while 9.9% were Christian 
(Protestant and Catholic). In most areas in Indonesia, Muslims are in the 
majority, with Christians only a small minority. But there are also areas where 
Christians are a local majority. In Java – and consequently also in our research 
area, the special region Yogyakarta – Christians are a small minority. In 
Maluku, both on the island of Ambon and specifically in the city of Ambon, 
Christians are a (relatively) much bigger group (detailed figures follow in 
section 1.5.1). In Yogyakarta, Christians were only occasionally directly 
involved in conflicts. If conflict occurred (there or elsewhere), they were rather 
passive, and saw themselves as victims of the conflict. However, in Maluku, 
Christians were more actively involved in violent actions. Meanwhile, 
Muslims in Maluku saw themselves (or were seen by Muslim groups outside 
Ambon) as victims of Christian oppression. Thus, Muslims in Maluku, as a 
minority group, perceived themselves in a similar way to how Christians did in 
Java.  
 
1.2 Generalised trust 
 
People living in a modern society don’t only need knowledge about others; 
they also need to trust unknown others they have to deal with. Positive 
expectations about others are a necessary condition for social cohesion and the 
avoidance of conflict (Seligman 1997: 37f; Field 2003: 62). In this study, we 
will examine attitudes towards generalised trust and the extent to which 
religious intra-group beliefs and inter-group beliefs induce or reduce trust. We 
expect that the results of this research may contribute to theological theory 
about the way religion contributes to trust between Muslim and Christian 
university students in Indonesia.  
What is trust? Trust is based on the assumption that others will behave 
according to our expectations and in line with what we value. When this 
happens, trust encourages social stability and peace. Trust is an important 
element of remaining optimistic about the future of a diverse and complex 
society. Without trust, society would be quite intolerable (Seligman 1997; 
Sztompka 1999: 11; Herbert 2003; Sunderland 2007). According to Sztompka 
(1999: 24f), trust (along with hope and confidence) is difficult, because trust 
assumes that people can think actively in facing an unknown future. Trust 
requires a willingness to take risks, because there is always uncertainty about 
                                                 
16
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321 Accessed on 1 September 2015. 
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how other individuals will act. One hopes that every individual in society will 
be a constructive agent of positive relationships. Trust enables individuals and 
groups to handle the complexity of social relationships, and to avoid social 
conflicts as well.  
What kind of trust is needed? Theoretically, two types of trust can be 
identified: interpersonal trust and social trust. The first type, interpersonal trust, 
is about relations between individual persons who have direct contact (e.g. 
friendships). Interpersonal trust presupposes closeness, mutual response and a 
certain level of intimacy. This type of trust addresses the concrete, fundamental 
human need for social contact; when the object of trust expands, the level of 
trust can become more abstract. The second type, social trust, is more abstract, 
because it refers not to people having personal relationships, but rather to 
unknown others and groups. In social trust, we have confidence in the overall 
qualities of the social system, the social order, or the regime. Social trust may 
(but does not necessarily) go beyond social categories. It may go beyond 
distinctions of ethnicity, religion, age, gender, economic status or political 
preference (Seligman 1997: 17f; Sztompka 1999: 41ff; Sunderland 2007: 5f).  
In this research we focus on social trust in the Indonesian context. To 
reduce religious conflicts in Indonesia, we need a kind of trust that contributes 
to bridging diversities; a kind of trust beyond the similarities between people, 
where trust is often already taken for granted. Although trust is indeed built 
through concrete experiences with other (often similar) people, we are looking 
for trust that reaches out to dissimilar others in specific circumstances. 
According to Uslaner (2002: 26; cf. Putnam 2000: 22f; Wuthnow 2002: 670) 
this kind of social trust is called generalised trust. Generalised trust is the 
expectation that others, including unknown and dissimilar others, are 
nevertheless part of our broadening ‘moral’ community (cf. Seligman 1997; 
Field 2003; Herreros 2004). Generalised trust will be further differentiated in 
this study, according to different societal domains in which inter-group 
problems arise. We do not observe trust as an abstract phenomenon, but as a 
specific attitude in concrete situations. In chapter 4, we will elaborate on 
generalised trust in more detail. 
Now the question arises: to what extent is religion relevant to 
generalised trust? To what extent is generalised trust among Indonesian 
Muslim and Christian students religiously inspired? When generalised trust is 
‘religiously inspired’, it is not only seen as an abstract philosophical idea, but 
also as a conviction inspired and promoted by religious belief. Religiously-
inspired generalised trust may be influenced by religious intra-group and inter-
group beliefs, as well as by religious practices. Religion can play either a 
positive or a negative role with regard to generalised trust.  
From the outset, there may be scepticism towards relating religion to 
the notion of generalised trust, because it is often assumed that religion 
promotes exclusive distinctions between the in-group and out-groups (Appleby 
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2000). Hence, Seligman (1997: 21f, 45f) argues that trust needs to be separated 
from (religious) faith. Trust is seen as ‘horizontal’ and immanent, while faith is 
more ‘vertical’, or transcendent. Religion is often supposed to create trust that 
is limited to the members of the in-group in a particular situation. But there is 
also an argument for religion’s positive contribution to trust in modern 
societies.  
Religion may be seen as an important source for and encouragement to 
trusting people in general (cf. Casanova 1994: 61; Sofyan 1999: 88ff; Herbert 
2003: 88). In Indonesia, there are programmes sponsored by Muslim, Christian 
and other believers, as well as religious institutions, that promote solidarity and 
justice. Just a few examples in our research areas are: the Institute for Interfaith 
Dialogue in Indonesia (Interfidei/Insitut DIAN: Dialog Antar Iman di 
Indonesia), the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS: Lembaga Kajian 
Islam dan Sosial, the Centre for Religious Studies (Duta Wacana Christian 
University), the Centre for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (Gadjah Mada 
University Yogyakarta), and the Interfaith Institution for Humanitarian Action 
in Ambon (cf. De Jong 2011: 262f). These groups stimulate interreligious 
dialogue and encourage the development of trust based on religious ideas.  
In short: religious communities are important socialising agencies for 
moral principles that may encourage trust in Indonesia. However, religiously-
inspired generalised trust cannot be taken for granted. Trust can only flourish 
when moral principles of solidarity and justice are applied to promote 
inclusiveness, fairness and equality (cf. Rawls 2001; Uslaner 2002; Herbert 
2003: 88f; Casanova 1994).  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
Religion can play an important role in preventing intergroup conflict by 
encouraging the development of generalised trust. But the opposite is also true: 
religion may induce intergroup conflict when it fails to stimulate generalised 
trust. To what extent do religious intra-group and inter-group beliefs induce or 
reduce generalised trust?  
To limit the scope of this research, we will concentrate on Muslims and 
Christians in selected areas in Indonesia. Comparisons between these two 
groups will be made with regard to their intra-group and inter-group beliefs, 
and with regard to the effect of these beliefs on generalised trust. We selected 
Muslims and Christians because there have been many intergroup conflicts in 
Indonesia in which these groups have been involved. Secondly, we chose 
university students as our respondents because they play a significant role in 
building relations between religious groups. They have often been involved in 
inter-religious activities, as well as being mobilised in times of conflict. As an 
elite-group, they can also be expected to play a crucial role in building up 
social cohesion in the future.  
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We expect that religiously-inspired generalised trust will be influenced 
by certain beliefs that religious people hold – firstly, religious intra-group 
beliefs, such as the images of God, the images of Muhammad, the images of 
Jesus, models for interpreting Holy Scripture and faith, and the concept of 
Holy Scripture. Secondly, we expect that religiously-inspired generalised trust 
will be influenced by religious inter-group beliefs, such as attitudes towards 
religious plurality, religiocentrism, the religion-state relationship, and a 
religious vocation for solidarity and justice. We expect intra- and inter-group 
beliefs to affect religiously-inspired trust, and will control for this influence by 
involving background characteristics (i.e. age, gender, educational background, 
family, religious involvement, perceived threat, and location). More 
specifically, we will address the following research questions:  
 
1. Are Muslim and Christian students’ religious intra-group beliefs in line with 
the theoretical models, and does cross-religious comparative understanding of 
religious intra-group beliefs emerge among Muslim and Christian students 
once group-specific differences have been ascertained? (Chapter 2) 
2. Are Muslim and Christian students’ religious inter-group beliefs in line with 
the theoretical models, and does a cross-religious comparative understanding 
of religious inter-group beliefs emerge among Muslim and Christian students 
once group-specific differences have been ascertained? (Chapter 3) 
3. Are Muslim and Christian students’ attitudes towards religiously-inspired 
generalised trust in line with the theoretical models? (Chapter 4) 
4. Does a cross-religious comparative understanding of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust emerge among Muslim and Christian students once group-
specific differences have been ascertained? And to what extent do background 
characteristics, religious intra-group beliefs and inter-group beliefs correlate to 
and influence religiously-inspired generalised trust? (Chapter 4) 
5. Can religiously-inspired generalised trust be theologically evaluated as a 
religious belief? (Chapter 5)  
 
1.4 Research design 
 
This section deals with our research design. We will describe the conceptual 
model, research methods and sampling method; i.e. the data collection of this 
research.  
 
1.4.1 Conceptual model 
 
The figure below shows the conceptual model, informed by our research 
problems and questions.  
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Figure 1.1 Conceptual model of relations between religious beliefs and 
religiously-inspired generalised trust 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The focus of this research is on religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Muslim and Christian university students in Indonesia. Religiously-inspired 
generalised trust is our dependent variable. We expect that this dependent 
variable will be influenced by independent variables, namely the background 
characteristics and religious intra-group beliefs of Muslims and Christians 
(images of God; images of Muhammad/Jesus; interpretation of Holy Scriptures 
and faith; and understanding of the Koran/Bible). 
Further, we expect that religiously-inspired generalised trust (the 
dependent variable) will be influenced not only by the independent variables, 
but also by intermediary variables, namely religious inter-group beliefs 
(attitudes towards religious plurality, religiocentrism, religion-state 
relationship, and religious vocation for solidarity and justice). The arrows in 
this conceptual model show both the direct and indirect influence between 
independent variables, intermediary variables and the dependent variable.  
 
1.4.2 Research methods 
 
To answer our research questions, we used three types of statistical analyses. 
The first type is factor analysis. This analysis enables us to determine to what 
extent the respondents agree with the conceptual distinctions we have made in 
all our independent, intermediary and dependent variables. The second type is 
bivariate analysis. This analysis is used to determine the relationship between 
independent variables, intermediary variables and dependent variables. Finally, 
we conducted multivariate analyses. These analyses are used to examine to 
what extent the dependent variable (religiously-inspired generalised trust) is 
explained by the influence of independent variables (religious intra-group 
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beliefs) and intermediary variables (religious inter-group beliefs). In all 
instances, we made cross-religious comparisons between our Muslim and 
Christian respondents. 
This research took place among Muslim and Christian university 
students in two areas of Indonesia: Yogyakarta, on the island of Java, where a 
Muslim population is predominant; and Ambon, in the province of Maluku, 
with a predominantly Christian population (cf. section 1.5.1).  
For this research, we used quantitative methods. We collected data by 
means of a questionnaire, which was drafted after consulting theologians and 
social scientists, and after having studied earlier, validated measuring 
instruments. However, there were also measurements developed for this project 
(see Appendices A and B). A trial use of the questionnaire was conducted with 
150 Muslim and Christian university students of Atmajaya University and the 
State Islamic University in Yogyakarta.  
The questionnaire contains three parts. The first part contains 
independent variables, namely background characteristics and attitudes 
towards religious intra-group beliefs. The second part deals with a set of 
measurements of intermediary variables, namely religious inter-group beliefs 
(religious plurality, religiocentrism, religion-state relationship, and religious 
vocation for solidarity and justice). And the third part includes the set of 
measurements for the dependent variable, namely religiously-inspired 
generalised trust.  
Some of the measurements of the background characteristics and 
religious intra-group beliefs are taken from the SOCON research.
17
 However, 
we modified some of the measurements for this research, e.g. ‘What is the 
Koran?’, ‘What is the Bible?’ and ‘What are the sacred scriptures?’ The 
measurements for the images of God and Jesus are based on measuring 
instruments developed in earlier projects of the department of Empirical-
Practical Theology at Radboud University in Nijmegen (cf. Van der Ven & 
Biemans 1994; Van der Ven 1998; Capucao 2010; Zaccaria 2010). Items 
concerning the images of Muhammad were newly constructed for this study. 
The measurements for attitudes towards religious plurality were taken mainly 
from Anthony et al. (2005: 163f; 2015). We also used and modified the 
measurements of ethnocentrism from SOCON (2000), and used Sterkens and 
Anthony (2008) for the variables of religiocentrism. Measurements for 
religion-state relationships and religious vocation for solidarity and justice 
were constructed specifically for this study, as were the 20-item instrument for 
religiously-inspired generalised trust and the 16-item instrument for perceived 
threat. For most of the measurements in this research, the respondents replied 
on a five-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not sure, 4 = 
agree, 5 = fully agree). 
                                                 
17
 SOCON stands for Sociaal-culturele ontwikkelingen in Nederland (2000). Nijmegen: 
ITS.  
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1.4.3 Sampling method and data collection 
 
We used a survey to gather the data for answering our questions. Using our 
conceptual model and literature study, we designed the measuring instruments 
and compiled a questionnaire. The questionnaire that contained the different 
measurements (validated in previous research, or tested in a try-out) was 
distributed to Muslim and Christian university students. In an effort to reach a 
research population that was representative of university students in Indonesia, 
we selected three categories of universities/institutes in both research locations, 
namely: 
1. State universities, not based on religious ideas, and with a heterogeneous 
student population that often mirrors the population in the area in terms of 
religious belonging. 
2. Islamic universities, founded by an Islamic organisation or by the state, 
and based on Islamic convictions. The majority (if not all) of the students 
are Muslim. 
3. Christian universities, founded by a church or a Christian organisation, and 
based on Christian convictions. The majority of the students are Christian.  
 
We selected two cities in Indonesia where all three categories of universities 
were present, i.e. Ambon and Yogyakarta. These two cities provide two 
different situations in relation to the relative group size of the Muslim and 
Christian populations. Ambon, in the province of Maluku in the eastern part of 
Indonesia, has had a strong Christian influence for a long time. In Yogyakarta, 
central Java, in the western part of Indonesia, the majority of the citizens are 
Muslim.  
 
The universities selected were: 
1. In Ambon: Pattimura State University (Unpati: Universitas Pattimura); 
Islamic State Institute (IAIN: Institut Agama Islam Negeri) – Ambon; 
Christian University of Maluku Indonesia (UKIM: Universitas Kristen 
Indonesia Maluku). 
2. In Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada State University (UGM: Universitas Gadjah 
Mada); Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University (UIN: Universitas Islam 
Negeri); Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW: Universitas Kristen 
Duta Wacana). 
 
Respondents were selected by stratified random sampling. First, we made a 
distinction between three groups of departments/programmes in each 
university, namely: Departments of Social Science, Law, Economics, and 
Language; Departments of Engineering and Exact Sciences; and Departments 
of Theology and Philosophy. We did so because we expect that the religious 
profile of students within these groups of departments may be different. Within 
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each group of departments, we randomly selected a fixed number of women 
and men. We selected an equal number of women and men, because men and 
women also have different religious profiles to each other (e.g. in terms of 
orthodoxy).  
We distributed and collected 1,692 questionnaires. Of these collected 
questionnaires, some were found to be invalid or unacceptable. After removing 
the invalid questionnaires, 1,499 valid questionnaires were left, with 
approximately 250 persons from each university, averaging 70 to 90 persons 
from each department. 
The questionnaires were distributed personally to each department of 
each university. We had contacted the staff of each university and department 
previously by mail, and sent them a sample of the questionnaire. We asked 
them to prepare a list of their students, from which we made a stratified 
random sampling, selecting 70 to 90 students who matched our categories. The 
students were to gather on a specific date and time and in a specific room. We 
met with the respondents and distributed the questionnaires. We waited while 
the respondents filled in the questionnaires, and were able to answer any 
questions directly. On average, each group of respondents filled in the 
questionnaires within between 50 and 65 minutes. Only in one department (at 
UKIM Ambon) did all 90 respondents gather at the same time in one room. All 
of the other departments had to divide the 70 to 90 respondents into two to four 
groups, because of class schedules or for other reasons. The exact number of 
distributed questionnaires for every university and department is reported in 
Section 1.5.2. The distribution of the questionnaires took place from August to 
November 2007. 
 
1.5 Description of research setting, population and sample 
 
This section deals with our research setting, population, and research sample. 
We will describe the research setting and population, which is the city of 
Ambon in the Province of Maluku, and Yogyakarta, the city and the special 
region, in Indonesia (1.5.1); and then we briefly present our research sample 
from Ambon and Yogyakarta (1.5.2).  
 
1.5.1 Research setting and population 
 
According to the latest census, from 2010, Indonesia has a population of 
237,641,326 people, including 207,176,162 Muslims, 16,528,513 Protestants, 
and 6,907,873 Catholics.
18
 However, our research population consists of 
students in two Indonesian cities: Ambon and Yogyakarta, in two very 
different provinces in Indonesia. We selected these cities for two reasons. First, 
                                                 
18
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321 Accessed on 1 September 2015. 
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Ambon and Yogyakarta offer variety in the relative group sizes of Muslims 
and Christians. Muslims are the vast majority in Yogyakarta (as well as in 
Indonesia as a whole), but they are a local minority in Ambon. Second, Ambon 
and Yogyakarta have different histories of (actual and potential) conflict 
between Muslims and Christians.  
 
Ambon  
The city of Ambon is located on the island of Ambon. It is the capital of 
Maluku province, which consists of several groups of islands in eastern 
Indonesia, including Ambon, Hitu, Buru, Seram, Kai, Aru, and many other 
small islands. North Maluku has been a separate province since 1999 and 
includes the islands of Halmahera, Tidore, Ternate, Morotai, Becan, Makian 
and several smaller islands. The islands of Maluku and North Maluku were 
historically grouped together as the Mollucas (cf. Heuken 2008: 23). 
 A description of Ambon city in Maluku province necessitates a historical 
perspective. In the early 17
th
 century, Dutch merchants of the VOC (Vereenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie / United [Dutch] East-India Company), a trade union 
granted political powers by the Dutch government, arrived in the islands. It was 
the start of a long period of control of the Maluku region by the Dutch (Knaap 
1991: 126). In 1630, the Dutch took over Ambon from the Portuguese, who had 
been there since 1512 (Keuning 1973: 20ff; cf. Heuken 2008). The Dutch 
merchants tried to establish a monopoly over the spice trade (nutmeg, mace and 
cloves) centred on several islands in Maluku where these plants flourished. It is 
for this reason that the islands of Maluku are known as the Spice Islands 
(Heuken 2008: 23). Dutch influence has been very strong in Ambon, especially 
with regard to religion and education. Christianisation created a bond between 
the local population and the colonial rulers (Ratnawati 2002: 4ff). The Dutch 
colonial administration encouraged the spread of Christianity in Ambon and 
other parts of Maluku. Both the VOC and then the Dutch East-Indies colonial 
administration implemented pastoral services which promoted the Dutch 
Protestant church (Steenbrink 2008: 99ff). Steenbrink (2008: 103) states that in 
1623, “Reformed Christianity was the leading religion in all settlements where 
VOC personnel would have the ultimate authority.” The Dutch turned the city 
of Ambon into a Christian town, and it became the centre of the clove trade. 
The VOC policy of the 1600s then segregated the citizens of the city from the 
residents of the villages around the city (orang negeri), including Muslims (cf. 
Knaap 1991: 107). At the same time, Christianisation continued to be 
systematically implemented through the baptism of Ambonese children and 
adults (Steenbrink 2008: 106ff; cf. Keuning 1973: 32). The churches in Ambon 
were run by Dutch church councils (kerkeraad), which consisted of ministers, 
VOC servants and Ambonese village chiefs. This unfair power policy and 
political patronage based on religious preferences stimulated the social 
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polarisation of Muslim and Christian groups in Ambon and in Maluku 
generally (cf. Keuning 1973: 59).  
 
Map 1.2 The Island of Ambon and surroundings  
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Christian Ambonese, especially members of the raja families,
19
 were 
given better opportunities to have a Western education. Christian towns and 
villages enjoyed favours from the colonial administration, such as education, 
work, health aid, food during times of natural disaster, etc. Being Christian 
became a requirement for securing favours and protection from the Dutch. 
Meanwhile, Muslim villages became worse off, thus creating jealousy 
(Steenbrink 2008: 104ff). Only in the 20
th
 century were ‘people’s schools’ 
(Volksscholen) built in six Muslim villages on the island of Ambon (Ratnawati 
2002: 5). The Muslim population grew, as Muslim immigrants from other 
islands – primarily the island of Sulawesi – moved to Maluku (Knaap 1991). 
The current situation in Ambon has historical roots in the Dutch colonial 
administration, which favoured Christians over Muslims, and developed a new 
religion-based community for Christians. 
Since the independence of Indonesia – especially during the period the 
New Order regime was in power (1966-1998) – the Indonesian government has 
been reversing this imbalance. Their political and economic policies began to 
support Muslims and migrant groups (who are mostly Muslim) in Ambon by 
offering them important positions in the political and economic domains. This 
encouraged the development of a new political patronage system that put 
Christians in disadvantaged positions. The new policies re-activated the old 
tension between Muslims and Christians. Increased polarisation and 
competition between Muslims and Christians were at the root of the religious 
riots that occurred in Ambon between 1999 and 2005 (Tanamal & Trijono 
2004: 232ff; cf. Ratnawati 2002; Suparlan 2002; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 
2009; Van Liere 2011). And after the worst riots had ended in 2005, the 
residential segregation between Muslims and Christians continued. Some did 
not want to (or could not) return to their old neighbourhoods where they used 
to be a (religious) minority. Residential areas of mixed religions were only 
located in cities, such as Ambon, or in neighbourhoods for civil servants and 
other government workers. In current times the problem has developed further, 
into an issue between the local population and migrant ethnic groups – while 
retaining the connection with religion (Suparlan 2002: 110; Steenbrink 2008: 
103; Van Liere 2011: 334).  
At the present time, according to the statistics of 2010, the province of 
Maluku has a population of 1.533,506 people. The provincial capital, Ambon 
city, has 331,254 inhabitants.
20
 Although the Christianisation of Ambon was 
quite successful during the colonial period, Christians are no longer a large 
majority. In 2010, there were 200,048 Christians (60.39%) in the city – 
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 The raja was the traditional leader of the negeri (villages) in Ambon. Their rule was 
based on heredity (Ratnawati 2002: 4).  
20
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=337&wid=8100000000 Accessed on 
1 September 2015. 
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consisting of 192,105 Protestants (57.99%) and 7,943 Catholics (2.40%) – 
while there were 128,417 (38.77%) Muslims. In Maluku province, the 
proportions of Muslims and Christians are almost equivalent to those in 
Ambon city.
21
 
In 2010, the majority of the 182,257 residents of Maluku province 
were self-employed, working mainly in the farming, fishing and agricultural 
industries.
22
 In addition to this, 155,220 people were employees (including the 
majority, who were employed in public and personal services or education). A 
significant number, i.e. 118,018, were unpaid family workers. The majority of 
residents of Ambon city in 2010
23
 were employees, totalling 58,113 people. 
Self-employed residents totalled 33,618, casual workers (non-contracted 
workers) 6,558, and unpaid family workers such as housewives or those in 
families who work for no salary totalled 4,617.  
 
Table 1.4: Population by religious affiliation in Ambon city and the province of 
Maluku 
 
 
Muslims 
Protesta
nts 
Catholic
s 
Hindui
sm 
Buddh
ism 
Confu
cianis
m 
Others 
Not 
asked 
Ambon city 128,417 192,105 7,493 435 120 7 44 2,183 
The province 
of Maluku 
776,130 634,841 103,629 5,669 259 117 6,278 6,583 
Source: 2010 Population Census, BPS – Statistics of Maluku Province 
 
Yogyakarta 
The city of Yogyakarta is the capital city of the special region of Yogyakarta 
(Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, or DIY), which has provincial status. Thus, 
there is a distinction between the city of Yogyakarta and the special region (or 
province) of Yogyakarta. In general, when residents speak of Yogyakarta, they 
tend to mean not just the city, but the special region, which consists of four 
regencies (Sleman, Kulonprogo, Bantul, and Gunung Kidul) and the capital 
city Yogyakarta itself.  
In 1755 the Treaty of Giyanti was signed by Paku Buwono III, ruler of 
Surakarta (Solo), by Mangkubumi of Yogyakarta, and by Nicolaas Hartingh, 
the Governor of the North-East Provinces of the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC). This treaty ended a long rebellion, dating back to the 1680s, between 
the ruler of the sultanate of Mataram in Central Java and challengers to the 
                                                 
21
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=8100000000 Accessed on 
1 September 2015. 
22
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=270&wid=8100000000 Accessed on 
1 September 2015. 
23
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=270&wid=8100000000 Accessed on 
1 September 2015. 
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throne. The treaty split the sultanate of Mataram into two separate sultanates: 
the eastern half continued to be ruled by Sunan Paku Buwono III, and came to 
be known as the Sultanate (Kasultanan) of Surakarta (Solo), while the western 
half was named the Sultanate of Ngayogyakarta (popularly shortened to 
Yogyakarta, ‘Prosperous Yogya’), and was ruled by Prince Mangkubumi, who 
became the first Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengku Buwono I (Smithies 
1986: 3ff; Darban 2000:8; Soetarto 2009: 32f, 46ff; Dwiyanto 2009: 10ff). 
Later, the Dutch administration also signed a treaty with the sovereigns of 
Yogyakarta, namely Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Sri Paku Alam. Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono ruled over most of Yogyakarta, and Sri Paku Alam ruled 
over some areas of Yogyakarta called Pakualaman (Nusantara 1999: 52). 
 Under the leadership of Sultan Hamengku Buwono I, Yogyakarta (see 
map 1.3) functioned as a new sultanate, under the watch of the Dutch colonial 
administration. However, there was regular opposition to the Dutch 
administration from within the Yogyakarta sultanate. One of the most famous 
efforts to challenge the Dutch colonial presence was led by Prince Diponegoro, 
the eldest son of Sultan Hamengku Buwono III. From 1825 until 1830 Prince 
Diponegoro led a massive revolt against the Dutch in Java, known as the Java 
war (Smithies 1986: 9f). The Dutch colonial administration finally 
acknowledged (in Staatsblad 1941 no. 47 and Staatsblad 1941 no. 577) special 
status for Yogyakarta, by which the sultanate was allowed to govern its own 
region. 
The special status of Yogyakarta continued when Sultan Hamengku 
Buwono IX and Sri Paku Alam VIII decided to join with the nascent Republic 
of Indonesia after the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945. In fact, 
Yogyakarta became the temporary capital of the new Republic of Indonesia 
when the Dutch forces reoccupied Jakarta, the capital city, in January 1946, 
during the independence struggle (Smithies 1986: 10f). The Sultan’s decision 
to support the Republic was at the height of his steadfast opposition to the 
Dutch colonial presence in Yogyakarta (Soejana et al. 2008: 665; cf. Dwiyanto 
2009). His declaration of his intent to join the Republic was witnessed in a 
statement from the President of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the 
Sultan’s position, dated 19 August 1945, and in the Sultan’s own statement, 
dated 5 September 1945. The Sultanate of Yogyakarta was established as the 
Special Region of Yogyakarta, with Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as the first 
(provincial) governor and Sri Paku Alam VIII as the vice-governor. 
Yogyakarta’s status as a Special Region was legalised in Law No. 3 of 1950 
regarding the special status of Yogyakarta (Nusantara 1999: 53; Soetarto 2009: 
38f, 104ff, 167f; Dwiyanto 2009: 502f). As the Sultan’s palace is in the city of 
Yogyakarta, the city serves as both the government administrative centre as 
well as the centre of the Yogyakarta sultanate. 
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Map 1.3 Special region of Yogyakarta and the city of Yogyakarta 
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In Yogyakarta – unlike in Ambon – Muslims have always 
outnumbered Christians. As in other areas of Western Indonesia, Islam has 
spread. The Sultanate of Yogyakarta continued the Islamic heritage of the 
Sultanate of Mataram.
24
 Sultan Hamengku Buwono I, after building his palace, 
Keraton, built the Great Mosque on the west side of the palace entrance, in 
1773 (Darban 2000: 8f). A further indication of the dominance of Islam in 
Yogyakarta’s history was the formation of Muhammadiah, an Islamic social 
and education organisation that has spread throughout the country since 1912. 
Muhammadiah was founded by Ahmad Dahlan, a sultanate retainer. Ahmad 
Dahlan was concerned about the development of Islam, especially in the field 
of education. He established many schools, which – unlike the more traditional 
pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) – followed the curriculum used by public 
schools without neglecting Islamic values (Darban 2000: 19ff). As reformist 
movement, Muhammadiah aimed at purifying Islam of traditions and cultural 
practices (especially in relation to prayers), improving education and Islamic 
teachings, and challenging the activities of Christian missionaries (Darban 
2000: 31f). 
The process of Christianisation in Yogyakarta was not initiated by the 
colonial administration, as it was in Ambon, Maluku. Serious and systematic 
missionary activities in Yogyakarta and other parts of Java began only in the 
19
th
 century. In Yogyakarta, Catholicism was spread by congregations such as 
the Jesuits, Ursulines, Franciscans, and Carolus Borromeus sisters; while 
Protestantism was taught by missionary groups, including the Nederlandsch 
Zendeling-genootschap (NZG) and the Nederlandsche Gereformeerde Zen- 
dings Vereeniging (NGZV), as well as by independent Christian teachers such 
as Kyai Sadrach. These groups could engage in missionary activities only with 
permission from the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Christianity spread through 
education and health-service institutions (hospitals) in Yogyakarta, but with 
limited support from the Sultan. Christians remained a minority group among a 
large majority of Muslims (Soejana et al 2008: 639ff; 671ff).  
According to the 2010 statistics,
25
 the population of the Special Region 
of Yogyakarta was 3,457,491 people. The city of Yogyakarta itself had a 
population of 388,627 people. The most populous regency was Sleman 
(1,093,110 people), where almost all the major universities are located. 
In terms of religious affiliation, Muslims are the overwhelming 
majority in Yogyakarta. In the entire Yogyakarta region, there are 3,179,129 
Muslims (91.95%), and only 94,268 Protestants (2.73%) and 165,749 Catholics 
                                                 
24
 The Mataram sultanate in central Java was an Islamic sultanate – also called ‘the 
later Mataram’, or ‘Islamic Mataram’ – in the late 16th century. It should not be con-
fused with the (Hindu/Buddhist) Early Mataram kingdom (8
th
  to 11
th
 century) (see 
Moertono 2009).  
25
 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=337&wid=0 Accessed on 1 Septem-
ber 2015. 
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(4.79%). The remainder of the population follows Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, or other belief systems. Most Christians live in the city of 
Yogyakarta and the regency of Sleman (cf. Table 1.7).
26
 
 
Table 1.5: Population by religious affiliation and region in Yogyakarta 
 
Regency/City Muslims 
Protestan
ts 
Catholics 
Hinduis
m 
Buddhi
sm 
Confuci
anism 
Othe
rs 
Not 
asked 
Sleman 971,414 38,910 74287 2,176 1,000 62 80  
Kulonprogo 366,747 5,107 16,224 25 599 0 8  
Bantul 868,326 13,995 26,790 1,125 274 26 50  
Gunungkidul 649,209 11,938 11,954 1,171 524 3 324  
Yogyakarta 
city 
323,433 24,318 36,494 760 1,145 68 44  
Special region 
of Yogyakarta 
3,179,129 94,268 165,749 5,257 3,542 159 506 8,881 
Source: 2010 Population Census, BPS – Statistics of D.I. Yogyakarta Province 
 
According to the 2010 statistics concerning employment, the majority of 
workers in the Yogyakarta region are employees (654,370 people). Of this 
total, 168,944 work in public and personal services, 106,455 work in 
manufacturing, and the remainder are employed in education services, farming, 
trading, hotels, and restaurants. Those who are self-employed (in a variety of 
occupations, including farming, animal husbandry, manufacturing, trading, 
hotel and restaurant services, and public and personal services) total 361,381 
people. The remainder are temporary employees and casual workers (non-
contracted workers). There are a considerable number of unpaid family 
workers, such as housewives or those who work in families for no salary, 
totalling 283,772 people.
27
 
 
1.5.2 Research sample 
 
The research sample consists of 1,499 Muslim and Christian university 
students in the cities of Ambon (Maluku province) and Yogyakarta (special 
region Yogyakarta). In the following section, we will describe the background 
characteristics of our sample, namely their gender, age, university and 
department, and religious affiliation.  
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 http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=3400000000 Accessed on 
1 September 2015. 
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Gender 
We have 699 male (46.6%) and 773 female (51.6%) respondents in our sample, 
while 27 respondents (1.8%) did not fill in their gender. 
 
University/Institution and Department membership 
The 1,499 respondents are from six universities in Ambon and Yogyakarta. In 
Ambon, there are 250 students from Patimmura State University (UNPATI: 
Universitas Patimmura Ambon) (16.7%), 246 students from the Islamic State 
Institute (IAIN: Institut Agama Islam Negeri Ambon) (16.4%), and 257 
students from Maluku Christian University (UKIM: Universitas Kristen 
Indonesia Maluku Ambon) (17.1%). Of the respondents in Yogyakarta, 244 
students come from Gadjah Mada State University (UGM: Universitas Gadjah 
Mada Yogyakarta) (16.3%), 256 students from Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State 
University (UIN: Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta) 
(17.1%), and 246 students from Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW: 
Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana Yogyakarta) (16.4%). We divided the 
respondents from seven departments into the categories mentioned above. The 
first category is made up of Departments of Languages (78 respondents, 5.2%), 
Law (Sharia) (76 respondents, 5.1%), Social Science (243 respondents, 16.2%) 
and Economics (180 respondents, 12%). The second category consists of 
Departments of Exact Sciences and Engineering (514 respondents, 34.3%); and 
the third category consists of departments of Theology (Ushuludin) (333 
respondents, 22.2%) and Philosophy (75 respondents, 5.0%). 
 
Age 
Our 1,499 respondents were between 17 and 24 years old, distributed as 
follows: 17 years old – 27 (1.8%); 18 years old – 185 (12.3%); 19 years old – 
315 (21.0%); 20 years old – 410 (27.4%); 21 years old – 268 (17.9%); 22 years 
old – 134 (8.9%); 23 years old – 91 (6.1%); 24 years old – 37 (2.5%); and 32 
respondents (2.1%) did not fill in a response to the question about age. This 
means that the majority of the respondents were between the ages of 19 and 21. 
This age range is representative for university students in Indonesia. 
 
Religious affiliation  
The religious affiliation of our respondents was one of Muslim, Protestant, 
Catholic or Pentecostal. The last three categories are the most common 
Christian groups in Indonesia. The composition of the spread of religious 
affiliation of our respondents was: Muslim – 792 (52.8%); Protestant – 574 
(38.3%); Catholic – 103 (6.9%); and Pentecostal – 30 (2.0%). However, for 
further analyses we combined the Catholic, Protestant and Pentecostal students 
into one group, deemed ‘Christian’, which totalled 707 respondents (47.2%). 
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1.6. Structure of the thesis 
 
After this introduction, this dissertation is structured as follows. 
In chapter 2, we examine religious intra-group beliefs, consisting of 
images of God, images of Muhammad (for Muslims), images of Jesus (for 
Christians), models for interpreting Holy Scriptures and faith, and the concept 
of Holy Scripture (the Koran for Muslims, and the Bible for Christians). All 
intra-group beliefs will be elaborated theoretically and put to the test in our 
survey.  
In chapter 3, we examine religious inter-group beliefs that concern 
attitudes towards interaction between diverse religions. These beliefs concern 
attitudes towards religious plurality, religiocentrism, the religion-state 
relationship, and a religious vocation for solidarity and justice. We also 
describe each topic in this chapter theoretically and empirically. 
Chapter 4 contains the core of our study, dealing with religiously-
inspired generalised trust. We elaborate on the concept of (generalised) trust 
based on literature, and will propose a measurement of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust and present the empirical research. We explain and discuss 
how our Muslim and Christian respondents understand different types of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust.  
There are several analytical steps to the empirical test. Firstly, we run 
factor analyses to examine the extent to which our Muslim and Christian 
respondents recognise the concept of religiously-inspired generalised trust. 
Secondly, we conduct bivariate analyses to reveal correlations between 
independent and intermediary variables and dependent variables. In this 
analysis, we seek to understand which variables have the strongest and weakest 
correlations. Thirdly, we conduct multivariate analyses, to discover the effects 
of independent and intermediary variables on the dependent variable. In this 
analysis, we establish which group of variables has the strongest influence on 
the dependent variable; and later, we make a prediction and an interpretation.  
In the final chapter, chapter 5, we conclude this study, in four sections. 
First, we return to our research questions and give a summary of the answers. 
Second, we make a theological evaluation of the idea of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust. We continue discussing the contribution of this research to 
social practice, and end with some suggestions for further research. 
 
  
Chapter 2 
 
Religious Intra-group Beliefs 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will discuss religious intra-group beliefs, and how our 
Muslim and Christian respondents understand them. Religious intra-group 
beliefs are the crucial elements of faith within a particular tradition, and in our 
study consist of the religious convictions regarding God, Muhammad and 
Jesus, the interpretation of Holy Scripture and faith, and the understanding of 
the Koran and the Bible. We assume that religiously-inspired generalised trust 
among religious groups will be influenced by these religious convictions. The 
specific expectations we have with regard to the relations between religious 
intra-group beliefs and religiously-inspired trust will be elaborated on in the 
fourth chapter. In this second chapter we discuss the religious convictions that 
contain the core religious concepts of our Muslim and Christian research 
population. Four sets of religious intra-group beliefs are included in our 
research.  
In the first place, we include images of God. Belief in God is part of 
the core of faith in both Islam and Christianity. But faith in God can take 
different forms; God has been described in many different ways, which can all 
be seen as diverse ‘images of God’. Although Islam and Christianity are both 
Abrahamic religions with similar roots, we will check whether various images 
of God are shared by both traditions. Second, we include specific beliefs 
regarding Muhammad and Jesus. Muhammad and Jesus play central roles in 
the stories of origin of both Islam and Christianity. However, their roles are 
very different in each tradition. Consequently, images of Muhammad and Jesus 
will most probably be different among the believers of each tradition. The view 
of Jesus in Islam is particularly different to the view of Jesus in Christianity. 
Because of this, we will not construct cross-religious comparative images 
equally applicable to both religious groups, but will look at the images of 
Muhammad only among Muslim respondents, and at the images of Jesus only 
among Christian respondents. Thirdly, we include beliefs regarding the 
interpretation of Holy Scripture and faith. With regard to Holy Scripture and 
faith, we will make a theoretical distinction between literal interpretations, 
hermeneutical interpretations, historical interpretations and psychological 
interpretations, and will test to what degree this distinction holds after 
empirical analysis. Fourth, we look at the general understanding of the Holy 
Scriptures (i.e. the Koran and the Bible respectively) among Muslims and 
Christians. Because Islam and Christianity are both religions of the book, the 
general understanding of the Holy Scriptures plays a central role in their belief 
systems, specifically with regard to the truth claims of believers. We will 
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observe how the Koran and the Bible are generally viewed by our Muslim and 
Christian respondents. 
First, we shall present the theoretical background of each belief. We 
shall also compare the empirical results of the Muslim and Christian groups, 
except regarding the images of Muhammad and Jesus, which are relevant only 
to the particular religious groups. The cross-religious comparative nature of our 
research necessitates an appropriate data analysis procedure that aims to 
establish comparative measurements of the beliefs without ignoring the 
distinctiveness of each religion. 
We use a three-step procedure in scale construction in order to achieve 
commonality of beliefs between both religious groups in our research. First we 
conduct a factor analysis for both groups of respondents (Muslims and 
Christians) together.
1
 By including all respondents in the same analysis, we 
assess the common structure of the religious beliefs for both groups. The 
second step is to examine the two religious groups separately. These separate 
analyses should show whether the overall structure of the first step is valid for 
each group. The purpose of this step is to uncover any inter-group differences. 
These differences are eliminated in the third step, where we examine the 
comparative concept of religious beliefs. Since we can only compare 
commensurable beliefs, whatever is distinctive is filtered out. Only after this 
last step has been completed can we speak of a comparative model of religious 
beliefs. In the discussion of the empirical results, we shall report only the 
results of the third-step factor analysis, although in our reflection we will also 
account for the differences filtered out in the second step (cf. Hermans & 
Sterkens 2014).  
2.1 Images of God 
For Muslims and Christians, God is the source and foundation of their faith. 
Muslims believe that Muhammad was the last prophet, who brought an 
important message to all mankind: there is only one God, and this God is Allah 
(Tawhid). In Islam, the salvation and very existence of humanity is dependent 
on the fact that Allah is the only God. In Christianity, Jesus' presence is a 
tangible manifestation of the God who loves mankind. Jesus is understood to 
be God incarnate. Christians believe that God saved mankind from sins 
through the death and resurrection of Jesus.  
In Nijmegen, there is a long tradition of researching images of God. 
There have been ample empirical theological studies conducted in Europe and 
elsewhere that have used measurements of ‘images of God’ and examined their 
prevalence in particular populations. It has also been tested whether these 
                                                 
1
 The criteria used in the Principal Axis Factoring (varimax) are: eigenvalue >1; com-
monality >.20; factor loadings >.30; and if items load high on two factors, the differ-
ence in factor loadings should be >.15 
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images of God influence specific attitudes or interpretations of human 
experiences; such as the issue of spiritual care, religious participation and other 
religious beliefs, ethnocentrism, and human rights (Van der Ven et al. 2004; 
Smeets 2006; Zaccaria 2010; Capucao 2010). In these studies, the images of 
God were theoretically distinguished between and tested empirically. A study 
that has close affinity with our research was conducted by Capucao (2010) on 
ethnocentrism among Catholic parishioners in the Netherlands. In his research, 
Capucao showed that the different images of God related in different ways to 
ethnocentric attitudes. Ethnocentrism is an attitude of exclusiveness, i.e. the 
combination of positive attitudes towards the (ethnic) in-group and negative 
attitudes towards the out-group. The idea of generalised trust relates to 
ethnocentrism in a certain way. While ethnocentrism is the negative outcome 
of religious identification (normatively speaking), generalised trust can be the 
positive outcome of it. Through generalised trust, the boundaries between in-
group and out-group can be reduced (Uslaner 2002; cf. Seligman 1997). If 
there is a relationship between images of God and ethnocentrism among 
believers, we may presume that there is also a relationship between images of 
God and generalised trust. 
We follow the main structure and terminology of the categorisation of 
images of God as used by Capucao (2010). This categorisation is based on a 
Christian frame of reference. However, this frame is only used as the context of 
discovery, and not as the context of justification; the typology of images of 
God is based on abstract logical distinctions, and the items are formulated in an 
abstract way, without cultural semantics. Therefore, in our opinion we can use 
this categorisation for our Muslim respondents in Indonesia as well. 
We shall begin this discussion with the theoretical perspective of the 
images of God (section 2.1.1), followed by a presentation of the results of our 
empirical findings on images of God among Muslims and Christians in 
Indonesia (section 2.1.2). 
 
2.1.1 Theory 
 
In the context of modern society, the discourse concerning God swings through 
a bipolar spectrum, of transcendence and immanence. According to Van der 
Ven, “religious phenomena, like the images of God, can only be adequately 
understood if they are analysed from the point of view of the various ways in 
which this dialectic between transcendence and immanence is manifested” 
(Van der Ven 1998: 156). In the following section, we will describe the four 
perspectives of images of God: iconic and aniconic God images, 
anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic God images, immanent-
transcendent and transcendent-immanent God images, and God-human reality 
relations within panentheism. 
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2.1.1.1 Iconic and aniconic God images 
Iconic and aniconic God images represent the bases of two types of faith; two 
ways in which people approach and develop their faith in God. The ‘bipolarity’ 
of iconic and aniconic images refers to the problem that our beliefs concerning 
God can only be expressed in non-material images (Zaccaria 2010: 80f). 
According to this understanding, an iconic God image is the faith in which 
religious believers use an image or an icon in order to talk about and reach out 
to God. Referring to Aquinas, Zaccaria (2010: 81) explains that we cannot 
identify God through our limited language, because God is totally different 
from humans. We have a non-comprehensive knowledge of God. Within this 
limitation, we can only talk about God in analogical terms (cf. Rocca 2004: 
40,132). Our statements regarding God are limited to the scope of human 
understanding. This awareness of our limitations and of the differences 
between humans and God can be found in both Islam and Christianity (Häring 
2001: 4). In several passages in the Bible, for example in Gen 1 and 2; Ex 6:2-
3; Deut 10:17-18; Ps 136:2-3; 1Jn 4, 9; and Jn 3:16, we find images of God as 
a creator, a judge, a God who loves humanity, etc. But in Isaiah (55:8), it is 
clearly stated that God’s will is different from the will of humanity. In Islam, 
we also find iconic images of God; such as God’s face, God’s hands and eyes, 
God who is sitting on the Throne, God who has feelings, the Wise, the Exalted 
in power (Sura 2:153; 3:18; 20:5; 33:43; 38:75; 55:17; 54:14). Here, God’s 
creatures perceive Him in similar images. Islamic theology understands this 
particular image-group of God as tashbih (affirming similarity) (Murata & 
Chittick 1995: 70f; cf. Abrahamov 1996: 2ff). Using the name Allah for God as 
the Divine Oneness in the Islamic confession (shahada) is strongly iconic in 
Islam. In the shahada, people who want to proclaim themselves as Muslims 
acknowledge that ‘there is no god but God’ (la ilaha illa’llah) (Murata & 
Chittick 1995: 10; cf. Sura 3:18,132; 5:92). 
Another type of faith is aniconic.
2
 This refers to the idea that believers 
cannot use icons or images to approach God. The problem of icons or images is 
that they restrict God; but God is an ‘ungraspable reality’, impersonal, remote, 
and not a ‘being’ (Capucao 2010: 34). Aniconic faith can be traced through the 
line of negative theology that questioned how the divine predicates are 
signified in the discipline of theology. Several writers and philosophers, such 
as Clement of Alexandria, Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Albinus, and many 
Gnostics, deny various attributes of God and stress that God transcends all 
definition and delimitation (Rocca 2004: 4ff; Van den Hoek 2009: 38ff). In 
aniconic faith, belief systems operate at a meta-level in relation to God images, 
which is referred to as ‘metatheism’. In this sense, aniconic faith claims that 
God is simply incomprehensible and incomparable. God is “something higher 
                                                 
2
 Van der Ven (1998: 157) mentions that “the prefix ‘an’ functions as what is known as 
an ‘alpha privans’, and goes beyond any image of God whatsoever.” 
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than we can figure out”, and beyond whatever humans can imagine (Tracy 
2002; Rocca 2004; cf. Ps 10:1, 145:3; Job 5:9; Is 40:28; Eccl 7:24).  
In Islamic theology, the perception of an aniconic God is called Tanzih 
(‘declaring incomparability’) (Sura 42:11; 37:173). Murata and Chittick (1995: 
70f) state, “Tanzih means literally ‘to declare something pure and free of 
something else’.” In this sense, God cannot be described by any perception, 
essentially because God is bigger and deeper than anything we (as creatures) 
can imagine. Van der Ven (1998) and Capucao (2010) note a misunderstanding 
that often occurs: metatheism is not a denial of theism, or a new form of 
atheism; rather, it is a religious conviction of the Ultimate Reality. It is 
interesting that the results of Capucao’s research (2010: 45) show that Dutch 
Catholics can recognise metatheism as a concept of God. They accept this 
concept quite easily.
3
 This result is confirmed by a survey conducted in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and South Africa, which shows more 
agreement with the idea of an ‘indefinable’ God (Ziebertz 2001: 340; Pieterse 
2001: 386f; Capucao 2010: 35f). However, I agree with Zaccaria (2010: 80) 
that the aniconic faith cannot be classified as a traditional God image, because 
traditionally the transcendent God – in both the Bible and the Koran – is 
recognised in more iconic, more specifically personal terms than aniconic (cf. 
Walbridge 2011: 65).  
 
2.1.1.2 Anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic God images 
Images can be either anthropomorphic or non-anthropomorphic (Capucao 
2010: 36ff). An anthropomorphic image portrays God as a transcendent figure 
who has feelings and emotions concerning humanity and nature. He/She acts 
and reacts like a human being. God has messages, plans, and compassion. 
He/She can be angry, or punish people who do not obey Him/Her. God is able 
to communicate, directly or indirectly, with humans. In anthropomorphic 
images, God is referred to using human predicates, such as ‘creator’, ‘father’, 
‘mother’, ‘ancestor’, ‘judge’, ‘king’; or is attributed human characteristics, 
such as ‘lovable’, ‘understanding’, ‘wise’, or ‘powerful’. Thus, in an 
anthropomorphic image, God is identified as a ‘person’, or has human-like 
characteristics. The ‘human’ God mirrors the relationship between God and 
human beings (Häring 2001). From a Christian perspective, there is a process 
of humanisation of the divine, particularly through the presence of Jesus as the 
‘human’ God. According to Häring (2001: 18ff), the features of the existence 
of a ‘human’ God are that God corresponds to human thinking, critically 
reflecting human experiences and hopes. God is recognised by the nature of 
humankind.  
                                                 
3
 The mean score for ‘metatheism’ is 3.9 (on a the 5-point Likert scale from total dis-
agreement (1) to full agreement (5), and the standard deviation is .98. Population, n= 
425 (Capucao 2010: 45). 
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Anthropomorphic images are common, because they help people to 
construct their relations with God. Human limitations to reaching God do not 
prevent us from maintaining this kind of image (cf. Zaccaria 2010: 82). Rahner 
(1999) agrees that basically, God is a mystery, and ungraspable; however, our 
inability to know God lies in the expression of freedom and personhood of 
God. In other words, according to Rahner, God is personal within His/Her holy 
mystery (Van Woezik 2010: 358, 368). Many examples can be found in the 
Bible that represent God as an individual personality; or, as Van der Ven 
(1998: 159) states, the idea of God as a “self-consciousness or a self-
determining I”. In this kind of image, God has a close relationship with humans 
and nature (Hos 11:9; Ez 20:33; Is 52:79).  
In the Bible, the anthropomorphic God intervenes in human affairs. 
For example, in the story of Exodus, God called Moses and ordered him to lead 
the Jews out of Egypt to Canaan; and later, God sends Jesus to earth to save 
humanity (Ex 2:23-25; Ex 14ff.; Jn 3:16). In the book of Genesis, in order to 
communicate directly with humans, God reveals Himself in the form of man 
(Gen 18:1-4; 32:24, 29-30). However, God’s presence may also take the form 
of a divine order for human beings to be responsible for their lives, for others 
and for the earth (Gen 1:26-30). In general, the examples of God in the Bible 
are of a God who is fully individuated (Garr 2003: 213; cf. Spencer 1998: 24).  
In the history of Christianity, the idea of a personal God persists. The 
Council of Nicea (325 CE) and the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) agreed that 
Jesus is both divine and human, representing God in human form. This 
decision has been and remains influential in Church doctrine.  
In the Koran, Allah, who is the Absolute One, has 90 anthropomorphic 
attributes, showing that the existence of God is related to human nature 
(Armstrong 1993: 153,167,175; Yaran 2003: 195f). We mentioned previously 
that tashbih (affirming similarity) is an important theological perception of 
God in Islamic theology. This indicates that the anthropomorphic approach as a 
form of tasbih in the depiction of God is sufficiently strong (Abrahamov 
1996). God is presented as having a similar nature to His creatures, for instance 
in the mention of God’s face, God’s hands, God’s eyes, God who is sitting on 
the Throne, God who has feelings, and God’s wisdom (Sura 2:153; 3:18; 20:5; 
33:43; 38:75; 55:17; 54:14). Those who emphasise anthropomorphic 
expressions conceive of the existence of God in the form of a body 
(Abrahamov 1996: 3). The relationship between God and humans is also 
strongly anthropomorphic: God loves His people, God helps and supports 
humans, and God is with humans (Sura 33:43; 12:100; 57:4; 33:8). 
Non-anthropomorphic images do not identify God as personal or as a 
‘person’, but express God in non-personal terms. Some scholars use the non-
anthropomorphic image when they refer to God as the ‘divine more’ or the 
‘something beyond the self’ or the ‘mysterium tremendum et fascinans’ (see 
Capucao 2010: 37). Christian mysticism is related to this image of God; it 
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recognises God as an iconic figure, but one shrouded in mystery and with 
hidden secrets. Hence, it prefers to speak of the ‘Unknowable God’, or the 
‘Ultimate Mystery’ (McColman 2010: 25).4 Van der Ven (1998: 159) and 
Capucao (2010: 38) show in their research that the non-anthropomorphic 
image is well accepted by different generations in the Netherlands, even more 
so than anthropomorphic images. A survey among students in South Africa 
shows the same tendency (Pieterse 2001: 386f).  
Islamic theology that emphasises non-anthropomorphic images can be 
seen in the Mutazilites school of thought and in the writings of its theologians, 
including al-Qasim (Watt 1973: 290ff; Abrahamov 1996: 7ff). Basically, they 
dispute tasbih (affirming similarity) and emphasise tanzih (declaring 
incomparability), in which God is imagined from a distance. Tanzih departs 
from the idea that God is one and absolute, and therefore cannot be reduced to 
anything (Murata & Chittick 1995: 71; cf. Abrahamov 1996: 8; Sura 42:11: 
112:4). Consequently, God can only be understood by himself, not by 
knowledge, power and life as imagined by humans. For example, the Koran 
states that God is in Heaven or on earth (Sura 6:3; 43:84), or refers to God’s 
kingship and throne (Sura 9:129; 23:116). If these verses were interpreted 
literally, then God would be limited to a human body located in a certain place. 
We need to frame God beyond limitations, through the presence and power of 
God as the ultimate (Abrahamov 1996: 9ff, 36ff; cf. Watt 1973: 209ff).  
 
2.1.1.3 Immanent-transcendent and transcendent-immanent God images 
According to Capucao (2010: 38ff), there are two poles that can be 
distinguished with regard to God images: immanent-transcendence and 
transcendent-immanence. Placed along a spectrum, three God images reflect 
the dynamics between these two poles: theism/deism, pantheism and 
panentheism.  
Theism and deism represent the absolute transcendent God. God is 
totally distinguished from humans and the world; God is not affected by 
anything. Capucao (2010: 39) states that in traditional theism, God is called a 
free agent. He is able to do everything. He knows everything, and is further 
depicted as perfectly good, eternal, immutable, etc. While theism is 
anthropomorphic in nature, deism departs from a non-anthropomorphic 
perspective.  
Pantheism is the opposite of theism. In pantheism, God is identified 
only in relation to the world. Consequently, God is absolutely immanent.  
Panentheism is different from both theism and deism, which stress 
absolute transcendence, and pantheism, which focuses on absolute immanence. 
Panentheism claims that God is both immanent and transcendent in a God-
world relation. Moreover, Capucao (2010: 30) states: “God and world neither 
                                                 
4
 In the next level, Christian mysticism understands that through the presence of Jesus, 
the Ultimate Mystery can be known as a person (McColman 2010: 48). 
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exhaust nor contain each other in their own being, and hence transcend one 
another despite their mutual immanence.” God has a very close relationship 
with humans and nature, and at the same time, God is different. In this sense, 
the traditional God image is closer to panentheism than theism/deism or 
pantheism (cf. Zaccaria 2010). In both the Bible and the Koran, God is 
portrayed as a supreme being, but is also described as being close to humanity 
and not unreachably distant.  
In summary, immanence and transcendence refer to the nature of the 
relationship between God and the world. The extreme end on one side is 
absolutism in the transcendent God (theism). In transcendent immanence, the 
relationship between God and the world is seen from the world’s perspective. 
In immanent transcendence, the middle of these two polar extremes is the third 
possibility: the balance between transcendence and immanence, i.e., 
panentheism. At the other end of the spectrum we find pantheism, in which 
there is no separation between God and the world. 
 
2.1.1.4 God and human reality in panentheism 
In this section we will discuss panentheism, i.e. the relationship between God 
and human reality. There are three kinds of relationships, namely individual, 
social, and cosmic relations (Van der Ven 1998: 161).  
 
Individual relations 
God relates to each human being at an individual level. This means that God 
has a specific relationship with each individual in an exclusive and personal 
manner. For Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, this kind of relationship is 
familiar. They are accustomed to expressions which express an intimate 
relationship, such as ‘God never abandons me’ or ‘God knows and understands 
me’ (cf. Capucao 2010: 40). If we follow what Häring (2010: 18) states about 
the existence of a ‘human’ God and the relation between God and humans, 
God is identified through individual thought, experience, and hopes. In many 
Indonesian Christian denominations, the influence of piety, in which the 
existence of God and salvation are seen as personal and strictly individual 
matters, is dominant (cf. Singgih 2000; Karyono 2003; Van Kooij & Tsalatsa 
2007). Jesus’ life as a representation of God’s revelation and salvation is also 
often interpreted at an individual level. In Christian preaching and Islamic 
proclamation, as well as in missionary (c.q. dakwah) activities, God is 
introduced as a saviour for (only) individuals. The consequence is that 
believers are mainly concerned about their personal salvation provided by God, 
with whom they have an individual relationship. Needless to say, this 
perspective often lacks a social dimension (cf. Mujiburrahman 2006). 
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Social relations 
God can also build relationships at a supra-individual level. Häring (2010: 18f) 
states that the relationship between God and human beings not only relates to 
individual experiences, but also to “our critically reflected experience of and 
with humanity”. ‘Humanity’ here refers to the unity of people in a social entity. 
Theological reflections that emphasise the social dimensions of God images 
are found in political theology (Moltmann 1967; 2000; Metz 1969) and 
liberation theology (Gutierrez 1974; Sobrino 1993; Boff 2000). These forms of 
theology are grounded in the principle that a social dimension is essential in 
human reality. The conditions of society, where people live together, represent 
the foundation for the formulation of the message and demonstration of the 
existence of God. Van Woezik (2010: 415ff) proposes the concept of ‘God as 
We’ – which does not imply that ‘we are God’. Human beings are not solitary 
individuals, but interact with each another in their work and daily life. Social 
concerns, friendships, and intimate relations are essential in our lives, and it is 
in these social relations that God’s presence can be identified. Van Woezik 
(2010: 49), rephrasing Rahner, states the “God is the ground of earthly we-
hood and the ideal of We-hood”. Based on such a social perspective, Christian 
contextual theologians in Indonesia (e.g. Singgih 1999; Banawiratma 2009) 
have developed the awareness that God can actually be found through social 
concerns. This also includes the concerns regarding the problems of poverty 
and interreligious relationships that are urgent and relevant in Indonesia 
(Mujiburrahman 2006; Banawiratma 2009). 
 
Cosmic relations 
Finally, the perspective of cosmic relations is also relevant when speaking 
about God. In literature, different labels are used for forms of theology that 
stress the relationship between God concepts on the one hand, and the cosmos 
or nature on the other: eco-theology, green faith, theology of nature, etc. 
(Bergmann 2005; Gottlieb 2006; Deane-Drummond 2008). Deane-Drummond 
(2008: xii, 81) posits that eco-theology is based on a critique of Christian 
theology that focused only on human beings. Not only has theology often 
ignored environmental issues, but there is also a tendency to position humans 
above nature. In eco-theology, there are efforts to develop a balance in 
religious concerns with regard to humanity and cosmic relations. When God 
created the world, He/She wanted to foster a good relationship with man and 
nature, both of which are God’s creations. Humanity cannot operate on the 
view that the nature belongs to humans (cf. Singgih 1997). Burnside (2001: 
151) describes this situation by saying that “humanity is celebrated but also 
subsumed within the whole of creation (e.g. Psalm 104; Job 38-39).” In other 
words, nature is seen by God as a part of creation of equal importance to 
human beings. The relationship between humans and nature should not be one 
of domination. God can be revealed not only through humans, but also through 
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nature (Deane-Drummond 2008: 135). As Gottlieb (2006: 243) concludes: 
“Who honours God’s creation, feels and responds to the sacredness of the 
earth, and tries to love all of our neighbours as ourselves.” Eco-theology 
invites people to experience the presence of God in the beauty and/or perfect 
order of nature. Consequently, people are responsible for caring for nature, 
which is a creation of God.  
 
2.1.2 Results 
 
The operationalisation by Capucao (2010, adapted from Van der Ven 1998)
5
, 
will be the frame of reference to distinguish the variation in God’s images. The 
main distinction is between iconic and aniconic. The iconic consists of two 
categories, namely anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic images. The 
iconic-anthropomorphic images consist of four specific images, namely theism, 
individual panentheism, social panentheism, and nature panentheism. The 
iconic non-anthropomorphic images consist of two images, namely deism and 
pantheism. The aniconic (non-anthropomorphic) images are expressed in 
metatheism. Altogether, this results in seven images of God. We used the 14-
item list of statements relating to the images of God – two items for each image 
– based on Capucao (2010: 44, 255f), and made some minor modifications to 
some words and sentences. In the questionnaire, we divided the questions into 
two groups. The first group consists of (iconic) anthropomorphic God images, 
and the second group consists of (iconic and aniconic) non-anthropomorphic 
God images. We will briefly describe the main characteristics (indicators) of 
each image. 
The first group refers to the (iconic) anthropomorphic images: theism, 
individual panentheism, social panentheism and cosmic panentheism (see 
Table 2.1). (1) In theism, God is seen as the creator of the world, and is 
distinguished from His creations, i.e., human beings and nature. God created 
the world and then He gave humans the responsibility of taking care of the 
world. (2) In individual panentheism, the relationship between God and 
individuals is very close. God is experienced through individual experiences, 
as expressed in statements such as ‘God understands me’ or ‘God never left 
me’. (3) In social panentheism, the friendship between God and humans is 
emphasised. Here, God is seen as the transcendent One who has a close 
relationship with the world, especially with humans as a social group. The 
factor of immanence can be seen when God’s presence and love is recognised 
in human friendship. (4) In cosmic panentheism, the relationship between God 
                                                 
5
 The theoretical construction here is also adapted from the Social and Cultural Devel-
opments in the Netherlands (SOCON) research programme in 1995, and its critique by 
the Nijmegen Institute of Studies in Empirical Theology (NISET) later. Some modifi-
cations were made in an effort to express the dialectics between transcendence and 
immanence (Van der Ven 1998: 156f; Capucao 2010: 33).  
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and the cosmos is emphasised. The presence of God can be experienced 
through the beauty or the peace of nature.  
The second group consists of non-anthropomorphic (iconic and 
aniconic) images of God. The iconic non-anthropomorphic images are deism 
and pantheism, while aniconic non-anthropomorphic images are metatheism 
(see Table 2.1). (5) Deism is belief in an absolute, transcendent God. Just as in 
theism, God as the creator of the world is distinguished from His creations, 
both human and cosmic. God is transcendent and powerful over His creations. 
However, there is a distinction between deism and theism. In theism, God is 
‘Something Higher’, in the sense of being unknowable, and an unsolvable 
mystery. Anthropomorphic terms are seen as too limiting to refer to the rich 
meaning of God. God is, in other words, ‘Something Higher’: a transcendent 
creator of the world. (6) Pantheism is also about ‘Something Higher’, but in an 
immanent way. The indicator here is the unity or the Oneness of the 
‘Something Higher’ and the world. (7) Finally, in metatheism, God is 
incomprehensible and unsearchable. Humans can only know that there is 
‘Something Higher’, but cannot name it. Thus, the indicator is ignorance of the 
‘Something Higher’. The following scheme shows our operationalisation of the 
theoretical construction.  
 
Table 2.1: Operationalisation of images of God  
 
Theoretical models Items 
 Iconic anthropomorphic 
Theism 1a. God set the world in motion and left it to humans to take care of it 
 7a. God got the world going and left the responsibility for it to humans 
Individual panentheism 2a. I trust God never to abandon me 
 6a. God knows and understands me 
Social panentheism 3a. When people are friends that is God’s love at work 
 5a. When people live in friendship, God’s love is present 
Cosmic panentheism 4a. I experience God’s goodness in the peace of nature 
 8a. I experience God’s presence in the beauty of nature 
 Iconic non-anthropomorphic 
Deism 1b. There is Something higher, through which the world originated 
 3b. There is Something higher, through which the cosmos and nature came into 
being 
Pantheism 4b. There is Something higher, with which people and the world form a perfect 
unity 
 6b. There is Something higher that ties people and the world together in perfect 
oneness 
 Aniconic non-anthropomorphic 
Metatheism 2b. There is Something higher, which we cannot name at all 
 5b. There is Something higher that we cannot even imagine 
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The research questions are: Does the empirical data corroborate with the 
theoretical conceptualisations about the images of God? We answered these 
questions through a factor analysis
6
 and examination of the responses.  
First, we conducted a factor analysis for all respondents (both Muslim 
and Christian) together. In this analysis, we assumed that their frame of 
reference with regard to images of God has the same structure, and the result 
was three factors. Next, all 14 items referring to the images of God were 
subjected to factor analysis for Muslims and Christians separately (mineigen = 
1; free factor solution). We found three factors among our Muslim 
respondents: factor one (items 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b), factor two (items 5a, 3a, 
4a), and factor three (items 1a, 7a, 2a, 8a, and 6a). However our Christian 
respondents responded differently. There were only two factors with mixed 
items: factor one (items 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b) and factor two (1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 
5a, 6a, 7a, 8a). Since we want to make a cross-religious comparison, we 
required a series of analyses to substantiate the construction of a comparative 
category common to the two religious traditions. Thus, in the third step we ran 
the factor analysis again with a two-forced factor solution; and we found the 
same constructions for Muslim and Christian respondents in a two-factor 
solution. One factor contains iconic anthropomorphic images (items 1a, 2a, 3a, 
4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a), while the second factor contains iconic non-
anthropomorphic and aniconic non-anthropomorphic God images (items 1b, 
2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b).  
 
  
                                                 
6
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
RELIGIOUS INTRA-GROUP BELIEFS 
 
53 
Table 2.2: Factor analysis (Paf, Varimax rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of images of God among Muslim and Christian 
students. 
 
Items Theory 
Dimension 
h2 
F1 F2 
6b. There is Something higher that ties people and 
the world together in perfect oneness 
Pantheism .89  .78 
3b. There is Something higher, through which the 
cosmos and nature came into being 
Deism .88  .78 
4b. There is Something higher, with which people 
and the world form a perfect unity 
Pantheism .86  .74 
1b. There is Something higher, through which the 
world originated 
Deism .83  .69 
5b. There is Something higher that we cannot even 
imagine 
Metheism .82  .68 
2b. There is Something higher, which we cannot 
name at all 
Metheism .65  .43 
3a. When people are friends that is God’s love at 
work 
Social panentheism  .73 .54 
5a. When people live in friendship, God’s love is 
present 
Social panentheism  .70 .48 
4a. I experience God’s goodness in the peace of 
nature 
Cosmic panentheism  .67 .45 
2a. I trust God never to abandon me Individual panentheism  .64 .41 
8a. I experience God’s presence in the beauty of 
nature 
Cosmic panentheism  .63 .40 
6a. God knows and understands me Individual panentheism  .62 .39 
7a. God got the world going and left the 
responsibility for it to humans 
Theism  .58 .33 
1a. God set the world in motion and left it to humans 
to take care of it 
Theism  .51 .26 
Cronbach’s Alpha .93 .84  
Number of valid cases 1459 1453  
Total variance explained 52.6%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = non-anthropomorphic God; F2 = anthropomorphic God 
 
This result can be understood as follows: first, our Muslim and Christian 
respondents in Indonesia only recognise the distinction between iconic 
anthropomorphic and the combination of iconic and aniconic non-
anthropomorphic images. How can this result be understood? We think that the 
iconic anthropomorphic images of God are very common in their religious 
traditions. God is attributed human characteristics. The iconic and aniconic 
non-anthropomorphic images are totally different. Second, Muslims and 
Christians in Indonesia do not recognise the difference between theism and 
panentheism, because the figure of God as a personal deity is more important. 
The personal God can be transcendent, but also immanent. Third, our Muslim 
and Christian respondents cannot recognise the differences between deism, 
pantheism and metatheism. All those images are about a non-anthropomorphic 
God, which is very different from the anthropomorphic/personal God. Thus, 
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this result produces two comparative scales of images of God for Muslims and 
Christians. The first scale was labelled ‘anthropomorphic God’ (items 1a-8a), 
while the second scale was labelled ‘non-anthropomorphic God’ (items 1b-6b). 
The total variance explained for both groups is 52.6%.  
 
The table below provides a summary of the levels of agreement, based on 
empirical investigation, with the images of God for Muslims and Christians.  
 
Table 2.3: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
images of God for Muslim and Christian students 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Anthropomorphic God     
Muslims 786 4.22 .54 -10.91** 
Christians 707 4.52 .48 -10.91** 
Non-anthropomorphic God     
Muslims 776 3.07 1.24 1.57 
Christians 699 2.97 1.19 1.57 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
In Table 2.3, we can see that both Muslims (m 4.22; sd .54) and Christians (m 
4.52; sd .48) accept the anthropomorphic images of God. The mean score of 
Christian respondents is higher than that of Muslims. The t-test displays a 
significant difference between Muslims and Christians regarding the 
anthropomorphic image of God (t -10.91, df 1491, p .00). We presume that the 
presence of Jesus – understood traditionally in Christianity as the incarnated 
God – strengthens the anthropomorphic images of God. For Christians, this 
image refers not only to God, but to how people experience the presence of 
God through the person who is really the image of God (2 Cor 4:4; Häring 
2001: 6ff).  
We also found that both Muslims (m 3.07; sd 1.24) and Christians (m 
2.97; sd 1.19) have ambivalent feelings towards the non-anthropomorphic 
images of God with high standard deviation. The t-test indicates that there is no 
significant difference between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia regarding 
this image (t 1.57, df 1473, p .12). The non-anthropomorphic image is not 
completely rejected. The high level of standard deviation shows that there is a 
considerable variance within our Muslim and Christian respondents between 
those who reject the non-anthropomorphic God image and those who accept it. 
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2.2 Images of Muhammad
7
 
 
Muslims view Muhammad not only as the founder of Islam, but also as the last 
prophet who conveyed to humanity the complete and final message from God. 
In the shahada (Islamic confession), believers who proclaim themselves 
Muslims acknowledge that there is no god but God, and that Muhammad is 
God’s messenger. The existence of Islam reflects the belief in Muhammad and 
the messages and instructions that he conveyed. In the Koran, Muhammad has 
several predicates (Sura 16:44; 7:157; 23:611; 3:132). He is the prime 
commentator on the Koran as the word of God, the legislator for the Muslim 
community, the prime example of a God-conscious human being, and the 
executor of God’s laws (Cornell 1997: 72). Islamic theology reminds us that 
the position of Muhammad in Islam is different from the position of Jesus in 
the Christian tradition. Muslims profess that Muhammad’s position and his 
prophethood is of extreme importance; he is the greatest and the last of the 
prophets of the Abrahamic religions (Sura 33:40; 68:4; 41:5; 6:50; 21:107). 
Muhammad is a man of God, but he never declared God to be an essential part 
of himself or any other human.  
We shall now explore the images of Muhammad from a theoretical and 
empirical perspective. What are the images of Muhammad found in the 
tradition? And to what extent do our respondents comply with these images? In 
other words, to what extent are the views of our Muslim respondents of 
Muhammad related to traditional thought? First, we will present images of 
Muhammad based on a study of Islamic theological literature (2.2.1). Second, 
we will examine the presence of these images in our research population 
(2.2.2).  
 
2.2.1 Theory 
 
In this section we will discuss images of Muhammad from a theoretical 
perspective. Our distinction between different images of Muhammad is mostly 
based on the literature inquiry, which included the Koran, the Hadith and the 
Sunnah (sayings, traditions and lifestyle of Muhammad),
8
 and the Sīra (history 
of life and deeds of Muhammad derived from the Hadith). Based on these 
sources, we have distinguished seven images of Muhammad. The first three – 
Muhammad as a prophet; his unique closeness to God; and his perfection – 
                                                 
7
 The author would like to thank Prof. Dr. Muhammad Machasin, Dr. Djaka Soetapa 
and Prof. Dr. Abdulkader Tayob for their advice on this section. Needless to say, any 
mistakes or misinterpretations are the sole responsibility of the author. 
8
 These two words are closely connected, both recording the sayings and actions of 
Muhammad. The Sunnah is more specific about what Muhammad said or did, whereas 
the Hadith is more general, referring also to what his wives and friends said about 
Muhammad (Siddīqī 1961: 2; al-Thāinī 2002: 65).  
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represent the images of an ontological Muhammad. The second class of images 
presents Muhammad as a figure who must be contemplated upon and imitated, 
rather than focusing only on his identity. Models that belong to this category 
are Muhammad as a model of spiritual development; Muhammad as a model 
for a good life; and Muhammad as a model of gratefulness towards God. The 
last image is humanistic, representing a secular view of Muhammad.  
 
2.2.1.1 Muhammad as a prophet 
The image of Muhammad as a prophet encompasses two ideas that need 
further elaboration: the ‘seal of the prophets’, and the concept of the revelation 
of God’s message. The first concept relates to the idea that Muhammad was 
sent by God, and is seen as His most important messenger. The second concept 
refers to the fact that Muhammad received God’s revelation directly in words, 
as proven by the existence of the Koran. We will briefly reflect on these central 
ideas relating to the image of 'Muhammad as a prophet'.  
Muhammad is called the ‘seal of the prophets’, or the ‘last prophet’ 
(khatam al-anbiya). He is seen as the final and most important prophet, who 
received God’s messages for all men, that they might develop a new society 
based on Islamic law, namely the umma (community) of Islam (Sura 33:40; cf. 
Murata & Chittick 1995: 134; Lammens 2000a: 206; Khan 2002: 14). 
Muhammad has an important task; he is the chosen one (Al-Mustafa), called to 
bring God's message to humanity and to proclaim a true religion and a true 
faith (Sura 5:5). The concept of a true religion and faith brought by 
Muhammad is rooted in an understanding that humans have been entrusted by 
God to live according to God’s will and instruction. Islam acknowledges that 
other prophets of other (Abrahamic) religions before Muhammad had already 
taught the truth through the Torah and the Gospels. The truth embedded in 
these traditions is, in the Islamic perspective, understood as a faith in only one 
God (tawhid). However, most human beings are still ignorant about the truth 
(Sura 33:72; 5:68). Thus, Muhammad did not bring a totally new message to 
the Arabs and all other people throughout the world. He confirmed and 
renewed the message conveyed by previous prophets of Judaism and 
Christianity (Sura 3:67). He came after Jesus, but his message was still in line 
with Jesus’ message (Sura 61:6). In Islamic tradition, it is believed that Jesus 
announced the coming of Muhammad as the final prophet, but Christians have 
ignored this important fact (Khan 1986: 15f). Jews and Christians are called 
‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitab). They are considered to be equal with 
Muslims; however, they misinterpreted God’s message, especially about faith 
in the one God (Blankinship 2008: 33; cf. Azzam 1993: 33f, 40f; Murata & 
Chittick 1995: 139; Buaben 1996: 74, 243f; Warraq 2000: 151f). For that 
reason, God had to complete and reveal his message through Muhammad, to 
bring them to complete obedience and submission to God. Muhammad is seen 
as the (supreme and last) prophet who brought God's message of 
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uncompromising monotheism, of absolute surrender to the One God who is 
creator, sustainers and judge. Muhammad is God’s major representative, and 
obeying the message of Muhammad is therefore equivalent to obeying God’s 
will (Rahman 1966: 17; Schimmel 1985: 25, 167f; Ernst 2003: 80; cf. Lamens 
2000b: 179).  
Although Muhammad is a prophet like other prophets,
9
 he does not 
occupy the same position. He is seen as the most important prophet; he 
received God’s revelation in word and proclaimed God’s message, mainly 
based on two fundamentals: faith (iman) of belief in the unity of God, and the 
‘right-doing’ (ihsan) of mercy and brotherhood (Sura 48:29; 15:88-89; 17:82; 
49:13; 89:17-26; Azzam 1993: 33 ff). In other words, people can recognise the 
word of God through Muhammad’s life, in which the right path was delivered 
and demonstrated (Khan 1986: 59, 78). This kind of image relates to God’s 
revelation of the Koran to Muhammad. The Koran, as Haleem (2008: 19) 
states, is the starting-point of Islamic theology. Because God revealed the 
Koran directly to Muhammad, it is traditionally seen as a miracle (Schimmel 
1985: 67; Khan 1986: 177; Armstrong 1991: 50; Renan 2000: 133). 
Muhammad received the first revelation from God in 610 CE (Sura 96:1-6). 
The Koran's testimony that Muhammad was illiterate (ummi) himself (i.e. Sura 
7:157) is usually interpreted as proof of Muhammad's direct reception of the 
revelation from God. The religious truth in the Koran comes directly from 
God, and not from Muhammad's mind. He received messages either directly 
from God or through the angel Gabriel – for twenty-three years, in clear Arabic 
(Sura 12:2) – recited them to people around him in prayer and worship, and 
taught them to his followers (Gibb 1978: 3, 70; Nasr 1995: 25; Khan 2002: 
16f; Ernst 2003: 74; Haleem 2008: 19, 21; Hadith of Al-Bukhari vol. 1, book 1, 
number 3).
10
 Muhammad’s adherents, the inner circle, then memorised and 
collected the verses of the messages, and finally wrote them down and 
collected them in what is known as the Koran.  
In the hadith of Al-Bukhari (narrated by ’Aisha) there was a 
conversation between one believer and Muhammad discussing the process of 
revelation: Al-Harith bin Hisham (mother of the faithful believers) asked 
                                                 
9
 The word ‘prophet’ for Muhammad has two meanings (Sura 33:40) (Murata, Chittick 
1995: 134). The first is ‘messenger’ (rasul), one who proclaims a new law in the world 
(Sura 7:158; 48:8-9). Islam acknowledges 315 messengers. In Sura 46:34, Muhammad 
is described as one of the great messengers (ulul – azm – those with firm resolution: 
also Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus). In this sense, Muhammad is related to the 
prophets of the Abrahamic traditions (cf. Sura 4:163-165). The second meaning is 
nabi: one who receives direct inspiration from God. Islam acknowledges 124 000 an-
biya (plural of nabi) (Schimmel 1985: 56).  
10
 The name ‘Koran’ (Qur’an) literally means recitation. Hence, the Koran is always 
read aloud. Ernst (2003: 95) states that “the oral component of the Koran is a major 
part of its transmission and reception”.  
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Muhammad: "O Allah's Apostle! How is the Divine Inspiration revealed to 
you?" Muhammad replied, "Sometimes it is (revealed) like the ringing of a 
bell, this form of Inspiration is the hardest of all, and then this state passes off 
after I have grasped what is inspired. Sometimes the Angel comes in the form 
of a man and talks to me, and I grasp whatever he says." 'Aisha added: “Verily 
I saw the Prophet being inspired Divinely on a very cold day and noticed the 
sweat dropping from his forehead as the Inspiration was over” (vol 1, book I, 
number 2).  
Among theologians and historians there has been extensive discussion 
about the exact origins of the revelations of the Koran. There is 
acknowledgement that Muhammad was morally and sensitively attuned to the 
social conditions in Arab world (Khan 2002; Sina 2008). Based on this 
sensitivity, Muhammad suffered when he saw people living in an unjust 
society. The idea of Muhammad's compassion before the revelations has led 
some to question the externality of the angel Gabriel, and the revelations 
themselves. Some argue that Muhammad actually borrowed ideas from the 
Judeo-Christian tradition to structure his thoughts as revelations. However, this 
idea has never been popular among Muslims, because it does do not do justice 
to the 'sanctity' and 'objectivity' of the message.  
The revelation of the Koran in words, and the request to proclaim the 
message, confirm the close and special relationship between God and 
Muhammad (Bowering 2003: 347; Buaben 1996: 61ff; Ernst 2003: 84). Islam 
believes that no-one else received any revelations after Muhammad in the same 
way (Sura 5:5). Hence, Islamic orthodoxy increasingly stressed Muhammad as 
a passive recipient of God’s word (Haleem 2008: 19ff; Rahman 1966, 11ff, 
30ff; cf. Bowering 2003: 348). The Koran is a revelation and the Word of God 
(Kalam Allah) that came into people’s midst through Muhammad. Craag 
(2001) states, “The Koran is not a text about something more ultimate than 
itself. It is in itself, as Book and text, the very ‘Word of God’ (Kalam Allah).” 
The Koran is the primary focus because it is God’s rule, and Islam is taught 
based upon it.  
It is interesting to note the proximity between the life of Muhammad 
and the Koran itself. Abu Nu’aim quotes Aisha, Muhammad’s wife, as saying 
that the character of Muhammad was the Koran, i.e., he liked what the Koran 
liked (Schimmel 1985: 26, 45f). Muhammad brought to people the truth, the 
original and ‘right’ religion established by God. He was chosen by God to 
convey the message, and establish a religion based on that revelation of God. 
In the Islamic tradition, Muhammad’s prophetic revelation is understood as an 
act of mercy for the world (rahmatan lil-‘alamin; Sura 21:107), and 
Muhammad is the instrument of God’s word (Rahman 1966: 28).  
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2.2.1.2 Muhammad is unique in his closeness to God 
The image of Muhammad as unique in his closeness to God relates to the story 
of Muhammad’s night journey (isra) and his ascension (mi’raj), which 
culminated in his face-to-face contact with God. The Koran testifies that 
Muhammad was carried off by an angel of God at night, from one sacred 
shrine to another; and from there, ascended to face God in Heaven, as no-one 
else had ever done before (Sura 17; 53). Prior to this, communication between 
man and God had occurred through intermediaries, such as angels or dreams, 
as in the stories of Abraham and Moses (Sura 53 cf. Gen 15:1-6; 18:1-5; Ex 
3:1-3). In the Islamic tradition, Muhammad faced God without any 
intermediaries. Muhammad's closeness to God, in his ascension, is depicted as 
absolutely unique. With regard to this ascension (mi’raj) and the related belief 
that Muhammad faced God directly, the following question can direct the 
interpretation of this religious image: Did Muhammad literally see God with 
his eyes, or did he ‘see’ God with his heart? This question is answered 
differently in the interpretations of the Koran, Hadith and Sīra (cf. Schimmel 
1985; Al Hamid Al Husaini 1990; Peters 1994; Sina 2008: 120 ff). In the 
following paragraphs, we shall elaborate on the two metaphors that indicate 
Muhammad’s unique closeness to God, namely: his night journey (isra), and 
his ascension, or heavenly journey (mi’raj).  
In the story of Muhammad’s night journey (isra), the angel Gabriel 
lifts Muhammad on Bouraq – a creature with the body of a horse, a human 
head, and wings – to fly from Al-Masjid-al-Haram in Mecca to Al-Masjid-al-
Aqsa in Jerusalem (Sura 17:1). During this journey with Gabriel, Muhammad 
was shown the marvels of heaven and earth. This journey demonstrates that 
Muhammad was chosen for a special relationship with God. In the Islamic 
tradition, Muhammad is also called habib Allah, God’s beloved friend,11 which 
demonstrates the important position of Muhammad and his life in relation to 
God’s teachings (cf. Sura 33:56).  
Muhammad’s ascension or heavenly journey (mi’raj) – which 
followed the night journey immediately – began when he arrived in Al-Masjid-
al-Aqsa in Jerusalem. He started the ascension (mi’raj) by climbing a ladder 
that passed through the heavens. During this ascension, Muhammad met the 
prophets of the past: in the first heaven he met Adam; in the second, he met 
John and Jesus; in the third the Patriarch Joseph, son of Jacob; in the fourth, 
the Prophet Idris; in the fifth Aaron, in the sixth Moses, and in the seventh 
Abraham. Finally, Muhammad reached the highest heaven, Paradise, where he 
faced God (Sura 53:7-15; 108:1). In the presence of God, Muhammad received 
the instructions for daily prayers (shalat) (Schimmel 1985: 159f; Al Hamid Al 
Husaini 1991: 422, 426ff; Peters 1994: 146f; Ernst 2003: 87f). In all 
interpretations, Muhammad is believed to have a uniquely close relationship 
                                                 
11
 The position of Muhammad as habib Allah is from the Sufi community, and gener-
ally accepted by the Muslim piety (Schimmel 1985: 57).  
CHAPTER 2 
 
60 
with God. In Sura 53, Muhammad stands upright facing his Lord, and Sura 17 
shows that Muhammad, in his supreme religious experience and heavenly 
journey, encountered and travelled together with God. This experience 
represents the highest mystical experience of Muhammad. Islamic modernists 
point out that Muhammad had a true ‘I-and-Thou’ relationship. Face-to-face 
dialogue between Muhammad and God proved that Muhammad was absolutely 
unique, and superior to all other prophets.  
The ascension also demonstrates a close relationship between God as 
the source of a vision, and Muhammad as the receiver of this vision (Colby 
2002: 171ff). For example, the status of Muhammad, in Islam, is superior to 
that of Moses. Moses fainted at the manifestation of the divine attributes in the 
burning bush, but Muhammad could speak directly and intimately to God (cf. 
Sura 53). There is no human other than Muhammad who had the same spiritual 
experience and face-to-face dialogue with God. In the Sīra,12 Muhammad is 
seen as the prophet whom God addresses as “unique among the creatures” 
(Schimmel 1985: 162ff).  
Some Islamic theologians, including the Mu’tazilite school,13 argue 
that this journey was spiritual or visionary (cf. Guillaume 1960: 58; Peters 
1994: 145). It is interesting that the Hadith of Al-Bukhari (narrated by Sharīk 
bin ‘Abdullāh bin Abī Namr, about the night of isra and mi’raj) also states that 
this moment is more visionary. The hadith says that it is characteristic of all 
prophets that their eyes sleep, but their hearts do not sleep. During the night of 
the isra and mi’raj, “Gabriel took charge of Muhammad and ascended along 
with him to the Heaven” (vol 4, book LVI, number 770). Orthodox scholars, 
however, interpret this story literally, and claim that Muhammad went on a 
physical journey. In the Sufi tradition, there is a belief that normal believers 
can reach God only in the spirit; Muhammad, as the last prophet, surpassed the 
normal limitations of humans, as proven by his journey to the Divine Presence.  
Obviously, this dispute cannot be solved easily. If Muhammad’s 
journey to heaven is interpreted as a physical journey, the image of 
Muhammad’s uniqueness becomes even stronger, and promotes the superiority 
of Muhammad in comparison to the other prophets. This literal interpretation 
has been encouraged by orthodox theologians to support the uniqueness of 
Muhammad, the only prophet who directly received a revelation from God. 
Ernst (2003: 88) points out that Muhammad brought back the instructions 
about daily prayers for Muslims. Hence, the prayers remind Muslims on a daily 
                                                 
12
 Sira means ‘the life’: the collection of writings about the life and deeds of Muham-
mad derived from the Hadith or Muslim Tradition (Lammens 2000b: 169). 
13
 Mu’tazilism was developed by Hasan al-Basri in 728 A.D., in Iraq; in the midst of 
many ideas and theories – such as Hellenism, Hellenised Christianity, Gnosticism, 
Buddhism, etc. – that contributed to philosophical, religious and moral disputes. 
Mu’tazilism in Iraq influenced Islamic ideas.  
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basis that Muhammad met God face-to-face. This makes the isra and mi’raj 
uniquely important events (Rahman 1966: 14; cf. Schimmel 1985: 162).  
 
2.2.1.3 Perfection  
The image in the Koran of the perfection of Muhammad can be discussed from 
two perspectives, namely the idea of the perfect man (insan kamil) and the idea 
of perfection in nature and moral qualities (khalqan wa khulqan). Both are 
closely related to the idea of a ‘mystical Muhammad’: he is the perfect man 
with perfect moral qualities, because he has pre-eternal divine light (Schimmel 
1985; cf. Ernst 2003: 84).  
As the perfect man (insan kamil), Muhammad is seen as a mediator of 
divine grace. He implements the divine purpose in the world. Muhammad 
bears all the divine names in himself. Schimmel (1985: 134, 137) says that he 
is the prototype of the universe, as well as of the individual, “the pupil in the 
eye of humanity”, the perfect man who serves as the medium through which 
God can manifest Himself, to be known and loved. In this image, Muhammad 
is understood to be an extraordinary man, a perfect man. Muhammad cannot be 
touched, criticised or challenged by his adherents or others, because he is 
superior to them. Although Muhammad is always portrayed as an ordinary 
person, with weaknesses and even sins, absolute obedience is owed to the 
prophet as he is free from faults. He was immaculate in the most insignificant 
details of life. Muhammad is a perfect example, an untouchable one, to his 
adherents (al mukhlas and al ma’shum; Sura 38:82, 83). In the Hadith of Al-
Bukhari (narrated by Abū Huraira), we can see the perfection of Muhammad. 
He wrote, “My similitude in comparison with the other prophets before me, is 
that of man who has built a house nicely and beautifully, except for a place of 
one brick in a corner. The people went around about it and wondered at its 
beauty, and said: ‘Would that this brick is put in its place!’ So I am that brick” 
(vol 4, book LVI, number 735). In Muhammad’s perfect life, we see God’s 
will, and what Islam is all about (Gibb 1978: 9). From this perspective, it is 
comprehensible that Muhammad is described in mystical traditions as a “ruby 
among the stones” carrying the divine light (Schimmel 1985: 134, 137; Nasr 
1995: 71).
14
  
Muhammad was also perfect in nature and moral qualities (khalqan wa 
khulqan). The history of Muhammad (Sīra) states that since his childhood, 
Muhammad had been different from the people around him. He was virtuous, 
and grew in purity (Rahman 1966: 11; Azzam 1993:9; Al Hamid Al Husainin 
1990: 175; Armstrong 1991; Khan 2002). “Muhammad detested the ways of 
the ignorant. Allah, the Almighty, kept him away from all evil ways and 
                                                 
14
 The mystical exegesis also interprets Muhammad as the perfect prophet because of 
his unique experience, particularly the ascension. In this sense, Muhammad is under-
stood to be standing as close to God’s reality as possible, proving the superiority of 
Muhammad in comparison with other creatures (Colby 2002: 173). 
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objectionable conduct” (Khan 2002: 12). Muhammad was created by God in 
this perfectness, and was therefore worthy to be followed. We can examine this 
idea through the concept of the nature of Muhammad, namely isma. Isma – 
which, in Islamic tradition, also applied to the nature of other prophets of God 
– refers to Muhammad’s protection from moral depravity, perfect moral 
integrity, and impeccability. God protects Muhammad from intentional 
mistakes, and corrects any that occur. Hence, the moral thoughts of 
Muhammad are not polluted by external errors (Sura 8:67; 80:1-10; 66:1-2). 
Nasr (1995: 71) says, “There is no doubt that he (Muhammad) was given by 
God an eminence which is certainly not ordinary and not simply human as this 
word is used today; although theologically he was not of divine descent, but a 
man.” In the Islamic tradition, there are four necessary attributes required for 
being a good man, namely, truthfulness (sidq), trustworthiness (amana), 
proclamation of the divine word (tabligh), and sagaciousness and intelligence 
(fatana) (Schimmel 1985: 57f). Isma relates to all of those attributes, so it 
means that Muhammad is a really perfect man in nature and moral qualities. 
God protected Muhammad from any intentional mistakes in his life and work. 
Divine protection is the source of Muhammad’s perfection. In these terms, no-
one can challenge Muhammad, because such a challenge would be interpreted 
as a challenge to God (cf. Renan 2000: 161).  
 
2.2.1.4 Model of spiritual development 
The model of spiritual development concerns the imitation of Muhammad’s 
example, in order to develop spiritually and grow nearer to God. Muhammad’s 
life and spirituality are an important source of inspiration for the Muslim 
community, as a spiritual example (Sura 33:21). The second source of 
inspiration is the return to fitra, which is the origin of human spirituality and 
belief in one God, by obeying God’s rules. Muhammad taught his followers 
how to live with God and return to fitra. Therefore, by following and imitating 
Muhammad, the Muslim community demonstrates their efforts towards 
spiritual development.  
Immediately after Muhammad received his revelation from God, 
telling him that he had become God’s messenger and that people had to believe 
in him, he began to teach his family and friends. Later, after his move from 
Mekka to Medina (hijrah), Muhammad realised that he had also been called to 
teach Islam to the wider society. This means that Muhammad became the finest 
role model for ‘right behaviour’; and by following Muhammad, people could 
live spiritually and grow closer to God (Khan 2002: 29 ff.). In the Hadith of 
Al-Bukhari (narrated by Anas) the prophet said, “None of you will have faith 
till he loves me more than his father, his children and all mankind” (vol 1, book 
II, number 14). Muhammad has a very central position regarding belief in God. 
People can attain the true faith when they follow Muhammad diligently. He 
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taught Islam not only through the revelations, but also through his exemplary 
life and spirituality.  
Muhammad’s behaviour and teachings were very concerned with 
worldly matters. Life in this world, in Islamic thought, is very meaningful, 
because we must prepare for life after death; but it is also important to oppose 
social injustice in life (Khan 1986: 25ff). Muhammad acknowledged that (the 
acquisition of) property can lead to greater injustice, and become a source of 
sin. He formulated his ideas on human society in the Arab world through his 
rituals, regular prayers and dogmas, and encouraged the Muslim community to 
develop their spirituality (Rahman 1966: 15f; Ramadan 2007: 22ff). Schimmel 
(1985: 25) states that obedience to Muhammad played an important role in the 
development of Islamic piety. Muhammad is the chosen one (al Mustafa), and 
his way of life (sunnah) became the valid path for people to grow closer to 
God. By using Muhammad’s spirituality as a model, believers can become 
aware of and draw closer to God’s will. Ramadan (2007: 111) notes the 
spirituality of Muhammad as the combination of strict faithfulness to his 
principles, and the human warmth constantly radiating from his presence.  
By following Muhammad, people can become closer to their “innate 
human nature” (fitra; Esposito 2003). According to the Hadith of Abu 
Hurairah, every human soul is born in the condition of fitra (kullu mauludin 
yuladu ala al-fitrah). Fitra has a physical component as well as a spiritual one. 
The fitra of the human body is its inborn beauty and perfection, as created by 
God. Because of this innate bodily perfection, radical changes to one's body to 
suit personal taste or fashion are condemned as unlawful changes to fitra. The 
spiritual component of fitra relates to the Islamic thought that human beings 
are born with an innate knowledge of the doctrine of the Oneness of God 
(tawhid – see Sura 112:1). Tawhid is the centre of Islamic belief,15 because 
without this belief, salvation is impossible (Murata & Chittick 1995: 145). 
Normally, lack of spirituality occurs when we are facing human shortcomings, 
such as heedlessness (ghafla) or forgetfulness (nisyan). Support is needed to 
retain our original perfect spirituality, or fitra.  
One of God’s instructions relayed through Muhammad with regard to 
fitra is to fast during the month of Ramadhan (Sura 2:183). Muhammad taught 
Muslims to develop their spirituality by controlling their natural desires during 
this month. All Muslims are expected to fast with their tongues, minds, and 
hearts (Ramadan 2007: 150; Hadith of Al Bukhari, vol 3, book XXXI, number 
118). Through this spiritual experience, Muslims can get closer to God and 
reclaim their fitra. Sura 17:82 (cf. Sura 7:172f) states that the Koran itself is 
the source of healing, and in reference to this verse, Muhammad is often called 
a tabib, a healer of the soul who can recognise the ailments of the human heart 
and can heal them by teaching and preaching. As the life and spirituality of 
                                                 
15
 The opposite of tawhid is shirk, which refers to making something comparable to 
God. 
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Muhammad have a power that can uplift humanity to the heights of the spirit, 
he is also called the ‘Light of Right Guidance’ (nur al – huda). Again, we see 
that through following Muhammad, Muslims can develop spiritually as human 
beings (cf. Schimmel 1985: 45, 235). Nasr (1995: 72) states that Muhammad 
fulfilled this function on the highest level, as the supreme model for human 
beings. Meanwhile, the Hadith of Al-Bukhari (narrated by Abud Huraira) 
states that Muhammad said, "There was no prophet among the prophets but 
was given miracles, because of which people had security or had belief; but 
what I was given was the Divine Inspiration, which Allah revealed to me. So I 
hope that my followers will be more than those of any other prophet on the 
Day of Resurrection" (vol 9, book XCII, number 379). 
 
2.2.1.5 Model for a good life 
‘Muhammad as the model for a good life’ elaborates on his teachings of living 
with and for others. God’s message through Muhammad is not only about 
transcendent matters, but also about immanent conditions. In the following 
paragraphs, we will examine Muhammad’s policies for human society, 
particularly in Medina, which represent an important exemplar for living with 
and for others. Later, we will examine Muhammad’s attention to ethical social 
obligations. In this image, Muhammad is depicted as a good teacher, with 
authority from God for bringing civilisation to the Arab people. Muslims 
recognise and respect the example of Muhammad’s life concerning rightful 
living with and for others according to God’s plan.  
Muhammad reflected on God’s revelations concerning real situations 
in society. In 622 CE, Muhammad created the ‘Medina constitution’. Through 
this constitution, Muhammad developed and managed a society in which 
people could live together in a united community. He struggled, facing a 
political crisis and social disintegration, and he managed to solve these 
problems (Armstrong 1991: 165; Khan 2002: 30ff). He introduced the concept 
of umma – community – with political arrangements to maintain peace and 
justice for all of the people who lived there. We cannot separate Muhammad’s 
social and political accomplishments from his divine revelations, because he 
had begun to receive revelations before he moved to Medina, and was still 
receiving them throughout his stay there. Muhammad demonstrated in Medina 
that there is a link between God’s message (and plan) and social issues, 
especially concerning living together with and for others.  
Muhammad was a teacher of how to live a good life – not only 
spiritually, but also socially. In Medina, we can see that Muhammad was a 
social reformer who developed a new social system in which people could live 
harmoniously with others, including Meccan immigrants, other Muslims, and 
non-Muslims. Muhammad stressed that a good Muslim shows not only 
devotion to God, but also compassion for his fellow humans. Through 
Muhammad, people learned the right way to live with and for others, by 
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obeying God. Muhammad established a new moral system for better social life 
(Schimmel 1985: 48, 55; Dabashi 1989: 61ff; Buaben 1996: 272; Ramadan 
2007: 110, 113f).  
Following Muhammad’s example, in their rituals and worship of God, 
Muslims should also be concerned with their ethical obligations to other people 
in their community. This understanding can be referred to as the Islamic virtues 
of living within God’s plan; and therefore, Islamic virtues addressing humanity 
and society. For Muhammad, ‘virtue’ is when our soul and heart are at peace; it 
is sin that creates impatience in the soul. Hence – and related to the image of a 
good life – Muhammad is also called ‘a messenger of virtues’ (Al Hamid Al 
Husaini 1990: 309). Muhammad translated the meaning of ‘peace’ into a 
concrete situation within society. For example, he taught his followers to feed 
the hungry and spread peace, among people they knew and did not know. In 
the Hadith of Al-Bukhari (narrated by ‘Aisha) there is a conversation between 
Muhammad and his wives: “Who among us will be the first to follow you after 
you die?" Muhammad said, "Whoever has the longest hand." The ‘long hand’ 
was a symbol of the practice of charity.  
Zainab bint Jahsh was the first of Muhammad’s wives to die after 
Muhammad died, during the caliphate of 'Umar; she was devoted to charitable 
acts (vol 2, book XXIV, number 501). Another Hadith states that a good 
Muslim is one who feeds (the poor), and who greets those he knows and does 
not know (Hadith of Al-Bukhari, vol 1, book II, number 11). Muhammad also 
taught his followers about justice in regard to their daily business with others. 
For example, Muhammad said that (narrated by Sālim’s father) “any person 
who takes a piece of land unjustly will sink down the seven earths on the Day 
of Resurrection” (Hadith of Al-Bukhari, vol 4, book LIV, number 418). The 
will of Allah, the only true God, would nurture a just society. In the Hadith of 
Al-Bukhari (narrated by Jarir bin ‘Abdullah), Muhammad said that Allah 
would not be merciful to those who were not merciful to mankind (vol 9, book 
XCIII, number 473). Zakat (charity tax) for the poor is the one of five core 
Islamic disciplines.
16
 According to this understanding, Rahman (1966: 12) 
points out the correlation between the main concept of Islam, namely the 
oneness of God, and the idea of humanity. He explains that people who believe 
in only one God must at the same time face (and struggle with) the 
consequences of social injustice (Sura 107). Thus, we can understand why 
Muhammad struggled very hard to establish the umma over the entire Arabian 
peninsula; not only for political reasons, but also for ethical and ritual reasons. 
He taught that all rituals, such as prayer, worship, fasting, and zakat (charity 
                                                 
16
 The five principles or pillars of Islam: 1) To testify that there is only one God, Allah; 
and Muhammad is Allah’s messenger; 2) To offer the (compulsory congregational) 
prayers dutifully and perfectly; 3) To pay zakāt (i.e. charity tax); 4) To perform Hajj 
(i.e. pilgrimage to Mecca); 5) To observe fasting during the month of Ramadān (see 
Hadith of Al-Bukhari vol. 1, book II, number 7).  
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tax), as well as the behaviour of Muslims in daily life, must be based on ethics 
and come from the heart of their humanity (Sura 22: 40-41).  
 
2.2.1.6 Model of gratefulness towards God 
The model of gratefulness towards God concerns how people learn from 
Muhammad to thank God for everything. Muhammad’s grateful attitude 
towards his task serves as an exemplary model for his followers. To understand 
how this image emerged, the Hadith of al-Bukhari quoted by Ramadan (2007: 
111) reports a conversation between Muhammad and his wife, Aisha. Aisha 
asked Muhammad: “Don’t you take on too much worship, while God has 
already forgiven all your past and future sins?” Muhammad replied: “How 
could I but be a thankful servant?” From this example we see that there are two 
messages in relation to the image of Muhammad: first, his gratefulness towards 
God is taught by showing God’s mercifulness and forgiveness. Second, 
through worshipping and serving God, we can demonstrate our gratitude to 
God.  
Sura 3:31-32 states that if people love and are grateful to God, they 
must follow and obey what Muhammad did. If they do so, God will love them 
and forgive their sins. In other words, God’s mercifulness and forgiveness is 
primarily realised through Muhammad’s sayings and teachings. Again, the 
central concept of innate human nature (fitra) plays a role in the elaboration of 
this idea. Fitra, in which humans realise the Oneness or Unity of God (tawhid), 
is a necessary condition for following the path of virtue. Without fitra, human 
beings will go astray, and will be abandoned by God (cf. Azzam 1993: 33 ff; 
Murata & Chittick 1995: 145; Blankinship 2008: 33). However, this can also 
be formulated in reverse: sinfulness can cause the loss of fitra. Hence, to 
preserve one’s fitra, it is important to know how to behave. The Koran and 
Muhammad’s sayings show that Muslims should make an effort to comply 
with and maintain the characteristics of fitra as described by Allah to 
Muhammad (e.g., Sura 33:36; 59:7; 2:136).  
Azzam (1993: 33, 56ff) states that there are two fundamentals in the 
Koran: first, faith (iman) related to tawhid and fitra; and second, ‘right-doing’ 
(ihsan) based on God’s instructions for living in mercy and brotherhood (cf. 
Murata & Chittick 1995: 145; Sura 48:29; 15:88-89; 49:13; 89:17-26). 
Muhammad led his adherents, first, to believe in the one God (iman). This is 
God’s mercy and forgiveness, an opportunity for sinful people to regain their 
fitra and attain salvation. Second, Muhammad guided the believers to respond 
to their faith through worship, which was related to the idea of God’s mercy. 
This concerns being grateful to God. In these terms, through following 
Muhammad’s deeds and sayings, people can learn to live with fitra; and at the 
same time, acknowledge how to express their gratefulness to God.  
In addition to mercifulness and forgiveness, Muslims demonstrate their 
gratefulness by worshiping and serving God (Sura 15:99). The Koran says that 
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Muhammad was a servant who had received God’s revelation (Sura 41:5). It is 
of crucial importance to worship and serve the one God correctly. The Koran, 
the mandate of the five daily prayers as revealed in Muhammad’s ascension 
and the four other pillars of the religion (declaration of faith, zakat, fasting, and 
pilgrimage), is essentially about revering the one God and being grateful to 
Him, because God has given people the chance to live in fitra. Further, 
Muhammad taught (Sura 56:57-73; 106:1-4) that gratefulness to God is based 
upon good health, knowledge, wisdom, meals, fulfilment of their wishes, and 
so forth. This attitude reflects a daily appreciation of the sovereignty of God 
and the willingness to be a servant of God (Cragg 2001: 42, 188f). The Hadith 
of Al-Bukhari (narrated by Abū Huraira) tells of the time when Muhammad 
was presented with two cups – one containing wine, and the other milk – on 
the night of his night journey to Jerusalem. He looked at the cups and took the 
one with the milk. Gabriel said, “Thanks to Allah, Who guided you to the fitra; 
if you had taken the wine, your followers would have gone astray” (vol 6, book 
LX, number 232). Through Muhammad as a servant of God, people learn how 
to serve God to demonstrate their gratefulness through proper life and worship 
of the one God (Sura 14:7; 7:17-18; Khan 1986: 33; Ernst 2003: 111ff).  
 
2.2.1.7 Humanistic Muhammad 
The last image of Muhammad focuses on his humanism. In this image, 
Muhammad is seen as a good person and important historical figure only; no 
more than that. He is acknowledged for his role at a particular time and in a 
particular context. He is admired as a truly great figure because of his powerful 
influence on the Arabs of his time, and is seen as a charismatic leader who 
people obeyed. Obviously, all of this is applicable to the other images as well. 
However, when Muhammad in viewed purely as a historical figure, without the 
religious overtones, there is a different perception of his impact on people’s 
lives. In this image, which focuses on his role in human (not religious) history, 
Muhammad is a charismatic and intellectual leader in Arabia in the seventh 
century CE.  
In the following discussion, we will address two aspects of this image. 
First, we will review the viewpoints of Islamic scholars who focus on 
Muhammad as an important figure in the history of the Arab community, rather 
than as a messenger of God. Then we will illustrate the role of Muhammad as a 
charismatic leader during a critical period in Arab history. From this point of 
view, Muhammad is seen as an important figure in the unification of the Arab 
people.  
In the literature about Muhammad (Engineer 1989; Buaben 1996; 
Renan 2000, Lamens 2000; Jeffrey 2000), one can conclude that Muhammad’s 
role as a historical figure is more significant than the other images that focus 
on his religious impact. For instance, Muhammad is seen as a political leader 
who was able to unite the Arabs in Medina (Jeffrey 2000: 348). Muhammad 
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established the concept of umma (community), by political arrangements to 
maintain peace and justice for all people who lived in the city. In the literature 
of western Islamic scholars, such as Watt (1984), Muhammad is seen as a 
brilliant reformer; a powerful leader; or a humble ordinary person who 
managed the social-political context of Arabia very well (Buaben 1996: 26, 32, 
65, 227ff; Ernst 2003: 84; cf. Peters 1994: 242; Jeffrey 2000: 347f). There 
were many problems, especially in Mecca and Medina – related to religious 
plurality, social circumstances, political struggle, and economic conditions – 
that needed to be addressed. In a context where there was no single decisive 
leader available, Muhammad emerged to play a pivotal role. In the shadow of 
larger and older empires, such as the Persian and Byzantine Empires, 
Muhammad became a powerful leader of the Arabs, and his regional power 
and influence began to spread (cf. Ramadan 2007: 149ff).  
The literature of Arab history calls the period prior to the emergence of 
Muhammad the age of ignorance (jahiliyyah) (Engineer 1989: 199; Al Hamid 
Al Husaini 1990; Armstrong 1991: 13; Omar 2003: 159). At that time, in the 
shadow of the great empires that surrounded them, the Arabs felt politically 
and religiously inferior. This sense of inferiority arose particularly when they 
compared themselves to Christian, Jewish and Roman communities. However, 
with the leadership of Muhammad, they were able to develop a strong identity 
as a Muslim community, and they became a major influence in the world. 
Arabia developed as a large Muslim community. Engineer (1989: 201) states 
that the presence of Muhammad could be interpreted as a liberation movement 
providing freedom of thought and action.  
Muhammad demonstrated his intellect and his remarkable leadership 
through his sayings, which were collected in the Koran. Some scholars believe 
that the Koran is a part of Muhammad’s career as a religious and political 
leader. The idea of Muhammad’s concern about the social, economic, political 
and religious situation at the time prior to receiving the revelations spikes 
speculation about the externality of the angel Gabriel and the nature of the 
revelations themselves. From a sociological perspective, the Koran can be seen 
as a superlative book, a work of Muhammad’s role as a religious leader (cf. 
Brown 1989; Bowering 2003: 350). Watt, quoted by Buaben, says that 
Muhammad’s success is supported by factors related to his characteristics as a 
seer, a wise statesman, and a shrewd and skilful administrator (1996: 273). The 
image of ‘humanistic Muhammad’ recognises Muhammad as a charismatic 
leader with a brilliant vision who played an important role in human history, 
particularly among the Arabs. His messengership, personal gifts, and 
incomparable works within society underpin his authority.  
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2.2.2 Results 
 
We measured the images of Muhammad by means of a list of statements based 
on the theoretical models presented above. We constructed three items for each 
of the seven models, so we have a 21-item list, in total, of images of 
Muhammad. The first image is Muhammad as a prophet. This image has two 
main indicators: first, Muhammad was sent by God and is the most important 
messenger/prophet; and second, Muhammad received God’s revelations 
directly in words, and this is proven by the very existence of the Koran. We 
find this image in items 1, 8, and 15. The second image is Muhammad’s 
unique closeness to God, as evidenced by his night journey (isra) and his 
ascension to heaven (mi’raj), where Muhammad faced God (items 2, 9, and 
16). The perfection of Muhammad is the third image. In this image we 
measured the concept of the perfect man (insan kamil), and the idea of 
perfection in nature and moral qualities (khalqan wa khulqan). Through these 
two indicators, Muhammad is seen as the perfect man who cannot be criticised 
by ordinary people. Items 7, 14, and 21 represent this image of perfection. The 
model of spiritual development, as the fourth image of Muhammad, represents 
the intent to imitate Muhammad in spiritual growth in order to become closer 
to God. Muhammad’s life and spirituality are an important source of 
inspiration for Muslims. Muhammad taught his followers how to live with God 
and return to the basic truth/fitra of human beings (items 3, 10, and 17). The 
fifth image is the model for a good life. Here Muhammad is depicted as a good 
teacher with authority from God, who presents the concerns of rightful living 
with and for others according to God’s plan. Through this indicator, we 
operationalised items 4, 11, and 18. The model of gratefulness to God is the 
sixth image of Muhammad, from whom people learned how to thank God for 
everything. We show two indicators of this image: first, Muhammad’s 
gratefulness towards God is taught by showing mercifulness and forgiveness; 
and second, we can demonstrate our gratefulness to God through worshipping 
and serving God. We operationalised this image into items 6, 13, and 20. The 
last image is the human side of Muhammad in which he is acknowledged for 
his role in a particular historical time and context. He is admired as a truly 
great figure because of his powerful influence, and is seen as a charismatic 
leader who was obeyed by the people at the time. Items 5, 12, and 19 reflect 
this image.  
Do the respondents in our study distinguish the images of Muhammad 
along the theoretical lines we described above? We will not make a cross-
religious comparison between Muslims and Christians, as Muhammad does not 
play a role in Christianity. It is highly unlikely that it’s possible to establish a 
comparative category for both religious traditions regarding Muhammad. 
Taking this into account, our questions are: Does the empirical data 
corroborate the theoretical conceptualisations made about the images of 
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Muhammad? Do these conceptual distinctions correspond to the empirical 
distinctions made by Indonesian Muslims about Muhammad? We answered 
these questions by factor analysis, and by examining the agreement of 
respondents with the various statements.  
 
Table 2.4: Operationalisation of images of Muhammad 
 
Theoretical models Items 
Prophet 1. Muhammad received God's revelations in word 
8. Muhammad is called as Prophet to preach God’s word 
15. Muhammad is sent by God to proclaim the revelations in word 
Unique in his closeness to 
God 
2. Muhammad’s journey to face God in the ascension [mi' raj] is absolutely 
unique 
9. Muhammad is unique in being face to face to God. 
16. Nobody has seen God face to face but Muhammad 
Perfection 7. You can not touch Muhammad because of his perfectness 
14. It is not allowed to criticize Muhammad 
21. There is no position form which one can challenge Muhammad. 
Model of spiritual 
development 
3. By following Muhammad, I grow near to God. 
10. Through imitation of Muhammed, I come closer to God. 
17. Following Muhammad, I grow in closeness with God. 
Model for a good life 4. Muhammad teaches me to live rightfully with and for others 
11. Through Muhammad I learn to live according to God's plan. 
18. Through Muhammad, I learn the right way to live with and for others. 
Model of gratefulness 
towards God 
6. Through Muhammad I learn to thank God for everything 
13. Muhammad shows me that I have to be grateful to God 
20. Muhammad teaches me to be a grateful servant of God 
Humanistic 5. Muhammad is no more then a good person in history. 
12. Muhammad was just a historical person, no more 
19. Muhammad is no more than a great figure in human history 
 
We ran a factor analysis
17
 for Muslims, and found that item 16 (“Nobody has 
seen God face to face but Muhammad”) and item 8 (“Muhammad is referred to 
as a prophet to preach God’s word) had a very low commonality. We 
eliminated item 8 and 16 from further analysis, and the scores on the resulting 
19-item list were then subjected to a factor analysis, which resulted in a five-
factor solution showing adequate factor loadings for Muslims. It is supported 
by 51.2% total explained variance. The five-factor solution consists of: 
humanistic image (items 19, 12, 5), image of uniqueness (items: 9, 2), image of 
perfection (items 14, 7, 21), image of the prophet (items: 15, 1), and the 
combination of the images of the model for a good life, the model of 
gratefulness, and the model of spiritual development (items 18, 20, 17, 13, 4, 3, 
6, 10, 11).  
 
  
                                                 
17
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalisation. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15  
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Table 2.5: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of images of Muhammad among Muslim students. 
 
Items Theory 
Dimension 
h2 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 
18. Through Muhammad, I learn the right way 
to live with and for others. 
Model for a good 
life 
.78     .58 
20. Muhammad teaches me to be a grateful 
servant of God 
Model of 
gratefulness 
towards God 
.71     .51 
17. Following Muhammad, I grow in closeness 
with God. 
Model of spiritual 
development 
.70     .57 
13. Muhammad shows me that I have to be 
grateful to God 
Model of 
gratefulness 
towards God 
.68     .48 
4. Muhammad teaches me to live rightfully with 
and for others 
Model for a good 
life 
.60     .35 
3. By following Muhammad, I grow near to 
God. 
Model of spiritual 
development 
.60     .41 
6. Through Muhammad I learn to thank God for 
everything 
Model of 
gratefulness 
towards God 
.57     .39 
10. Through imitation of Muhammed, I come 
closer to God. 
Model of spiritual 
development 
.55     .39 
11. Through Muhammad I learn to live 
according to God's plan. 
Model for a good 
life 
.43     .31 
19. Muhammad is no more than a great figure in 
human history 
Humanistic  .87    .74 
12. Muhammad was just a historical person, no 
more 
Humanistic  .86    .73 
5. Muhammad is no more then a good person in 
history. 
Humanistic  .71    .52 
9. Muhammad is unique in being face to face to 
God. 
Unique in his 
closeness to God 
  .79   .65 
2. Muhammad’s journey to face God in the 
ascension [mi' raj] is absolutely unique 
Unique in his 
closeness to God 
  .76   .61 
14. It is not allowed to criticize Muhammad Perfection    .86  .70 
7. You can not touch Muhammad because of his 
perfectness 
Perfection    .66  .49 
21. There is no position form which one can 
challenge Muhammad. 
Perfection    .55  .42 
15. Muhammad is sent by God to proclaim the 
revelations in word 
Prophet     .73 .56 
1. Muhammad received God's revelations in 
word 
Prophet     .53 .32 
Cronbach’s Alpha .86 .84 .78 .76 .58  
Number of valid cases 760 766 779 779 774  
Total variance explained 51.2%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Uswa; F2 = Humanism; F3 = Uniqueness; F4 = Perfection; F5 = Prophet 
 
How can we label the last factor, which combines different models of 
Muhammad (items 18, 20, 17, 13, 4, 3, 6, 10, 11)? We think that all models 
refer to the concept of uswa in Islam, which refers to Muhammad (at a more 
general, higher level of abstraction) as a model of behaviour. The term uswa is 
actually taken from the Koran (Sura 33:21). Muhammad as uswa is based on 
the fact that he was chosen by God, and that he brought God’s message to the 
world. People who follow and imitate Muhammad are obeying God’s rules and 
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plan (cf. Sura 4:80). Muhammad is important because of his position as the last 
and chosen prophet (al-Mustafa), and his reputation is reflected by his deeds. 
Since the beginning, Muhammad has been alleged to be “the reliable one” 
(Schimmel 1985), because he had the ability to inspire confidence in others (al 
– Amin). He worked very hard to convince people who initially refused to 
acknowledge him, and he finally succeeded in spreading Islam among the 
Arabs. By following the path of Muhammad in their own lives, Muslims can 
attain the true path to God, and learn to show their gratefulness to God 
(Schimmel 1985: 16, 26; Armstrong 1991: 78; Nasr 1995: 71; Ramadan 2007: 
161ff). We see that the mixed factor refers to the general idea of Muhammad as 
a model (uswa). Muhammad as uswa refers to the admirable life of 
Muhammad, as a model human being who asked and helped people to follow 
God’s will. In light of this, we decided to accept and label the new scale as 
uswa (model). The Cronbach’s alpha of this image for Muslims is .86.  
 
The tables below is a summary of the levels of agreement of our respondents 
with the images of Muhammad. We indicate the agreement of our respondents 
with the images of Muhammad using a Likert scale (1-5) to measure the 
responses, from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to ‘fully agree’ (5), and we analysed it 
through the mean score. 
 
Table 2.6: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
images of Muhammad for Muslim students 
 
 N Mean s.d. 
Prophet  779 3.69 .92 
Uniqueness   779 4.03 .88 
Perfection  779 3.66 .94 
Uswa 788 4.32 .50 
Humanistic 766 2.70 1.21 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
 
From the mean scores, we can see that Muslims positively affirm all images of 
Muhammad, except the humanistic one (Table 2.6). Our Muslim respondents 
show their agreement with the image of uswa (m 4.32; s.d .50), uniqueness (m 
4.03; s.d .88), prophet (m 3.69; s.d .92), and perfection (m 3.66; s.d .94). The 
image of uswa has the highest score, indicating that our Muslim respondents 
recognise Muhammad’s position through his life and deeds. The t-test shows 
that the difference between the image of uswa and the image of uniqueness is 
significant (t 9.69, df 778, p .00). This means that on average, Muslim students 
in our sample agree with the image of Muhammad as uswa significantly more 
than with the image of Muhammad as uniqueness and the others. According to 
this result, the Hadith – a collection of Muhammad’s sayings and deeds – must 
be interpreted in relation to current contexts (cf. Al-Thāinī 2002).  
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The humanistic image (m 2.70; s.d 1.21) had a negative ambivalence 
mean with high standard deviation. Muslims tend to reject this image, because 
they cannot limit Muhammad’s role to being purely historical. In the Koran 
and Hadith, Muhammad is referred to not as an ordinary human being, but also 
as an integral part of Islam’s principles of faith. The first of the Islamic 
principles is “to testify that none has the right to be worshiped other than Allah, 
and that Muhammad is Allah’s messenger.” At the same time, Muhammad is 
dearer than anything else (Hadith of Al-Bukhari vol 1, book II, number 7 and 
15). From this perspective we can understand the tendency of our respondents 
to disagree with this image of a humanistic Muhammad.  
 
2.3 Images of Jesus 
 
The images of Jesus can be examined through biblical stories (especially in the 
New Testament), and study and reflection upon Jesus in Church tradition(s) 
and theology. These sources provide a broad range of information about the 
images of Jesus. The New Testament has different perspectives of Jesus, as 
interpreted by each of the four gospels’ authors in specific contexts of the early 
church. Later interpretations of the images of Jesus reflect a variety of church 
traditions. For instance, in Asian liberation theology a Christology emerged 
that is more inclusive towards other religious traditions (Rayan 1992; Wilfred 
1994). In short, images of Jesus are the result of dialectical processes that 
consider the figure of Jesus as revealed by the four gospels, Jesus’ disciples, 
and the church community, as well as being informed by cultural contexts. 
Hence, there have been many developments and processes of re-interpretation 
regarding the images of Jesus (Pelikan 1985; Kuester 2001; Greene 2003; 
Amaladoss 2006).  
Jesus is the central figure in Christianity; he is understood to be the 
‘God-man’ in person. In previous empirical research in the Netherlands 
(Capucao 2010, 223ff), the image of the classical Jesus had been found to  
induce ethnocentrism, at least when social characteristics are not taken into 
account. Obviously, we are also interested in testing to what extent the images 
of Jesus can have the opposite effect, in terms of generalised trust. To answer 
these questions, it is necessary in this chapter to examine, first, which images 
of Jesus are recognised by our respondents.  
In this section we shall explore the images of Jesus from both 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. What are the images of Jesus that can be 
found in the tradition, and to what extent do our respondents comply with these 
images? We shall elaborate upon these inquiries in two sections. First, we will 
present the images of Jesus based on a theological study of Jesus (Christology) 
(2.3.1). Second, we shall report on the degree to which these images are 
present in our research population (2.3.2).  
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2.3.1 Theory 
 
According to Capucao (2010: 49ff), Christology as a theological interpretation 
of Jesus Christ provides three general distinctions: classical Jesus; a 
hermeneutic-oriented Jesus; and a humanistic Jesus (cf. Borg 2006b). The 
classical Jesus image is anchored in the traditional Christology about the 
divinity of Jesus. The questions that should be answered in this Christology 
concern whether Jesus was God or a demigod, immortal or mortal, and whether 
he descended from heaven (Talbert 2011). The hermeneutic-oriented Jesus is 
the Christological discourse that reflects upon the tradition of Jesus and the 
context of human society. The humanistic image of Jesus sees Jesus only from 
the perspective of human experience, and his role in history.  
 
2.3.1.1 Classical Jesus 
The most classic and traditional Christology image is Jesus as the incarnation 
of God. In Christological literature, this image is commonly called the 
cosmological or cosmic model (Pelikan 1985: 57ff; Haight 1999: 187ff; 
Greene 2003: 31ff; Capucao 2010: 51ff). Haight (1999: 15f) identifies this type 
of Christology as a ‘narrow’ Christology, in which the focus is Jesus himself 
and his status as Christ in relation to God and other human beings. We can also 
categorise this type of Christology as a Christology from above, because it 
places more emphasis on the divinity of Jesus (cf. Zaccaria 2010: 163ff). There 
are two important elements regarding this image: first, the concept of the 
divinity of Jesus, in which Jesus is perceived as existing with God since the 
beginning of time; and second, Jesus as the incarnation of God in human form.  
The Gospel of John (1:1-3) serves as the basis for the idea of the 
divinity of Jesus. In this text, Jesus is referred to as the logos. In the first 
century, the Greek term logos was understood to be the ‘Word of God’ 
(Pelikan 1985: 58, 69). This is immediately reminiscent of Genesis 1:1, in 
which the Word of God (logos) refers to God Himself, who created the world 
and the universe. The word logos also refers to the reason or purpose of God 
(Pelikan 1985: 58). This understanding is confirmed in the story of creation 
(Genesis 1:1ff.), where logos represents the power of transforming chaos into 
cosmos, separating what is ‘not good’ from ‘good’. Here, logos is the Word of 
God, as well as the reason and purpose of God – to bring harmony to the 
cosmos in the centre of the universe (Greene 2003: 37f). Thus, the presence of 
Jesus is also a reason to bring order into the world, because Jesus is the Word 
of God, and God’s revelation. John 1:1-3 and Paul's epistles convey the 
message that Jesus as logos is Jesus who existed with the Father from the 
beginning, before the creation. This is an image of the divinity and the eternity 
of Jesus, as well as of his oneness with God the Father (homoousios).  
In the history of the church, the understanding of oneness with God 
was initially interpreted and confirmed by the Council of Nicea (325 CE) and 
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the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE). In those two church councils, all doctrines 
and understandings that distinguished Jesus from God (e.g. Arius’ 
interpretation, 256-336 CE) or which separated the divine and human aspects 
of Jesus (e.g. the debate between the Alexandrian and Antiochene Schools) 
were rejected (Macquarrie 1990: 150ff; Haight 1999: 274ff; Capucao 2010: 
53). A modern theologian who strongly supports the classic Christology of the 
cosmic Christ is Karl Barth (see Barth 2003). Barth refuted the humanist 
Christological approach as well as Schleiermacher’s idea of ‘Christology from 
below’. According to Barth, the history of Jesus began in eternity, from above. 
Only God can express Himself; hence Jesus is God incarnate, and belongs 
within the Godhead. The idea of ‘Jesus in eternity’ is understood as Jesus who 
existed before heaven and earth were created (Macquarrie 1990:279ff; Haight 
1999: 310; Barth 2003: 46f; Capucao 2010: 56).  
The image of Jesus as the incarnated God is mentioned in Paul’s 
epistles (Rm 1:20; 1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:15-20). John 3:16 reveals that God sent his 
Son to the earth. This verse must be understood in the context of the incarnated 
logos, where Jesus is God incarnated as a human person. Jesus is referred to as 
the ‘new Adam’, who is different from the first Adam (1 Cor 15:45 and Rm 
5:12). As the new Adam, Jesus is a heavenly man who brought righteousness 
to humanity. Jesus as God incarnate could be called the ‘man of heaven’ who 
led human beings to ‘participate’ in God (Pelikan 1985: 71; Greene 2003: 53). 
The Council of Chalcedon decided that there were two natures of Jesus: Jesus 
as God, and as a human being. The divine and the human were combined in the 
single person of Jesus. In other words, Jesus is a God-man. In this incarnation 
process, according to Barth, the truth about the nature of human beings is 
stated clearly by God himself through the human Jesus. Through His 
resurrection, the position of Jesus as divine mediator between God and man is 
validated by God the Father (Haight 1999: 196).  
 
2.3.1.2 Hermeneutic-oriented Jesus 
The hermeneutic-oriented image of Jesus is the opposite of the classical image 
of Jesus. If in the classical image of Jesus His divinity is the starting point for 
Christology, in the hermeneutic-oriented image of Jesus, the context and 
human experience are the starting point for a reflection on Jesus (Capucao 
2010: 59). The hermeneutic process is based on an interpretation that tries to 
understand the meaning of Jesus in an interaction between context and 
tradition, peoples, cultures, and the biblical stories. In this interpretation, 
people connect their own context and stories to the biblical tradition of Jesus 
(Haight 1999: 16; Küster 2001: 33). Thus, the context of Jesus’ life must be 
understood and related to our current context (cf. Greene 2003: 107; cf. Dupuis 
1997). The pioneer among the modern theologians who introduced this kind of 
Christological discourse was Friedrich Schleiermacher. This line of theological 
development produced new images of Jesus, which we will present in this 
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section. Another popular term from this model is ‘Christology from below’ 
(see Macquarrie 1990: 192ff; Haight 1999: 30ff; Zaccaria 2010: 167ff).  
We will now describe four images belonging to this type of 
hermeneutic-oriented Christology. We will distinguish four images: spirit-
motivated Jesus, society-related Jesus, Jesus in solidarity, and model for a good 
life.  
 
Spirit-motivated Jesus 
In this image, Jesus is seen as a unique person because he is a true 
manifestation of God’s spirit. At the same time, Jesus’ uniqueness is 
represented by his historical presence. Through his works and words as a 
teacher, a prophet, and a servant, the historical Jesus is understood as the 
source of the image of a spirit-motivated Jesus.  
Jesus was perceived differently from the many figures who preceded 
him (Lk 4:16-30, Matt 13:53-58). The crowd around Jesus and his disciples 
recognised him as an individual with unique skills and powers. Jesus 
introduced himself as the one who acted with God's authority or spirit (cf. Mk 
1:27-28, Lk 11:20; Matt 7:28-29; 12:28. See Pelikan 1985: 14; Borg 2006b: 
64). The story of God’s affirmation of Jesus’ existence in the world (Matt 3:16-
17, John 1:32) emphasises that he was unique because of the presence of God's 
spirit in him. This means that Jesus’ actions in the world were a commitment 
of his will to act upon the ideals and hopes of God the Father (Luke 22:42). 
Schleiermacher states that Jesus is the completion of the creation of man, and 
that the presence of God’s spirit in him can truly be felt (Macquarrie 1990: 
207). In this respect, Jesus can be perceived as a ‘spirit-filled person’ (Borg 
2006b: 42ff; Borg 2009: 60; Wright 2009: 35). The whole life of Jesus was 
filled by God’s spirit, which defined his identity.  
Jesus’ uniqueness and the work of God’s spirit can be recognised 
through Jesus’ life, works among and words to humanity. It is important to see 
how this understanding is applied to concrete human experience (see Capucao 
2010: 71). In the gospels, when Jesus asked his disciples, "Who do people say I 
am?", there were several answers. Some said ‘John the Baptist’, others ‘Elijah’, 
and still others ‘one of the Prophets’ (Mk 8:27-28). The three predicates 
mentioned here – teacher, prophet, and servant – give different perspectives on 
Jesus as filled with God’s spirit (cf. Borg 2006b: 50f; Haight 1999: 55 ff).  
Jesus as a teacher is the most common predicate, and the most readily 
accepted (Pelikan 1985: 11). In the New Testament, there are many references 
to Jesus as an ‘Aramaic rabbi’, meaning teacher (Mk 9:5, 11:21; Jn 1:38, 3:2, 
Lk 10:25-37, Matt 19:16; 26:49 etc.). In the gospels, Jesus' ministry in general 
is described as the conveyance of moral teachings and wisdom (‘sage’) to 
people who came to listen to him. The central message conveyed by Jesus is 
the coming of the kingdom of God. In Mark 1:14, Jesus declared that the 
coming of the kingdom was imminent. Wright (2009: 33) explains that the 
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kingdom of God is not a place where God rules, but rather the time when God 
will rule. The kingdom began when Jesus (as the representation of God) came 
to the world. Jesus should not be considered simply a teacher of morals; more 
than that, he was a unique teacher of wisdom that brings people to find 'the 
way' that will heal them and lead them to the truth (Haight 1999: 71; Borg 
2006a: 30f, 56; 2006b: 97ff; Amalados 2006: 32).  
Jesus' teaching about the kingdom of God also demonstrates his 
prophethood (Pelikan 1985; Wright 2009: 32f; cf. Borg 2009: 72). In the 
context of the Jews’ struggle to liberate themselves from the Roman empire 
and their hopes for the coming of the Messiah, Jesus conveyed God's message 
about the kingdom of God – not just through words, but also through his mercy 
and compassion in his work and deeds (Luke 24:19), which were directed by 
God's spirit; because the kingdom of God becomes apparent through Jesus’ 
presence and works (Haight 1999: 66; Greene 2003: 68; Wright 2009: 37). 
The predicate of Jesus as a servant can be seen in John 13:14-17 (cf. 
Lk 22:27), in the story in which Jesus washed the feet of his disciples. Jesus 
demonstrated to his disciples that even though he was called God and was their 
teacher, he was there to serve them. In the early church tradition, Paul used the 
predicate of ‘servant’ to describe the life and words of Jesus, who was willing 
to 'pour out in emptiness', or release his divinity to become a human being 
(Phil 2:5-7; c.f. Matt 16:24). The key term regarding this image is 
‘compassion’. Phil 2:5-7 states that God is compassionate, so we should be 
compassionate (Lk 6:36, Matt 5:48). Borg (2006b: 122) calls the compassion 
shown by Jesus through his words and his life “a radical turning to God”. Jesus 
taught and inspired his disciples to deny themselves, to pick up their crosses, 
and to follow Him (Matt 16: 24; Matt 6:24). Jesus can be perceived as a 
servant, but also as the bearer of wisdom about a new way of living (John 14:6. 
See Borg 2009: 70). In the church’s reflection on Jesus as the Messiah, He is 
often associated with the story of the suffering servant in Isaiah 40-55. The 
Messiah was not seen in pomp and grandeur, but rather in the struggle of 
facing the enemies of Israel (Wright 2009: 97). In this tradition, the Messiah 
was recognised in the concept of the servant of God who brought God's mercy 
to mankind, rather than the ruling king.  
Through his unique life, Jesus shows that God does not want to leave 
human beings without His grace and protection. God’s spirit guarantees the 
continuity of Jesus’ works in human life through the lives of Jesus’ adherents 
(see John 13 and 14). God’s spirit empowers Christians to live and work, and 
to continue in Jesus’ example. In this model, the focus is not only Jesus, but 
also God’s spirit; so God’s spirit can be recognised as working within human 
experience outside the church (Haight 1999: 454, 456).  
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Society-related Jesus  
The society-related image of Jesus in liberation theology raises the idea of 
Jesus as a liberator (Boff 1987). Liberation theology is a theological reflection 
on concrete situations of poverty, oppression and marginalisation. Liberation 
theology is not a mere theme for reflection, but a theology that encourages 
churches to actively embrace a transformation and liberation praxis in poor and 
marginalised communities (Gutierrez 1974; Assmann 1975; Sobrino 1993). 
Awareness and critical analysis of (the praxis of) society is the starting point 
for an understanding of Christian faith that offers hope and a concrete image of 
Jesus. Sobrino (1993: 11ff) labels such a concrete image of Jesus as a ‘new 
image’ of Christ. This kind of Christology does not focus on the identity of 
Jesus as such, but rather on a hermeneutic process of the concrete situation of 
the poor and oppressed. Here, Jesus is a figure with whom people can identify; 
but also a symbol of resilience, and liberation from suffering, poverty and 
marginalisation. In this sense, Jesus is represented in the image of a liberator 
(see Boff 1987).  
The liberation theology developed in Latin America is in a relatively 
homogeneous religious context. In Asia, liberation theology developed from a 
different contextual awareness to the Latin American context. Pieris (1980: 
42), an Asian liberation theologian from Sri Lanka, states that "theology in 
Asia is the Christian apocalypse of the non-Christian experience of liberation." 
Besides the fact that poverty and suffering are highly prevalent in Asia, the 
heterogeneity of cultures and religions is the context of Asia. Typical of 
liberation theology in the Asian context is its inclusiveness towards other 
religious traditions (Wilfred 1994: 152ff; cf. Rayan 1992). In Asian liberation 
theology, Jesus – who suffered on the cross – represents the suffering of all 
human beings. It is not about people who identify themselves with God's 
suffering; but rather, the suffering and crucified God who identifies Himself 
with all beings in their suffering (Song 1980: 165). The spirit of liberation lies 
first in the willingness of God in Jesus Christ to experience the suffering of all 
people, all religions and ethnicities in Asia, so that people can feel hopeful for 
the future (Song 1980; Rayan 1992; Wilfred 1994;). Asian liberation theology 
identifies Jesus as the God who suffers along with the poor and the 
marginalised. By enduring suffering and Jesus’ resurrection, people have hope 
for a new life granted by God through Jesus (Phil 2:8; Song 1980: 54). Jesus, 
who identified himself with human suffering, is a concrete manifestation of 
humanity’s struggle against powerlessness and hopelessness. Song (1980: 167) 
describes the life and work of Jesus as the power of the powerlessness through 
which God frees us from hatred, anger, destruction, despair, and even death 
(Lk 4:18-19). Jesus supported those who were poor and oppressed, and helped 
those who were sick and had sinned. Jesus guided and liberated them to attain 
justice and peace. 
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The society-related image of Jesus can also be characterised through 
the idea of salvation. All people can be redeemed from their sins. In this 
Christology, Jesus is portrayed as a benevolent figure. Sobrino (1993: 18ff) 
states that a dogmatic understanding of salvation is often too abstract. 
Liberation theology – which departs not from above (beyond history), but from 
below (situational) – proposes that salvation is not an individual matter, but 
should be translated in the context of socio-political and economic repression 
(Haight 1999: 383). Furthermore, liberation theology encourages a re-
examination of what Jesus did in this world, and asks what the presence of 
Jesus means in the context of suffering. A hermeneutical process such as this 
(cf. Capucao 2010: 67f) stimulates an understanding that the salvation of Jesus 
brings hope and liberation to people who are suffering (Gal 5:1). From the 
perspective of an Asian liberation theology, the suffering God in Jesus is the 
redeeming God who is present in this world to fight sin and darkness, and 
bring the power of love and hope (Song 1980: 54, 166f). In this respect, our 
relations with the poor and those who are suffering are no longer only a matter 
of social ethics, but also an essential part of the Gospel. Salvation is liberation 
in the context of a society-related image of Jesus. 
 
Jesus in solidarity 
The other hermeneutic-oriented image of Jesus is ‘Jesus in solidarity’. This 
image must be understood in the context of a secularised culture; in other 
words, how do readers interpret the story of Jesus in a modern context (cf. 
Dupuis 1997: 14ff; Banawiratma 2000: 174; Capucao 2010: 73)? Following 
Van Buren (1963), Capucao (2010) demonstrates this kind of Christological 
discourse, and explains that the main idea here is that the current world is not 
to be avoided if we want Jesus to be known and relevant. As the Christological 
discourse of the transcendent or mystical Jesus is no longer appropriate for a 
secular or modern society, Jesus must be seen through the relevant ‘language’, 
i.e., his humanity and his actions regarding ethical issues. This is referred to as 
the ethical approach to Christology (Capucao 2010: 74).  
Pelikan (1985), under the heading ‘Jesus is the Son of Man’, explains 
that the image of the humanity of Jesus, in which Jesus is the concrete 
manifestation of the God who cares about human issues, cannot be avoided. 
The interesting thing here is that the presence of Jesus in the world, even if 
initiated from a mystical and abstract idea, refers in the end to the deeds of 
Jesus as a human in the world. Similarly, the dogmatic understanding of sin 
and the power of demons, in the context of an historical Jesus, come in relation 
to concrete ethical issues, such as suffering, poverty, discrimination, injustice, 
and so on. This indicates that God's revelation in Jesus was a manifestation of 
God's action in history and the human experience (see Song 1980; Capucao 
2010). This is called ‘gospel-based humanism’ (Van Buren 1968:81). When we 
talk about salvation through Jesus’ life, we can understand it in the context of 
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God’s concern for humanity (cf. Schillebeeckx 1980: 222). Jesus’ presence and 
life were meant to liberate humanity from suffering, injustice and 
unrighteousness. His actions introduced the way for people to feel God’s 
awareness of their suffering. Therefore, it is said that in the Gospels, the 
imminence of the Reign of God – in which God's peace and action would be 
evidenced through the presence of Jesus among human beings – was expressed 
in concrete terms (Schillebeeckx 1980: 843; Dupuis 1997). Furthermore, 
Dupuis (1997: 343) states that “Jesus was putting the church at the service of 
the Reign ... charging them to proclaim the coming of the Kingdom (Matt 10:5-
7).” In this respect, to see Jesus in his humanity helps us to meet and 
understand our problem and task in the current context.  
In the Gospels, there are many stories about Jesus that tell us how he 
related to ethical issues in society. There are two well-known parables that can 
serve as examples: the story of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:29-37), and the 
parable of the Last Judgment (Matt 25:31-46). The first parable recounts how a 
Samaritan helped a Jew who had been beaten by robbers and ignored by a 
priest and a Levite. Borg (2006a: 176) states that this parable shows the central 
importance of compassion in the ethical teachings of Jesus; compassion 
reaches beyond hostility, ethnicity and social differences. Similarly, the second 
parable shows that people who have taken care of the sick, the naked, the poor, 
and strangers are judged well when facing the last judgement. Compassion 
encourages us to care for everyone, and Jesus demonstrated through his life 
how compassion produces solidarity and care (Borg 2006a: 178f). He paid 
attention to people, and secured them whatever they needed (see also Lk 14:1-
6, 18:35-42). Jesus reprimanded his disciples when they disregarded other 
people. He encouraged nurturing a deep solidarity with the entire community. 
Even the death of Jesus on the cross (the crucified Christ) demonstrates 
solidarity, patience and charity with all human beings, including sinners and 
those who suffer. It refers to the understanding that true love is self-sacrificing 
love for the needs of others; and Jesus demonstrated this love through his 
commitment and involvement in his life in the world (Song 1980: 55; 
Schillebeeckx 1980: 222 ff; Pelikan 1985: 104).  
Capucao (2010: 74f), following Van Buren, concludes that nurturing 
human relationships is the fundamental need of our secular and modern 
society. The image of Jesus in solidarity that focuses on his humanity and 
compassion for other human beings is the response to that need. It uses the 
horizontal perspective as the starting point of the Christological discourse. 
Here, Jesus is the ultimate example of human solidarity. It asks: If the disciples 
of Jesus had seen concrete examples through the actions and life of Jesus about 
how to live with solidarity and care for everyone, then how do people of 
modern times deal with this image (cf. Banawiratma 2000)?  
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Model for a good life 
As mentioned previously, this model is adapted from the same image of 
Muhammad in Islam, called uswa (model for a good life). Theoretically, the 
image of Muhammad as uswa is based on the fact that Muhammad’s life is the 
central figure of the religion, guiding people to follow God’s rule. Regarding 
Jesus, the image of the model for a good life shows that Jesus is also a central 
and guiding figure in Christianity. The traditional image of Jesus as a divine 
figure is retained; however, the divine entity descended and became a perfect 
human. In this sense, Jesus is seen as the model of the perfect human, whose 
example should be followed.  
The image of Jesus that was described by Paul, namely “the new 
Adam” (1 Cor 15:45f; Rm 5:12f.), is relevant to the image of the model for a 
good life. The first Adam failed to follow God’s will, and so led humans into 
punishment. As a new Adam, Jesus brought about the opposite. Jesus is the 
incarnated God, a perfect human, because he is from God. Greene (2003: 
53,59) states that as a new Adam, Jesus is the prototype of a new, reconciled 
humanity, who brings grace, righteousness and life everlasting. According to 
Greene (2009: 107), this image is a natural rather than a supernatural view of 
the classical Jesus, and it presents the possibility for humans to live in 
communion with God. Humans can see Jesus as a perfect example of a human 
life lived in conformity with God’s will. We can learn from Jesus’ life and 
teachings, and we can share in the divine sonship (Rm 8:12-17; 2 Cor 3:17-18). 
Through Jesus, we can learn about God’s will directly. A different explanation 
describing the image of the model for a good life is given by Hick (2001). He 
proposes an interpretation called ‘metaphorical Christology’, in which the 
incarnated Jesus is a metaphor for “the ideal of human life lived in full 
openness to God, the ideal agape, self-giving love according to God’s plan” 
(2001: 152). This Christological discourse confirms the existence of Jesus 
beyond the metaphor itself. Jesus can be relevant for humans as a model of 
how we should live according to God. 
Another characteristic of the model for a good life that can be traced 
from the Christology discourse is the idea of the ‘Reign of God’. The Reign of 
God is the main message proclaimed by Jesus. The concept of the Reign of 
God refers not to heaven, but to the idea of living according to God’s will, and 
living with and for others, including the sufferers and the poor. In the Reign of 
God, the human community can experience the ‘right’ way to live in the world 
with respect to all humanity, and the attainment of truth through Jesus (Haight 
1999; Greene 2003; Borg 2006a). Jesus, who proclaimed the Reign of God, 
also lived it (Matt 8:20). Jesus is the ideal example of living in the Reign of 
God, an example whom all people can follow.  
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2.3.1.3 Humanistic Jesus 
The ‘humanistic’ image of Jesus focuses on his humanity, and is based on an 
historical and secular perspective. In this image, Jesus is regarded as a religious 
figure who lived and worked in a particular historical and social context. We 
will describe this image through historical perspectives and social psychology. 
At the beginning of his book The Historical Jesus, Crossan (1991) 
states that the images of Jesus are varied. The historical perspective of Jesus is 
often not critically examined in theology. More often, the historical figure of 
Jesus – which cannot actually be taken out of the context of Hellenistic 
Judaism in Palestine during the Roman occupation, including all of the 
historical dynamics of that time – is overlooked or dismissed by various 
dogmatic claims. Jesus, then, is perceived as a figure who is not human. The 
‘historical’ Jesus refers to the recognition of the Jesus who was a 
Mediterranean Jewish peasant in the early first century. At that time, economic 
issues, oppression and social-political injustice in the Jewish community under 
Roman colonial rule (imperial slavery) and Jewish religious leaders was 
causing social unrest. Therefore, states Crossan (1991: 421), the historical 
Jesus was a rebellious Jewish peasant who appeared in the midst of this social 
tension. Jesus’ free healings, communal meals, promotion of religious and 
economic egalitarianism, and criticism of the hierarchical and patronage norms 
of the Jewish religious leaders and Roman power were expressions of protest 
and anger from lower Galilee. From this perspective, the historical Jesus was a 
great person who appeared in the right place at the right time, no more than 
that. Jesus is an historical apocalyptic figure in a particular context; however, 
early Christianity in the first century changed the apocalyptic Jesus into a non-
apocalyptic figure, and promoted misunderstandings of Jesus’ life, divinity and 
resurrection (Crossan 2001: 95f). The historical Jesus is seen as an important 
figure who brought important messages to the world, but nothing more than 
that. As Funk (2001: 139) mentions, early Christianity and church orthodoxy 
interpreted Jesus’ birth, crucifixion, and resurrection in the mystical framework 
of a dying/rising lord. In this respect, early Christianity misinterpreted the 
figure of the historical Jesus (cf. Crossan 2001).  
In addition to the historical approach, the social psychological 
approach too can provide an image of the human Jesus. Fromm (1963) is a 
scholar who uses a psychoanalytical perspective to understand religion, 
especially religious conviction about Jesus. According to Fromm, the 
traditional doctrine of Jesus in Christianity (Act 2:36) is an expression of hope 
in a particular society that was full of suffering and oppression due to Roman 
rule. In this context, Fromm refers to Jesus as the ‘Christ fantasy’ (Fromm 
1963: 46f). By using the perspective of Freud's psychoanalysis, Fromm 
explains that Jesus is the figure of a man who was placed at God's side and was 
made a co-regent with God the Father. Furthermore, Fromm (1963: 47) says, 
"Jesus was a symbol of their unconscious hostility to God the father, for if a 
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man could become God, the latter was deprived of his privileged fatherly 
position of being unique and unreachable." Thus, the man became God; and 
this fantasy satisfied the oppressed.  
But three centuries after the time of Jesus, Christianity became the 
official religion of Roman Empire, during the reign of Constantine. At this 
time, according to Fromm (1963: 60ff), Christianity changed from the religion 
of the oppressed to the religion of the rulers. Under these conditions, Christian 
dogma also changed; it departed from the idea of man becoming God, 
embracing the idea of God becoming man. In this respect, Jesus was 
recognised as God (cf. the image of incarnation). According to Fromm, this 
view deviated from the basic postulates of the founders of Christianity; 
therefore, the history of Jesus is different from 'the Christ dogma' (1963: 77). 
Basically, this transformation demonstrates how people fight to overcome the 
problems in their lives; they do not just take refuge in concepts that are 
transcendent.  
 
2.3.2 Results 
 
We will now describe these categories of images of Jesus as they fit into three 
general strands. First, according to Capucao (2010), we see that tradition-
bound images include classical and neo-classical models. However, we have 
combined the tradition-bound images in only one representative classical 
image of Jesus, which refers the concept of divine incarnation. The reason is 
that we expected that our Christian respondents would be able to understand 
this image more easily, because it already exists in their mindset – regardless 
of whether they agree with it or not. Second, for hermeneutic-oriented images 
of Jesus, we selected and will describe four aspects: spirit-motivated, society-
related, solidarity, and model for a good life. We modified Capucao’s 
categories, replacing his aspects of the interpersonal-oriented Jesus with the 
image of the model for a good life, which was adapted from our exploration of 
the images of Muhammad. This image of Muhammad as a model (uswa) 
expresses how Muslims recognise Muhammad as the central religious figure 
who taught them about living a good life, as an individual and as a member of 
society. We predicted that this model could also be relevant for Christians, as 
Jesus is also the central religious figure in the Christian religion, from whom 
they can learn about God’s will. The third and last category concerns the 
humanistic Jesus, where Jesus is acknowledged more from a historical and 
social perspective.  
We examined and constructed six conceptual models of the images of 
Jesus (Table 2.7). We operationalised these six conceptual models into an 18-
item list – three items for each image. For most items we selected and adapted 
items from Van der Ven and Biemans (1994: 205f; Van der Ven et al. 2004: 
591f; Capucao 2010: 257ff). The first image is the image of the classical Jesus, 
CHAPTER 2 
 
84 
which has two indicators: the concept of the divinity of Jesus, in which Jesus is 
perceived as existing with God since the beginning of time; and Jesus as the 
incarnation of God in human form. The second image is of the spirit-motivated 
Jesus. The indicator of this image is Jesus as a unique representation of the 
existence of God’s spirit. At the same time, Jesus’ uniqueness was represented 
through his historical life, especially through his works and lessons as a 
teacher, prophet, and servant. The society-related Jesus is the third image. 
Since this image is inspired by liberation theology, the indicator concerns how 
Jesus dealt with the situations of the poor, oppressed and marginalised victims 
of socio-political policies. The next image is Jesus in solidarity, which focuses 
on Jesus’ life and work in concrete human experience. Solidarity and care are 
the ethical issues that are relevant with the current situation. The fifth image is 
the model for a good life. The indicator is the presence of Jesus as the model of 
an ideal human. Through Jesus, people can learn about God’s will and 
experience the right way to live in the world, with respect for all of humanity 
and truth. The final image is the humanistic Jesus, which focuses on Jesus as a 
person who inspires people, and as a religious figure who lived and worked in 
a particular historical and social context (see Table 2.7).  
 
Table 2.7: Operationalisation of images of Jesus 
 
Theoretical models Items 
Classical 1. God sent his son Jesus to earth 
6 Jesus is the God-man who existed with the father from the beginning 
14. Before Jesus came to earth he had lived with the father from the 
beginning 
 
Spirit-motivated 2. Jesus was a unique prophet, as God’s Spirit of mercy directed his work 
and deeds 
10. Jesus was a unique servant, as God’s Spirit of compassion animated 
his life and words 
15. Jesus was a unique teacher, as God’s Spirit of love was in him 
 
Society-related 3. Jesus works among the marginalized in their struggle for liberation 
8. Jesus guides the oppressed to the land of justice and peace 
17. Jesus supports the poor by liberating them from injustice 
 
Solidarity 4. Jesus has shown us how to live in solidarity with others 
9. Through his life Jesus showed us what it is to care for everybody 
13. Jesus was a real example of caring for everybody in need 
 
Model for a good life 7. Jesus teaches me to live rightfully with and for others 
12. Through Jesus I learn to live according to God's plan. 
18. Through Jesus, I learn the right way to live with and for others. 
 
Humanistic 5. Jesus is no more then a good person who inspires people how to live 
well. 
11. Jesus was just a historical person, no more 
16. Jesus is no more than a great figure in human history 
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Now we will show the empirical ‘grounding’ of the conceptual framework 
regarding the images of Jesus spelled out in the preceding section. We shall 
explore the empirical tenability of the conceptualisation of these images. Since 
Jesus is the central religious figure in Christianity based on religious 
experience and the concept of the trinity, we realise that it is difficult to have a 
truly common idea among both Christians and Muslims. Although Jesus is also 
recognised as a prophet in Islam and in the Koran, this recognition comes with 
a totally different understanding. Basically, Muslims do not accept the concept 
of the trinity associated with Jesus in Christianity (Murata & Chittick 1995: 
170f cf. Leirvik 2004). Jesus is seen as an important figure in the Koran 
because he is the one of the prophets sent by God to warn people of the 
consequences of resisting God’s will. Muslims recognise Jesus as a person 
from whom they can learn (Sura 3:45-46; 5:17,75; 19:30ff.; 4:172). In the 
Islamic tradition, Jesus is also recognised as a person who is still alive, and will 
return to this sinful world to fight against the Antichrist /Al-Dajjāl. Later, Jesus 
will be a king of the whole world, and will proclaim Islam as righteousness 
(Cragg 1999a: 59; Peters 2011: 268; see Sura 19:33; 43:57-64). For Muslims, 
Jesus is the prophet and messenger of God who came before Muhammad, who 
was the last prophet and the most central religious figure in Islam. Thus, the 
perception of Jesus in Islam is fundamentally different from the perception of 
Jesus in Christianity. We decided not to make a cross-religious comparison 
between Christians and Muslims. We ran this empirical test among Christians 
only. The question is: Does the empirical data corroborate the theoretical 
conceptualisations about the images of Jesus among Christian students in 
Indonesia? We answered this question by reviewing our research questions by 
factor analysis, and then by analysing the survey responses.  
After subjecting the scores from Christian respondents to the 18-item 
list to factor analysis,
18
 we found mixed factors. Four factors were extracted. 
Subsequently, we still had a problem with the forced four-factor solution: item 
1 coincided with an inappropriate factor. We then filtered item 1 (‘God sent his 
son to earth’) and then conducted a forced four-factor solution. We obtained a 
four-factor solution in the following models: classical Jesus (items 6 and 14), 
spirit-motivated Jesus (items 10, 2, and 15), humanistic Jesus (items 16, 11, 
and 5) and one factor each for solidarity, society-related Jesus, and model for a 
good life (items 18, 7, 12, 9, 8, 13, 4, 17, and 3). Theoretically, we can explain 
this new scale (items 18, 7, 12, 9, 8, 13, 4, 17, and 3) because the three images 
concerned come from the discourse of hermeneutic-oriented Christology, and 
have a similar core – i.e. Jesus as a model from whom people can learn about 
how to live with others and in the current context. We labelled this new factor 
the ‘Jesus model’. For Christians, the result explains 54.7% of the variance. 
                                                 
18
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
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Table 2.8: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of images of Jesus among Christian students. 
 
Items Theory 
Dimension 
h2 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
18. Through Jesus, I learn the right way to live 
with and for others. 
Model for a 
good life 
.83    .65 
7. Jesus teaches me to live rightfully with and for 
others 
Model for a 
good life 
.77    .58 
12. Through Jesus I learn to live according to 
God's plan. 
Model for a 
good life 
.71    .53 
9. Through his life Jesus showed us what it is to 
care for everybody 
Solidarity .71    .52 
8. Jesus guides the oppressed to the land of justice 
and peace 
Society-related .71    .51 
13. Jesus was a real example of caring for 
everybody in need 
Solidarity .67    .48 
4. Jesus has shown us how to live in solidarity 
with others 
Solidarity .65    .53 
17. Jesus supports the poor by liberating them 
from injustice 
Society-related .63    .46 
3. Jesus works among the marginalized in their 
struggle for liberation 
Society-related .47    .37 
16. Jesus is no more than a great figure in human 
history 
Humanistic  .94   .85 
11. Jesus was just a historical person, no more Humanistic  .88   .75 
5. Jesus is no more then a good person who 
inspires people how to live well. 
Humanistic  .56   .35 
6 Jesus is the God-man who existed with the father 
from the beginning 
Classical   .88  .74 
14. Before Jesus came to earth he had lived with 
the father from the beginning 
Classical   .60  .42 
10. Jesus was a unique servant, as God’s Spirit of 
compassion animated his life and words 
Spirit-
motivated 
   -.70 .53 
2. Jesus was a unique prophet, as God’s Spirit of 
mercy directed his work and deeds 
Spirit-
motivated 
   -.67 .45 
15. Jesus was a unique teacher, as God’s Spirit of 
love was in him 
Spirit-
motivated 
   -.61 .58 
Cronbach’s Alpha .90 .82 .71 .76  
Number of valid cases 702 692 704 699  
Total variance explained 54.7%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Model; F2 = Humanism; F3 = Incarnation; F4 = Inspiration 
 
The table below provides a summary of the agreement from the empirical 
investigation of the images of Jesus for Christians.  
 
Table 2.9: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
images of Jesus for Christian students 
 
 N Mean s.d. 
Classical 704 4.15 .83 
Spirit-motivated 699 4.36 .69 
Model 707 4.57 .43 
Humanistic 692 2.46 1.16 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
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We indicate the agreement of our respondents with newly constructed scales of 
images of Jesus in each group. We used a Likert scale (1-5) to measure the 
agreement of our Christian respondents, from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to ‘fully 
agree’ (5), and we analysed it through the mean score.  
The highest mean score is for Jesus as a model for a good life (m 4.57; 
s.d .43), followed by the images of spirit-motivated (m 4.36; s.d .69) and 
classical Jesus (m 4.15; s.d .83). These are all accepted by Christians. Jesus as 
a model for a good life has the highest mean score with the lowest standard 
deviation. The t-test shows that the difference is significant between the image 
of Jesus as a model for a good life and the image of classical Jesus (t 14.34, df 
703, p .00), and so is the difference between Jesus as a model for a good life 
and Jesus as spirit-motivated (t 9.62, df 698, p .00). This indicates that 
Christians accept the image of Jesus as a model for a good life very well, even 
more so than the images of classical and spirit-motivated Jesus. In this 
particular image, Jesus is recognised as the central figure from whom 
Christians can learn how they should live with others and about God’s will. 
Jesus’ life is the source of the values of love, justice, liberation, peace, and 
compassion. The image of the Jesus model fits with the needs of Indonesian 
society, in which diversity, injustice, marginalisation, and poverty are part of 
the concrete situation.  
Table 2.9 also shows that our Christian respondents recognise the 
classical image of Jesus. Thus, we can see that classical Christology concurs 
with hermeneutic-oriented Christology. The ‘Christology from above’ that 
emphasises the divinity of Jesus is not separated from the ‘Christology from 
below’ that emphasises the humanity of Jesus and the hermeneutic process of 
recognising Jesus.  
The humanistic image of Jesus was rejected by our Christian 
respondents (m 2.46; s.d 1.16). This could be because the core of Christianity 
is about Jesus as the son of God, not just as a historical figure. He is the 
saviour of humanity. The doctrines of the Council of Nicea (325 CE) and the 
Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) that are still recognized by many churches in 
Indonesia as the main sources of Christian confession are based on the 
perception of Jesus as both a human and as God.  
 
2.4 Models for interpreting Holy Scripture and faith 
 
How do Muslims and Christians respectively interpret their Holy Scripture(s)? 
And in what possible ways do they interpret their own faith, particularly their 
belief in God? The way in which people interpret religious texts and faith 
reflects the idea that they have about what religious texts and beliefs express as 
norms, rites, values and conduct (cf. Setio 2009: 119). In other words, the 
meaning of a text in Holy Scripture and people’s belief in God should be more 
important than the definition of what Holy Scripture is. Some people think that 
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the Holy Scriptures express the relationship between human beings and God. If 
they understand them as a literal description of this relationship, they will 
favour a literal interpretation of religious texts and faith. If they think texts and 
faith demand a critical interpretation in relation to human experiences of God 
in our time, they will favour a hermeneutical interpretation.  
There are also models of interpretations which interpret texts and 
belief in terms of something other than the relationship between man and God. 
In a historical interpretation, texts and beliefs express historical facts. In a 
psychological interpretation, texts and beliefs are understood as the expression 
of mental processes (such as longings, fears, and hopes).  
Each model for interpreting religion reflects methods. They have a 
long history, and have undergone vigorous debate in different times and places. 
There are scholars connected with each model of interpretation – such as 
Schleiermacher, in regard to the hermeneutical method, and Freud, regarding 
the psychological approach. In our study we are not interested in analysing the 
positions of these interpretations in history; but we distinguish between the 
different models for interpreting religion as ideal types (in the Weberian 
sense).  
 In a previous study (Wulff 1997; Fontaine et al. 2003), people who 
accepted a literal interpretation of their religious scriptures tended to score 
higher on measures of prejudice, and showed a lower ability to adapt. Among 
Christians and Muslims, for instance, theological justification for violence is 
always found in how religious believers develop their doctrines, based on their 
interpretation of particular texts and religious figures in the Bible or the Koran 
respectively (cf. Steffen 2013: 102ff; Lawrence 2013: 127ff). This position 
tends to support an exclusivist religious attitude, in which only one religious 
tradition or scripture is accepted in defining the true God. In this sense we 
really need a kind of critical process for interpreting Holy Scripture, to 
encourage trust. The question that arises here is: Which model for interpreting 
Holy Scripture and religion do our respondents recognise and accept? Later, in 
Chapter 4, we will see whether these variables correlate with and predict 
religiously-inspired generalised trust.  
This section has two sub-sections. First, we will discuss the theoretical 
aspects of the different models for interpreting Holy Scripture and belief in 
God (2.4.1). Next, we will present the empirical results from our research 
(2.4.2). The leading research questions are: Which models for interpreting 
Holy Scripture and faith can be identified among Muslim and Christian 
students in Indonesia? Are there any differences between Muslim and Christian 
students in the levels of agreement regarding different forms of interpreting 
Holy Scripture and faith? 
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2.4.1 Theory 
 
We created four models for interpreting the Holy Scriptures and faith: literal, 
hermeneutical, historical, and psychological interpretations. 
 
2.4.1.1 Literal interpretation 
In a literal interpretation, every story in Holy Scripture – including the miracles 
– is accepted as reality, and an actual event that occurred in time and space. 
Non-acceptance of the literal interpretation is viewed as a denial of God. 
Agreement with a literal understanding is seen as a strong indicator of religious 
orthodoxy. The presumption is that the Scripture is recognised as literally the 
Word of God proclaiming the truth. In line with this, a literal understanding 
can be seen as an attitude of submission to the authority of God. God is also 
the very source of the words and deeds in which He expresses himself in 
history. The aim of reading Holy Scripture in the first place is mainly to 
maintain religious doctrines. In this sense, Holy Scripture is immune to any 
form of criticism. That is why this literal interpretation model is considered an 
orthodox approach (cf. Martin 1975: 135; Childs 1992: 30; Collins 2005: 13).  
In the history of biblical interpretation, in the third century the school 
of Antioch maintained a very literal sense of the Holy Scriptures (Grant & 
Tracy 2010: 172). One of the famous scholars from this school was Theodore 
of Mopsuestia, who held the view that the meaning of the text is dependent on 
the historical events described in the text. According to Collins (2005: 13f), 
theologians espousing a literal interpretation are not so much interpreting the 
scripture, as reading texts from their own dogmatic viewpoint. Collins calls 
this attitude a ‘history interpreted by faith’, and the opposite of historical 
research. In this interpretation everything in Holy Scripture is true and 
possible, as long as the (religious) central message and the religious doctrine of 
the theologian himself is confirmed (Childs 1992:11f; Collins 20015: 14).  
A literal interpretation is also strong in the Islamic tradition of reading 
the Koran. The Koran is literally the Word of God that Muhammad, the last 
prophet, received directly from God (Schimmel 1985; Khan 1986; Armstrong 
1991; Ernst 2003; Haleem 2008). In Arabic, the word Koran derives from 
qara’a meaning ‘to read’, or qarana meaning ‘to collect’ (Esack 2005: 30). 
There is a strong consensus among Muslim scholars that the best interpretation 
of the Koran is the Koran itself; and Muhammad, as its recipient, provided the 
explanations in the Koran (Saeed 2006: 8f; Mattson 2008: 184). The Koran is 
seen as a miracle in which people can find God’s true message. After the 
prophet Muhammad died, his followers opposed any new efforts to interpret 
the Koran (cf. Rahman 1966: 40). Some Muslims believe that the Koran has no 
hidden meanings that require particular knowledge to understand (Essack 
2005: 17f; Mattson 2008: 222). The Koran is accepted as the written form of 
revelations in Arabic, which is a sacred language, and literal interpretation is 
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more common and acceptable. The Koran is the single truth that governs 
human behaviour (cf. Sura 38:1; 36:11; 41:41). 
 
2.4.1.2 Hermeneutical interpretation 
In a hermeneutical approach, the meaning of Holy Scripture needs to be 
reflected and elaborated. because the text is perceived more as a ‘symbol’ that 
conveys relating to the divine (cf. Bruns 1992: 83ff; Haleem 1993: 72ff; Wulf 
1997; Fontaine et al. 2003; Dempsey 2010). A hermeneutical interpretation 
does not reject the fact that Holy Scripture has authority; but this interpretation 
model acknowledges the distance between the reader, who is living today, and 
the texts of the scripture. Religious believers and readers should realise that the 
scripture does not give a direct knowledge about the divine without a critical 
interpretation, in search of the meaning of the text in terms of the relationship 
between man and God. The attraction of the hermeneutics approach is its 
flexibility in interpreting texts in light of relevant contemporary contexts and 
issues. Meaning and the understanding of religious beliefs are not to be seen as 
static, because the text of Holy Scripture needs to be applied to the needs and 
concerns of people in a specific time and place. (Barton 1998; Carroll 1998; 
Clark 2004; Han 2004; Saeed 2006). 
In Christian (biblical) theology, the development of the hermeneutical 
methods of interpretation has influenced biblical scholarship from the 
beginning (Palmer 1969; Thiselton 1992). Based on the history of biblical 
theology, allegorical interpretation is the first model, and an essential part of 
hermeneutics process (Childs 1992: 13; Bruns 1992). This method was used in 
the time of the Stoics, with the interpretation of Greek and Roman myths. 
Allegorical interpretation, which is quite subjective in interpreting the 
meanings behind the symbols or words in holy texts, was popularised by the 
mashab of Alexandria in the second century. In the allegorical approach, the 
main idea usually is that the Old Testament is a testimony to the time before 
Jesus Christ (cf. Childs 1992: 14). Clement of Alexandria interpreted texts of 
the Old Testament as symbols of the presence of a deeper truth, namely Jesus 
Christ, indicating that these Old Testament texts were christocentric. Origen 
was another well-known figure in Alexandria at that time who suggested that 
the core of the biblical text was prophecy announcing the coming of Jesus. The 
other great allegorist is Philo, who interpreted the story of Cain and Abel (Gen 
4:1-16) as a moral narrative about the soul’s internal conflict, and about how 
self-love destroys the love of God (Bruns 1992: 94).  
Biblical hermeneutics developed in the 20
th
 century, including literary 
criticism, structuralism, ideology criticism, and the narrative approach. A 
literary criticism approach focuses on how the reader can gain meaning from 
the text by focusing on the text as literature, rather than placing it in a historical 
context. It is treated as a story or poem which contains (relevant) messages 
(Childs 1992: 18ff; Jasper 1998). Jasper (1998: 25) defines literary readings as 
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hovering between the imaginative and poetic, and the academic. In this 
approach, Holy Scripture is seen not only as a sacred text, but also as a 
‘classic’ text in which there are two kinds of textual meaning; firstly, the 
semantic meaning of textual language, and secondly, the meaning that results 
from the interaction between the context of the text and the context of the 
reader (cf. Barr 1960; Childs 1992; Barton 1994; Saeed 2006).  
Hermeneutics in Islam may not have developed as early as it did in 
Christianity; but this does not mean that the hermeneutic interpretation of the 
Koran is non-existent (Akhtar 1997: 107; Saeed 2006; cf. Körner 2005; Esack 
2005; Mattson 2008). Traditionally, Islamic theology has known tafsir 
(interpreting) as a discipline. The Koran is the written text of revelations from 
Allah to Muhammad, which are not always explicit (cf. Sura 3:7). Many verses 
are allegorical, or have hidden meanings which must be interpreted and the 
meaning extracted (Esack 2005: 76; Mattson 2008: 222). Early Islamic 
scholars, such as Muqatil ibn Sulayman and al-Razi, interpreted the Koran 
through linguistic and contextual analyses (Mattson 2008: 186ff). For example, 
Abrahamov (1996: 4) shows how Muqatil ibn Sulayman interpreted Sura 48:10 
(“God’s hand is over their hands”) by explaining that ‘God’s hand’ cannot be 
interpreted literally, but should be understood as an assurance that God keeps 
His promises. The Mu᾽tazilite school in the eighth and ninth century obviously 
support a hermeneutical interpretation of the Koran, particularly regarding the 
anthropomorphism of God (Watt 1973; cf. Abrahamov 1996: 6). Modern 
interpretations of Islam are accepted as legitimate, as long as the Koran is the 
highest source of religious and moral legitimacy (Moussalli 1999; Saeed 2006).  
In the modern era, we have seen Islamic scholars such as Fazlur 
Rahman in the USA and Nurcholish Madjid in Indonesia use a 
contextualisation approach, because they acknowledge the distance between 
the context of the text (the Koran) and our contemporary situation. The Koran 
as the revelation of the Word of God is still accepted as a religious idea; but we 
should always remember that the Koran was revealed in a specific context to 
the prophet. As a consequence, we need to find and interpret the important 
meanings about the relationship between man and God, and about values, 
found in the scriptures (Johns & Saeed 2004: 79ff; Esack 2005: 142ff; cf. 
Haleem 1993).  
 
2.4.1.3 Historical interpretation 
The historical interpretation model reflects the idea that the text of Holy 
Scripture can be interpreted as a rational process (De Wit 2004: 8f; cf. Fontaine 
2003; Han 2004). In the history of biblical interpretation, this model emerged 
when rationalism began to develop in Europe in the 15
th
 century (Grant and 
Tracy 2010: 111). Faith in God was no longer assumed, but began to be viewed 
from a more rational perspective. Belief in God's plan and revelation, for 
example, cannot simply be referred to in the scriptural text. The Holy 
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Scriptures should be recognised as texts written by authors, and the reader 
should recognise the author’s experiences of God in specific contexts. This 
means that the experience of God in the Holy Scriptures is developed by 
religious believers, within the particularity and dynamic movement of history 
(Childs 1992: 16). Religious images in the Holy Scriptures are not set in stone, 
because they are influenced by particular contexts and cultures. In other words, 
the meaning we extract from the Scriptures is only one among many other 
possibilities (see Fontaine 2003). 
Regarding the history of interpreting the Koran, we refer again to the 
Mu’tazilites, a group of intellectuals who upheld the employment of reason and 
logic in theology and faith-building (Watt 1973; Rahman 1982; Esack 2005; 
Mattson 2008). In the eighth and ninth centuries CE, in the cities of Basra and 
Baghdad, this school supported a philosophical and critical approach to the 
Koran. The Mu'tazilites accepted the Koran as the word of God; but at the 
same time, they accepted that the Koran had been created at a certain time and 
in a certain context. Islamic reform theologians such as Fazlur Rahman and 
Abdullah Saeed, and Turkish Islamic scholars such as Mehmet Paḉaci and 
İlhami Güler, also investigate the Koran via the framework of the time when it 
was revealed to Muhammad (Rahman 1966: 40f; Saeed 2006: 116ff; cf. Körner 
2005; Esack 2005). Mattson (2008: 32) says that “[m]any of the first Qur’anic 
verses to be revealed relate to Muhammad’s inner state as he began his 
prophetic mission”. In this sense, if the Koran is seen as God’s revelation at a 
specific time, it must be acknowledged that the revelation was influenced by 
the historical and social conditions of that time (Esack 2005: 111; Saeed 
2006:124f). 
 
2.4.1.4 Psychological interpretation 
The psychological interpretation model sees religious concepts as expressions 
of psychological processes. Although it is not necessary to reduce religious 
concepts to mental mechanisms, the process of rationalism in modernity gives 
a strong basis for this type of interpretation. The central idea is that science 
provides rational explanations for many worldly phenomena, including human 
faith in God. Religious concepts of God, salvation, rites, religious institutions 
and moral norms are understood to be products of the human mind (Boyer 
2010). According to Boyer (2010: 12), “Beliefs in gods and spirits are not 
explained by the existence of gods and spirits, but by mental assumptions 
about agency.” Beliefs about the origin of morality are not explained by moral 
codes and commandments, but by the way humans’ minds represent moral 
judgements.  
Typical of the psychological perspective is a functional definition of 
religion. Freud (1961), the founder of psychoanalysis, explains that the oldest 
and most urgent wish of human beings is to free themselves of the terrifying 
impression of helplessness in childhood. According to Freud (1961: 24, 171; 
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cf. Freud 1966: 412), their longing for god(s) is identical to their longing for a 
father who will protect them against the consequences of their weakness. From 
this aspect, as Freud posits (1955: 186), “religions find their place as attempts 
to seek a compensation for the lack of satisfaction of human wishes.” Religion 
and faith are illusions created to fulfil human needs. People trust and rely on 
religion to secure a better life for themselves by exorcising the terrors of 
nature, reconciling them to the harshness of death, and compensating them for 
suffering (Freud 1961: 18). 
 
2.4.2 Results 
 
In this section we describe the process of scale construction of models for 
interpreting Holy Scripture. First, we formulated two indicators for each model 
of interpretation. Based on this conceptual framework we operationalised the 
models in statements that were then presented to our respondents. According to 
the theoretical explanation above, there are four models for the interpretation 
process of religion and Holy Scripture: the literal, hermeneutic, historical, and 
psychological interpretations.  
We will now describe the first step, i.e. the formulation of two 
indicators for each model. For the first model, literal interpretation, the first 
indicator is that God’s truth is defined and delivered only in the texts of the 
Holy Scriptures, and therefore the texts are immutable. Religious believers 
must accept the texts literally. The second indicator is the idea that people’s 
own scripture represents the only path that leads to God. In a literal 
interpretation there is only one truth, which is found only in people’s own 
scriptures. 
The second model is hermeneutic interpretation. The first indicator is 
the idea that Holy Scripture has a deep truth with regard to man’s relationship 
to God, which can only be found through interpretation. The second indicator 
is that the deep meaning of Holy Scripture about the relationship between man 
and God is not affected by historical factors or the time of writing. Holy 
Scripture is not merely a historical and social account.  
The two indicators for the third model, historical interpretation, are: 
firstly, that all human experiences about God and our religious beliefs cannot 
escape the effects of history and social context. The second indicator is the idea 
that human experiences of God are malleable, because they depend on specific 
situations and contexts. Consequently, our beliefs about God based on our 
interpretation of Holy Scripture are only one of many possibilities.  
Psychological interpretation is the fourth model. The first indicator for 
this model is the idea that modern science makes religious explanations 
superfluous. The second indicator is the idea that human faith is the expression 
of psychological processes and illusionary wishes (e.g. the expression of a 
weak personality). 
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Out next step was the construction of items in order to measure the 
four models for the interpretation of Holy Scripture. Our measuring instrument 
consisted of eighteen statements (Table 2.10). The literal interpretation and 
psychological interpretation processes each consisted of five-item lists, while 
the hermeneutical interpretation and historical interpretation processes 
consisted of four-item lists. 
 
Table 2.10: Operationalisation of models for interpreting Holy Scripture and 
faith  
 
Theoretical models Items 
Literal interpretation 2. God has been defined for once and for all and therefore is immutable 
5. Even though this goes against modern rationality, religious wonders are 
possible 
8. Only specific religious traditions guarantee admittance to God 
10. Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious question 
15. I think that stories in the Sacred Scriptures should be taken literally, as 
they are written 
Hermeneutic interpretation 1. 1. The Sacred Scriptures hold a deeper truth which can only be revealed 
by personal reflection 
4. The Sacred Scriptures are a rough guide in the search for God, and not a 
historical account 
7. Even though the Sacred Scriptures were written a long time ago, they 
retains a basic message 
16. Despite the injustices caused by my religion, its original message 
remains valuable to me 
Historical interpretation 6. Each statement about God is a result of the time in which it was made 
9. The manner in which humans experience God will always be coloured 
by society 
13. God grows together with the history of humanity and therefore is 
changeable 
14. My beliefs are only one possibility among many others 
Psychological interpretation 3. Faith turns out to be an illusion when one is confronted with the 
harshness of life 
11. The world of stories from the Sacred Scriptures is so far removed from 
us, that it has little relevance 
12. Science has made a religious understanding of life superfluous 
17. In the end, faith is nothing more than a safety net for human fears 
18. Faith is an expression of a weak personality 
 
When we examined the correlations among the four models for interpreting 
Holy Scripture and faith, a correlation stronger than .30 was found between 
only two pairs of items: items 17 and 18 (.42), and between items 2 and 13 (-
.31). We decided to run a factor analysis using only the four items 17, 18, 2 
and 13 for both religious groups.
19
 A further analysis for each group separately 
showed no difference in result. The result of the factor analysis showed a two-
factor solution. The total variance explained for both groups is 39.3%. The first 
                                                 
19
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
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factor (items 18 and 17) refers to the psychological interpretation. The second 
factor consisted of items 13 and 2. Item 13 has the highest factor loading. We 
labelled this factor ‘historical interpretation’: beliefs about God are bound to 
history and context, and (because of this) these beliefs are not immutable. 
Table 2.11 displays the results of the factor analysis.  
 
Table 2.11: Factor analysis (Paf, Varimax rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of models for interpreting Holy Scripture and faith 
among Muslim and Christian students. 
 
Items Theory 
Dimension 
h2 
F1 F2 
18 Faith is an expression of a weak 
personality 
Psychological 
interpretation 
.68  .48 
17 In the end, faith is nothing more than a 
safety net for human fears 
Psychological 
interpretation 
.63  .42 
13 God grows together with the history of 
humanity and therefore is changeable 
Historical interpretation  .60 .37 
2. God has been defined for once and for all 
and therefore is immutable 
Literal interpretation  -.53 .30 
Cronbach’s Alpha .58 .47  
Number of valid cases 1488 1488  
Total variance explained 39.3%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Psychological interpretation; F2 = Historical interpretation 
 
The table below provides a summary of the agreement found in the empirical 
investigation of the models for interpreting Holy Scripture and faith among 
Muslim and Christian students. 
 
Table 2.12: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
models for interpreting Holy Scripture and faith among Muslim and Christian 
students. 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Psychological interpretation     
Muslims 787 2.84 1.08 -.76 
Christians 701 2.88 1.17 -.76 
Historical interpretation     
Muslims 777 1.81 .75 -8.23** 
Christians 701 2.17 .95 -8.23** 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
What is the level of agreement with these models, for both groups? Muslims 
are negative ambivalent about psychological interpretations (m 2.84; s.d.1.08), 
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with a high standard deviation. This result indicates that they do not totally 
reject the idea that their faith is the expression of their fear and the need for 
safety. Christian students also show a negative ambivalence for psychological 
interpretation (m 2.88; s.d 1.17) with a high standard deviation. There are no 
significant differences between the average levels of agreement of Muslims 
and Christians for the psychological interpretation model (t -.76, df 1486, p 
.45).  
Muslim and Christian students reject historical interpretation (see 
Table 2.12). They disagree that faith in God, who is defined in Holy Scripture, 
is historically changeable and mutable. For Muslims, the Koran is the true 
Word of God, through which humans obtain an idea about God. The level of 
disagreement is significantly lower for Muslim students compared to Christian 
students (t -8.23, df 1476, p .00). 
 
2.5 The concept of the Koran and the Bible 
 
What is Holy Scripture? This question is not so much about how to interpret 
Holy Scripture, but about attempting to identify the character of the Koran and 
the Bible. What do the texts of the Koran and the Bible express for Muslims 
and Christians respectively? We will distinguish three different concepts: the 
word of God, a source of divine inspiration, and expression of human culture 
(2.5.1). Next, we will present the empirical results of our comparison between 
Muslim and Christian students (2.5.2).  
 
2.5.1 Theory 
 
In this section we briefly explain the theoretical concepts of the Holy 
Scriptures, based on the three distinctions outlined above. 
 
2.5.1.1 The Word of God 
Among Muslims, the Koran is believed to be the Word of God (Kalām Allah). 
It is accepted as the prime theophany of Islam, consisting of divine speech: the 
literal and immutable word of Allah (cf. Rahman 1966; Esack 2005; Cornell 
1997: 69; Akhtar 1997: 108). God revealed the verses collected in the Koran 
directly to Muhammad, through a specific process. Muhammad, as a prophet 
and messenger of God, collected all of the texts given to him by God directly 
in word or through dreams and by angels. The Koran contains only God’s 
words received by Muhammad, while Muhammad’s words and actions are 
collected separately in hadith (reports) or sunna (the way of Muhammad’s life) 
(Mattson 2008: 20). On this point, Esack (2005: 31) states that “…for 
Muslims, the Koran stands at the heart of Islam as a worldview and is the only 
valid contemporary revelation; to invoke the Koran is to invoke God. The 
Koran is God speaking, not merely to Muhammad in seventh-century Arabia, 
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but from all eternity to all humankind.” The Koran is seen as the written Word 
of God entering the world. Muslims believe that the Koran is not merely a 
book inspired or influenced by God and written by Muhammad; it is God’s 
spoken word, which is central to Muslim life. This concept focuses on God’s 
revelation within Holy Scripture. Only through the Koran can Muslims find the 
ultimate meaning and the ultimate reality (cf. Mattson 2008: 231). 
In Christianity, for Roman Catholic and Protestant churches the 
concept of the Word of God (Jn 1:1-3) basically refers to Jesus Christ. The 
Word of God is about God revealing Himself in human form. Jesus Christ is 
the ultimate revelation in Christianity; and through Jesus, believers can 
communicate with God. Jesus is the Word of God in person, and people can 
only accept His divinity when they fully accept His humanity (Martin 1975: 
98). The Bible is seen as the word of God spoken in the words of men. In our 
history, the authors of the Bible were inspired by God’s spirit to share God’s 
revelation and His will (Martin 1975: 116, 136; Morgan 1998: 116). In this 
concept, the core message of the Bible as the word of God should be about 
Jesus as God’s revelation and the true Word of God.  
 
2.5.1.2 A source of divine inspiration 
The second concept places more emphasis on the function of the Holy 
Scriptures for religious believers, who search in the scriptures for spiritual 
ideas and values related to their lives with and for others. Holy Scripture is not 
seen merely as the sacred book, but more as help towards building a 
relationship with God. Readers need to seek meaning within the scriptures in 
order to understand religious ideas and values, and to develop a relationship 
with God.  
Readers who interpret and learn from the Koran develop not only their 
knowledge, but also their righteous life based on God’s wish; at the same time, 
they also maintain their relationship with God (cf. Mattson 2008: 220). In this 
regard, the Koran can be referred to as a main source of divine inspiration. The 
Koran contains rules and regulations with regard to three righteous deeds, 
namely: personal conduct, social and economic conduct, and institutionalised 
religious practices (Rahman 1966; Cornell 1997; cf. Mattson 2008). For 
Christians, the Bible as source of divine inspiration is seen as an inspired 
discourse regarding ethics, church order, and doctrine (Marshall 2004: 34). The 
Bible is opening human minds to new possibilities in personal life and societal 
life, within the church and outside (Morgan 1998: 122ff; cf. Barr 1960). 
Christians believe that through the Bible, they can live with God and share 
God’s value in the world today. Through Christians reading and understanding 
the Bible, God’s spirit will inspire their lives. 
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2.5.1.3 A collection of cultural texts written by men 
The idea that Holy Scripture is essentially a collection of cultural texts puts the 
writing process at the heart of understanding Holy Scripture. Every author 
writes within a personal and social context. The writing process cannot avoid 
the influences of particular cultural ideas, and the context of a particular time. 
In this concept, Holy Scripture is interpreted and understood based on critical 
methodology. According to Esack (2005: 8f, 91f), the idea of the Koran as 
cultural text comes primarily from non-Muslim Koranic scholars, such as 
Crone and Cook (1977) and Wansbrough (1977). These scholars are 
categorised by Esack as ‘disinterested observers’. They approach the Koran 
merely as a historical-cultural literature that should be examined through 
literary analysis. Through their analysis they argue that the Koran is the 
product of imperfect editing of materials from a plurality of traditions (Esack 
2005: 92). From a sociological perspective, the Koran is often seen as a work 
of Muhammad’s role as a religious, social and political leader who worked and 
developed a new community in Mekka and Meddina in the late sixth and the 
beginning of the seventh century (Brown 1989 and Bowering 2003).  
 
2.5.2 Results 
 
We used the three ideas discussed above as items in our measuring instrument 
(Table 2.13). Although we can find the three ideas of Holy Scripture in both 
Islam and Christianity, we decided to examine the correlations for both 
religious groups separately, as this could give an idea of whether or not these 
concepts are related differently within each group. If this was the case, it could 
reflect a conceptual difference between the two groups. This would make the 
measuring instrument problematic in cross-cultural research. 
 
Table 2.13: Operationalisation concepts of Holy Scripture  
 
Theoretical models Items 
The Koran 1 A source of divine inspiration 
2. 2 The word of God 
3 Just a collection of cultural text written by men 
The Bible 1 A source of divine inspiration 
3. 2 The word of God 
3 Just a collection of cultural text written by men 
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Table 2.14: Correlation of concepts of the Koran (Muslims) 
 
  Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Correlation Item 1 1.00 .17** -.06 
  Item 2 .17** 1.00 -.29** 
  Item 3 -.06 -.29** 1.00 
Low correlation = r<.30; Moderate = .30 ≤ r≤ .40; Strong = 40 ≤  r ≤ .50; Very strong = r ≥ .50 
 
Table 2.15: Correlation of concepts of the Bible (Christians) 
 
  Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Correlation Item 1 1.00 .29** -.12** 
  Item 2 .29** 1,00 -.38** 
  Item 3 -.12** -.38** 1,00 
Low correlation = r<.30; Moderate = .30 ≤ r≤ .40; Strong = 40 ≤  r ≤ .50; Very strong = r ≥ .50 
 
In our analysis, we found the same results for correlations. In Table 2.14 and 
2.15, item 3 (‘Just a collection of cultural texts written by men’) is understood 
differently from the other concepts by both religious groups. Agreement with 
the concept of Holy Scripture as a collection of cultural texts correlates 
negatively with two other items. Both items refer to a religious understanding 
of Holy Scripture as a sacred book. This means that if our respondents – both 
Muslims and Christians – viewed Holy Scripture as a collection of cultural 
texts, then they contradict the idea of Holy Scripture as a sacred book.  
 
Table 2.16 below provides a summary of the agreements from the empirical 
investigation of the concept of the Koran for Muslims and of the Bible for 
Christians.  
 
Table 2.16: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
the concept of the Koran among Muslim students and the Bible among 
Christian students. 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
 N Mean s.d. 
A Source of Divine Inspiration    
Muslims (The Koran) 762 4.19 1.19 
Christians (The Bible) 679 4.14 .99 
The word of God    
Muslims (The Koran) 769 4.66 .79 
Christians (The Bible) 703 4.58 .73 
Just a collection of cultural text written by men    
Muslims (The Koran) 748 1.50 .86 
Christians (The Bible) 680 2.02 1.15 
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In Table 2.16, we find that Muslims accepted the concept of the Koran as a 
source of divine inspiration (m 4.19; s.d 1.19), and totally accepted the concept 
of the word of God (m 4.66; s.d .79). Muslims’ conviction that the Koran is a 
direct revelation of God through Muhammad (the Word of God) is seen as very 
important, and therefore the Koran is a kind of legal authority. It is more 
important than the concept of the Koran as a source of divine inspiration. 
Meanwhile, Muslims totally reject the concept of the Koran as a collection of 
cultural texts written by men (M 1.50; s.d. .86). This concept is less likely to 
emerge among Muslims, because of a fundamental understanding that the 
Koran is the Word of God that was revealed directly to Muhammad. Thus, in 
Islam the Koran is not perceived as the work of man (Muhammad), but of God 
Himself.  
Table 2.16 also displays Christian concepts of the Bible. Christian 
respondents accepted the Bible as a source of divine inspiration (m 4.14; s.d 
.99) as well as the concept of the Bible as the word of God (m 4.58; s.d .73). 
The concept of the Bible as the word of God is accepted more than that of the 
Bible as a source of divine inspiration. This indicates that Christians believe 
that the Bible can be a source of divine inspiration, as long as it is also 
understood to be the word of God. It is interesting to see that our Christian 
respondents do not agree with the concept that the Bible is a collection of 
cultural texts written by men (m 2.02; s.d 1.15). It shows that Christians (still) 
reject liberal ideas regarding Holy Scripture. However, the standard deviation 
for this concept is relatively high, meaning that there is relatively high 
disagreement on the topic within the group of Christians. 
 
  
Chapter 3 
 
Religious Inter-group Beliefs 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will discuss religious inter-group beliefs among our Muslim 
and Christian respondents. Inter-group beliefs refer to those religious 
convictions that relate (in)directly to inter-group relations. We expect these 
inter-group beliefs to be relevant for religiously-inspired generalised trust.  
We will discuss four groups of religious inter-group beliefs. The first 
group concerns attitudes towards religious plurality; we would like to see 
whether our respondents’ attitudes towards religious plurality are exclusivistic 
or open-minded (3.1). The second group concerns religiocentrism, i.e. the 
combination of in-group favouritism and the rejection of out-groups. We shall 
examine the degree of religiocentrism among Muslim and Christian students in 
Indonesia (3.2). The third group of inter-group beliefs relates to the different 
ways our respondents look at the different possible relationships between 
religion and state. In this section we will determine which models of religion-
state relationship are recognised by our respondents, and which they prefer 
(3.3). The last group concerns religious vocation for  solidarity and justice. 
Solidarity and justice will be described as principles that are rooted in a 
theological understanding of God’s will that is focused on humanity. We will 
test how much our Muslim and Christian respondents agree with our different 
models of ‘solidarity and justice’ (3.4). 
Once again, we shall discuss each concern in two sections: a 
theoretical perspective, and then the empirical results from the survey 
responses. We also shall compare the empirical results between Muslim and 
Christian groups. The cross-religious, comparative nature of our research 
necessitates an appropriate data analysis procedure. In particular, cross-
religious comparison requires a series of analyses to substantiate the 
construction categories comparable for the two religious traditions under study, 
without ignoring the distinctiveness of each religion. To achieve this, again we 
run a three-step procedure of factor analyses (cf. Hermans & Sterkens 2014).  
We first conduct a factor analysis among Muslim and Christian 
respondents together. In including all respondents in the same analysis, we 
assume that religious beliefs have the same structure in both groups.
1
 In a 
second step, we examine the two religious groups separately, along with the 
items that remained after the first step. These separate factor analyses show 
                                                 
1
 The criteria used in the Principal Axis Factoring (varimax) are: eigenvalue >1; com-
monality >.20; factor loadings >.30, and if items load high on two factors, the differ-
ence in factor loadings should be >.15. 
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whether the overall structure of the first step holds good for each group 
individually. In other words, the second step reveals whether the models 
established in the overall analysis recur in the analyses relating to particular 
groups. The purpose of this step is to uncover inter-group differences. In a third 
step, these inter-group differences are eliminated, by running a factor analysis 
with the items remaining after the second step – for Muslim and Christian 
respondents put together again. The differences (in measurement) between 
Muslims and Christians are therefore eliminated in this final step, leading to a 
cross-religious comparative model. We speak of a comparative model of 
religious beliefs only after the third step of factor analyses. This rather 
complicated procedure guarantees cross-religious comparability. In the 
discussion of the empirical results we report only the result of the third-step 
factor analysis, although we also account for the differences filtered out in the 
second step. After the factor analysis, we continue to run the analysis, and 
display the agreement of our respondents towards each attitude. 
 
3.1 Attitudes towards religious plurality 
 
Religious plurality is one of the key challenges for the truth claims that to a 
certain degree are always part of religious tradition. Because of increased 
mobility, and the growing scale and frequency of contacts between different 
cultural groups (a consequence of globalisation), society is characterised by 
even greater plurality than ever before, ranging from language and ethnicity to 
cultural norms and religion. In general, plurality increases the number of 
relevant institutions, in the widest sense of the word, which in turn leads to an 
even greater variety of convictions, values and norms (cf. Douglas 1986). 
Since personal convictions are endorsed by the social environment, religious 
convictions will change as social conditions change; or at least they should 
change, if they are not to become out of context with the society. Discussing 
religious attitudes in the context of modern plurality, Schillebeeckx (2014-X: 
49) states: “A person’s inner conviction is perhaps just as strong as ever as 
confirmation, but of course more modest, more reserved and in this sense to 
some degree ‘relativised’: modern believers know that there is also truth in 
other convictions about life.” However, whether this is a descriptive 
observation or a normative desire is a point that may be discussed. After all, 
religious radicalisation and the flourishing of religious fundamentalism are also 
regarded by many as modern phenomena (cf. Emerson & Hartman 2006). 
In this section, we describe how Muslim and Christian university 
students in Indonesia deal with religious plurality. Apart from cultural 
differences that are dealt with on a daily basis, the presence of other religions 
in one’s social environment leads to intellectual, religious and theological 
challenges for individual believers. There are at least two reasons why attitudes 
towards religious plurality in Indonesia are interesting. First, religion is 
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important in Indonesia. It can be described as belonging to the ‘normal 
atmosphere’ that Indonesians breathe. Religion is closely intertwined with 
culture in general, and is influential in daily individual and societal life (Pieris 
2001: 71; Vigil 2008: 17, 28). Second, with Indonesia’s dense population, 
individual believers can seldom avoid contact with (people belonging to) other 
religious traditions – even when religious distribution is geographically 
defined.
2
 Based on the 2010 national census, out of a total Indonesian 
population of 237 641 326 people, approximately 87.2% are Muslim, 7.0% are 
Protestant, 2.9% are Catholic, 1.7% are Hindu, and the few other belong to 
religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism and other beliefs (Indonesia 
Statistics 2010). Failure to develop good communication between religious 
communities will inevitably generate tension. For this reason, inter-religious 
communication can be seen as a sign of active participation in society. Inter-
religious dialogue shows that people at least respect each other, recognise other 
communities, and are (initially, at least) willing to seek solutions to differences 
through reasoned negotiation (cf. Herbert 2003: 88).  
In our description of how Indonesian university students deal with 
religious plurality, we will make use of the categories established in the 
‘theology of religions’. The classifications in the theology of religions show 
how exclusive or inclusive religious attitudes towards others are. We shall 
explore attitudes towards religious plurality from both the theoretical and the 
empirical perspectives. The research questions arise here: What are the 
attitudes towards religious plurality that can be found among Muslim and 
Christian university students in Indonesia, and are there any significant 
differences between Muslims and Christians? First, we will present the 
attitudes towards religious plurality based on theology of religions (3.1.1). 
Second, we will investigate to what extent these beliefs are present in our 
research population (3.1.2).  
 
3.1.1 Theory  
 
In this section, we will describe different attitudes towards religious plurality 
from a theoretical perspective, the so-called ‘theology of religions’. Initially, 
many authors in this field worked with three models: exclusivism, inclusivism 
and pluralism. However, the theology of religions continues to grow, and these 
distinctions do not yet express all existing attitudes towards religious plurality. 
Especially when we talk about pluralism; we cannot tell whether there are still 
distinct theological models of pluralism or not. According to Knitter (2002), 
we can find new distinctions between the attitudes towards religious plurality; 
                                                 
2
 While Islam dominates most of the archipelago, some regions have a substantial 
Christian population. The provinces where the Christian population is above 30% are 
East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, West Papua, North Sulawesi, Maluku, West Kalimantan, 
and North Sumatra (Statistics Indonesia 2010). 
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he divides pluralism into two distinct models, as well as two previous models. 
At the same time, discussion has emerged as to whether these distinctions, 
mainly to be found in Christian theology, were also applicable to categorising 
convictions in other religious traditions. In other words, can these different 
attitudes towards religious plurality be found among non-Christian believers as 
well? And if so, can we determine and operationalise them in the same way? 
We will briefly describe five models theoretically, and identify 
elements of these models in both Christianity and Islam. The five models of 
attitudes towards religious plurality are: replacement monism, fulfilment 
monism, commonality pluralism, differential pluralism, and relativistic 
pluralism.  
 
3.1.1.1 Replacement monism 
Central to Knitter’s (2002) replacement model is the conviction that one 
particular religion is the only true religion. In this model, therefore, the 
believer’s own religion is valid and universal, and should replace all other 
religious traditions. The judgment of the early church fathers Origen and Saint 
Cyprian that there is no salvation outside the Church (extra ecclesiam nulla 
salus) demonstrates the attitude that true faith in God can be found only in the 
community of true Christians (cf. Auer & Ratzinger 1983). In Protestantism, 
the replacement model emerged in traditional interpretations of the dictum sola 
fide, sola gratia, sola scriptura, meaning that there is no justification outside 
faith, no salvation without divine grace, and that the Bible is the only 
authoritative word of God (cf. Barth 1999: 227ff). The Christian reformers 
Martin Luther and John Calvin taught that salvation is only possible through 
faith in Jesus (Kärkäinen 2003: 74ff). In Islam, the core of faith as expressed in 
the sahada (confession/witness to faith) is: “There is no god but God (Allah), 
and Muhammad is God’s messenger”. The revelation through Muhammad is 
considered to be God’s final message to the world, and Islam is considered to 
be the pure religion of Abraham. The only way to attain salvation is through 
submission to God in Islam (Sura 2:130,135; 4:59; cf. Watt 1990: 38; Calder; 
Mojaddedi; Rippin 2003: 135ff). These few examples clearly demonstrate that 
there are traces of replacement monism in both Christianity and Islam. 
Replacement monism in general dictates that salvation (through liberation, 
redemption or compassion) can be found only through one’s own religious 
tradition. Other religious traditions do not contain truth and should be replaced 
by the true one. As did many other scholars, the earlier Knitter (1985) called 
this the ‘exclusivism model’.  
Knitter further distinguishes between those who demand total 
replacement and those who defend a need for partial replacement. The first 
group claims a radical monistic orientation, and excludes the possibility of 
divine revelation – let alone salvation – in other religious traditions (e.g. Smith 
1922: 626ff; Barth 1999). The latter group maintains the absoluteness and 
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superiority of the own tradition, but acknowledges the possibility of revelation 
in other religions, even though they cannot offer salvation (e.g. Tillich 1999: 
286). Currently, in Indonesia, replacement monism is prevalent in some groups 
that strive for aggressive Christianisation or Islamisation (cf. Mujiburahman 
2006; Abuzza 2007).  
 
3.1.1.2 Fulfilment monism 
Fulfilment monism combines the affirmation of God’s presence in other 
religions with the non-negotiable aspect of salvation through the own tradition. 
In this model, people believe that God can work in many religions, and that 
other traditions endorse particular religious experiences that hold partial truths 
or parts of the truth; however, only one’s own religion contains the full truth 
and can fulfil the shortcomings of other religious traditions. In the Catholic 
tradition, the documents of the Second Vatican Council (Nostra Aetate 2; Ad 
Gentes 9, 11, 15, 18) acknowledge the ideas of “rays of Truth” and “seeds of 
the Word” in other religious traditions. According to Lumen Gentium 16 these 
ideas can be understood as “preparation for the Gospel”.  
More recently, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2000) 
writes in its declaration, Dominus Iesus (no 8): “Therefore, the sacred books of 
other religions, which in actual fact direct and nourish the existence of their 
followers, receive from the mystery of Christ the elements of goodness and 
grace which they contain.” The pioneering works of Rahner (1969; 1970) 
clarify this trend as well. Rahner acknowledges that God’s grace is active in 
other religions, and views those religions as possible channels of revelation. At 
the same time, since Jesus Christ is God’s ultimate revelation and the final 
deliverer of human salvation, those who receive grace in their own religions 
are unwittingly oriented to Christianity, and hence can be considered 
‘anonymous Christians’ (cf. Cobb 1999: 25ff; Kärkäinen 2003: 193).  
According to Henry de Lubac, Christianity is the ‘single axis’ for true 
fulfilment of all religiosities (Kärkäinen 2003: 106). Among Protestant 
theologians, Paul Tillich introduced a challenging thought regarding the 
existence of Jesus and Christianity within diversities. For Tillich, Jesus is not 
considered in an absolute way, as in the replacement model. However, through 
Jesus, other religions can find the ‘New Being’ in which all religions can find 
God, the Ground of Being (Kärkäinen 2003: 226ff). Newbigin (1999) is 
another modern theologian, influential in Asia, who can be associated with this 
model. Islam, too, knows this inclusive approach towards other religious 
traditions. For instance, when Muhammad is called ‘the seal of the prophets’ or 
‘the last prophet’ (khatam al-anbiya), he is referred to as the greatest and the 
last of the prophets of the Abrahamic religions (Sura 33:40; 68:4; 41:5; 6:50; 
21:107). This implies the inclusion and acceptance of previous (pre-Islamic) 
prophets among Jews and Christians, even though they did not receive divine 
revelations in the same way (cf. Murata & Chittick 1995; Haleem 2008: 19ff).  
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The label ‘fulfilment monism’ clarifies this model’s similarity to 
‘replacement monism’. In both models of monism, the uniqueness and 
universality of one’s own religion is the centre. Other religions are considered 
either totally or partially invalidated. From this, we can understand that the 
replacement model and the fulfilment model share a monistic perspective in 
which the absolute validity of one’s own religion is the centre. It is of little 
surprise, then, to find that ‘fulfilment monism’ and ‘replacement monism’ are 
regularly seen to cluster together in empirical surveys in varied research 
populations (e.g. Vermeer & Van der Ven 2004; Anthony et al. 2005).  
 
3.1.1.3 Commonality pluralism 
Pluralism models are not based on claims to the superiority and absoluteness of 
the believer’s own religion, but appreciate the positive aspects of plurality. 
Specifically, the commonality pluralism model deals with different religions in 
which the common elements of various religions are recognised. From this 
perspective, each religious tradition can contribute to a complete expression of 
the ultimate truth; and at the same time, each religious tradition must face 
sharing their specific experience and knowledge. According to Knitter (2002: 
173), this third model combines universality with particularity. Following 
Knitter’s argument – in which he uses the label ‘mutuality pluralism’ – in the 
following section we briefly explain three perspectives of commonality 
pluralism, namely: philosophical-historical, religious-mystical, and ethical-
practical.  
The philosophical-historical perspective focuses on the idea that 
behind the different phenomena of religions, either philosophically or 
historically there is one infinite reality (Hick 1973; 1980; 2001b). The infinite 
reality is bigger than and beyond all religious phenomena. The central concept 
of this perspective, according to John Hick, is the understanding of the Real 
that refers to the Transcendent, namely the ultimate truth or divine reality, or 
God. In many traditions, the Real or the Transcendent is symbolised either 
personally – such as God, Allah, Krishna, or Shiva – or impersonally, like 
Brahman or Nirvana (see the section on images of God). Hick believes that the 
Real or the Transcendent is the result of the postulated ground of the different 
forms of religious experience (Hick 1973: 140; Hick 1989:103f, 236; 2001b: 
33f; cf. Placher 1989: 145ff; Phan 2004: 102ff). Every religion has its own 
religious experience that is not the same in other traditions. The consequence is 
that different religions with different experiences reveal different concepts of 
the Real or the Ultimate Truth. However, according to Hick, these different 
experiences are only a phenomenon of the Real that is basically the result of 
human interpretation of religious experience, historically conditioned or 
socially constructed. Beside the phenomenon there is the noumenon, which is 
the Real an sich (Hick 1989: 236). The noumenon is always more than the 
accessible phenomenon. This perspective can also be recognised in the work of 
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Pannenberg (1985). He believes that there is no ‘common essence’ among 
diverse religions, basically because each religious tradition has its own 
interpretation and reflection on the context and history of its own religion. For 
Pannenberg, Christianity is one religion among many searching for the truth 
and participating in the life of God. In this regard, Pannenberg believes that 
The Spirit, which is universal, has a centre role among diverse religious 
traditions. The Spirit elevates religious people to involvement in the life of God 
(cf. Kärkäinen 2003: 238ff). 
The religious-mystical approach springs from, on the one hand, the 
seriousness of entering deeply into religious experience and then realising that 
what one has experienced in one’s own tradition is very limited. On the other 
hand, openness to different religious experiences brings people to see the same 
thing; that is, the same Mystery. Panikkar (1993) and Samartha (1995) embrace 
this approach. The religious-mystical approach believes that there are mystical 
experiences of various religious traditions that can discover the divine. 
According to Samartha (1995: 110), the divine itself is the Mystery, in which 
the Truth of the Truth cannot be limited only to one tradition, or one particular 
historical and religious experience. Religious traditions have their own 
experience in responding to and approaching the Mystery. Basically, then, this 
approach recognises diverse concepts of the divine. However, at the same time 
this approach believes that behind the differences of religious traditions and 
experiences, there is a mystery of religious fact – or what Panikkar calls a 
mystery in which there is a basis for shared experience activity within all 
religions (cf. Kärkäinen 2003: 303).  
The ethical-practical perspective understands that ethical agendas such 
as the needs and sufferings of the poor and the oppressed become common 
ground within diversity. It is assumed that each of the different traditions has 
some kind of global responsibility for ethical issues in this world. In this 
perspective, common problems also become common ground within diversity. 
Knitter (2002:136f) explains, “[...] there is something that confronts all the 
religious families of the world, something they cannot deny, something that is 
much more identifiable and immediate and pressing than Hick’s ‘really Real’ 
or Panikkar’s ‘one religious fact’ (without denying those things)”. Through 
ethical responsibility, different religious traditions can grow and understand 
each other. This stance can be recognized in Asian liberation theology 
(Amalados 2006; cf. Pieris 1992). In Indonesian Islam, the issue of solidarity 
with the impoverished over the boundaries of the religious divide can be noted 
in discussions of legitimate agents concerning collecting and/or receiving alms 
(zakāt) (cf. Hooker 2003: 111ff; von Benda-Beckmann 2007). Indeed, the 
World Parliament of Religions, in 1993 and 1999, defined the ethical agenda 
provided by human and ecological suffering as being common to all religions. 
With regard to the parliament of religions, Hans Küng promoted the idea that 
every religion should basically focus on promoting humanity (cf. Küng 1993: 
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xvii-xx; Kärkäinen 2003: 201f; Anthony et al. 2005: 159). In this respect, 
relations with the poor and those who are suffering are no longer only a matter 
of social ethics, but also an essential part of religious praxis. 
In short, in commonality pluralism, joint reflections on transcendence, 
shared religious experiences or common societal aims form the bridge in 
encounters between religions. For some considerable time the Indonesian 
government has been encouraging the search for common ground between 
religions. During the New Order regime (1967-1989), ‘harmony’ was a key 
concept in inter-religious relationships, and the Pancasila ideology was 
promoted as an effort to look for joint inspiration among the different religious 
traditions (cf. Mujiburahman 2006: 268ff; Intan 2006). We might therefore 
expect that commonality pluralism would be one of the most popular models 
for the interpretation of inter-religious relations in Indonesia.  
 
3.1.1.4 Differential pluralism 
Differential pluralism – labelled the ‘acceptance model’ by Knitter (2002) – 
emphasises that every tradition demonstrates a different religious experience, 
or a valid way to the ultimate truth, or destination; or as Cobb, Jr. (1999: 184) 
mentions, a prime matter. Every religious tradition has the experience and its 
own language that cannot be assessed and then made to fit into our pre-existing 
categories. In other words, we cannot measure one religion according to the 
measuring system of another. Because of incommensurability, at best, 
traditions can offer some ‘theological hospitality’ to make room within their 
own identity for the foreign (Moyaert 2011: 266; cf. Cobb 1999: 184f; Vigil 
2008: 82). Theological hospitality is about equality. Equality emphasises 
deeply religious diversity. Consequently, every religion and its religious 
experience will be different, but equal; or vice versa, i.e. because they are all 
equal, they can clearly see each other’s differences (cf. Vigil 2008: 82). 
According to Knitter (2002) there are three perspectives reflecting the 
differential pluralism model: a cultural-linguistic view on religion, plurality of 
ultimate concerns, and theological comparison. 
The cultural-linguistic view departs from a postmodern discourse that 
emphasises respect for difference. In postmodernism, there is no place for one 
dominant or superior religion, because the entirety of life and thought is shaped 
by diverse and unique cultural and linguistic frameworks (Lindbeck 1984: 33; 
cf. Placher 1989). Lindbeck (1984: 31ff), as a post-liberal theologian, criticises 
the understanding that there is a core experience shared in religious diversity, 
as in the commonality pluralism model. According to Lindbeck, religion is "a 
kind of cultural and linguistic framework that shapes the entirety of life and 
thought" (1984: 33), and each cultural and linguistic form is unique. One 
particular religion and its experience can be understood specifically within its 
particular culture and language system (Lindbeck 1984: 113ff.; cf. Placher 
1989: 163; Knitter 2002: 182). Religious experiences are shaped and moulded 
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through particular cultural and linguistic forms, and obviously commonalities 
between religions are rare. A kind of dialectical process, which can lead to 
mutual learning and self-correction, may be possible; but by no means can 
one’s own grand theory be imposed on others. 
The plurality of ultimate concerns perspective has a spokesman in 
Mark Heim (1995), who states that differences between religions are not just 
language-deep. According to Heim (1995: 147ff), difference lies not only in 
the cultural-language systems, but also within the religions themselves – the 
so-called ‘plurality of ultimate perspective’. His viewpoint is basically that 
there is validity in each individual, community, faith, and experience, because 
each religion has own context, understanding and destination. According to 
John Cobb (1999: 67ff) – who has a similar opinion to Heim – every religious 
tradition has its own claims and norms that cannot be judged from different 
contexts. Therefore Cobb refers to a ‘relatively objective norm’, in which there 
is validity in each individual, each community and each faith, because each has 
its own context, understanding and destination. It is therefore impossible to 
judge them from other contexts. In a pluralistic society, we must see that every 
norm and the claim of each tradition have the truth within itself. When we open 
ourselves to dialogue, and learn from the truths that exist in a different 
religious tradition, then the norms become relatively objective. We can learn 
and develop our own faith at that moment to see and meet with the differences 
that exist in other religions. In this respect, God or the Ultimate Reality is 
recognised in different forms (cf. Knitter 2002: 193; Anthony et al. 2005: 
160f).  
The comparative theological approach emphasises the differences 
between religious traditions as a basis for dialogue. No religion has complete 
information about other religions; but to admit this ignorance implies an 
obligation to make an honest effort to converse with other religions. Through 
dialogue and comparison, one can build a better understanding of the other 
religious traditions – as well as a better sense of one’s own. Knitter (2002: 
203ff) refers to Clooney (2010) and Fredericks (1999) as promoting this 
approach: "One enters dialogues both as believer convinced of the claims of 
one religious tradition and as a human being open to the possibility that one 
has something to learn from representatives of another religious tradition" (cf. 
Cobb 1999: 66, 180). The primary purpose of dialogue within religious 
diversities is to learn from others. There is more truth than our own tradition; 
we cannot assume that only our religion has the truth. Hence, we must learn 
from the others who also have truths.  
Differential pluralism too has supporters in Indonesian society. Mukti 
Ali, Indonesia’s former minister of religion (1971-1978), pioneered the study 
of comparative religions at the State Institute of Islamic Studies in Yogyakarta. 
This area of study was founded on respect for differences, and on religions 
‘agreeing to disagree’ with other religions (Mujiburahman 2006: 269f). To 
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what extent do Muslims and Christians in Indonesia today accept the basic 
ideas of this model?  
 
3.1.1.5 Relativistic pluralism 
In addition to the concepts already discussed, in the theology of religions we 
always find discussions on relativism. Relativism may be understood as the 
radical acceptance of different truths as having equal worth. Because we accept 
the differences radically, a normative critique of the absolute norm is 
impossible. In these circumstances people do not know whether there is any 
truth, or whether they or others have a truth. Actually, everything is viewed in 
the same way, in a kind of twilight world in which everything has the same 
colour (Knitter 2002: 162; Cobb, Jr. 1999: 66; cf. Hick 2001b; Vigil 2008). 
Knitter (2002: 162ff, 224ff) does not include relativism as a separate model. 
He shows that relativism is a possibility (or even a danger) that can arise, 
especially in the mutuality model (commonality pluralism) and acceptance 
model (diversity pluralism). According to Knitter, the mutuality model 
(commonality pluralism) tries to avoid relativism by finding common ground 
as normative content. But here, the question must be raised: does the ‘common 
ground’ that we understand also fit with other traditions’ understanding?  
As our normative idea is coerced towards the different traditions, this 
model falls into what Knitter refers to as ‘imperialism’ (2002: 163). In 
diversity pluralism (the acceptance model), imperialism is avoided by trying to 
listen to different traditions based on their own language instead of using one’s 
own. However, even in the attempts to avoid it, relativism rebounds again. 
Cobb (1999: 66) states that relativism that recognises all norms and truths 
seems fair, but actually vitiates the claims themselves. However, relativism is 
described as being not necessarily part of pluralism. Anthony et al. (2005: 161) 
have operationalised relativism as the idea that "all religions are held to be of 
equal value and significance, irrespective of any common elements and 
differences that may exist among them." We see that this model is a 
consequence and a possibility that may appear in the pluralism model, in which 
we see differences between religious traditions as equally valid. It is also 
possible that this model exists among Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. 
Following Anthony et al. (cf. 2015: 117-142), we will view it as a separate 
model.  
 
3.1.2 Results  
 
We will now provide the empirical grounding of the conceptual framework that 
has been spelled out in the preceding section. We shall explore the empirical 
tenability of the conceptualisation of these attitudes, and investigate the 
presence of these attitudes among Indonesian university students. The five 
models described above were operationalised in measuring instruments based 
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on Anthony et al. (2005: 163f). We have used this categorisation because it 
was empirically tested in a cross-religious comparative study among Muslims, 
Christians, and Hindus in Tamil Nadu. And it has proved to be applicable to 
respondents belonging to different religious traditions as operationalised in a 
questionnaire. We made a few modifications for our specific research 
population, especially regarding some of the wording.  
 
Table 3.1: Operationalisation of attitudes towards religious plurality 
 
Theoretical models Items 
Replacement 
monism 
1. Only through my religion people can attain true liberation. 
4. Eventually my religion will replace other religions. 
6. Other religions do not offer a true experience of God. 
19. The truth about God, human beings and the universe is found only in my 
religion. 
Fulfillment monism 3. Compared with my religion, the other religions contain only partial truths. 
5. Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to liberation . 
8. Other religions will eventually find their fulfillment in mine. 
10. Other religions do not offer as deep a God-experience as my religion. 
Commonality 
pluralism 
7. Different religions reveal different aspects of the same ultimate truth 
9. Different religions present different paths to the ultimate liberation. 
12. The similarities among religions are a basis for building up a universal religion. 
14. Different aspects of the same divine reality are experienced in different 
religions. 
Differential 
pluralism 
11. Differences between religions are an opportunity for discovering truth. 
13. Differences between religions are part of God’s plan to save the world. 
16. Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment and growth. 
18. Differences in God-experience (anubhava) made possible by various religions 
challenge the idea that God is one. 
Relativistic 
pluralism 
2. All religions provide an equally profound experience of God. 
15. All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth. 
17. All religions are equally valid paths to liberation. 
20. Although there are many religions, at the deepest level there are no real 
differences. 
 
Each of the five models was operationalised in four items (see Table 3.1). The 
first model, ‘replacement monism’, was identified by the indicator that the 
conviction of one’s religion is the only true religion, hence it is the only valid 
and universal one that can or would replace all other religions. Another 
indicator was that a true experience of God can be found only in the own 
religious tradition. Following these indicators, we then operationalised four 
items.  
‘Fulfilment monism’, as the second model, was represented by three 
indicators: first, God can work in many religions; second, only my religion 
declares the perfect truth and has deep God-experience; and third, other 
religions contain only partial truths, hence they need to be fulfilled and will 
find that fulfilment in my religion. Based on these three indicators, we 
operationalised four items.  
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The third model, ‘commonality pluralism’, which claims that every 
religion had its own richness, was represented by the indicator that every 
religion reveals or presents different aspects of the same ultimate truth or the 
same divine reality. The ‘differential pluralism’ model’s primary indicator was 
that every religion demonstrates a different experience of God, or a valid way 
to the ultimate truth, and that the diversities are recognised as a basis for the 
mutual discovering of truth or the growth of each religion.  
The last model, ‘relativistic pluralism’, was represented by the 
indicators that all religions are recognised as equally valid in reaching the 
ultimate truth, and that every religion can experience a different God-
experience and path to liberation. We used a five-point Likert scale for these 
items, ranging from total disagreement (1) to full agreement (5).  
To answer our research question, we needed to establish measurements 
that were equally applicable (i.e. comparative) to both Muslims and Christians. 
Since our models originated from Christian theologies, this was not self-
evident. Technically formulated, this issue concerned the ‘cross-religious 
comparability of the concepts’ and the ‘measurement equivalence’ of related 
operationalisations. As discussed more extensively elsewhere (Meredith 1993; 
Harkness, Van de Vijver & Mohler. 2003; Van de Vijver et al. 2008; Sterkens 
& Anthony 2008; cf. Anthony, Hermans & Sterkens 2010), comparative 
research necessitates a specific data analysis procedure to reach equivalence. 
We will report the results of the third step in the series of factor analyses in 
which comparative measurements of particular concepts were established, and 
briefly account for the differences filtered out in the second step.
3
  
Table 3.2 shows the result of the third step, i.e., the Principal Axis 
Factoring (Oblimin rotation) of the remaining items for both Muslims and 
Christians. This results in reliable measuring instruments that can be used for 
comparing Muslims and Christians with regard to ‘attitudes towards religious 
plurality’. Three factors were found that were equally applicable to both 
Muslims and Christians. Replacement monism and fulfilment monism were 
clustered in one single factor that we labelled ‘monism’ (item 5, 19, 4, 8, 10, 3, 
1, 6). Commonality pluralism is measured by three items (item 7, 9, 14) and 
relativistic pluralism is also measured by three items (item 15, 17, 20). All 
other items were removed, because they showed either low commonality (h
2
) 
or low or double-factor loadings, or led to different results for Muslims and 
Christians.  
 
  
                                                 
3
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
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Table 3.2: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), communalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of religious plurality among Muslim and Christian 
students 
 
Items Theory 
Dimension 
h2 
F1 F2 F3  
5. Compared with other religions, my religion 
offers the surest way to liberation . 
Fulfillment 
monism 
.82 
  
.65 
19. The truth about God, human beings and the 
universe is found only in my religion. 
Replacement 
monism 
.80 
  
.65 
4. Eventually my religion will replace other 
religions. 
Replacement 
monism 
.76 
  
.61 
8. Other religions will eventually find their 
fulfillment in mine. 
Fulfillment 
monism 
.72 
  
.60 
10. Other religions do not offer as deep a God-
experience as my religion. 
Fulfillment 
monism 
.72 
  
.56 
3. Compared with my religion, the other 
religions contain only partial truths. 
Fulfillment 
monism 
.72 
  
.59 
1. Only through my religion people can attain 
true liberation. 
Replacement 
monism 
.71 
  
.42 
6. Other religions do not offer a true experience 
of God. 
Replacement 
monism 
.69 
  
.51 
7. Different religions reveal different aspects of 
the same ultimate truth 
Commonality 
pluralism 
 
.62  
.37 
9. Different religions present different paths to 
the ultimate liberation. 
Commonality 
pluralism 
 .59 
 
.37 
14. Different aspects of the same divine reality 
are experienced in different religions. 
Commonality 
pluralism 
 .42 
 
.22 
15. All religions are equally valid ways to 
ultimate truth. 
Relativistic 
pluralism 
 
 
.89 .75 
17. All religions are equally valid paths to 
liberation. 
Relativistic 
pluralism 
 
 
.85 .69 
20. Although there are many religions, at the 
deepest level there are no real differences. 
Relativistic 
pluralism 
 
 
.50 .38 
Cronbach’s Alpha .91 .55 .80  
Number of valid cases 1459 1469 1482  
Total variance explained 52.6%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = monism; F2 = commonality pluralism; F3 = relativistic pluralism  
 
To illustrate the latter, we will briefly refer to the second step. Christians 
agreed on all items for relativistic pluralism (item 2, 15, 17, 20) in one single 
factor. Another factor contained mixed items, i.e., differential pluralism (item 
13, 11, 16, 18) and commonality pluralism (item 14, 12). Muslims produced 
different responses. One factor consisted of mixed items, namely relativistic 
pluralism, differential pluralism and commonality pluralism (item 17, 15, 20, 
16, 2, 12, 18), and another factor referred to differential pluralism and 
commonality pluralism. Since we should obtain a comparative factor for both 
traditions, we tried to interpret and filter some items. Apparently, the 
respondents, both Muslims and Christians, were confused about differential 
pluralism as the items were scattered throughout the survey. For Muslims, 
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differential pluralism items clustered with relativistic pluralism and 
commonality pluralism; whereas for Christians, differential pluralism clustered 
with commonality pluralism in one factor. We filtered all of the items of 
differential pluralism ("Differences between religions are an opportunity for 
revealing truth", item 11, 13, 16, 18) because our respondents did not seem to 
recognise the difference between differential pluralism and other forms of 
pluralism. Item 2 (relativistic pluralism, "All religions provide an equally 
profound experience of God") and item 12 (“The similarities among religions 
are a basis for building up a universal religion") were also left out, because of 
low factor loadings. As a result, we obtained a comparative three-factor 
solution that was equally applicable to Christians and Muslims: monism, 
commonality pluralism and relativistic pluralism.  
Once cross-religious comparability is established, one can ask the 
question whether there are significant differences between Muslims and 
Christians. Table 3.3 shows the levels of agreement in attitudes towards 
religious plurality among Muslims and Christians, and indicates significant 
intergroup differences. 
 
Table 3.3: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
monism, commonality pluralism, and relativistic pluralism for Muslim and 
Christian students 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Monism     
Muslims  792 3.68 .77 20.59** 
Christians  706 2.79 .90 20.59** 
Commonality pluralism     
Muslims  770 3.41 .69 .40 
Christians  699 3.40 .65 .40 
Relativistic pluralism     
Muslims  779 3.13 1.03 -11.75** 
Christians  703 3.73 .90 -11.75** 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
Most of our Indonesian Muslim respondents agreed with monism (m 3.68; s.d 
.77), followed by commonality pluralism (m 3.41; s.d .69) and relativistic 
pluralism (m 3.13; s.d 1.03). Christian respondents, on the other hand, scored 
highest on relativistic pluralism (m 3.73; s.d .90), followed by commonality 
pluralism (m 3.40; s.d .65) and monism (m 2.79; s.d .90). Thus, the order of 
agreement with the comparative models of interpreting religious plurality was 
exactly opposite for Muslims and Christians. The t-test shows that the 
differences between the average levels of agreement of Muslims and Christians 
are significant for the outer ends of the spectrum, i.e. monism (t 20.59, df 1496, 
p .00) and relativistic pluralism (t -11.75, df 1480, p .00). These findings could 
be interpreted from either of two perspectives: first, from the perspective of the 
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content of the religious traditions, and second, from the perspective of the 
relative group sizes (i.e. majority versus minority) in Indonesia.  
From the first perspective, it could be said that Islam appears to 
provide fertile ground for monistic attitudes, e.g. in convictions such as the 
shahada (“There is no god but God, and Muhammad is God’s messenger”) and 
the concept that Muhammad is the chosen one (al Mustafa) and the last prophet 
(khatam al-anbiya), as well as, perhaps, the orthodox interpretation of innate 
human nature (fitra), which says that belief in the Oneness or Unity of God 
(tawhid) is the only virtuous path. Without tawhid, salvation is impossible 
(Murata & Chittick 1995: 145). Moreover, any doubt or even refusal to 
recognise Muhammad as the last prophet is considered to be a sin equivalent to 
apostasy (Azzam 1993: 33; Blankinship 2008). In brief, agreement with 
monism could well be related to other traditional theological concepts. Does 
Christianity allow more openness for the faithful to interpret Christian truth 
claims more modestly?  
The second perspective considers the relative sizes of the religious 
groups at national level. Being the majority religion in Indonesia, Islam can be 
quite self-confident in emphasising their truth claim. Although Muslims scored 
highest on monism, at the same time they accepted commonality pluralism. 
Apparently, openness towards other religious traditions is possible when 
looking for similarities. As a minority group, Christians support pluralism 
more than monism, and it is in their interest to do so. It appears that in their 
context, it is more important to encourage mutual respect and equality than to 
find commonalities between traditions, or even to stress religious superiority.  
 
3.2 Religion and religiocentrism 
 
Apart from attitudes towards religious plurality, we will also discuss believers’ 
relationships with believers of other religious traditions from the perspective of 
religiocentrism. Religiocentrism, by analogy with ethnocentrism,
4
 is 
understood as a combination of positive attitudes towards the religious in-
group, and negative attitudes towards religious out-groups. The study of 
ethnocentrism and religiocentrism is frequently researched with the help of 
quantitative empirical methods, in a variety of contexts (Verberk 1999; 
Sterkens 2001; Sterkens & Anthony 2008; Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru & 
Kraus 2009; Capucao 2010; McFarland 2010). In an empirical study among 
Catholic parishioners in the Netherlands, Capucao (2010) showed the presence 
of ethnocentrism in the research population, and extensively discussed the 
social location of this phenomenon. Among other characteristics, he related 
ethnocentrism to specific religious convictions. In a cross-religious 
                                                 
4
 Referring to Sumner (1906: 2), Sterkens & Anthony (2008: 33) describe ethno-
centrism as “the technical name for the view in which one’s own group is the centre of 
everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.”  
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comparative empirical study in Tamil Nadu (India), Sterkens & Anthony 
(2008) showed that religiocentrism occurs at a variety of levels among 
Muslims, Christians and Hindus. They also found significant correlations 
between religiocentrism and particular religious convictions, especially 
religious truth claims, and religious socialisation, as well as with socio-cultural 
characteristics (such as language and urbanisation) and socio-economic 
characteristics (such as caste, and educational level of parents).  
The knowledge of and experiences with one’s own religious group and 
other religious groups are important factors in the formation of in-group 
favouritism and out-group prejudice. Religiocentrism is not just an abstract 
issue, but also a harsh reality that has great impact on people’s lives. Therefore, 
we think it plays an important role in a study on generalised trust. We expect 
that religiocentrism would correlate negatively with religiously-inspired 
generalised trust, and would be a predictor for the absence of generalised trust. 
However, before we test this hypothesis, in the next section we will answer the 
following question: to what extent is religiocentrism present among Muslim 
and Christian students in Indonesia? In the next section, we will present a brief 
discussion of religiocentrism from a theoretical perspective, especially with 
regard to social identity construction. Then we will investigate our empirical 
findings on religiocentrism among our respondents.  
 
3.2.1 Theory 
 
In this section, we will present a general overview of religiocentrism based on 
the theory of social identity and ethnocentrism.  
 
3.2.1.1 Religiocentrism  
The term ‘religiocentrism’ adopts ethnocentrism and applies it to the context of 
religious inter-group relationship (cf. Sterkens & Anthony 2008). Sumner 
(1906) is the social psychologist who introduced the term ‘ethnocentrism’ as 
the combination of feelings of superiority of the in-group with negative 
feelings or prejudices towards out-groups. We recognize that ethnocentrism 
indicates a strong tendency for prejudice against different groups. Hence, the 
negative out-group attitudes are called ‘generalised prejudice’, or ‘generalised 
out-group negativity’ (Allport 1958; McFarland 2010).  
From a social psychological perspective, a group is defined by three 
components: cognitive, evaluative and emotional (Tajfel 1981: 229). The 
cognitive component refers to the sense or the knowledge that one belongs to a 
group. The evaluative component refers to the positive or negative value 
connotation that individuals make with regard to their membership in a certain 
group, and their non-belonging to other groups. In this component, the 
individual begins to make a stronger identification with one group among 
others. The emotional component is the strongest identification marker, in the 
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sense that besides the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the group, there are 
associated emotions linked to preferences for or against one’s own group and 
others. In this respect, group formation entails processes in which cognitive, 
evaluative and emotional components produce positive in-group attitudes and 
negative out-group attitudes.  
In-group centredness, in-group favouritism, feelings of superiority, the 
idea that one’s own group is better than others, and even dominance of one’s 
own group over others are all included in the category of positive in-group 
attitudes. Negative out-group attitudes can more or less be understood as a 
consequence of positive in-group attitudes: people who belong to other groups 
are evaluated negatively, are seen as inferior, and may even be rejected or 
exploited (Bizumic et al. 2009: 871; McFarland 2010: 454; Vanhoomissen & 
Van Overwalle 2010: 85). Negative out-group prejudice is often influenced by 
a specific history of a particular group in relation to others, in which the desire 
to dominate is strongly present (McFarland 2010: 454, 472).  
 
3.2.1.2 Social identity construction and religiocentrism 
From a previous empirical study (Vanhoomissen & Van Overwalle 2010: 104), 
we know that ethnocentrism (or religiocentrism) is influenced by an 
individual’s prior knowledge about and experience with the groups involved. 
This finding illustrates the claim of social identity theory that describes the 
process in which individuals define themselves in relation to both in-groups (to 
which these individuals belong) and out-groups (to which they do not belong). 
According to Tajfel (1981), social identity formation entails processes of social 
categorisation, social identification, social comparison, and relative 
deprivation.  
Social categorisation is “a process of bringing together social objects 
or events in groups that are equivalent with regard to an individual’s actions, 
intentions and system of beliefs” (Tajfel 1981: 254). If we put this in the 
context of religious inter-group relationships, then similarities and differences 
between members of the same religious group – as well as between members 
of different religious groups – are evaluated as an important consideration of 
religious identity construction.  
In the processes of social identification, individuals build their 
identities based on identification with positive characteristics of the in-group, 
and contra-identification with negative characteristics of (mainly) out-groups.   
Tajfel (1981: 255) defines this process as “part of an individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership.” In this process, positive stereotypes emerge in relation to one’s 
own group, and negative stereotypes in relation to other groups. Tajfel (1981: 
225) uses the term ‘social stereotype’ to explain superiority and prejudice 
within inter-group relations and the psychological process of social identity 
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development. Here, social identity – or more specifically, religious identity – is 
a process of social inclusion and exclusion.  
Social comparison is a psychological process in which a group identity 
can be established when the own identity is compared with the identity of 
another group. Tajfel (1981: 258) states: “The social identity of an individual 
conceived as his knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together 
with some emotional and value significance to him of his membership can only 
be defined through the effects of social categorisations segmenting an 
individual’s social environment into his own group and others.” The positive 
stereotype about the in-group and negative stereotype about out-groups become 
a means for individuals to position themselves in society and to develop their 
social identity. Basically, social comparison is about prejudice between groups 
that functions to establish and maintain social identity (cf. Bizumic et al. 2009; 
McFarland 2010).  
In relation to social comparison, Tajfel (1982) discusses relative 
deprivation, which refers to a failure of expectations made during the 
comparison process. According to social psychological assumption, the attitude 
towards inter-group relations is closely related to the understanding and 
relation of each individual to the others within a particular group. Therefore, in 
the social comparison process there is a kind of transition from intra-group to 
inter-group attitudes. When individuals compare themselves with other groups, 
then the purpose of comparison will be according to what they want and from 
their perspective. Therefore, as Tajfel (1981: 261) describes, “[...] it is more 
likely that, in situations marked by strong psychological cleavages between 
groups, the targets of comparison will be from the individual’s own group 
rather than from an out-group.”  
Based on the social identity theory, social categorisation, social 
identification, social comparison and relative deprivation, all demonstrate the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion, and the tendency towards prejudice 
against different groups. As with ethnocentrism, religiocentrism contains two 
elements: excessive positive attitudes towards the in-group, and generally 
negative attitudes towards the out-group, which encourage exclusion (cf. 
Sterkens 2001: 155; Sterkens & Anthony 2008: 34f). It has a strong tendency 
to encourage social inclusion and exclusion based on in-group favouritism and 
out-group prejudice. Religion thus becomes an identity marker. Religious 
ideas, including religious images, functioning in the processes of social 
categorisation, identity, comparison, and relative deprivation, produce an 
understanding of individual identity and the identities of others, while the 
religions delineate differentiations between groups (cf. Capucao 2010). 
Religious conflicts or inter-group contact avoidance can occur as 
religiocentrism levels rise. In-group favouritism and prejudice towards out-
groups can represent simple inter-group competition. In the context of religious 
conflict, one particular religious group distinguishes itself as superior to other 
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religious groups. Similarly, the other groups also position themselves in a 
superior position. Competition occurs because individuals in every religious 
group position themselves as the primary source of evaluation (self-anchoring); 
they are unable to develop comparable evaluations of other religious groups 
(cf. Vanhoomissen et al. 2010; Abanes, Scheepers & Sterkens 2014). A cross-
religious research in Tamil Nadu, India, reveals that relative group size 
(resulting in majority-minority positions) also has an effect on religiocentrism. 
Negative out-group attitudes tend to be higher among members of minority 
groups, which increases the potential for inter-group confrontation (Sterkens & 
Anthony 2008; cf. Capucao 2010; Abanes et al. 2014).  
Religiocentrism is one of many factors involved in religious conflict in 
Indonesia. Usually, social conflicts in Indonesia erupt out of political or 
economic issues, not religious ones; however, religion has become a tool and a 
motivation for justifying conflict and violence (cf. Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 
2009). Wilson (2008: 192), referring to the conflict in North Maluku, states 
that “Religion is not only used as a tool by those seeking to provoke violence, 
but also simultaneously heightened the emotions of combatants, facilitated the 
mobilisation of militias, determined the form of that mobilisation and provided 
the ideology that sustained those militias in the field.” Here, religion did 
contribute to the construction of the identities of both individuals and groups.  
Conflict often results during competition for scarce resources, such as 
economic wealth and political power. Identities founded in competition can 
potentially lead to mutual intolerance between groups. The mere establishment 
of religious identity is a potential cause of violence (Appleby 2000; Almond, 
Appleby & Sivan 2003; McTernan 2003; Sidel 2006; Sterkens 2007). In the 
period prior to the violent clashes, a strong (re)definition of religious identity 
and (re)articulation of claims to religious authority was observed. These 
articulations can be seen as relatively independent causes of the conflicts, as 
such religious attestations are more likely to turn violent in states of heightened 
uncertainty and anxiety (Sidel 2006: 7ff). Hence, many social conflicts in 
Indonesia – especially those in Ambon, Halmahera, Poso, and Tasikmalaya – 
did involve religious identification, which made it possible for smaller political 
or economic conflicts to escalate into massive violence between religious 
communities (Hadiwitanto 2002; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009).  
Obviously, religiocentrism does not support the development of 
generalised trust. Generalised trust presupposes the willingness of individuals 
and groups to not limit themselves to self-anchoring and their own frame of 
reference. It takes certain principles that can serve as a common ground to 
build positive attitudes towards other individuals and groups, even though they 
may be unknown (cf. Rothstein & Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002; Hooghe 2007). 
We therefore expect that religiocentrism will be negatively related to 
generalised trust.  
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3.2.2 Results 
 
Making a comparative measurement of religiocentrism for two different 
religious traditions entails specific difficulties. Each tradition may attribute 
different positive and negative characteristics toward the others. The attributed 
positive and negative characteristics may (but will not necessarily) differ, 
because religiocentrism can be seen as a function of an interaction between 
very specific groups. For example, typical positive attributions Muslims make 
about themselves (e.g. Muslims understand the will of God because they 
follow Muhammad as the last prophet) may be different from the positive 
attributions Christians make about themselves (e.g. Christians are good people 
because they follow the example of Jesus). And the same applies to negative 
attributes. To make cross-religious comparative measurement possible, we 
must look for characteristics that are equally applicable to both groups. We 
chose the theoretical operationalisation of Sterkens and Anthony (2008), 
because it had been empirically tested in a previous cross-religious 
comparative study among Muslims, Christians, and Hindus. We also used the 
characteristics attributed to these groups because they proved to be applicable 
to respondents belonging to different religious traditions. As we attributed the 
positive characteristics to the in-group and the negative characteristics to the 
out-group, the exact formulation were different for Muslim and Christian 
respondents (cf. Sterkens & Anthony 2008).  
However, we modified Sterkens & Anthony (2008) and added two 
more items for positive in-group attitudes, and two more for negative out-
group attitudes. For both Muslims and Christians, positive in-group attitudes 
concern two personal ideals: the own religion helps them to be good people 
(items 1a-1b, 3a-3b, 7a-7b), and the own religion helps them to live better 
moral lives and become virtuous (9a-9b, 11a-11b). The negative out-group 
attitudes express negative characteristics that believers attribute to other 
religious traditions. We operationalised this in three characteristics. First, other 
religious groups are identified as the cause of inter-group conflicts (2a-2b). 
Second, other groups are described as morally inferior, because of not doing 
good deeds, doing bad deeds, being intolerant, and treating others with 
disrespect (4a-4b, 6a-6b, and 10a-10b). Third, believers from other religious 
traditions are described as lacking a sense of nationalism, which is seen as 
something very negative in the Indonesian context (8a-8b). For Christian 
respondents, these negative characteristics are attributed to Islam or Muslims in 
general; for Muslim respondents, they are attributed to Christianity or 
Christians in general.  
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Table 3.4: Operationalisation of religiocentrism among Muslim and Christian 
students 
 
Theoretical models Items 
 Muslims Christians 
Positive ingroup  1a Muslims respond to God most 
faithfully. 
1b Christians respond to God most 
faithfully. 
 3.a Thanks to their religion most 
Muslims are good people. 
3b. Thanks to their religion most 
Christians are good people. 
 7a. Because of their religion, Muslims 
are spiritually rich. 
7b. Because of their religion, 
Christians are spiritually rich. 
 9a. Muslims’ religion prompts them to 
live better lives. 
9b. Christians’ religion prompts them 
to live better lives. 
 11a. Their belief gives Muslims a strong 
virtuous character. 
11b. Their belief gives Christians a 
strong virtuous character. 
Negative outgroup  2a. Christians are often the cause of 
religious conflict. 
2b. Muslims are often the cause of 
religious conflict. 
 4a. Christians may talk about doing 
good deeds, but they do not practice 
them. 
4b. Muslims may talk about doing 
good deeds, but they do not practice 
them. 
 6a. When it comes to religion, 
Christians are intolerant. 
6b. When it comes to religion, 
Muslims are intolerant. 
 8a. Because of their religion Christians 
lack a sense of national belonging. 
8b. Because of their religion Muslims 
lack a sense of national belonging. 
 10a. Christians treat other people 
without respect. 
10b. Muslims treat other people 
without respect. 
 
We also added two items for positive out-group attitudes: Muslim respondents 
were asked about two positive characteristics attributed to Christians, and 
Christian respondents were asked about two positive characteristics attributed 
to Muslims. Although positive out-group attitudes are interesting, these items 
were not part of the religiocentrism-measuring instrument, and were not used 
in further analyses. However, we did feel that the items were necessary for 
breaking down the response set, and for avoiding any possible irritation among 
the respondents that could arise if the questions posed were only about positive 
in-group and negative out-group attitudes (cf. Sterkens 2001: 157f).  
Since the measuring items were addressed specifically to each religious 
group, we conducted the factor analyses separately for Muslims and Christians.  
In order to obtain results of two comparative factors, we filtered three 
items for positive in-group attitudes: item 1a/b (‘Muslims/Christians respond to 
God most faithfully’), item 3a/b (‘Thanks to their religion, most 
Muslims/Christians are good people’), and item 9a/b (‘Muslims’/Christians’ 
religion prompts them to live better lives’), which always resulted in a low 
factor loading. We succeeded to obtaining a two-factor solution, which is 
comparative for Muslims (Table 3.5) and Christians (Table 3.6). For Muslims, 
items 10, 6, 4, 2, and 8 clustered in one factor. We labelled it ‘negative out-
group attitudes’. Items 7 and 11 coincided in one factor, and they were labelled 
‘positive in-group attitudes’. This result explains 41.4% of the variance. For 
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Christians, the negative out-group attitudes consist of items 2, 6, 10, 4, and 8, 
and the positive in-group attitudes were items 7 and 11. The two-factor 
solution for Christians explained 42.9% of the variance. We found that all of 
the indicators for negative out-group attitudes were recognised by both 
religious groups, while the comparative scale for positive in-group attitudes 
consists of items 7 and 11.  
 
Table 3.5: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of religiocentrism among Muslim students 
 
Items Theory 
Factors 
h2 
F1 F2 
10a. Christians treat other people without respect. Negative outgroup .72  .51 
6a. When it comes to religion, Christians are intolerant. Negative outgroup  .61  .37 
4a. Christians may talk about doing good deeds, but 
they do not practice them. 
Negative outgroup  .60  .36 
2a. Christians are often the cause of religious conflict. Negative outgroup  .58  .33 
8a. Because of their religion Christians lack a sense of 
national belonging. 
Negative outgroup  .57  .37 
7a. Because of their religion, Muslims are spiritually 
rich. 
Positive ingroup   .77 .59 
11a. Their belief gives Muslims a strong virtuous 
character. 
Positive ingroup   .61 .37 
Cronbach’s Alpha .75 .65  
Number of valid cases 767 778  
Total variance explained 41.4%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Negative outgroup attitudues; F2 = Positive ingroup attitudes 
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Table 3.6: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of religiocentrism among Christian students 
 
Items Theory 
Factors 
h2 
F1 F2 
2b. Muslims are often the cause of religious 
conflict. 
Negative outgroup  .69  .49 
6b. When it comes to religion, Muslims are 
intolerant. 
Negative outgroup .65  .44 
10b. Muslims treat other people without respect. Negative outgroup .62  .37 
4b. Muslims may talk about doing good deeds, but 
they do not practice them. 
Negative outgroup .61  .35 
8b. Because of their religion Muslims lack a sense 
of national belonging. 
Negative outgroup .56  .38 
7b. Because of their religion, Christians are 
spiritually rich. 
Positive ingroup  .84 .73 
11b. Their belief gives Christians a strong virtuous 
character. 
Positive ingroup  .51 .25 
Cronbach’s Alpha .77 .59  
Number of valid cases 690 697  
Total variance explained 42.9%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Negative outgroup attitudues; F2 = Positive ingroup attitudes 
 
The table below shows the levels of agreement with positive in-group attitudes 
and negative out-group attitudes for Muslims and Christians.  
 
Table 3.7: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
religiocentrism for Muslim and Christian students 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Positive in-group     
Muslims  778 3.60 .91 6.35** 
Christians  697 3.31 .82 6.35** 
Negative out-group     
Muslims  778 2.71 .63 -.24 
Christians  705 2.72 .67 -.24 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
We used a Likert scale to measure the agreement of our respondents from 
totally disagree (1) to totally agree (5), and calculated the mean scores on each 
scale. On the items measuring positive in-group attitudes, our Muslim 
respondents scored (on average) 3.60 (s.d. .91). It seems they accept positive 
in-group attitudes. Meanwhile, Christian respondents produced slightly 
different results. They had a positive ambivalent response for positive in-group 
attitudes (m 3.31; s.d .82). The t-test confirms that there is a significant 
difference between Muslims and Christians regarding the mean score of 
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positive in-group attitudes (t 6.35, df 1473, p .00). Our Christian respondents 
scored lower on positive in-group attitudes than Muslims, indicating that 
Muslims are more positive about their own religious tradition than Christians, 
especially regarding seeing themselves as morally superior.  
Christians, who are in the minority in Indonesia, seemingly have fewer 
positive in-group attitudes, while majority Muslims are significantly more 
positive about their own tradition. In terms of the relative group size, this result 
is different to what Sterkens & Anthony (2008: 47) found in Tamil Nadu 
(India). Here, minority groups (Christians and Muslims) had more positive in-
group attitudes than the religious majority (i.e. Hindus). These differing results 
indicate that relative group size (majority versus minority) seemingly does not 
determine (exclusively) the level of positive in-group attitudes, but that it (also) 
relates to the self-understanding of the religious tradition concerned.  
For negative out-group attitudes our Muslim respondents (m 2.71; s.d. 
.63) and Christian respondents (m 2.72; s.d .67) have the same negative 
ambivalent response. There is no significant difference between those Muslims 
and Christians regarding negative out-group attitudes (t -.24, df 1491, p .81). 
They both tend to reject negative attitudes towards other religious traditions.  
 
3.3 Attitudes towards religion-state relationships  
 
In this section, we will examine attitudes towards the relationship between 
religion and state as a part of religious inter-group beliefs. These attitudes are 
considered to be relevant to religiously-inspired generalised trust because 
religion and generalised trust manifest themselves in public domains where the 
state exercises control. Our research questions in this section are: which 
models of religion-state relationships can be found among Muslims and 
Christians, and to what extent do our respondents agree with these models? 
First, we shall present a theoretical structure of religion-state relationships 
(3.3.1). We shall ground this theoretical structure on a political-philosophical 
distinction between liberalism and communitarianism. Second, we shall 
operationalise this typology with a measuring instrument, and describe the 
empirical results of our research on attitudes towards religion-state 
relationships (3.3.2).  
 
3.3.1 Theory 
 
We identify different models of relationships between religion and state based 
on the political-philosophical concepts of liberalism and communitarianism 
(Sandel 1983; Taylor 1994; Fergusson 1997; Rawls 2001). These two models 
take opposite stances towards the individual and towards the neutrality that 
transcends values and groups. We used the two models specifically with regard 
to our discussion of religion-state relationships. Furthermore, the models take 
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different stances on the (level of) neutrality of the government (state) towards 
the different substantial values of communities of citizens.  
 
3.3.1.1 Liberalism 
Liberalism places the highest value in life on the individual. In liberalism, 
‘neutrality’ becomes an important factor with regard to society. According to 
Sterkens (2001: 190f), neutrality has both a procedural and a substantive 
aspect. Procedural neutrality basically means that government, as the 
representation of the state, cannot invoke any substantive definition of what 
constitutes what is good for anybody. Any policy of the state must attempt to 
satisfy everybody. Substantive neutrality means that there are no any particular 
norms or values, such as particular religious ideas, that affect the state and the 
government. Each individual is autonomous, unique and different. Every 
autonomous individual must have absolute freedom, without any interference 
from society. Rawls (1971, 2001) describes people in such a society as free and 
equal individuals in which the neutral society respects the freedom and equality 
of every person. Substantive neutrality in liberalism proposes that free 
individuals and a neutral society will develop a just and fair society; because, 
as Van der Ven (2000) states, “there is an equal opportunity to openly state 
convictions about what is necessary for the good life in terms reasonable to the 
general public.”  
Liberalism emphasises the idea that every person should have equal 
access to the facilities the government provides, and that society should not 
compel diverse individuals to adopt any particular values. Furthermore, the 
focus of liberalism is not only on individualism, but also on state neutrality (cf. 
Fergusson 1997: 41). The state takes a neutral position by providing the 
opportunities for every citizen to develop according to his or her own choice. 
The state should acknowledge and appreciate the differences that exist between 
individuals and in society, including religious groups. There is no intervention 
from the state in the lives of citizens and groups of citizens, or vice versa.  
Because the state maintains a neutral position, it is expected that every 
citizen has an equal opportunity to establish equity and to choose between 
certain values, concepts and doctrines. However, substantive neutrality needs 
to meet the minimum standards of justice. It means that the state cannot 
tolerate any discriminatory behaviour, and the government has a great 
responsibility to reduce (religious) discrimination (cf. Sterkens 2001: 191). To 
a certain degree, liberalism understands that failure to appreciate the individual 
can be a source of conflict (cf. Mulhall & Swift 1996; Fergusson 1997; Van der 
Ven 2000; Trigg 2007). 
Liberalism can further be divided into two strains: autonomy liberalism 
(or radical liberalism) and diversity liberalism (or moderate liberalism). One 
may distinguish between the two by the accent on the desire either to strive for 
individual autonomy or to maintain a diversity of communities (Sterkens 2001: 
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191f). Autonomy liberalism focuses on the autonomy of the individual as the 
ultimate goal. And in diversity liberalism, autonomy is located at community 
level; which means that the ultimate goal for state or government policies is to 
maintain and foster a diversity of communities. 
 
Autonomy liberalism 
The substantive concept of the autonomy liberalism model is regarded as the 
ability and willingness of an individual to adopt a critical attitude towards the 
customs, values and norms of any tradition. Such a critical attitude implies 
individual freedom to criticise the notions of a given tradition, according to 
internal and external criteria (cf. Hirst 1974; Siegel 1988). For autonomy 
liberalists, this is legitimate, since our times are characterised by rationally 
substantiated dissent about what constitutes the good life. The appropriate 
response to diversity is to put the accent on individual freedom of choice.  
In the context of religion-state relationships, autonomy liberalism 
supports state neutrality; i.e. the state is completely independent of any 
particular religious group, concept, idea or value system. The state views its 
citizens as individuals who are autonomous in action, knowledge and moral 
values; each individual has the right to attain their own knowledge and 
formulate their own values without state intervention. Humans are autonomous 
and have the right and capacity to assign moral priorities for themselves 
(Mulhall & Swift 1996: 45). For Rawls (1971: 136ff), such a position is in line 
with the thought experiment that in developing policies, the deciding parties 
should not have any about the abilities and social position of themselves or 
others. In a context free of preconceptions, individuals can build up 
cooperative relationships regulated by principles of justice for all. The strict 
separation between religion and state within autonomy liberalism does not 
assume the state is hostile towards religion, though there is no space for 
government intervention regarding religion. The consequence is that religion 
cannot take a role in the public sphere (cf. Fox 2008: 78ff; Madeley 2009: 
185ff). 
The strict separation between religion and political governance is 
opposed to some fundamental concepts within Islam. For most Muslims, 
religion is not only an essential element of individual life, but also of politics. 
Muslims have the responsibility to maintain the unity of religious law and its 
application in society (Wahid 1999: 54ff). When Indonesia’s constitution was 
drafted in 1945, Muslims were divided into two major groups: a conservative 
faction that promoted the formation of an Islamic state, and a more liberal 
nationalist group that favoured cooperation between religion and state, but 
were generally opposed to a strict separation (Ichwan 2006). The idea that the 
state could treat religion – i.e. Islam – in a completely neutral fashion was, it 
seems, not acceptable (Sidel 2006; cf. An-Na’im 2008: 223ff). Even today, 
there are Muslim individuals and groups who promote the Islamisation of 
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society and politics in Indonesia (Wahid 1999: 70; Ichwan 2006: 35ff; 352ff; 
Salim et al. 2011; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015). We therefore expect that the 
autonomy model will find little support among Indonesian Muslims. 
We expect Christians to evaluate the autonomy model less negatively. 
In early church history, church and state were very closely related. Fergusson 
(2004: 45) states that “[b]oth church and state are to be set within and 
subordinated to a theological vision of the divine rule in history and its 
eschatological outcome”. But in the modern period, and especially during the 
period of the reformation, the distance between church and state grew. The 
church was no longer the main determinant of society.  
Nevertheless, (the theology of) the church continued to evaluate socio-
political realities. While religion cannot dominate society, it can still be a 
source of inspiration for people to build society. The secularisation and 
functional differentiation that are characteristic of modernisation have strongly 
influenced the Christian tradition (Fergusson 2004: 47ff, 158ff). Likewise, the 
slow development of the separation between church and state in Christian 
Europe has had an influence on the self-understanding of Christianity in 
Indonesia. In the deliberations of the Investigating Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) in 1945, Christians in general 
belonged to the group that advocated neutrality of the state with regard to 
religion, while they also pled for acceptance of religious differences (Ichwan 
2006). However, this is not to say that Indonesian Christians would agree 
(either then or now) with all aspects of autonomy liberalism. The relative group 
size of Christians in Indonesia, i.e. that they are a small minority, may also 
influence the level of agreement with this model. More agreement with 
autonomy liberalism may actually represent a kind of resistance to or 
apprehension towards the dominance of Islam in Indonesia (cf. Hadiwitanto 
2002). 
 
Diversity liberalism 
The diversity liberalism model positions the importance of autonomy at the 
level of communities. Diversity liberalism still sees the ideal of individual 
autonomy as a substantive definition of the good life. However, in this case 
individual autonomy implies restrictions to the efforts of diverse cultures to 
survive. Consequently, it jeopardises the diversity of societal forms. After all, 
some cultures set less store by individual autonomy than others do, or regard it 
as a threat to the survival of the community (Taylor 1994: 60f; Galston 1995: 
251). This means that the aim of government policies is to adequately ensure 
the survival of different religious communities. The principle of neutrality (by 
which the state will not intervene into affairs of the individual) is still critical; 
however, the diversity of individuals and groups is looked upon as a 
substantive matter (cf. Mulhall & Swift 1996: 173ff; Rawls 2001: 40, 187; 
Sterkens 2001). The freedom of communities to perpetuate their own identity 
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should be restricted only to the extent that they fail to respect diversity by 
adopting an intolerant, disrespectful attitude towards other traditions. 
According to this view, the principles of autonomy and neutrality should be 
understood as a plea for maximum diversity of religious communities. The 
diversity liberalism model, then, is basically a moderate liberalism which 
emphasises state neutrality and individual autonomy, and at the same time 
recognizes groups or communities among individuals. 
Diversity liberalism can be found in the later writings of Rawls, in his 
response to criticism of liberalism. In this sense, Rawls’ liberalism upholds the 
political ideals of both individuals and society (Rawls 2001: 153ff). Rawls 
describes a well-ordered society as a fair system of cooperation between free 
and equal people, with justice as fairness (Rawls 1971). Regarding the religion-
state relationship, in diversity liberalism the government recognises different 
religious groups equally, without distinguishing between them. Although the 
state is neutral to all individuals and religious groups, it nevertheless protects 
them, to support a free and diverse society. The primary aim of the state is to 
safeguard diversity per se – including differences between religious traditions. 
Thus, in diversity liberalism the state is neutral regarding religion; but it does 
not ignore religion, because it is a part of society that helps to build the country 
(Rawls 1971: 513ff; Galston 1995: 523; Mulhall & Swift 1996: 44f).  
Muslims and Christians who identify with secular nationalist groups 
are likely to agree with this model. They will argue that society will prosper 
when individuals and groups can live in freedom. However, a model that 
emphasises individuality and diversity runs counter to the interpretation of 
Islam made by more conservative Muslims. For example, in 2005 the Council 
of Indonesian Islamic Scholars (MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia) issued a 
religious order (fatwa) against the discourse of pluralism, because they claimed 
it was against the teachings of Islam. In their view, it was important to 
emphasise the bond of humanity in one single truth and doctrine, particularly 
Islam (cf. An-Na’im 2008: 266). Conservative Muslims do not accept the 
exaltation of the individual, because they consider individuals as meaningful 
only when they are bound in righteousness as defined by the teachings of 
Islam. Diversity liberalism requires Muslims to reflect critically upon the 
power of the state in association with the Islamic understanding of society 
(Wahid 1999; An-Na’im 2008).  
 
3.3.1.2 Communitarianism 
Communitarianism criticises liberalism for stressing individualism and 
neutrality, and thereby eroding the importance of shared values in society. 
Communitarian criticisms of liberalism concern the freedom in which 
individuals can develop in equality and justice. Critics of liberalism argue that 
autonomy is not possible, and neutrality not desirable. In the communitarian 
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view, liberalism neglects the substance of specific religious traditions that can 
contribute to culture and society (e.g. Sandel 1983; Taylor 1994). 
If in liberalism the highest value is placed on the individual, in 
communitarianism the highest value is placed on the community – either the 
group, or society. While the individual is still appreciated, his or her value is 
tied to his or her commitment to the community. Communitarians feel that 
though individuals have their own identities, these identities must relate 
explicitly to communities and dialogical relations with others. They believe 
that no-one exists separately from a community, such as a family or a social 
group. This means that individual identity is always socially derived (Taylor 
1994: 34). Through the interactions in a community, individuals appropriate 
their ‘communal’ identity, in which shared values and norms play an important 
role. The community is the locus of ideas and practices transmitted to every 
individual; and in turn, communal culture is formed by the contributions of 
individuals. Communitarians stress that individuals are always tied to the 
community, while liberalism (in their view, at least) underestimates the role of 
communal culture (Sandel 1983; Santosa 1994; Fergusson 1997). According to 
communitarianism, therefore, communitarians would not consider the rights 
and freedoms of the individual to be more important than common interests 
and shared values (Mulhall & Swift 1996: 67f; Trigg 2007: 92).  
In the context of religion-state relationships, communitarianism 
promotes state-sponsored opportunities for religious, ethnic or other 
communities to develop shared values that serve the ‘good life’. 
Communitarians believe that the substantive definition of the good life can be 
found at community level. In this respect it is understandable that the state 
should foster religious groups as the main resources of value formation (cf. 
Taylor 1994: 40f; Sandel 1983; Santosa 1994). Communitarianism can further 
be divided into two strains (Sterkens 2001: 194ff; cf. Fox 2008: 4ff, 62f; 
Madeley 2009). The first is group communitarianism (moderate communi-
tarianism), in which diverse communities are recognised as parts of society. 
The second is state communitarianism, which can be identified as a radical 
communitarianism. In this model, the collective values and goals espoused by 
the whole society are substantial. 
 
Group communitarianism 
The word ‘group’ in the term ‘group communitarianism’ implies that 
individuals cannot disconnect completely from their social attachments (cf. 
Fergusson 1997: 42). In this model, shared values in each group are 
substantive. However, this model posits that in the context of diversity, shared 
values can be established only at community level. Thus, this model 
distinguishes society as a whole from the communities that are parts of wider 
society. The society is comprised of a variety of smaller social groups, 
including religious groups. This understanding of society compels the state to 
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recognise different (religious) groups, and to support their flourishing for the 
sake of society as a whole. State governance should support all religious 
groups and facilitate the transmission of their values and norms. The wider 
society will only prosper when all groups are facilitated and even supported 
(Trigg 2007: 92, 208; Fox 2008: 48, 362).  
In general, Muslims and Christians in Indonesia are more comfortable 
with this model. In 1945, the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence (PPKI: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) 
concluded that a religiously engaged state was the solution to the tensions 
between the secular nationalists, Islamic nationalists and conservative 
Muslims. The first of Indonesia’s five state principles (Pancasila) noted in 
Indonesia’s constitution is ‘belief in the one and only God’. The other four 
principles are (2) just and civilised humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) 
democratic rule that is guided by wisdom resulting from deliberation and 
representation; and (5) social justice for all people.  
The theologically-inspired ‘belief in the One and Only God’ as the 
first-mentioned principle in the preamble, and in the constitution itself (i.e. art. 
29 sub 1), is perhaps surprising for a country with such religious plurality. 
Although the Pancasila clearly indicates a general acceptance of religious 
plurality, the first principle can also be seen as an indication that openness 
towards religious differences needs to be developed further (Wahid 1999: 55ff; 
Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015). In a civil society, there is a strong relationship 
between the state and the diverse groups that are part of it. Former Christian 
leaders in Indonesia, such as Soegijapranata, I.J. Kasimo and TB Simatupang, 
have always encouraged Christians to be critical, but at the same time to 
contribute to the state and society (KWI Youth Commission 1995).  
Indonesia recognises six generally accepted religious traditions: Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Whether 
this can be called ‘recognition’, insofar as this implies that others are not 
‘recognised’, is subject to debate (Hefner 2000: 43ff; cf. Ichwan 2006). But the 
Indonesian government seems to be committed to the development of these 
religious traditions and with the implementation of their religious values (An-
Na’im 2008: 258). It is quite obvious that group communitarianism is the 
model implemented in Indonesia through different legislations and regulations. 
Although the government recognises religious diversity, it often prioritises the 
needs and requests of the majority religion (cf. Wahid 1999: 109; An-Na’im 
2008: 233, 257ff). For example, there is a tendency for the government to 
adopt and favour the requests of the majority religion group in determining 
state policies and regulations. This reveals an ambivalent attitude towards the 
group communitarianism model within Indonesian society (cf. Fox 2008: 202, 
216f).  
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State communitarianism 
The state communitarianism model is a radical form of communitarianism in 
which one substantial view becomes the foundation for the state. The shared 
values and collective goals espoused by the society are the substantive matter 
(cf. Sandel 1983, Taylor 1994, Santosa 1994; Benhabib 1996; Fergusson 
1997). In the context of a religion-state relationship, the state has a very close 
relationship with only one particular religion; the state represents only one 
religious group, which is a source of values for the entire society (Trigg 2007: 
92). State and politics are grounded on religious concepts, values and ideas. 
The particular religion plays an irreplaceable role and creates the system of 
moral values within the society and political sphere.  
For some Muslims, state communitarianism fits with their religious 
ideal that Islam should be the prime source of values in political life. This is 
reinforced by the belief that Islam represents a complete answer to all of life’s 
needs (cf. Wahid 1999: 56ff). Although Islam cannot define a concrete and 
practical form of governance in terms of state regulations and government 
procedures, there is a foundation of Islamic faith, the oneness and unity of God 
(tawhid), that influences how Muslims view the state (see chapter 2). The 
primary focus of Islam is the acceptance of tawhid as the basis of faith and the 
main value of social life. Tawhid has deep implications for the societal domain. 
Since the early days of the new republic and the formulation of the Indonesian 
constitution, there has been lively debate regarding the implementation of 
Islamic law (sharia) (Ichwan 2006; An-Na’im 2008).  
In the current debate regarding the religion-state relationship, state 
communitarianism remains a pivotal issue among Indonesian Muslims. An-
Na’im (2008: 248) states: “[T]he substantive and symbolic role of Islam in the 
struggle for Indonesian independence has been a key factor in the contestations 
over defining the relationship among Islam, the state, and society in the 
postcolonial context.” There was considerable disappointment among 
conservative Muslim groups when the 1945 Indonesian constitution did not 
include sharia (Ichwan 2006: 48ff; An-Na’im 2008: 259ff). Current radical 
Islamic groups in Indonesia, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI: Front 
Pembela Islam) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), as well as political parties 
such as the Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), 
through various political and social efforts, encourage the implementation of 
sharia. They believe that Islam, as the religion of more than 80% of the 
population, should be the single source of values for the Indonesian state (cf. 
Azra 2006; Mujiburrahman 2006; Sidel 2006).  
In Europe, from the fourth century AD until the late middle ages, there 
were close relationships between church and state in different periods. As 
Christianity spread, some countries became Christian states, where political 
and social interests operated under the influence of church policies and 
Christian values (Twaddle 2002: 1ff). In the self-understanding of this 
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Christian governance there was a tension between the anticipation of the 
coming rule of God, and the partial fulfilment of it by the grace of Christ’s 
resurrection (Fergusson 2004: 23). Churches saw themselves as recipients of 
the will of God through Christ. The early church believed it had the 
responsibility to bring all people in the evil world to faith in God, according to 
the Church’s interpretation. In this respect, Christendom demonstrated a kind 
of state communitarianism as the responsibility of the church in the world 
(Fergusson 2004: 23ff).  
But in the modern and secularised period, from the 17
th
 century 
onwards, the role of the church declined under the influence of rationalisation. 
State communitarianism was no longer popular among mainstream Christians 
in the Western world. Christian mainline churches in Indonesia can be placed 
in this Western tradition. However, the fast-growing Pentecostal churches in 
Indonesia centre around the Holy Spirit as the only truth. These churches 
provide a strong impetus for the Christianisation of society as a spiritual 
responsibility of Christianity (cf. Van Kooij & Tsalatsa 2007: 155f, 173f).  
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
We have described four models of attitudes towards the religion-state 
relationship from a theoretical perspective, namely autonomy liberalism, 
diversity liberalism, group communitarianism, and state communitarianism. 
We developed indicators for these models, which we operationalised in a list of 
16 items, with four items for each model (see Table 3.8).  
For autonomy liberalism, we identified total separation of religion and 
state as the main characteristic. It entails complete substantial and procedural 
neutrality, and no interference from the state regarding religion. 
In diversity liberalism, the state protects the religious freedom and 
rights of individuals and groups, and guarantees the equal treatment of all 
religions.  
In group communitarianism, the state not only protects and recognises 
different religious groups, but also facilitates and promotes the religious 
traditions so they are able to transmit their values. Religious groups receive this 
support because they are considered to contribute substantially to the moral 
foundations of society. 
Finally, state communitarianism can be characterised by a very close 
relationship between the state and one particular religious group. The state 
does not facilitate different religious groups, but bases the entire society on 
only one religion; thus, the values and norms of the state are inspired by and 
based on that one particular religious group. As a result, the entire state system 
of government and politics is inspired by the values and norms of that 
particular religion. 
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A five-point Likert scale was used for responses to these items, 
ranging from totally disagree (1) to fully agree (5).  
 
Table 3.8: Operationalisation of attitudes towards the religion-state relationship 
 
Theoretical models Items 
 Liberalism 
Autonomy liberalism 1. The state and religious traditions should be totally independent from 
each other 
5. The government should not interfere with religion at all. 
9. The state and religion should be completely seperated. 
13. The state should not deal with religious matters at all. 
 
Diversity liberalism 2. The state should protect all religions in society without any distinction. 
6. The state should protect all religious communities for the sake of 
diversity. 
10. The state should guarantee the freedom and rights of all religious 
groups on equal basis. 
14. The state should protect all religions to flourish in society. 
 Communitarianism 
Group communitarianism 3. The state should facilitate religious communities to flourish. 
7. The state should support different religious communities to transmit 
their values. 
11. The state can benefit from the promotion of religious values. 
15. The state should promote religious traditions to transfer their values. 
 
State communitarianism 
 
4. The state should base the whole society on the values of my religion. 
8. Politics should be inspired by specific religious ideas. 
12. The state should be based on the values and  norms of my religion 
16. The government should be inspired by values and norms of my 
religious tradition. 
 
To answer our research question about the attitudes towards the religion-state 
relationship, we show the results of the factor analysis and the agreement of 
our respondents towards the religion-state relationship (see Table 3.9).  
The third step of the factor analyses
5
 resulted in three equivalent 
scales: items 14, 6, 2, and 10 (diversity liberalism) cluster together with items 3 
and 7 (group communitarianism) in one factor; items 12, 16 and 4 coincide in a 
second factor (state communitarianism); and items 9, 13, 5, and 1 coincide in a 
third factor (autonomy liberalism). This means that the moderate models of 
diversity liberalism and group communitarianism cluster together in one single 
measurement. We labelled this particular factor the‘cooperation model’. The 
two outer ends of the spectrum of the relationship between religion and state, 
which we identified theoretically, are also clearly separated among Muslim and 
Christian respondents: state communitarianism, and autonomy liberalism 
(Table 3.9). 
                                                 
5
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
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The two moderate models of the relationship between religion and 
state are combined in one measurement of ‘cooperation between religion and 
state’, made up of items 14, 6, 2 and 10 of our theoretical model for diversity 
liberalism, and items 3 and 7 of our theoretical model for group 
communitarianism. In the diversity liberalism model, the state is neutral 
towards religion, but it recognises diverse religious groups as autonomous, and 
protects them. In group communitarianism, the state recognises diverse 
religious groups as essential members of the community, and sources of shared 
values. Hence, the state actively facilitates and supports religious groups.  
Overall, our respondents do not emphasise the differences between the 
two moderate models; rather, they stress the common characteristics: that the 
separation between religion and state is not total, and that the state should 
recognise different religious groups. In Indonesia, the state cannot separate 
itself from the religious communities, and religion is clearly visible in the 
public domain. Article 29 of Indonesia’s Constitution states that the state is 
based upon the belief in one God, and that religious freedom is guaranteed 
within the limits of this prerequisite. An independent Ministry of Religious 
Affairs is responsible for coordinating matters of religion. Our Muslim and 
Christian respondents combine these fine distinctions in the general idea that 
the government should protect, support and facilitate religious traditions in 
society, thus reflecting a model of cooperation in the relationship between 
religion and state. 
State communitarianism is understood to be a very close relationship 
between one particular religion and the state. In this radical model, governance 
is strongly influenced by the norms of that particular religion (for instance, 
items 12 and 16). The state not only endorses one particular religion, but also 
recognises it as the sole official religion. 
Autonomy liberalism is at the opposite end of the spectrum, featuring 
total separation between religion and state. This does not necessarily mean that 
the state is hostile towards religion; rather, it means the state is neutral, and 
does not interfere in religion and religious affairs (Table 3.9).  
  
RELIGIOUS INTER-GROUP BELIEFS 
 
135 
Table 3.9: Factor analysis (Paf, Varimax rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of religion-state relationship among Muslim and 
Christian students. 
 
Items Theory 
Factors 
h2 
F1 F2 F3  
14. The state should protect all religions to 
flourish in society. 
Diversity liberalism .70 
  
.48 
6. The state should protect all religious 
communities for the sake of diversity. 
Diversity liberalism .68 
  
.48 
10. The state should guarantee the freedom 
and rights of all religious groups on equal 
basis. 
Diversity liberalism .64 
  
.41 
2. The state should protect all religions in 
society without any distinction. 
Diversity liberalism .61 
  
.38 
3. The state should facilitate religious 
communities to flourish. 
Group communitarianism .57 
  
.33 
7. The state should support different 
religious communities to transmit their 
values. 
Group communitarianism .54 
  
.29 
12. The state should be based on the values 
and  norms of my religion 
State communitarianism  
.83  
.71 
16. The government should be inspired by 
values and norms of my religious tradition. 
State communitarianism  
.77  
.60 
4. The state should base the whole society 
on the values of my religion. 
State communitarianism  
.66  
.44 
9. The state and religion should be 
completely seperated. 
Autonomy liberalism   
.74 
.56 
13. The state should not deal with religious 
matters at all. 
Autonomy liberalism   
.69 
.48 
5. The government should not interfere with 
religion at all. 
Autonomy liberalism   
.61 
.37 
1. The state and religious traditions should 
be totally independent from each other 
Autonomy liberalism   
.56 
.31 
Cronbach’s Alpha .79 .79 .74  
Number of valid cases 14
80 
1456 14
62 
 
Total variance explained 44.9%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = cooperation; F2 = state communitarianism; F3 = autonomy liberalism 
 
Next, we calculated the mean scores and standard deviations for each model of 
religion-state relationship, and checked for significant differences between 
Muslims and Christians by means of an independent-samples T-test. The level 
of agreement with the three models of religion-state relationships is expressed 
in a five-point Likert scale running from total disagreement (1) to total 
agreement (5). Table 3.10 below provides a summary of the average scores, 
and the inter-group differences.  
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Table 3.10: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
the religion-state relationship for Muslim and Christian students. 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Cooperation    
Muslims 789 4.04 .56 -9.899** 
Christians 707 4.30 .48 -9.899** 
     
State communitarisnism    
Muslims 763 3.29 .93 12.780** 
Christians 693 2.69 .89 12.780** 
     
Autonomy liberalism    
Muslims 789 2.41 .81 -.317 
Christians 706 2.43 .81 -.317 
Scale: 1(Totally disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Not sure), 4 (Agree), 5 (Totally agree) 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
Both Muslim and Christian Indonesian students favour the model of 
cooperation between religion and state, and show relatively high levels of 
agreement with it (mean: Muslims 4.04; Christians 4.30). There is ambiguity 
towards the model of state communitarianism (Muslims 3.29; Christians 2.69) 
and disagreement with autonomy liberalism (Muslims 2.41; Christians 2.43). 
Although the order of preference for or disapproval of the three models is the 
same for Muslims and Christians, there are nevertheless significant differences 
between Muslims and Christians in the level of (dis)agreement.  
The cooperation model between religion and state can count on 
general agreement from both Muslims and Christians. Muslims accept the 
cooperation model (mean 4.04) with a relatively small standard deviation 
(0.56). Christians, on average, show even more agreement with the cooperation 
model (mean 4.30), and are almost unanimous in this agreement (standard 
deviation 0.48). Statistically, the agreement of Christians is also significantly 
stronger than that of Muslims. Indonesia is often described as a religiously 
engaged state in which the government should show support for all religious 
traditions, following the ideology of pancasila and its constitution (Ichwan 
2006).  
Seemingly, this idea can count on support from among both Muslims 
and Christians. The state should protect all religions, allowing them to flourish; 
it should protect the religious communities, for the sake of diversity; and it 
should guarantee the freedom of all religious groups equally. Since the 
emphasis in this model is on equality, it is not very surprising that Christians 
agree (significantly) more with this model, although it also implies that there is 
no wall of separation between religion and state. The Christian respondents 
seem to make the statement that their preference for the cooperation model also 
implies that the majority group should not be favoured. 
State communitarianism is less agreed upon. Still, Muslims show a 
somewhat ambivalent agreement with the state communitarianism model, but 
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the high standard deviation shows that there are differing opinions about state 
communitarianism within the Muslim group itself (mean 3.29; standard 
deviation .93). Christian respondents show a negatively ambivalent response to 
state communitarianism (mean 2.69; sd .89). The difference between Muslims 
and Christians is also statistically significant. Seemingly, Christians have far 
more difficulties with the statement that the state should be based on the values 
and norms of one’s own religion (item 12), or that the government should be 
inspired by the values and norms of one’s own religious tradition (item 16). So 
while Christians disagree on the whole that Christianity should be the only (or 
even the main) religious tradition with which the government should cooperate 
– an aspiration that would be rather unrealistic anyway, given their minority 
status – Muslims are positively ambivalent about it.  
Given the context, it is remarkable that Christian respondents do not 
reject state communitarianism without exception. It’s possible that some 
Christian fundamentalist groups with strong exclusivist religious truth claims 
may think that their own faith will replace others in the future, and that at that 
time, state communitarianism might be preferable. Nevertheless, on average, 
Christians tend to reject state communitarianism, probably because it ignores 
religious plurality, or because it implies the repression of minority groups, of 
which they themselves are an example. A similar explanation may be given for 
the positive ambivalent stance of Muslims towards state communitarianism. As 
a majority group they may expect more power in the political domain, as 
majority-group Muslims could be tempted to promote their values exclusively 
in the public sphere (cf. Van Klinken 2001; Noorhaidi 2005; Sidel 2006; 
Mujiburrahman 2006; Ichwan 2006; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009).  
However, Muslims also seem to realise that the presence of other 
traditions makes it difficult to implement state communitarianism, even apart 
from its desirability. Although there has been debate in the Indonesian Islamic 
communities regarding the relationship between religion and state, the 
(preferred) influence of religion on governance remains relatively popular, 
especially among radical Muslim groups (cf. Brown 2000; Azra 2006). In 
Islamic thought, the relationship between religion and politics has always been 
strong. Muhammad established the ummah (community) to maintain peace and 
justice for all people who lived in Medina. The ummah is usually interpreted 
not only as including the faithful in a strict sense, but as a ‘community’ or even 
a ‘nation’ that shares cultural traditions, or ethical convictions, or – even more 
strictly – follows the sharia. So gradually, there has been a development from 
cultural to more strictly religious interpretations of the ummah with regard to 
governance (Denny 1975; Brown 2000; Waardenburg 2002).  
Autonomy liberalism is rejected by both Muslims (m 2.41; sd .81) and 
Christians (m 2.43; sd .81). There is no significant difference between the two 
religious groups (t -.32, df 1493, p .75). Both Muslim and Christian students in 
Indonesia agree that religion should not be marginalised in public matters and 
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that the state should not ignore religions. The respondents felt that the state 
must always consider religious ideas and values in the drafting of public 
policies, and that religion must have an acknowledged position within society 
with regards to state policies. Autonomy liberalism is the least favoured model 
of religion-state relationship; which is understandable against the Indonesian 
background, where the plausibility of religion is very high, both at individual 
and at societal level.  
 
3.4 Religious vocation for solidarity and justice 
 
In the last section we will examine religious vocation for solidarity and justice 
among Muslims and Christians. This section is essential to the context of 
religious inter-group beliefs. Previously we discussed attitudes towards 
religious plurality, religiocentrism, and models of religion-state relationships. 
These inter-group beliefs refer to religious convictions that relate (in)directly to 
inter-group relations. With ‘religious vocation for solidarity and justice’ we 
wish to examine a more personal religious conviction – at the individual level, 
but which nevertheless will affect inter-group relations. We also expect it to 
relate strongly to generalised trust. We expect that a personal commitment to 
principles of universal solidarity and justice will induce higher levels of trust 
towards others.  
Since this research is about religiously-inspired generalised trust, we 
will examine agreement with principles of solidarity and justice, specifically 
within a religious tradition. Our research question in this section is: To what 
extent is religious vocation for solidarity and justice present among our 
Muslim and Christian student population in Indonesia? Firstly, we shall present 
a theoretical discussion of religious vocation for solidarity and justice (3.4.1). 
Then we shall describe its measurement and its prevalence among Muslim and 
Christian students (3.4.2). 
 
3.4.1 Theory 
 
In this section, we will briefly present a general overview of the principles of 
solidarity and justice within Islam and Christianity. 
 
3.4.1.1 The principles of solidarity and justice in Islam 
The Islamic theology of solidarity and justice can already be found clearly in 
the Koran. The Koran confirms that God (Allah) is greatly concerned with his 
creatures (Sura 7:11; 80:24-32), and justice must be done to everybody (Sura 
51:1-6). Muslims believe that God has been watching and working actively 
among His creatures, who are called to promote justice as well as showing His 
purpose and Word. The Koran shows that God has responsibility towards His 
creatures and is also concerned about them. Stewart (2008: 52) posits that “the 
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Allah of the Koran is not a celestial watchmaker, who having started the 
universe off, left it to run by itself; every event – the falling of rain, the 
germination of seed, the ripening of fruit – is a divine act.”  
At the same time, God’s engagement with the world invites people to 
try to understand and live according to God’s wish. Human beings are expected 
to respond to God’s acts. When people are willing to submit to God’s will, God 
will reward these men and women, regardless of their wealth (Sura 33:35). 
This understanding is based on the belief that in spiritual matters, all human 
beings are treated equally in front of God (Stewart 2008: 103). Briefly, there 
are two important dimensions to the appeal for solidarity and justice: first, God 
Himself has a purpose and a will with regard to His creatures, and especially 
human beings; and second, men and women must respond to God’s appeal. 
What then is God’s purpose and will for human beings? Islamic 
theology presents tawhid as a fundamental teaching (Sura 13:3; 67:1; cf. 
Murata & Chittick 1995). In Chapter 2 we have explained that tawhid is 
Islam’s basic doctrine of the oneness of God. God is one (Al-ʾAḥad) and single 
(Al-Wāḥid). He is unique and indivisible, but also indefinable. Tawhid  is also 
His basic purpose and wish (Sura 51:56; Sura 33:72; 5:68; 112:1; cf. 
Muthahari 2003: 30f). So God’s main purpose is to invite humans to 
understand that He is the one and only God, who represents an absolute truth 
and will for human beings. God is the Creator and the only source of truth, 
including life principles for all creatures, and He is very keen to invite people 
to understand this. Everything that is true and good in this world should 
originate in this particular belief.  
According to the Koran, Muslims’ belief that God is the absolute 
source of truth will bring them a life of perfect harmony, co-operation and 
solidarity (Sura 2:177; 41:10; 49:13; 51:19; 67:15). In this essential unity and 
solidarity, there is also an equality of all humans (Sura 49:13). Kotb (1953: 20) 
states, “[T]he universe is a unity emanating from a single Will; because man is 
himself a part of the world, dependent upon and related to all the other parts; 
and because individuals are as atoms, dependent upon and related to the world; 
therefore they must have the same dependence upon and relation to one 
another.” Complete harmony and unity are the origin and purpose of humanity. 
Solidarity and justice are consequences of the origin and purpose of humanity 
(Syari’ati 1982: 73ff; Rahman 1995: 402ff; Muthahari 2003: 44f). The 
principles of solidarity and justice in Islam emerge from the understanding of 
perfect harmony and the fundamental equality as God’s will. Solidarity and 
justice are religious responsibilities in which people are subject to God’s will. 
They have to care for others and strive for justice for their fellow believers, but 
also for all other people (Sura 57:25). 
All human life is directed principally to serve and fulfil God’s will 
(Sura 6:162). Muhammad, as the last of God’s messengers, is believed to have 
brought a strong message about how to serve and fulfil God’s will. Muhammad 
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is depicted as a messenger of God who taught people how to live according to 
God’s will, i.e. living in solidarity and justice with fellow human beings (cf. 
Schimmel 1985; Ramadan 2007). We note, for example, that one of the five 
pillars of Islam is social tax (zakat). The implementation of zakat is a concrete 
manifestation of solidarity with those who are poor and weak, and therefore 
contributes to social justice (Sura 22:40-41). When Muhammad went to Mecca 
and Medina, he worked on behalf of God to promote justice; especially for the 
weak, such as orphans, widows, slaves and the poor (cf. Dabashi 1989: 54). 
Also, Islamic law (Sharia) must basically be understood as a manifestation of 
God’s message conveyed by Muhammad about humanity (Stewart 2008: 215ff; 
cf. Kotb 1953: 30ff ; Akhtar 1997: 111; Cornell 1997). Solidarity and justice 
are not only spiritual aspirations in Islam, but are also requirements to be 
fulfilled concretely in life.  
 
3.4.1.2 The principles of solidarity and justice in Christianity 
From the Bible, Christians believe that humans were created in the image of 
God (Gen 1:26). This can be interpreted as meaning that human beings are 
created to be bound by God and to participate in God’s will, i.e. goodness for 
all human beings (cf. Brueggemann 2002; Nardoni 2004). The consequence of 
this understanding is that God as the creator is different from human beings, 
but not necessarily entirely separated from humans. There is a dynamic 
interaction between God and humans. Brueggemann (2002: 41) describes 
‘humans as the image of God’ as a situation in which human beings are not 
allowed to live in absolute independence. But it explicitly does not mean that 
God wields power arbitrarily. Human freedom cannot be separated from what 
God has expected from the beginning. The relationship between God and men 
is one of interactive fidelity. On the one hand humans are given space for 
development; at the same time, they are required to obey God’s principles. God 
is recognised as the creator of new things in accordance with His original 
intentions and promises, in which the development of His creations is 
guaranteed as long as they worship God (Dunn & Suggate 1993: 42; 
Dingemans 2002: 9f). Again, we see that God is the source of truth, and in this 
sense God’s will is an important subject that is related to human action. 
Basically, Christians learn about God’s will for their life from the Bible, as the 
source of Christian theology.  
The Old Testament stories tell of a God who is concerned with the 
human condition. The exodus narrative (Deu 6) is an important Old Testament 
example of God’s concern. It is an event of liberating justice (cf. Nardoni 
2004). When humans are powerless and helpless, God hears their cries with the 
passion of solidarity and justice (Ex 1:13-14; 2:24). Solidarity and justice are 
the main foci of liberation theology. 
Liberation theologians believe that the exodus story illustrates God’s 
concern for human life, especially for those who are weak (Pico 1989: 72f; 
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Burnside 2011). God does not support oppression. God is the ultimate judge; 
he intervened, condemned, and saved the people of Israel from the oppression 
of the Egyptians (Ex 8:22-23; 9:4, 26; 10:22-23; 11:7; Ps 146:7-9). 
Furthermore, in the Bible (Gen 4:10; Is 1:17-18; 33:22; Ps 9:13, 19; 5:2) God 
is portrayed more universally as the Creator who hears the ’cries’ of the 
oppressed. According to Nardoni (2004: 62), “[t]he exodus is a paradigm of 
hope for all oppressed people, assuring them that they have not been created to 
be slaves, but to be free in a society that should protect and practise justice.” 
God’s actions, such as those in the story of the exodus, are interpreted as acts 
of solidarity and justice in which God confronts the oppressors to defend all of 
His creations (Psalm 103:6). Based on this perspective, God is essentially 
recognised as “the ultimate source of justice” (Deut 32:4), and His actions aim 
to restore human life to solidarity in which a “divinely mandated social order” 
will be established (Burnside 2011: 104 ff.; Pico 1989: 74). The Old Testament 
shows Christians that God as the Creator cares about the lives of all creatures. 
God is the God of novelty. He encourages us to struggle for a just and peaceful 
world (Dunn 1993:32; cf. Gen 18:19; Deut 16:19-20; Ps 7:18; 9:8-9). In short, 
God created human beings not to fight and oppress each other, but to live 
together in harmony (cf. Brueggemann 1982). 
The God who rejects oppression and injustice among His creatures is 
also described in the New Testament, especially in the Gospels. Jesus brought 
a message about the Kingdom of God (Mk 1:14-15; Matt 4:17; Lk 4:14-15). 
Jesus’ concept of the Kingdom of God has similarities with the message in the 
Old Testament (Is 52:7; 40:10; Dan 7:1-28) in which God brings about the 
restoration of the people of God, and submission to the nations of Yahweh. 
However, the Kingdom of God in Jesus’ perspective is broader. It focuses on 
the restoration of humanity and the revolution of socio-religious life. The 
social values in the Kingdom of God that Jesus taught and exemplified in His 
life are solidarity and justice. The stories in which Jesus helped those who were 
marginalised, sick, poor, hungry and sinful affirm these values. Asian 
theologians, such as Sing (1980) and Yewangoe (1989), understand that 
through Jesus, Christians can see that God is not distant from mankind and 
humanity’s problems. God is the Creator who is willing to become involved in 
the history of mankind, which is marked by injustice and suffering (cf. section 
2.4.1). Jesus represents God’s will and power to repair and renew the broken 
world through His solidarity with mankind and sense of justice (Balasuriya 
2000; Dingemans 2002: 10; Nardoni 2004).  
More firmly, Yewangoe (1989: 325) states, "Jesus is the face of God in 
suffering human history.” The life of Jesus shows His efforts to deal with 
humanitarian issues, especially those involving justice leading to solidarity. 
The Kingdom of God consists of God’s principles, in which solidarity and 
justice are relevant, introduced into human life as a radical alteration (Matt 5:3-
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12; Lk 6:20-23). In this respect, we understand that the kingdom of God 
becomes God’s will about a consummated reality (cf. Nardoni 2004: 184).  
Human beings are instructed to live with God and do God’s will, 
within the world and among others. In this respect, ‘solidarity and justice’ has 
two sides: first, solidarity and justice have a transcendent meaning, as the 
divine principle; and second, they have an immanent meaning, as the purpose 
of human life. The principle of justice as God’s will in Christianity will bring 
human beings together into a universality in which people are bound by 
solidarity as God’s creations (cf. Stewart 2008: 245ff). Human solidarity and 
justice reflect God’s solidarity with and justice towards mankind. The Bible 
refers to this clearly: “It is impossible to be just, acceptable before God, while 
at the same time being unjust towards one’s neighbour” (Dunn 1993: 39; cf. Ez 
18:5-9; Is 58:3-7; Am 5:21-24; Mic 3; Matt 22:34-40; 25:38-40). Through 
Jesus, Christians develop and implement the spirituality of solidarity and 
justice. Nardoni (2004: 196) states, “Jesus’ aim was to create a community 
seeking peace and rejecting violence, fostering mutual service and living in 
love, practising justice and exercising compassion.” People called to embody 
God’s justice also live with the same principle of solidarity and justice aimed at 
universal human interests. In this respect, bringing solidarity and justice to 
human life is a religious vocation in Christianity. And such a vocation of 
solidarity and justice represents a Christian spirituality of practical and 
concrete concerns regarding all forms of injustice and suffering in the lives of 
mankind (see Lk 10:30-35; cf. Nardoni 2004: 47; Pico 1989: 91; Yewangoe 
1989). 
 
3.4.2 Results 
 
Based on the reflections above, we can distinguish two important 
characteristics of the religious vocation for solidarity and justice among both 
Muslims and Christians (cf. Burnside 2011: 103, 140). First, the principles of 
solidarity and justice are related to the belief in God as the Creator (Genesis 1-
2 in the Bible, and many verses throughout the Koran, specifically Sura 7:54, 
189; 15:26; 32:7-8; 71:13-17). Second, God’s will is related to how humans 
define themselves, and the prescriptions on how they treat others. The 
Scriptures show that the principles of justice and solidarity relate strongly to 
God’s will regarding human life (cf. Ps 9:8-9; Sura 6:114).  
We have developed a four-item measurement of ‘religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice’ (see Table 3.11). First we asked for agreement about 
“living together in harmony as creations of God” (item 1). This item represents 
the understanding that humans should live according to God’s wishes and 
commands, as indicated in the Holy Scriptures. Other items ask about God’s 
wish for solidarity and justice for everybody (item 2, 3, 4), pointing out that 
people live together in a plural society with other, different, people. The 
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principle of ‘solidarity and justice’ was demonstrated by God through the life 
and teachings of Jesus and Muhammad (for Christians and Muslims 
respectively). It demonstrates how people should live, despite their differences. 
A five-point Likert scale was used to indicate the level of agreement with each 
of the statements, from total disagreement (1) to full agreement (5).  
 
Table 3.11: Operationalisation of religious vocation for solidarity and justice 
 
Items 
1.  I belief and support the idea that God created human beings to live together in 
harmony 
2. I belief that love and solidarity among diverse people is the prime command of 
God. 
3. The Holy texts stimulate me to strive for justice and fairness for everybody, 
irrespective their religion. 
4. I belief that showing solidarity with everybody is God's wish. 
 
To confirm that the four items reflected the concept of religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice, the responses were subjected to a factor analysis.
6
 The 
factor analysis confirmed a one-factor solution containing all four items among 
both religious groups, explaining 51% of the total explained variance (see 
Table 3.12). 
 
Table 3.12: Factor analysis (Paf), commonalities (h
2
), percentage of explained 
variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of comparative understanding of 
religious vocation for solidarity and justice. 
 
Items Factor h2 
1.  I belief and support the idea that God created human beings to live together in 
harmony 
.76 .43 
2. I belief that love and solidarity among diverse people is the prime command of God. .72 .57 
3. The Holy texts stimulate me to strive for justice and fairness for everybody, 
irrespective their religion. 
.72 .52 
4. I belief that showing solidarity with everybody is God's wish. .66 .52 
Cronbach’s Alpha .81  
Number of valid cases 1484 
Total variance explained 51.0% 
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
 
Table 3.13 shows the levels of agreement with our measurement of religious 
vocation for solidarity and justice among Muslims and Christians, as well as 
the inter-group differences. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Extraction method: principal axis factoring. Rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Minimal eigenvalue 1; commonality > .20; factor loadings > .30, and if 
items load high on two factors, the difference in factor loadings should be > .15 
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Table 3.13: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
religious vocation for solidarity and justice, for Muslim and Christian students 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
     
Religious vocation for solidarity with & justice for the other  
Muslims 790 4.10 .60 -7.45** 
Christians 704 4.33 .58 -7.45** 
     
Scale: 1(Totally disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Not sure), 4 (Agree), 5 (Totally agree) 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
Muslims positively accept religious vocation for solidarity and justice (m 4.10; 
s.d .60). This religious vocation is also totally accepted by Christians (m 4.33; 
s.d .58). The mean score among Christians is somewhat higher than among 
Muslims, with a statistically significant difference between these religious 
groups (t -7.45, df 1492, p .00) (see Table 3.13). This finding could be rooted 
in the relatively strong presence in Indonesia of Christian liberation theology, 
which depicts Jesus as a liberator and emphasises appeals for solidarity and 
justice (cf. Boff 1987; Sobrino 1993; Dupuis 1997; Banawiratma 2000). It is 
also possible that the context of the relative group sizes (i.e. minority versus 
majority) plays a role in inter-group differences. In comparison to Muslims, 
who are in the majority in Indonesia, as a minority group Christians have often 
experienced situations calling for solidarity and justice, thus motivating them 
to show more concern for these principles. 
 
  
Chapter 4 
 
Religiously-inspired Generalised Trust  
in Indonesia 
 
4.1 Research problems 
What is trust? What different types of trust can be identified? How do Muslim 
and Christian students in Indonesia think about different types of trust? And 
what are the religious beliefs that explain people’s trust – or lack of trust – in 
others? These are the main questions we will discuss in this chapter. 
In this study, we focus on a concept of social trust that is directed at 
people we do not know personally. More specifically, we will describe a 
specific form of social trust: ‘religiously-inspired generalised trust’. We do so 
because generalised trust is necessary for the peaceful coexistence of 
individuals belonging to different groups, even though they may identify with 
one specific religious group. In a modern society, relations between people 
who do not know each other personally are unavoidable, and even necessary. 
And in a plural society, these relationships between individuals and groups 
naturally cross the boundaries of religion and ethnicity (Marschall & Stolle 
2004). Modern society requires a form of trust that enables individuals to relate 
to members of other communities despite their differences. Without 
generalised trust, it is impossible to bind diverse people together (Putnam 
2000:136; cf. Glanville & Paxton 2007). Compared to current literature, this 
study makes two important contributions to the conceptualisation and the 
measurement of generalised trust. We will specify the concept of trust in 
specific societal domains, and we will elaborate on the concept of trust by 
discussing ‘religiously-inspired generalised trust’. 
Firstly, in most studies generalised trust is studied at an abstract level, 
i.e. as an abstract idea within society in general. A dominant measurement in 
this tradition is the General Social Survey (GSS) instrument, which asks 
respondents to react to the following statements: “On the whole, one can trust 
people”; “Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, 
or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?”; “Would you say that most 
of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for 
themselves?” (Uslaner 2002; Welch et al. 2004:323; Glanville & Paxton 
2007:234; Uslaner 2008:731; Hooghe et al. 2009; Traünmuller 2010:350). It is 
possible to measure generalised trust at an abstract level, if one assumes the 
imagining of specific roles and related expectations by the respondents 
(Seligman 1997). But we think that a general measurement has limitations if 
one wants to know the attitudes of people within a specific context. Trust is 
always contextual, i.e. related to specific persons and groups in specific 
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conditions. People’s levels of trust might be different depending on the societal 
domain to which trust is applied. While people may show a high level of trust 
in one domain (such as health care, or education), they may show less trust in 
another domain (such as politics, or the legal system). Therefore, we study 
generalised trust in concrete terms in different societal domains in the specific 
context of Indonesia. To what extent do people in Indonesia show ‘generalised 
trust’ in specific societal domains?  
Secondly, we will elaborate on the relationship between religion and 
trust by speaking of ‘religiously-inspired generalised trust’. Trust will be 
understood as an element within the religious meaning system. We refer to 
generalised trust as a religious attitude towards people outside one’s own 
religious community. In the context of Indonesian society, religion is salient to 
people’s lives. Religion plays an important role in private and public spheres. 
One could even say that religion blurs the distinction between private and 
public to a certain degree, because people act on the basis of personal religious 
convictions within the public domain. It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine 
not being religious in Indonesia. In such a context, religion is not only likely to 
be a determinant of generalised trust, but is likely to be part of ‘trust’ itself. 
Religion is a rich source of values that are important for social cohesion, such 
as solidarity and justice. As a source of moral values, religion influences 
believers’ attitudes within specific societal domains, such as the economy, 
politics, education and socio-cultural life (cf. Casanova 1994; Uslaner 2002; 
Herbert 2003; Tan & Vogel 2008). The strong influence of religion does not 
mean that Indonesia knows no modernisation at all. There certainly is 
modernisation, in the sense that the economic, political, social and cultural 
domains of life function as relatively independent systems. Even so, religion 
may relate to solidarity or lack of solidarity within these domains. This 
relationship may be positive or negative.  
Religion may promote trust, but can also lead to (out-group) distrust. 
The latter is the case when religious convictions are exclusivistic and 
discriminatory in nature. In fact, religiosity is often related to in-group 
preference and out-group derogation (Allport 1966; Hood et al. 2005; Tan & 
Vogel 2008). Some religious ideas, e.g. religious fundamentalism or exclusive 
truth claims, are poor foundations for generalised trust (Putnam 2000; Uslaner 
2003). Also, in Indonesia religion sometimes fails to support generalised trust, 
and is even related to conflict (cf. Mujiburahman 2006; Sterkens & 
Hadiwitanto 2009). 
Previous sociological studies have observed the impact of religion on 
generalised trust. In these types of research, religion is usually only measured 
by religious self-definition (i.e. belonging to a religious tradition or 
denomination) and participation in religious practices, while generalised trust 
is operationalised in items of the General Social Survey mentioned above (cf. 
Welch et al. 2004; Glanville & Paxton 2007; Uslaner 2008; Tan & Vogel 2008; 
RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED GENERALISED TRUST IN INDONESIA 
 
147 
Traunmüller 2010). The research results show, inter alia, that non-
fundamentalist church denominations (more specifically, mainline 
Protestantism), church attendance and religious activities are positive 
predictors of generalised trust (Uslaner 2002; Welch et al. 2007; Hooghe et al. 
2009; Traunmüller 2010). In this study we address two further problems.  
Firstly, we expect that religious self-definition and religious practices 
are insufficient to predict religiously-inspired generalised trust. We will 
identify two relevant categories of predictors of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust, namely religious intra-group beliefs, and religious inter-
group beliefs. Religious intra-group beliefs are about how religious believers 
understand some elements of their own religious tradition, such as their own 
Holy Scripture, or specific religious images of God, Jesus Christ or the prophet 
Mohammad. Religious inter-group beliefs refer to religious convictions about 
the relation between one’s own tradition and other religious traditions. 
According to Johansson-Stenman et al. (2009), Muslims and Hindus in rural 
Bangladesh trust members of their own religion more than they trust people 
from other religions. This is hardly surprising, if one knows that 
religiocentrism – the combination of positive attitudes towards the in-group 
and negative attitudes towards the out-group – is prevalent among all religious 
traditions (cf. Sterkens & Anthony 2008). There is a peculiar sort of belief that 
one’s own religious tradition is better than others. This belief is indeed a 
constraint for generalised trust.  
But secondly, we will also account for personal characteristics, socio-
economic circumstances, the relative group size (majority/minority position) 
and past experiences of injustice or conflict that may affect the level of 
generalised trust (Rothstein 2001; Hooghe et al. 2009). High socio-economic 
status, equal status contact, and fair social and political institutions are all 
related to more generalised trust. But depending on the context and exact 
circumstances, variables may influence levels of generalised trust differently, 
as we have seen in research in the US and Europe. In the US, ethnic diversity 
negatively affects generalised trust, while European research has found that 
ethnic diversity gives people a chance to communicate and build cooperation, 
and ultimately has a positive impact on generalised trust (Hooghe et al. 2010).  
This chapter has the following outline. In section 4.2, we formulate 
specific research questions. The theoretical framework of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust is presented in section 4.3, and specified for different domains 
in section 4.4. In the final section (4.5), we present our research findings, 
looking first at the various types of religiously-inspired generalised trust that 
we can identify among Muslims and Christians in Indonesia (4.5.1), followed 
by the level of agreement of our Muslim and Christian respondents (4.5.2), and 
the social location of types of religiously-inspired generalised trust (4.5.3). 
Finally, we will show which background characteristics, religious intra-group 
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beliefs and religious inter-group beliefs decisively influence religiously-
inspired generalised trust (4.5.4).  
4.2 Research questions 
The main questions of our study are: 
 
To what extent do Muslims and Christians agree with religiously-
inspired generalised trust related to specific domains in Indonesia?  
 
And to what extent do religious intra-group and inter-group beliefs 
influence religiously-inspired generalised trust? 
 
In the first place, Muslims and Christians may have different understandings of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust. Differences may be there because the 
groups have other ideas about solidarity with others, but also because of the 
different social status of each individual and group involved. To investigate 
this, we need a clear definition of generalised trust, and ideas about how 
generalised trust fits into the religious meaning systems of both Muslims and 
Christians. Secondly, the intergroup differences in religiously-inspired 
generalised trust may be influenced by a number of aspects within a religious 
meaning system; namely, religious intra-group beliefs and religious inter-group 
beliefs.  
 
We can elaborate on these ideas in the following specific research questions: 
1. Which types of religiously-inspired generalised trust exist among Muslim 
and Christian students in Indonesia?  
2. Are there significant differences between Muslims and Christians 
regarding types of religiously-inspired generalised trust? 
3. To what extent do background characteristics, religious intra-group beliefs 
and religious inter-group beliefs correlate with religiously-inspired 
generalised trust?  
4. To what extent is religiously-inspired generalised trust influenced by 
background characteristics, religious intra-group beliefs and religious 
inter-group beliefs? 
4.3. Theoretical framework 
In the first section we define the concept of ‘generalised trust’, against the 
background of the current literature on trust (4.3.1). We will then develop 
generalised trust further, in the specific context of Indonesia (4.3.2). Finally, 
we describe the relationship between religion, generalised trust, and the 
Indonesian context (4.3.3).  
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4.3.1 The concept of ‘generalised trust’ 
We will first describe ‘trust’ in the broader framework of social capital, and 
distinguish between interpersonal trust and social trust. Next, we will describe 
‘strategic trust’ and ‘moralistic trust’ as forms of social trust, based on the 
different ways the trust or manages the uncertainties he has about the trustee. 
We further describe ‘generalised trust’ as a form of moralistic trust in a moral 
community that is open to outside input. And finally, we describe ‘religiously-
inspired generalised trust’ as a form of generalised trust within the religious 
meaning system. 
 
Trust 
Many scholars recognise the necessity of trust for stable relations and 
voluntary cooperation in society (Misztal 1996; Fukuyama 1995; Seligman 
1997; Putnam 2000; 2002; Uslaner 2002, Hardin 2006). Trust is often 
associated with the idea of social capital, which encompasses the benefits of 
social networks. Putnam (1993) states that social capital refers to three key 
features of social organisation, namely: trust, norms of reciprocity, and 
networks of civic engagement. These three characteristic features of social 
capital enable participants to cooperate by facilitating the coordination of 
actions. Trust plays a central role in social cooperation. It is an essential 
condition for the norms of reciprocity that arise from social networks, and it is 
necessary for civic engagement as well (Field 2003: 31f; cf. Fukuyama 1995; 
Seligman 1997; Uslaner 2004; Hooghe 2007).  
In general, ‘trust’ is a firm belief in the reliability, honesty, fairness 
and benevolence of someone or something. We speak of trust when somebody 
(i.e. the trustor) relies on the fact that the behaviour of another person or entity 
(i.e. the trustee) will be in agreement with the trustor’s positive expectations. 
Trust is the expectation that others will behave as we want them to, according 
to certain values and norms. But it remains an expectation, and we cannot be 
absolutely sure about it. At the start of a relationship of any kind, people 
construct expectations and beliefs about each other. One can speak of an 
‘exchange relationship’ when there is an effort to reconcile one’s own needs 
with the needs of others. In an exchange relationship, expectations are built 
mutually, and further negotiated.  
Following Zucker (1986), Misztal (1996: 16) says: “Trust is ‘a set of 
expectations shared by those in an exchange’, and different types of exchange 
can be defined according to the level of trust present within the relationship.” 
Misztal shows that expectations about the motives of other people are 
important elements of trust. In relationships between people, there is always a 
level of uncertainty about other people’s motives. Here, trust is defined by 
Misztal (1996:24) as holding “some expectations about something future or 
contingent or to have some belief as to how another person will perform on 
some future occasion. Trust refers to the belief that the result of somebody’s 
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intended action will be appropriate from our point of view.” Trust is the belief 
that other people’s behaviour will meet one’s own expectations. Trust helps to 
reduce uncertainties (or even risks) in social relations. As relations with others 
are deepened, trust can be strengthened, and ‘uncertainty’ may be diminished. 
When we get to know people better, we have stronger expectations about their 
behaviour. And if they behave as we want them to do, they become 
increasingly trustworthy (Sztompka 1999:69f; Putnam 2000:142, 147; Herreros 
2004:8; You 2012).  
Only when there is a certain level of trust can individuals or 
collectivities of individuals (i.e. groups) develop relationships and mutual 
cooperation. Trust gives stability to society, reduces uncertainty and generates 
reciprocity. It is thus at the centre of norms of reciprocity and networks of 
engagement. Trust is a prerequisite for cooperation, but in turn it is also 
strengthened by cooperation (cf. Hooghe et al. 2009; Rothstein & Stolle 2001). 
Trust is a vital element in relationships between individual persons and/or 
groups in the present, and necessary for their further development in the future 
(Putnam 1993; Misztal 1996: 23f; Rothstein & Stolle 2001). Glanville & 
Paxton (2007: 230) mention that “trust is seen as foundational to understanding 
cooperative behaviour of many types”. 
According to Sztompka, trust exists at the abstract level of 
relationships, along with hope and confidence. While hope is “a passive, vague 
and not rationally justified feeling that things will turn out to the good” 
(Stompka 1999, 24),  confidence is a kind of emotion of assured expectation. 
Hope, confidence and trust all contribute to the active anticipation of an 
unknown future. But they are also different. Hope is the mental energy that we 
are willing to invest to anticipate the fulfilment of our desired goal; the more 
important the goal, the more we will invest in plans and actions to realise that 
goal. As is the case with trust, when we hope for something, the outcome is 
unsure. But hope may be distinguished from trust because its focus is on own 
goals and interests, and not on the expected behaviour of others (cf. Snyder 
1994).  
Confidence, too, has to do with our expectations for the future. But for 
Seligman (1997; 1998), confidence (unlike trust) is based on knowledge in 
circumstances in which roles and role expectations are clear. Confidence is at 
play when the abilities of the involved parties complement each other, and 
when the contract between them is clear. For example: I have confidence that 
the teachers at the school where my children study will teach them well. This 
presupposes that the teachers and I have a common understanding of standards 
of education. The teachers in that school must have graduated from a college of 
education, and the school must have a reliable system for assessing the quality 
of learning. Ultimately, these considerations produce what Seligman calls a 
‘familiarity’ that can be understood as an assumed communality for strong 
evaluation (1997:69). As with trust, confidence is the belief that the future 
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outcome will be in accordance with one’s expectations. But unlike confidence, 
trust does not need well-defined relationships.  
 
Interpersonal trust and social trust 
A common distinction between types of trust is based on the quality of the 
relationship between the person who relies on another person or entity (i.e. the 
trustor) and the recipient of the trust (i.e. the trustee). If trustor and trustee 
know each other personally, one could speak of interpersonal trust. If the 
relationship between trustor and trustee is rather superficial, one might speak 
only of social trust. Consequently, they relate to different kinds of social 
capital (cf. Herreros 2004:13; Putnam 2000:136). 
Interpersonal trust or ‘thick’ trust is embedded in well-known personal 
relations, and underpins reciprocity between familiars. There is trust between 
friends, between family members, and between classmates who know each 
other relatively well. We trust them (or not) because we share a history, and 
have expectations about them based on previous personal experiences. 
Interpersonal trust tends to reinforce exclusive identities within dense 
networks, and solidarity with (predominantly) similar others; for instance, in 
terms of ethnicity and religion. Interpersonal trust is likely to contribute to 
bonding social capital (i.e. solidarity with similar others), because we are more 
likely to interact closely with those belonging to groups that we are part of as 
well.  
In social trust, or ‘thin’ trust, we trust people we do not know 
personally. In social trust we have faith in the outcome of the behaviour of 
people we do not know. Social trust is outward-looking, and generates broader 
identities and relatively abstract forms of reciprocity. Seligman (1998:293) 
states that “[social] trust is needed when there is no basis for confidence, when 
behaviour cannot be predicted or when strangers are part of the interaction”. 
Trust in people we do not know personally – and who are perhaps not even 
known by people we do know personally – is more likely to contribute to 
bridging social capital. This is certainly the case when we do not share specific 
characteristics with the unknown people that we trust. In these circumstances, 
social trust contributes to bridging social capital – i.e. solidarity with dissimilar 
people who do not belong to groups we identify with, e.g. religious or ethnic 
groups (Putnam 2000: 22f; Wuthnow 2002: 670).
1
  
                                                 
1
 In addition to this general distinction between interpersonal trust and social trust, trust 
may also be distinguished by its specific qualities, namely: anticipatory trust (action 
towards others because there is anticipation that the others will comply with our expec-
tations), responsive trust (action motivated by the particular ability and expected re-
sponse of the others), and evocative trust (in intimate relationships). Another distinc-
tion is based on the varieties of expected conduct. In this respect, trust may be divided 
into axiological trust (based on morals), fiduciary trust (based on duties in certain 
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Strategic trust and moralistic trust 
Social trust may be further divided into strategic trust and moralistic trust, 
based on the way we deal with the uncertainty present in the relationship we 
have with people we do not know personally. How do we deal with this 
uncertainty that is part of our expectations? How does the trustor control his or 
her uncertainty about the behaviour of the trustee? The trustor can do so in (at 
least) two ways: by extrapolation of the experiences he or she had with similar 
others; and by supposing that he or she has values and norms in common with 
the trustee (Uslaner 2002).
2
 
Strategic trust is built through evidence and experience with people or 
institutions that are similar. We trust unknown others because of our 
experiences with people with similar characteristics. ‘Similarity’ can be 
defined in numerous ways: in terms of gender, nationality, ethnicity, religious 
belonging, or whatever relates people to others. For instance, we trust people 
who studied at a specific university, because those we have met personally 
have complied with our standards. Or, for example, we have good evidence 
that people from a certain religious denomination are trustworthy. Because we 
have had good experiences with people with similar (group) characteristics, we 
feel indirectly acquainted with those we do not know personally. Simply, we 
believe that these unknown persons will behave as we expect, because similar 
others have done so before (Uslaner 2002: 3, 22; cf. Misztal 1996; Putnam 
2000). 
In moralistic trust, the trustor supposes that he or she shares with the 
trustee certain values and norms that direct the latter’s behaviour. Because the 
trustee is supposed to have the same moral principles, his or her actions may be 
predicted to a certain degree. Moralistic trust is in this sense “creating a moral 
community among social actors” (Seligman 1997: 77; cf. 1998: 394ff). For 
instance: I trust people because I firmly believe that they are willing to show 
respect to other people. And even when I have no information about them, I 
trust other people because I suppose they are reliable, honest and fair. These 
moral foundations reveal a perspective of the world as a respectable place in 
which people are trustworthy. Moralistic trust is based upon a positive outlook 
and certain optimism about all people, even those who are (very) different. The 
values supposedly shared may be rather abstract, such as ‘solidarity’ and 
                                                                                                                      
situations when the interests of others are placed before our own), and instrumental 
trust (based on roles in society) (Sztompka 1999: 27-8, 51-4). 
2
 Please note that there is no agreement on the exact terminology used by different 
authors to discuss ‘trust’, including those quoted in this chapter. What we describe here 
as ‘interpersonal trust’ in the footsteps of Uslaner (2002) is what some call ‘particular-
ised trust’ (Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994; Uslaner 2002), and is close to what Selig-
man labels ‘confidence’. What we call ‘social trust’ is sometimes labelled ‘generalised 
interpersonal trust’ (You 2012) or in short, ‘trust’ (Seligman 1997). 
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‘justice’. These values underpin all social relationships, and make experience 
of similar others unnecessary (as in strategic trust); neither is an agreement or 
contract necessary (as in confidence). Moralistic trust enables people to go 
beyond the boundaries of personal acquaintance. In other words, moralistic 
trust promotes reciprocity and networks of engagement with potentially 
everybody in society. We can relate this to Rawls’ (2001) theory of justice as 
fairness, in which every person in society is presumed to be willing to build 
shared meanings and values for the sake of a just and good life. Although 
others may not always act as we expect, we still perceive them as trustworthy. 
The assumption of common fundamental moral values makes it unnecessary to 
know people personally (cf. Fukuyama 1995; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999; 
Uslaner 2002).  
 
Generalised trust 
Finally, generalised trust can be described as a form of trust that reaches out to 
dissimilar others in specific circumstances, and that is based on both strategic 
trust and moralistic trust. In the words of Uslaner (2002: 26): generalised trust 
is “the perception that most people are part of your moral community; a 
measure of the scope of our community, and it is based upon both morals and 
our collective experiences”.3 
First, generalised trust is related to strategic trust, because it is based 
on positive experiences we have had in the past in our own community, i.e. 
with similar others. We have learnt to see people as trustworthy because of our 
positive experiences with in-group members. But the strategic trust of 
unknown individual others belonging to a certain (e.g. religious) community is 
now widened, to include trust of people from other communities as well. Not 
only in-group members are trusted, but out-group members as well. Positive 
experiences influence the development of trust beyond the borders of the own 
community (Rothstein & Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002; Glanville & Paxton 
2007). For instance: because our Christian church has good relationships with 
the Islamic community in town, our attitudes towards religious plurality in 
general are positively affected (cf. Hadiwitanto 2002). Thus, strategic trust 
based on positive experiences in the in-group is generalised towards others as 
well.  
The concept of ‘generalised trust’ supposes that when trust is built 
among individuals through positive experiences in their own community, it can 
be generalised to members of other communities as well. But what about 
contact with members of other groups? Empirical research shows that cultural 
diversity affects generalised trust either positively (in Europe) or negatively (in 
the United States). Here we hypothesise that more contact with out-group 
                                                 
3
 Stressing generalised trust, Uslaner (2002) is more optimistic about plural societies 
than Hardin (2006: 123-128), who emphasises generalised distrust: people do not be-
lieve in others.  
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members induces generalised trust (cf. Hooghe et al. 2009), especially when 
four conditions are present: the parties to the contact are of equal status; there 
are common goals being pursued by group members; there is intergroup 
cooperation; and there is institutional support from authorities, laws, norms, 
customs, etc. These are the classic conditions of Allport (1958: 281) for 
intergroup contact to reduce out-group negativity. These conditions imply that 
experiences may also hinder development solidarity with out-group members – 
for example, when strong in-group identification leads to exclusionary 
reactions (cf. Putnam 2000: 78; Hayashi & Yosano 2005; Abanes, Scheepers & 
Sterkens 2014).  
Second, generalised trust is related to moralistic trust because it refers 
to a widening moral community based on such moral principles as solidarity 
and justice. Because basic values are considered to be widely present, the 
moral community opens for people with whom it has no ties, e.g. of kinship, 
ethnicity or religion (Rothstein & Stolle 2001). Religious groups may be 
perceived as separate moral communities. Generalised trust can arise when one 
is prepared to recognise that out-group members also base their attitudes upon 
principles of solidarity and justice. One learns to see that others, too, are 
trustworthy, as soon as values are considered to be more universal than 
originally thought. The larger the scope of a moral community, the more one 
can build cooperation on a broad scale (Rothstein & Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002: 
26ff, 74).  
Thirdly, generalised trust also concerns what should be done in a 
practical way to implement trust in specific circumstances. Trust must be made 
tangible. Trust towards others has practical implications. Trust must be made 
operational in a specific context. It implies solidarity with and justice towards 
members of the out-group in a specific society. In the operationalisation, we 
will pay attention to this aspect. We will elaborate on the practical implications 
of trust in different societal domains (section 4.3.3). 
Obviously, one could speak of a continuum from a more particular 
kind of trust to one that is more general, with ‘particularised trust’ and 
‘generalised trust’ as the outer ends of this continuum (Uslaner 2002: 26ff; 67). 
In particularised trust, a limited number of people and institutions are assumed 
to be good. Mostly, people see themselves to be part of a moral community 
based on similarities, such as religion, ethnicity, gender or socio-economic 
class. Because there is suspicion that out-group members are a threat to the in-
group interests, there will be a demand for proof that those out-group members 
really intend to offer something good. Empirical research shows that the levels 
of generalised trust are generally higher in majority groups (in terms of relative 
group size) and in high-status groups than in minority groups and low-status 
groups (Hooghe 2007). But when one is willing to expand one’s relationships 
with others, more people in the moral community of solidarity and justice will 
be included (cf. Seligman 1997; Herreros 2004: 13; Hooghe 2007). 
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Religiously-inspired generalised trust 
In this chapter, we consider generalised trust from a religious perspective. This 
means that social trust (including strategic and moralistic trust) originally built 
in a specific religious community is widened towards other religious 
communities. We consider generalised trust to be religiously inspired, because 
religious communities are important socialising agencies for moral values and 
norms in Indonesia. Generalised trust cannot be taken for granted. Moral 
principles do not emerge without reasonable interaction with sources of values. 
There must be places where values and norms are nurtured, developed and 
learned. In this respect, generalised trust cannot stand apart from specific 
communities. Next to the family, religious communities are powerful sources 
for the learning of moral principles (cf. Rawls 2001: 189-91; Tan & Vogel 
2008: 833). In Indonesia, for the most part, moral socialisation takes place in 
religious communities.  
Religion is not only salient on the individual level; Indonesian society 
can also be characterised by a relatively high level of religious (and ethnic) 
segregation. This is also true for the cities in which this research took place, 
although in quite different degrees. In general, religious segregation occurs in 
both political and social domains. Some political parties are based on religious 
affiliation, and other (secular) parties receive some of their votes from specific 
religious groups. In the social domain, one sees religiously segregated 
education (Bagir et al. 2011; 2012) and intimate relationships and marriage 
along religious lines (Bowen 2003: 240ff). In Yogyakarta, ethno-religious 
groups live relatively peacefully together, but students from outside Java still 
live mostly in their own regional dormitories (Mas‘oed et al. 2001: 126; 
Zudianto 2008: 82). In Ambon, segregation is much stronger. Interaction 
between Muslims and Christians has been seriously distorted ever since the 
(ongoing) violent clashes that began at the end of the last century, with 
manifest contact avoidance between the two groups as a result (Yanuarti et al. 
2005: 82). In 2008, almost 88% of Moluccan inhabitants lived in religiously 
segregated areas (Subair et al. 2008: 186).  
The salience of religion, on one hand, and segregation by religion, on 
the other, leads to an interesting paradox. Religion is an important source of 
values and norms that support the development of trust, and religion 
contributes to the development of networks in which interpersonal trust 
develops in the direction of social trust. But on the other hand, segregation 
limits the possibility of having positive experiences with out-group members, 
and makes it more difficult to assume that we share moral principles of 
solidarity and justice. Contact avoidance between groups can even function as 
an instrument to avoid manifest conflict based on different interests (Tabory 
1993: 148). Because of these specific circumstances in Indonesia, we will 
research religiously-inspired generalised trust. Religiously-inspired generalised 
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trust is a combination of strategic and moralistic trust originally developed in a 
specific religious community, but now widened towards out-group members in 
specific circumstances.  
In empirical studies, religion is either positively or negatively 
correlated with generalised trust (Uslaner 2002; Welch et al. 2007; Hooghe et 
al. 2009; Traunmüller 2010). On the one hand, religious traditions are the 
bearers of moral principles that positively influence generalised trust; e.g. 
respect for all individuals, recognition of other communities, and compassion 
for the poor. On the other hand, religion may create division and antagonistic 
attitudes towards other religious groups, and therefore negatively influence the 
development of generalised trust (cf. Galtung 1994: 40-55; Putnam 2000: 78f; 
Herbert 2003; Uslaner 2008; Tan & Vogel 2008: 833; Welch et al. 2004: 319). 
The question remains: to what extent do religions induce or reduce generalised 
trust? 
4.3.2 Generalised trust in the modern world 
Before we deal with the central question which religious attitudes explain 
people’s level of trust in others, we present some reflections on the importance 
of generalised trust in modern societies. We will argue that generalised trust is 
necessary to maintain harmonious social relationships in modern societies, 
exactly because of the complexity of modernisation.  
 
A general understanding of modernisation 
Modern societies differ from traditional societies. In general, one can say that 
traditional societies are smaller in scale and more homogeneous in composition 
than modern societies. In traditional societies there is still little role 
differentiation, and inter-individual and inter-group relationships are relatively 
close within one single territory (Seligman 1997: 38ff). In the 19
th
 century, 
modernisation was often associated with the opening of “horizons of the future 
with unending progress towards a better human condition” (Wagner 2008: 1). 
Modernisation was associated with an increase in individual freedom and 
improved societal developments. But modernisation soon became associated 
with problems as well. We will discuss the pros and cons of modernisation 
within its three elements: rationalisation, differentiation and societalisation (cf. 
Herbert 2003; Black 1967; Punter 2007; Bhambra 2007). 
Rationalisation refers to the replacement of traditional motifs for 
behaviour with ones that are rational and calculated. Rationalisation has been 
strong in science and technology, and has led to rapid industrial development, 
and increased production and consumption. On the individual level, people no 
longer see themselves to be objects of powers which they cannot control, but as 
free subjects, with the intellectual capacity to control and transform the 
environment. However, rationalisation has not only brought progress; 
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potentially, it has a negative and dehumanising effect on society as well (cf. 
Habermas 1986; Giddens 1990). Fear of misuse of technology (e.g. nuclear 
technology) and industrial developments that oppress the poor are examples of 
how rationalisation brings up moral issues. Morality is characterised by 
rationalisation as well. Tradition and religion are no longer the only and 
uncontested sources of morality; rational argumentation and careful weighing 
of individual interests can lead to moral judgement as well (Rawls 2001: 42f; 
Uslaner 2002; FitzGerald 2012).  
Differentiation refers to the upcoming logic of the public system, 
which differs from the logic of the life-world, as well as to increased role 
differentiation within individuals. First of all, differentiation refers to the 
distinction between the life-world and the public system. The life-world 
consists of the shared knowledge and values within the social and cultural 
domains that legitimise society. The public system consists primarily of the 
economic and the political domains. Both life-world and public system have 
their own logic, and their own media of exchange. The growing importance of 
money as a medium of exchange permitted the independent functioning of the 
economic system. Maximisation of profit became the guiding principle in an 
economy that is increasingly dissociated from social and cultural life. In 
politics, gaining and keeping power is the driving force behind a relatively 
independent political system. The autonomy of economics and politics means 
that these systems develop through self-generating and independent processes 
that are only marginally influenced by the totality of roles and institutions in a 
society. Consequently, the public system (economic and political domain) and 
the life-world (social and cultural domain) develop (semi-)independently, with 
only relatively weak connections between them (cf. Black 1967: 13ff; 
Habermas 1986; Giddens 1990: 21ff; Marschall & Stolle 2004: 131; Bhambra 
2007).  
For example, the financial system runs by its own logic. It has no 
direct relationship with political legitimacy, or with the concept of education in 
a community. This differentiation may potentially lead to a situation in which 
the life-world is, to some degree, colonised by power (political domain) or 
financial interests (economic domain). Society may become fragile and 
instable when the roles of the public system do not relate to roles in the life-
world. The weaker the relationship between life-world and public system, the 
weaker social integration will be (Habermas 1987: 113ff; cf. Giddens 1990). 
Second, differentiation occurs at the level of the individual as well. In modern 
societies, invidual roles have become more specific, and highly differentiated. 
As a consequence, social relationships are characterised by a variety of role 
expectations. This makes building social relations and social cooperation more 
complex than before (Seligman 1997: 38f; Sztompka 1999: 12; cf. Black 1967: 
24ff).  
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Societalisation is the process of transformation from small 
communities into larger societal networks (Herbert 2003: 38ff; cf. Black 1967: 
21). Industrialisation, changes in educational needs and developments of work 
patterns have all contributed to rural migration and urbanisation. Cities 
continue to grow faster than the population in rural areas. At the same time, 
technological developments, such as faster and better-accessible transportation 
and improved communication possibilities, have brought people closer to each 
other. Small communities are transformed into large, diverse groups of people. 
Social relations in modern societies are no longer bound by kinship or spatial 
proximity. The social environment becomes very complex, with growing 
impersonality and anonymity (cf. Black 1967: 32; Giddens 1990; Misztal 
1996; Seligman, 1997: 38f; Sztompka 1999: 1ff).  
Modern communities are large and complex. They embody a plurality 
in roles, functions and ideological convictions. In this context, frictions can 
easily arise when mutual expectations are not met. Lack of solidarity and even 
manifest conflict can easily occur. Dialogue and communication are needed to 
overcome these potential problems related to modernisation. Unlike 
communication in traditional society, which was based primarily on primordial 
ties or kinship, communication in modern societies should be based on 
cooperation in the midst of various uncertainties (Fiorenza 1992). Therefore, a 
modern society needs shared values or moral principles that can rationally 
create and sustain a social system, of very different people, with a positive 
spirit of cohabitation.  
 
The complexity of modern society and the need for generalised trust 
Modern society – characterised by rationality, differentiation, and 
societalisation – brings what Giddens (1990: 35) calls an ‘environment of risk’. 
This means that there is an increased risk of instability; because, for instance, 
of misuse of technology, lack of necessary information, complicated 
relationships, and conflicting needs. One can no longer rely on the well-known 
relationships with self-evident expectations in a stable, small-scale context. 
Modern societies have a kind of institutionalised pattern of risk because of 
complexities and differences, e.g. in salary system, power distribution, and 
access to education or conflicting values. According to Giddens (1990: 34), 
modern society represents “an alteration in the perception of determination and 
contingency, such that human moral imperatives, natural causes, and chance 
reign in place of religious cosmologies.” In this sense we argue that modern 
societies face two typical challenges, namely system limits and unfamiliarity 
(cf. Seligman 1997).  
First, there are many relatively independent systems at play in modern 
society: the economy, politics, social life and cultural life. Within each system, 
individuals fulfil roles that require a specific knowledge to serve particular 
goals and interests. And every individual fulfils (sometimes multiple) roles in 
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each system. These roles are bolstered by normatively prescribed expectations. 
We can see role expectations in interactions between government and citizens, 
between teachers and students, between merchants and buyers, or between 
believers and their religious leaders. As more people fulfil specific roles, the 
normative role-expectations become increasingly diverse and changeable. This 
may lead to problems; therefore, stable social structures require ‘negotiated 
expectations’ (Seligman 1997). A certain level of consensus in these 
‘negotiated expectations’ is necessary because people who do not know each 
other, and who may not even meet, interact anyway. These interactions have 
contingent outcomes, especially when the role expectations are abstract, or 
when consensus about them is limited (cf. Giddens 1990: 83ff; Seligman 2007: 
20). ‘System limits’ refers to the limitations in communication between people 
in modern society; and consequently, the contingencies in this interaction. It is 
very difficult to predict the outcome of relationships when so many roles are at 
play, and when there is no clear consensus about role-expectations (cf. Giddens 
1990: 83ff; Seligman 1997: 28f, 35; 1998: 394).  
Second, unfamiliarity emerges when individuals who do not know 
each other personally need to interact. Usually, familiarity is based upon ties of 
kinship, belonging to a (e.g. religious) group, a social network, or a shared 
ideology. This familiarity forms the ground of a bond between social actors. 
Familiarity is an assumed communality between persons based on shared 
evaluations or shared moral codes (Seligman 1997: 69). However, 
rationalisation, differentiation and societalisation have changed the formation 
of social relations. Social relations are no longer based on kinship, religious 
belonging, or shared ideology, and can no longer rely on visible relations in 
small contexts. In modern societies relationships are always unfamiliar to a 
certain degree, because ‘faceless commitments’ can simply not be avoided in 
abstract systems. Abstract systems with no or few interpersonal face-to-face 
commitments have their limitations in what we can expect (cf. Giddens 1990: 
80ff). 
How can we overcome system limits and unfamiliarity in modern 
societies? How are peaceful relations possible when we know hardly anything 
about each other? For Seligman (1998: 393ff), ‘trust’ is the answer. We need 
trust when “there is no system within which sanctions can be imposed or when 
there is no underlying sense of or terms of familiarity or sameness that would 
allow such prediction”.4 Generalised trust emerges when the rights and the 
                                                 
4
 When Seligman (1998: 393) says that “there is no system within sanctions [that] can 
be imposed”, this does not mean that are no sanctions in interactions in which there are 
clear role expectations. Obviously there is a system of regulation in formal relation-
ships, e.g. in the relationships between seller and buyer, or between teacher and stu-
dent. The ‘system limits’ refer to the diversity and variability of interactions in the 
modern society. Role expectations become negotiable when more people are involved 
in the fulfilment of roles. The unfamiliarity of teachers and parents also increases the 
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obligations of the actors involved are negotiated in open communication. 
Through communication between individual and supra-individual actors, 
definitions of reciprocity are agreed upon (cf. Seligman 1998). And when the 
scope of our community expands, the scope of generalised trust also widens. 
Generalised trust is the expectation that others will behave as we want them to 
according to certain values and norms, and this positive outcome expectation 
overcomes system limits and unfamiliarity. In other words: ‘generalised trust’ 
is a necessary condition for social stability in modern societies. It enables 
people to be part of a widening community. And the ‘risks’ in the environment 
are bearable because people expect positive outcomes in faceless interactions, 
based on previous experiences (strategic trust) and shared values and norms 
(moralistic trust). Generalised trust transforms the risks into positive 
contingencies. In this sense Seligman (1997: 40) summarises by saying that 
trust is “something emerging in the interstices of systemically defined role 
expectations – that very lability that is built into modern systems of confidence 
and which allows the emergence of trust in a manner that was not possible in 
other forms of social organisation.” In modern societies, generalised trust is an 
important condition for facing the future of social relations actively and 
constructively (cf. Giddens 1990, 83ff; Mistzal 1996; Sztompka 1999; 
Rothstein & Stolle 2001; Uslaner 2002; Hooghe et al. 2009).  
4.3.3 Religiously-inspired generalised trust in Indonesian societal domains 
What does generalised trust mean to people in a specific context? How is 
religiously-inspired generalised trust implemented in different societal domains 
in Indonesia? And what are the operational indicators of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust? We will show what religiously-inspired generalised trust can 
mean, specifically in the economic, political, social and cultural domain in 
Indonesia. More specifically, we will highlight what religiously-inspired 
generalised trust can mean in our two research areas: Ambon (Maluku) and 
Yogyakarta (central Java).  
 
Economic domain  
Within the economic domain, job opportunity and fair payment are two 
important issues in Indonesia. Competition over jobs and struggles over fair 
payment both occur along religious lines. We will explain why we have taken 
up these issues in the measurement of religiously-inspired generalised trust in 
Indonesia. 
                                                                                                                      
risk of conflicting role expectations. For example: in a school, teachers from various 
backgrounds may have differing views on their role, and parents may have different 
expectations as well. When they do not know each other, latent conflicts about the 
expectations are more likely to manifest. In short, the lack of system in which sanc-
tions can be imposed refers to system limits and unfamiliarity. 
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Job opportunity refers to somebody’s prospect of having a fair chance 
on the labour market in accordance with his or her capacities – independent of 
social background, ethnic group membership or religious belonging. However, 
in Indonesia the chance to find a job is sometimes influenced, if not 
determined, by personal networks and group belonging. Needless to say, this 
can lead to distrust and conflict between groups. What occurred (and to some 
extent continues to occur) in Ambon is a clear example.  
Job competition has been an important source of conflict between 
Christians and Muslims in Ambon. Ever since the Dutch colonial period, 
government has been contributing to religious segregation by giving one 
religious group preference over another. During Dutch colonial times, 
Christians in Ambon had a better chance of gaining employment in the public 
service as clerks, teachers, police officers or soldiers in the Dutch Colonial 
Armed Forces (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, or KNIL). Muslims 
were hardly ever employed by the colonial government. Most of them were 
farmers, traders, business people, or they worked for non-governmental public 
agencies (Tanamal & Trijono 2004: 232ff; Sidel 2006: 169). However, during 
Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998) many (mainly Muslim) migrants 
came to Maluku, and the government created job opportunities for migrant 
communities.  
During this period, Christian communities lost some of their economic 
power. Patron-client relations continued to dominate recruitment mechanisms, 
but were less controlled by Christian groups. Understandably, the economic 
inequality in Ambon that tended to go along with religious segregation led to 
interreligious tensions and mutual distrust. In Christian communities, for 
instance, it was felt that the quick economic upliftment of migrants from places 
such as Buton, Bugis and Makassar was orchestrated by the Maluku provincial 
government in an effort to boost Islamisation in the area (cf. Kingsbury 2003: 
105f). During the 1990s especially, Muslim networks emerged that offered 
access to government patronage. Unequal treatment on the labour market – 
with Muslims disadvantaged during the Dutch colonial period, and Christians 
under the New Order – caused (non-simultaneous) feelings of marginalisation 
on both sides. Lack of intergroup solidarity, religious intolerance, and more 
specifically the riots between Muslims and Christians in Ambon between 1999 
and 2005 cannot be isolated from this economic and political contestation 
(Sukma 2003: 66; Kingsbury 2003: 106; Tanamal & Trijono 2004; Sterkens & 
Hadiwitanto 2009). In the time following the most extreme period of rioting, in 
2001, Ambon was deeply religiously segregated, with occasional outbreaks of 
violence. With the exception of those working in the city centre, economic 
activity was deeply religiously segregated as well. In 2012, the unemployment 
rate reached 7.5% of the total population in Maluku. In a country where 
unemployment implies no means of existence at all, this is relatively high. 
Distrust and conflict between Muslims and Christians contributed to ongoing 
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poverty, due to the limitation of business opportunities and generally poor 
relations. In this context, religiously-inspired generalised trust in the economic 
domain could contribute to an improvement in daily living conditions (cf. 
Seligman 1998; McTernan 2003: 10).  
Yogyakarta (Java) does not have Ambon’s history of economic 
contestation between Muslims and Christians. Yogyakarta city never 
experienced serious social conflicts; neither did the special region of 
Yogyakarta (DIY: Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta) ever manifest interreligious 
conflicts. Yogyakarta has a relatively well-developed economy with active 
trade, manufacturing, service and tourist sectors. Outside the city there is a 
flourishing agricultural sector. But this relatively calm situation does not mean 
that there are no problems at all. The economic situation in Indonesia, 
particularly in Java, is often associated with issues of race and religion (Habir 
1999:171; Hefner 1999: 231; cf. Goenawan & Harnoko 1993: 54ff). It’s 
generally understood that the Indonesian economy has been dominated by the 
Christian-Chinese community, so indigenous people (commonly known as 
Muslim-natives or pribumi) need to protect their economic interests (cf. Habir 
1999:173; Hefner 2000: 140f). Although religion will never be a formal 
selection criterion, religious affiliation plays a role in employment possibilities. 
Consequently, there is (still) some economic division along religious affiliation 
lines. For example, when the movement to serve Muslim-native interests 
became stronger under Suharto in the 1990s (sponsored by the Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals’ Association, or ICMI), the number of Christians in 
government declined (cf. Hefner 1999: 230). This illustrates that religious 
affiliation does play a role in economic policies (cf. Ray & Goodpaster 2003: 
91). Government offices tend to give more opportunities to Muslims, which 
makes it difficult for a Christian to make a career as a state employee (Magnis-
Suseno 2006: 29; cf. Hefner 2000: 140). While this does not necessarily imply 
overt discrimination, but may simply be a consequence of networks limited to 
religious in-group members, there are nevertheless cases of vacancies being 
restricted to Muslims or Christians only. This is unlike ever to be a formal 
requirement, but selection based on religious belonging is rather a tacit policy. 
Obviously this situation does not support diversity, and ultimately results in a 
lack of trust between people. 
Fair salary system. Another crucial economic issue in Indonesia is fair 
payment. Most Indonesian labourers working in factories or home industries – 
especially those with relatively low levels of education – earn low salaries, 
based on temporary contracts. According to 2014 statistics, labourers in the 
manufacturing industries, for example, earn on average Rp. 2,015,300 per 
month, while those who work in textile industries and trading earn Rp 
1,920,900 and Rp 1,664,600 (Subdirektorat Statistik Upah dan Pendapatan 
2014: 25, 27; cf. Hill 2000; Arifin 2011). According to the World Bank, 
Indonesia falls into the lower-middle-income economy category, together with 
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countries such as the Philippines and India. For comparison, Malaysia, China, 
and Thailand are classified as upper-middle-income economies.
5
 A study in 
Java shows that the average labourer’s minimum salary can only cover 62.4% 
of their living expenses (Tjandraningsih 2011: 258). Indonesia is definitely in 
need of an improvement in labour conditions, supported by adequate 
regulations, all in a spirit of justice (Tjandraningsih 2011; Astiyah; Matondang; 
Rokhimah 2011). Even in comparison with other Asian countries, Indonesian 
salaries are low. Temporary contracts and outsourced employment do not 
favour labourers’ rights, and decrease the responsibilities of companies and 
employers. In 2013, the regional minimum monthly salary in Ambon was Rp 
1.275.000, and Rp 947.114 in Yogyakarta. This is already a substantial 
increase on 2012 figures: Rp 975.000 (Ambon) and Rp 892.660 (Yogyakarta) 
(Governor Decree/Surat Keputusan Gubernur no. 173/2012; Governor 
Decree/Surat Keputusan Gubernur no. 370/KEP/2012). According to the 
Indonesia’s national statistics bureau, 19,49% of Maluku province’s population 
(including Ambon) was considered to be poor in 2014. (Maluku is the poorest 
province in Indonesia after Papua and West Papua.) In the special region of 
Yogyakarta, about 15.43% of the total population was considered to be poor.
6
  
More generally, one could say that the relationship between Muslims 
and Christians is affected by socio-economic issues. Especially since the New 
Order regime, ethnic or religious belonging and socio-economic issues have 
been related (cf. Borsuk 1999: 153ff; Hefner 1999: 231; Habir 1999). Workers 
are generally understood to be indigenous (pribumi) and Muslim, while factory 
owners and supervisors are generally understood to be non-native (particularly 
Chinese), and have a non-Muslim religious affiliation (Hadiz 2001: 273ff; 
Sulistiyo 2001: 300; cf. Mas’oed et al. 2001: 134ff). In summary, there are 
reasons enough for tension between privileged and underprivileged in 
Indonesia. Sometimes – perhaps too often – economic conditions are perceived 
in terms of religious affiliation. Many Muslims think that Christians had 
greater access to state resources during the colonial era, and made fortunes in 
that period, resulting in the stereotype that all Christians belong to the 
economic middle class (Steenbrink 1995: 97; Hefner 2000: 140; cf. Hadiz 
2001; Mas’oed et al. 2001).  
Although, on average, Christians have better access to education (cf. 
Hoon 2011) and have more financial resources (cf. Steenbrink 1995), it does 
not mean that all Indonesian Christians belong to the higher socio-economic 
                                                 
5
 According to the World Bank in 2013, income classifications by GNI per capita are 
as follows: estimated to be low-income = $1,045 or less; lower-middle-income = 
$1,046 - $4,125; upper-middle-income = $4,126 - $12,745; high-income = $$12,746 or 
more; see: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries. See also 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1. Accessed 1 September 2015. 
6
 http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek 
=23&notab=1. Accessed on 1 September 2015. 
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strata. On the contrary, there are a relatively large number of Christians living 
in some of the poorest areas in Indonesia, such as the Moluccas, Papua and 
West Papua. Nevertheless, economic competition along religious lines seems 
to be inevitable in Indonesia. Former president of Indonesia (1998-1999) 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie states: “The economic liberalisation of the late 
1980s had unleashed a new wave of enterprise; however, Muslims and non-
Chinese Indonesians remained secondary players in it.” (Hefner 2000: 164). 
This statement confirms that people often use ethno-religious categorisations 
when economic issues are discussed; in this example, Muslims, non-Muslims 
and ethnic Chinese (versus natives or pribumi) (cf. Hefner 1999: 231f; Habir 
1999; 173, 200ff; Hadiz 2001: 273f). This way of describing economic facts 
can encourage distrust between Muslims and Christians. Economic deprivation 
in combination with religious categorisation is fertile ground for distrust 
between groups. But for peaceful intergroup relations, generalised trust is a 
necessary condition. Within the economic domain, religiously-inspired 
generalised trust can take the form of supporting equal job opportunities and 
fair salaries for everyone, independent of religious belonging (cf. Basri 2002: 
126; McTernan 2003: 10; Tanamal & Trijono 2004; Van Klinken 2006; 
Loveband & Young 2007).  
 
Political domain 
One of Indonesia’s main problems in the political domain is power misuse and 
a patronage system. Individuals belonging to a group, in whatever way defined 
– including religious groups – may be ignored and/or discriminated against by 
power holders, while others are supported and favoured. Distrust between 
groups in terms of obtaining, retaining and executing power continues to be a 
threat to a stable Indonesian society (cf. Habir 1999: 171f; Sterkens & 
Hadiwitanto 2009). A short overview of the political context in Indonesia in 
general, and more specifically in Ambon and Yogyakarta, further clarifies the 
political origins of interreligious conflict and the need for generalised trust in 
the political domain.  
Unfair use of power. Power is used unfairly when political leaders are 
not equally concerned about everybody, and according to our research, when it 
is dependent on religious belonging. Ever since the declaration of Indonesian 
Independence by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945, there have been 
tensions between secular nationalist and Islamic groups. Some Islamic groups 
hoped that Indonesia would become an Islamic state, while secular and non-
Islamic nationalist groups were strongly opposed to this idea. In very general 
terms, one can say that this debate resulted in a compromise in which 
Indonesia became a ‘religiously engaged’ state, where religious diversity was 
recognised, and to a certain degree, facilitated – by, among others, a separate 
ministry of religious affairs. Until about the mid-1980s, under Suharto’s New 
Order regime (1966-1998), public governing and religiosity seemed to be 
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clearly separated, in what has been called an ‘exclusionary corporatist 
framework’ (Uhlin 1997; Husein 2001; van Klinken 2001; Porter 2002; Sidel 
2006). During this period, the state was the central power that safeguarded the 
interests of society at large, and regional governments were closely monitored 
by the central regime. The central government even controlled the appointment 
of regional leaders. The interference of religious groups in the political domain 
was not tolerated, and was seen as a threat to the existing political structures 
(Malley 1999: 81ff).  
In the final part of the New Order regime (from the second half of the 
1980s), religious groups seemed to gain influence again. After the fall of 
Suharto (1998) Indonesia remained a religiously-engaged state, but religious 
groups gained political relevance and religion became a significant topic in 
politics. One could even say that religion has been strengthening its position in 
the public domain since 1998 (cf. Hefner 1999: 229ff). This is evidenced, for 
instance, by an act that abolished the requirement for socio-political 
organisations to be based on Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation.
7
 
‘Political liberalisation’ has allowed the establishment of religiously affiliated 
(mainly Islamic) political parties. Next to Muslim-based secular parties, there 
are militant Islamic movements and orthodox Islamic parties that have 
attempted to realise the sharia in the constitution through an amendment of 
Article 29. In the year 2000, conservative Islamic groups held a congress in 
Yogyakarta to revive the long-standing demand for sharia in Indonesia’s 
constitution. These radical religious movements called for the Muslim majority 
to fight the hegemony of the (religious) central government (Van Klinken 
2001: 39; de Jong 2009: 156). But in the meantime, between 1998 and 2014, 
things had already changed. Not only was the central government now 
influenced by religiously inspired politicians and political parties; at the local 
level, parts of the Islamic law (sharia) were implemented in a few provinces, 
such as Aceh and West Sumatera (Ichwan 2006; Sidel 2006). As 87% of the 
population is Muslim, the government often seems to consider Indonesia to be 
an Islamic country (Sofyan 1999), and Muslim legal thought increasingly finds 
its way into contemporary Indonesian society (Feener & Cammack 2007). 
These developments make it clear that the relationship between religion and 
political power is a hot issue indeed.  
In Ambon, once again we can gain a better understanding of the role of 
religion in politics by looking at Indonesian history, from Dutch colonial times 
onwards. Under colonial rule, Christian communities liked to identify 
themselves with Dutch culture. Some of them worked for the Dutch 
government and were well acquainted with the Dutch language and culture (cf. 
Hefner 1999: 221). Muslim communities were fringe groups, largely ignored 
by the central Dutch government. This resulted in (further) negative attitudes 
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towards the influential Christian communities. Because of the special 
relationship between Christian groups and the Dutch government, Christians 
were stereotyped as people with anti-nationalist attitudes. Muslims, by 
contrast, were more likely to be seen as Indonesian nationalists (Tanamal & 
Trijono 2004; Pieris 2004). After Indonesian independence, the issue of 
Indonesian nationalism versus Moluccan separatism became relevant. The 
prejudice that Ambonese indigenous people (for which we can read 
‘Christians’) lacked a sense of Indonesian national pride, and were all 
supporters of an independent Republic of the South Moluccas (Republik 
Maluku Selatan), became widespread.  
Muslims, on the other hand, were generally seen as unconditional 
supporters of an integrated Republic of Indonesia, which embraced Javanese 
rule wholeheartedly. Under Suharto’s New Order regime, Muslim immigrants 
from outside the Moluccas – mainly from Buton, Bugis and Makassar – 
changed the power balance between different ethno-religious communities in 
Ambon. The central regime dealt inadequately with local sensitivities, and paid 
little attention to the social consequences of large-scale migration. Policies 
made by a highly centralised government lacked clear democratic procedures, 
and to some extent ignored the voices of local populations. The arrival of more 
Muslim migrants strengthened the self-confidence of Muslims in Ambon, but 
also contributed to further religious segregation. The more radical wing of the 
influx also tried to gain political power as a kind of ‘religious obligation’. In 
Ambon, (mis)use of power went hand-in-hand with religious contestation 
(Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009: 64; cf. Hefner 1999: 40ff).  
Ever since independence, the special region of Yogyakarta (DIY: 
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta) has had a level of autonomy comparable with 
that of a province. After the death of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX – monarch 
of the historic sultanate, and also first governor of the special region – in 1988, 
his oldest son was inaugurated as sultan Hamengku Buwono X in 1989. In 
recognition of Hamengku Buwono IX’s role in the Indonesian struggle for 
independence, the hereditary monarch was to hold the position of governor 
automatically. However, this provision was not honoured by the Indonesian 
central government in 1989. Sultan Hamengku Buwono X was formally 
recognised as governor only after the democratic election among the 
Yogyakarta special region electorate in 1998 required by central government. 
In the 10 years between 1989 and 1998, Yogyakarta was ruled by the acting 
governor, Sri Paku Alam VIII (Nusantara 1999: 80). There is an ongoing 
debate, especially in central government, whether the Sultan can claim 
leadership of the special region by tradition; or if he must be legitimised by 
democratic election in line with Law no. 32/2004.  
In 2012 the central government finally issued Law no. 13/2012 on the 
exceptional position of Yogyakarta. Among other things, this law determines 
that the Sultan (i.e. the descendant of Hamengku Buwono) automatically 
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becomes governor, and that the Duke of Paku Alam automatically becomes 
vice governor. The state therefore recognises the special status of Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono and his descendants as King(s) of Yogyakarta.
8
 The sultan 
attributes his popularity in part to the good relationships between the Muslim 
majority and the Christian minority, which to some degree are explained by his 
diplomatic leadership style, and his concern for his people. Nevertheless, 
Yogyakarta is still faced with problems of power misuse. Some policies, on a 
local and supra-local level, cause ethno-religious tensions. For example, on the 
local level, the governor’s decree of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Surat 
Instruksi Gubernur DIY) no. K/898/I/A/1975 issued on 5 March 1975 states 
that only pribumi (Indonesian native people) may own land. Non-native 
citizens may only use the land and the buildings built on it. The term ‘pribumi’ 
(native) is used to distinguish native Indonesian people from non-pribumi 
(non-natives), referring to Indonesian citizens of Chinese, Arab, Indian or 
European descent. But in social life, and in the application of this law, non-
pribumi commonly refers to ethnic Chinese Indonesian citizens only (Mackie 
1976; Suryadinata 1997: 17).
9
 Chinese people in Yogyakarta, although they 
may be Indonesian citizens, are therefore explicitly banned from ownership 
(Governor Decree/Surat Instruksi Gubernur no. K/898/I/A/1975).  
Although this instructional letter of the governor contradicts other laws 
and regulations, in practice, ethnic Chinese do not succeed in buying land in 
Yogyakarta. For example: Law no. 5/1960, the basic law on land ownership, 
does not distinguish between native and non-native citizens; and Presidential 
Instruction no. 26/1998 even requires that state officials should not distinguish 
citizens based on ethnicity and religion. There are other laws that also try to 
prevent ethnic discrimination in this regard. Laws no. 12 and 23/2006 state that 
citizens of the Republic of Indonesia should not be treated differently based on 
ethnicity, race, religion, class or gender; and Law no. 12/2008 asserts that there 
should be no local regulations (even in a special region) that oppose laws and 
regulations on a higher level. But the current governor of Yogyakarta shows no 
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 Law no. 13/2012 Chapter 18 verse 1: “Calon Gubernur dan calon Wakil Gubernur 
adalah warga negara Republik Indonesia yang harus memenuhi syarat: c) bertahta 
sebagai Sultam Hamengku Buwono untuk calon gubernur dan bertahta sebagai Adi-
pati Paku Alam untuk calon Wakil Gubernur”. (The candidates for governor and vice-
governor are Indonesian citizens, who further: c) reign as Sultan Hemengku Buwono 
(the candidate for Governor) and as Duke of Paku Alam (the candidate for Vice-
Governor).  
9
 In 1967 the Indonesian government issued a Presidential decree (Instruksi Presiden 
no. 14/1967) that prohibited the use of Chinese symbols and traditions, including lan-
guage. This decree was an expression of the widespread idea that ethnic Chinese, al-
though already Indonesian citizens, have a negative impact on society, especially since 
Chinese people were associated with communism (Liem 2000: 72). In 2000 this Presi-
dential decree was repealed by a new Presidential decree by Abdurahman Wahid 
(Keputusan Presiden no. 6/2000).  
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intention of annulling Governor’s decree no. K/898/I/A/1975;10 neither does 
the central government seem to give priority to straightening out this problem 
(Thontowi 2002: 62f). The commonly-heard legitimisation for this practice is 
that it prevents the (relatively affluent) ethnic Chinese from dominating the 
land market (Susanto 2008: 71ff). 
Patronage system. Patronage refers to the support or privilege that a 
system or individual bestows on another, based on religious affiliation. In a 
political system, it can be considered to oppose the equal right of everybody to 
elect or to be elected without any relationship to religious belonging. In 
Indonesia, political competition develops along religious lines. For instance: 
the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDIP: Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan) and the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS: Partai Damai 
Sejahtera) are primarily supported by Christians, while the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), the National Awakening Party (PKB: 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) and the United Development Party (PPP: Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan) have an Islamic electorate (Tomsa 2009). To 
overcome political competition between Muslims and Christians after the 2005 
riots in Ambon, most political parties agreed to make appointments in local 
governance of pairs of Muslim and Christian candidates. When the governor is 
a Christian, the vice-governor should be a Muslim; and when the mayor is 
Muslim, the vice-mayor is expected to be Christian (cf. local election in 2006 
and 2011). This preoccupation with the religious power balance in central 
positions can be seen as a consequence of a deeply-rooted patronage system. 
Such a society is definitely in need of political leadership with concern for 
everybody, independently of the religious belonging of either electors or 
elected.  
The political divide between Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta is 
much smaller than in Ambon. The nationalist parties, such as the Indonesian 
Democratic Party – Struggle (PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), 
the Democratic Party (PD: Partai Demokrat) and the Party of the Functional 
Groups (Golkar: Golongan Karya) find wide support among both Muslims and 
Christians (Van Bruinessen 2004: 142; Baswedan 2004: 672ff; Machmudi 
2006). This seems to show that radicalism in the political domain is not that 
strong in Yogyakarta. However, one can still speak of a patronage system, 
observable in two phenomena. First, Indonesian citizens, including Javanese, 
seem to suppose that Muslims are entitled to rule in central and local 
governments because they are in the majority. Muslims especially tend to 
reject the power claims of individuals who belong to the religious minority. 
Hefner (1999: 212), following Anderson (1983), states that “Islam served as a 
kind of ‘imagined community’ – a way of thinking about and enacting a sense 
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 Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta, re-
jected the complaint of a citizen who protested against the discriminatory policy, in 
letter no. 430/3703 dated 15 November 2010. 
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of shared identity and destiny beyond the confines of face-to-face interaction”. 
As a result, tensions about leaders and religious affiliation always arise in both 
general and local elections (Mas’oed et al 2001: 132f). Second, the special 
status of Sultan Hamengku Buwono (and his descendants) and Sri Paku Alam, 
as governor and vice-governor respectively of Yogyakarta, means that non-
Muslims or individuals from another ethnic group will never hold these 
positions (cf. Rifa’i 2002: 119; Thontowi 2002: 59; Nugroho 2002: 12ff, 38). 
Obviously this situation is contrary to the democratic attitude that everybody, 
at least theoretically, has an equal chance of being elected. 
Needless to say, societal tensions may arise when a specific religious 
group is privileged in policy developments, while other groups feel 
marginalised or even discriminated against. On the national level, 
contemporary Indonesian politics is more influenced by religion than it was a 
few decades ago – so much so, that some scholars speak of the Islamisation of 
law in modern Indonesia (Salim 2008; cf. Feener & Cammack 2007). Even 
recent laws aiming to reduce religious tensions have contributed to the 
marginalisation of religious minorities. For instance, the proposal of the 
Religious Harmony Bill in October 2011, which aimed at preventing and 
resolving interreligious conflicts, has contributed to further religious 
segregation in schooling, health care, religious celebrations and marriage (cf. 
Human Rights Watch 2013: 26-49; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015).  
When government politics does not show concern for everybody – 
especially for minority groups who are most in need for it – social stability is 
threatened. In the political domain, ignoring common interests, patronage 
systems and power misuse is dangerous for the stability of the multicultural 
Indonesian society (Sofyan 1999: 20; Van Klinken 2001). Acknowledgment 
that elected politicians are trustworthy and strive for the greatest benefit for all 
would be a welcome change in Indonesian politics. Religiously-inspired 
generalised trust in the political domain means that religious groups support 
that political election should not be based on religious belonging, but on 
striving for fair policies for everybody, without patronage or power misuse that 
only benefits certain groups.  
 
Social domain 
Within the social domain, access to all levels of education for everybody is an 
extremely topical issue in Indonesia. Public schools cannot satisfy the need for 
quality education. For this reason, people sometimes turn to private (i.c. 
religiously affiliated) schools, for which costs are generally higher. Although 
some of these religiously affiliated schools follow an inclusive admittance 
policy, in practice it leads to religious segregation. We discuss the issue of 
education in relationship to religiously generalised trust in two sections: access 
to all levels of education, and avoidance of segregation. 
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Access to all levels. First, we must mention that quality education is 
relatively expensive in Indonesia, especially higher education (Booth 1999: 
123ff; Supratiknya 2001; Surakhmad 2009). Since 2006, the Indonesian 
government has decided to spend 20% of national expenditure on education.
11
 
With this budget, government finance covers the cost of public schools. 
According to the Indonesian National Statistics Bureau (BPS: Badan Pusat 
Statistik), the school participation rate (i.e. the number of children in an age 
group currently in school, regardless of level) in 2013 for 7- to 12-year-olds 
(elementary school) was 98.42%. But this percentage declines for older 
students: 90.81% for 13- to 15-year-olds (junior high school); 63.84% for 16- 
to 18-year-olds (senior high school); and only 20.14% for 19- to 24-year-olds 
(higher education). There are few differences between Maluku and Yogyakarta 
in the age groups until 15 years old, but the difference widens the older the 
students examined. School participation rate for 16- to 18-year-olds is 70.28% 
in Maluku and 81.41% in Yogyakarta; the rate for 19- to 24-year-olds is 
33.80% in Maluku and 45.86% in Yogyakarta.
12
 Of course, it is important to 
note that Yogyakarta is a city well-known for its higher education institutions, 
and many youngsters live in this city to study. Nevertheless, we can safely say 
that access to higher levels of education is difficult for most Indonesians, but 
on average, Muslims are lower educated than Christians. Arifin (2011: 231f) 
shows that the majority of Muslim labourers finished only primary school, 
while most Christian labourers attained education above the primary school 
level. Only 3.4% of Muslim labourers in Indonesia completed senior high 
school, in contrast with 7.7% of Christians.  
 Private schools, including religiously affiliated schools, do not receive 
subsidies from the government. Teachers’ salaries and material expenses are all 
covered by student fees, sometimes with some support – gifts from foundations 
or (religious) communities that support the schools. This makes private 
education expensive and less accessible. In 2010 Yogyakarta had 107 state 
primary schools with 23 953 students, and 75 private primary schools with 21 
999 students. At high-school level there were 11 state schools with 7 523 
students, and 36 private schools with 9 073 students in total (BPS Provinsi DIY 
2010). Some educational institutions support students with a relatively poor 
background so they may access education at higher levels as well, but never to 
the extent that one could speak of equal access for all (Supratiknya 2001; 
Surakhmad 2009).  
No segregation in education. In a religiously plural context more 
emphasis could be given to equal access for all groups. This implies a 
multicultural approach to education, which is still poorly developed in 
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 See: http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view 
& id=3723&Itemid=29 Accessed on 1 September 2015. 
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 See: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_ 
subyek=28&notab=3 Accessed on 1 September 2015. 
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Indonesia, in both public and private schools (Supratiknya 2001: 201ff; 
Sunarto 2004: 51ff). Multicultural education requires recognition of and an 
encounter with religious and ethnic diversity (among other social identities) 
(Sunarto 2004). But in fact, multicultural education is not really accepted by 
some religious groups (Christiani 2009: 178ff; de Jong 2009: 161). The 
obstacle is theological exclusivism in Muslim and Christian groups. Many 
school boards and teachers are more interested in developing the own religious 
identity than in introducing other religious traditions. Even when school 
populations are mixed, religious education is mostly strictly segregated (cf. 
Yusuf & Sterkens 2014). As a consequence, students have limited 
opportunities to encounter other religious traditions. In Ambon especially, 
religion continues to produce social segregation, even more after the worst 
conflicts between 1999 and 2005 than before these conflicts. In Yogyakarta 
segregation is also strong in schools. There is a strict rule that students have 
their religious education according to religious affiliation, with only few 
exceptions – in some private schools, where religious groups are mixed in 
some ‘interreligious education’ lessons (Listia et al. 2007: 57ff; Yusuf & 
Sterkens 2014; cf. Sunarto 2004).  
Generally, segregation is stronger in state schools than in Christian or 
Catholic schools. Muslim schools have very few non-Muslim students. Some 
state schools in Yogyakarta even have policies that go against multiculturalism, 
such as the obligation for female students to wear a veil (Salim et al. 2011). 
Recent history partially explains segregation in education. Most Christian 
ethnic Chinese enrol their children in private (Christian) schools because they 
have little confidence in the quality of state schools, and because they were 
discriminated against in state schools in the past. On the other hand, quite a 
few Christian schools were established by Christian churches related to ethnic 
Chinese groups (e.g. Gereja Kristen Indonesia), or by wealthy Chinese 
businesspeople, or they are the legacy of Dutch missionaries (Hoon 2011). 
Although private Christian schools may have an inclusive ideology, in practice 
they contribute to further educational segregation. Segregated education rarely 
contributes to generalised trust. It may even induce religious exclusivism and 
radicalism. That is why the cry for more multiculturalism in education is often 
heard (Sunarto 2004: 48ff; Listia et al. 2007; cf. Azra 2002: 28ff, 252ff; Tilaar 
2004: 185ff). Generalised trust implies that education is accessible for 
everybody, not only for certain (ethno-religious) groups or social classes.  
 
Cultural domain 
The cultural domain concerns people’s values and norms. In our study it 
especially concerns the tolerance respondents have towards people with 
differing values and norms, including tolerance towards a hedonistic lifestyle – 
the latter specifically relevant to a religious population in Indonesia. The main 
question here is the extent to which the national motto ‘unity in diversity’ 
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(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) can be implemented. In the New Order period, 
national unity was defined in a top down approach which limited the variety of 
cultural expressions. This situation resulted in a cultural hegemony, rather than 
in a unity built from diverse cultural traditions. This condition was exacerbated 
when the New Order government adopted a repressive approach to achieving 
unity (Hooker 1999: 277f). Differences of opinion and value were considered 
to be enemies that would hinder the ideal of unity. Therefore, the government 
had the right to reject any expression that was considered to disturb the ‘unity’ 
– or, more truthfully, the ‘uniformity’ – of the government view. The failure to 
accept and maintain differences still potentially brings distrust and conflict to 
society today.  
The conflicts in Ambon (Maluku) illustrate how important it is to 
respect different values. The people of Maluku have a traditional social 
institution to guarantee peaceful relationships and cooperation between 
villages: the pela-system. Pela (‘pact’) refers to an institutionalised bond of 
friendship or brotherhood between native residents of two or more villages. As 
with any other institution, a good understanding of pela requires a detailed 
historical description. Institutions are not created instantaneously, but built up 
over the course of history. During a process which is generally known as 
'institutionalisation', an interdependent relationship is established between the 
convictions of individuals; the norms and values of a group; and socially 
recognized structures. In general, a specific pela would be established between 
inhabitants of different villages under particular circumstances, and would 
obviously become more institutionalised over time. None of the different pela 
types relates to religion. Pela is blind to religious affiliation, and may concern 
agreements between villages of predominantly the same religious tradition, or 
agreements between villages of different religious traditions. Traditionally, the 
pela-system has emphasised and strengthened common interests and shared 
values between Christian villages and Muslim villages. In general, pela has 
guaranteed harmonious relationships between Christians and Muslims, because 
it has relied on a long and trustworthy acquaintanceship between the two 
(Bartels 1997; cf. Coolley 1962: 71ff; Tanamal & Trijono 2004: 236ff; Lowry 
& Littlejohn 2006). 
 However, during the late 1990s the pela-system was unable to prevent 
violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims, because to a large extent its 
authority was already gone. The traditional pela were undermined mainly 
because of rapid changes in the local population. Immigration from other 
islands brought people for whom the pela had no meaning. After all, in the 
past, pela had been established between local village leaders for specific 
reasons. These arrangements did not seem to be relevant to immigrants in a 
completely new context. During the eighties and nineties, there had already 
been conflict between pribumi (natives or 'people of the land') and pendatang 
(migrants or 'non-founders'). There was a lack of mutual trust. Locals accepted 
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migrants as guests, but the latter were not supposed to own land or to stay there 
forever. Migrants were expected to comply with native rules and to respect 
local authorities. But they were not keen on their second-class societal position, 
and strove for a better life (Tockary 2002: 70ff; Suparlan 2002: 107ff). 
Although conflict in Maluku (and specifically Ambon) originally began 
between pendatang and pribumi, it was easy to interpret it in terms of a conflict 
between Muslims and Christians, because most of the migrants were Muslim, 
and Ambon city (in fact, all of Maluku province) was originally predominantly 
Christian. Distrust slowly emerged between different ethnic and religious 
groups, and still exists today, leading to ongoing violent outbursts (Bagir et al. 
2012: 53ff).  
The city of Yogyakarta has never had a significant social conflict. It is 
known as the city of tolerance. However, that does not mean there are no 
problems in Yogyakarta in the cultural domain. Religious contestation is still to 
be found in some areas; for example, there have been discriminatory actions by 
the government and the majority group regarding the establishment of churches 
and Christian schools, and suspicions of Christianisation (cf. Ichwan 2006; 
Cholil et al. 2010; Bagir et al. 2011; Tim Peneliti Yayasan Paramadina et al. 
2011). No churches have been destroyed and few have been forced to close in 
Yogyakarta. However, there have been some demonstrations to protest against 
new churches opening.
13
 Some Muslim groups argue for the enforcement of 
sharia law, or show generalised suspicion towards Christians and their faith. In 
2000 a congress was held in Yogyakarta by fundamentalist Islamic groups in 
favour of making Indonesia an Islamic state, and asking for Islamic law to be 
included in the constitution (Van Klinken 2001: 39). So there are traces of 
Islamisation in Yogyakarta. As mentioned before, some public schools have 
begun to develop Islamic policies; for instance, some motivate for (or even 
oblige) female students to wear veils, or promote Islamic practice and proclaim 
it to be better than Christianity, or prohibit contact between male and female 
students (Salim et al. 2011; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2015).  
Even more serious are the occasional attacks on houses of worship and 
public places, intended to ignite interreligious hostility (Tim Peneliti Yayasan 
Paramadina et al 2011: 56). Another example of issues related to the 
recognition of different values and lifestyles (i.c. hedonism) is the protest that 
took place on 14 February 2009. About 50 members of the Islamic Defenders 
Front (FPI: Front Pembela Islam) protested at several entertainment venues in 
Yogyakarta; among them, restaurants serving haram food, and alleged houses 
of prostitution. Threats were made because these places did not adhere to 
Islamic values. In the same year there was the forced cessation of a history 
teachers’ workshop in Yogyakarta in which the era of communism was studied 
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 For instance, in 2007 the Front Pembela Islam (or FPI; the Islamic defenders front), 
an Islamic radical group, protested against the construction of a church in the Kayen 
region in Yogyakarta.  
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and discussed, because some religious groups feared the revival of communism 
(Cholil et al. 2010: 62). In general, lack of respect for the diversity of cultural 
values and ideological convictions may lead to tensions and distrust among 
people (cf. Van Klinken 2001; Bertrand 2004; Malik 2005; Bagir et al. 2011; 
Bagir et al. 2012).  
People need experiences and principles that help them to recognise and 
tolerate cultural differences. In this respect, religiously-inspired generalised 
trust in the cultural domain is necessary to decrease societal polarisation. 
Religiously-inspired generalised trust in the cultural domain sees religion as a 
positive agent of diversity. Religion can potentially encourage the recognition 
of and respect of a plurality of values. Generalised trust is a necessary 
component for constructive social relations in a plural context (cf. Giddens 
1990, 83ff; Mistzal 1996; Sztompka 1999; Rothstein & Stolle 2001; Uslaner 
2002; Hooghe et al. 2009). 
 
4.4 Measuring instruments 
 
How do we measure ‘religiously-inspired generalised trust’ in the different 
domains we identified? We use three indicators for the operationalisation of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust. The first indicator is that it is “a measure 
of the scope of our community” (Uslaner 2002). In the formulation of the 
items, we use ‘my religion’ or ‘my religious community’ to refer to the specific 
community to which our respondents belong, instead of ‘religion’ or ‘religious 
community’ in general. Secondly, the community must be an active supporter 
of trust. As operationalisation, we use an imperative in combination with ‘my 
religion’ or ‘my religious community’, such as ‘to stimulate’, ‘to contribute’, 
“to support” or “to promote”. This imperative indicates a positive contribution 
of ‘my religion’ to generalised trust in a specific domain. Thirdly, the concept 
of generalised trust is measured in the specific domains of society, namely 
economic, political, social, and cultural. Instead of using the general word 
‘trust’, we use the idea of generalised trust, in which people evaluate others as 
trustworthy based on principles of solidarity and justice in these concrete 
societal domains. In each domain, we have chosen two important issues that 
are relevant to the Indonesian context. We discuss these issues extensively in 
the section ‘Generalised trust in the specific context of Indonesia’ (supra 
4.3.3).  
We created four items for each domain, i.e., two items for each issue. 
Hence, there is a total of 16 specific statements with which respondents can 
indicate their disagreement or agreement, using a five-point Likert scale. These 
items can be seen in the following table:  
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Table 4.1: Operationalisation of religiously-inspired generalised trust in 
specific domains. 
 
Concrete issues Economic domain 
Salary system 1  My religious community should stimulate a fair salary system for 
everybody, independent of their religion 
 9  My religion should contribute to a better minimum income for all 
employees 
Job opportunity 2  My religious community supports programs that defends everybody's 
right to get a job 
 10  My religion promotes equal job opportunities for everybody 
 Political domain 
Fair use power 3  My religious communities should stimulate political leadership with 
concern for everybody, independent of their religion 
 11  My religion should contribute to fair political leadership with concern 
for everybody. 
No patronage 4  My religious community stands up for everybody's right to be elected 
without relationship to his or her religion 
 12  My religion promotes the best candidate in a position, also when he or 
she does not belong to my religion. 
 Social domain 
Education no segregation 5  My religious community should stimulate education for everybody, 
independent of the religion of the pupils or students.  
 13  My religion is willing to contribute to the education of everybody. 
Education to all levels 6  My religious community should support equal access for everybody to 
every level of education.  
 14  My religion should promote further and higher studies for everybody. 
 Cultural domain 
Different values 7  My religion promotes respect for the values of all religions. 
 15  My religious community should recognize the contribution of all 
religious values in society.  
Tolerance to hedonism 8  My religious community should respect those who are only interested in 
what gives them pleasure. 
 16  My religion tolerates a hedonistic lifestyle, even when it is opposed to 
those values 
4.5 Empirical results 
After our theoretical description of religiously-inspired generalised trust and its 
operationalisation, we will now answer our research questions in different 
sections. First, we examine the extent to which the different dimensions of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust may be found among Muslim and 
Christian students in Indonesia by means of factor analyses (4.5.1). Next, we 
describe the extent to which our respondents agree with religiously-inspired 
generalised (4.5.2), followed by the social location of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust among our Muslim and Christian respondents (4.5.3). Using 
significant correlations in particular, we then examine the characteristics that 
predict the extent of their agreement with religiously-inspired generalised trust 
(4.5.4).  
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4.5.1 Factor analyses  
The first research question is: which types of religiously-inspired generalised 
trust are present among Muslim and Christian students in Indonesia? To 
answer this question, we conduct a factor analysis in three steps (Van de Vijver 
& Leung 1997). First, we conduct a factor analysis for all respondents (both 
Muslim and Christian) together. In this analysis, we assume that their frame of 
reference with regard to religiously-inspired generalised trust has the same 
structure. Items below the statistical criteria are removed for the next step of 
the analysis.
14
 In a second step, we examine the two religious groups 
separately. These separate factor analyses show whether the overall structure of 
the first step is valid for each of these groups. This second step checks for 
structural differences between the models specific to each religious group. It 
may result in types of religiously-inspired trust that are different for Muslim 
and Christians. If an item does not fit our statistical criteria it is removed in the 
final step. The third step aims to establish cross-religious comparative scales of 
trust. Here, the remaining items common to Muslims and Christians (after the 
first and second steps) are inserted in a final factor analysis for Muslim and 
Christian respondents together. The scales resulting from this third step show 
the cross-religious comparative types of religiously-inspired trust present 
among Muslim and Christian students (cf. Hermans & Sterkens 2014).  
These are the results of the factor analyses. There are two tables of 
newly-constructed factors from the factor analyses, shown separately for both 
religious groups (step 2). Table 4.2 presents the factor analysis for Muslim 
respondents, and Table 4.3 shows the factor analysis for Christians.  
The factor analyses reveal that both groups have four factors; but two 
of these four factors are different, for both groups.  
Table 4.2 shows that the four items in the economic domain form one 
factor (items 1, 9, 2, 10) among Muslims, as proposed in the theoretical 
outline. But the remaining items are not grouped per domain. The second 
factor consists of two items from the cultural domain, concerning the issue of 
tolerating hedonism (items 8 and 16). The third factor consists of all the items 
from the political domain (items 3, 11, 4, 12) plus one item from the social 
domain (item 5, the issue of no segregation in education). The fourth factor 
comprises two items from the cultural domain concerning the acceptance of 
different values (items 7 and 15), and three items from the social domain, 
regarding education for all levels and education with no segregation (items 13, 
6, 14). The explained variance is 42.9%.  
 
                                                 
14
 The criteria used in the factor analysis are eigenvalue >1; commonality >.20; factor 
loadings >.20. 
RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED GENERALISED TRUST IN INDONESIA 
 
177 
Table 4.2: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), and 
percentage of explained variance of religiously-inspired generalised trust in 
specific domains among Muslim students. 
 
 
Items 
 
Theoretical domain 
Dimension h2 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
6 My religious community should support equal 
access for everybody to every level of education 
Social: education for 
all levels 
.65     .59 
7 My religion promotes respect for the values of 
all religions 
Cultural: different 
values 
.65     .41 
14 My religion should promote further and 
higher studies for everybody 
Social: education for 
all levels 
.64     .50 
13 My religion is willing to contribute to the 
education of everybody 
Social: education no 
segregation 
.53     .38 
15 My religious community should recognize 
the contribution of all religious values in society 
Cultural: different 
values 
.50     .33 
16 My religion tolerates hedonistic behaviour, 
even when it is opposed to the own values 
Cultural: tolerating 
hedonism 
 .68    .46 
8 My religious community should respect those 
who are only interested in what gives them 
pleasure 
Cultural: tolerating 
hedonism 
 .64    .38 
4 My religious community stands up for 
everybody's right to be elected without 
relationship to his or her religion 
Political: no patronage   -
.64  
 .43 
3 My religious communities should stimulate 
political leadership with concern for everybody, 
independent of their religion 
Political: fair use of 
power 
  -
.55  
 .51 
5 My religious community should stimulate 
education for everybody, independent of the 
religion of the pupils or students 
Social: education no 
segregation 
  -
.48  
 .42 
11 My religion should contribute to fair political 
leadership with concern for everybody 
Political: fair use of 
power 
  -
.45  
 .48 
12 My religion promotes the best candidate in a 
position, also when he or she does not belong to 
my religion 
Political: no patronage   -
.40  
 .26 
2 My religious community supports programs 
that defend everybody's right to get a job 
Economic: job 
opportunity 
   .63  .44 
1 My religious community should stimulate a 
fair salary system for everybody, independent of 
their religion 
Economic: fair salary 
system 
   .61  .46 
9 My religion should contribute to a better 
minimum income for all employees 
Economic: fair salary 
system 
   .58  .36 
10 My religion promotes equal job opportunities 
for everybody 
Economic: job 
opportunity 
   .50  .46 
Cronbach’s Alpha .77 .61 .71 .74  
Number of valid cases 78
2 
78
3 
78
4 
78
5 
 
Total variance explained 42.9%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Socio-cultural trust ; F2 = Tolerating hedonism; F3 = Political trust; F4 = Economic trust  
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Table 4.3: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), and 
percentage of explained variance of comparative understanding of religiously-
inspired generalised trust in specific domains among Christian students. 
 
 
Items 
 
Theoretical domain 
Dimension h2 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
4 My religious community stands up for 
everybody's right to be elected without 
relationship to his or her religion 
Political: no patronage .80     .55 
3 My religious communityies should 
stimulate political leadership with concern for 
everybody, independent of their religion 
Political: fair use of 
power 
.64     .58 
11 My religion should contribute to fair 
political leadership with concern for 
everybody 
Political: fair use of 
power 
.62     .58 
10 My religion promotes equal job 
opportunities for everybody 
Economic: job 
opportunity 
.58     .45 
5 My religious community should stimulate 
education for everybody, independent of the 
religion of the pupils or students 
Social: education no 
segregation 
.54     .57 
2 My religious community supports programs 
that defend everybody's right to get a job 
Economic: job 
opportunity 
.53     .50 
12 My religion promotes the best candidate in 
a position, also when he or she does not 
belong to my religion 
Political: no patronage .50     .26 
8 My religious community should respect 
those who are only interested in what gives 
them pleasure 
Cultural: tolerating 
hedonism 
 .77    .60 
16 My religion tolerates hedonistic behaviour, 
even when it is opposed to the own values 
Cultural: tolerating 
hedonism 
 .53    .29 
14 My religion should promote further and 
higher studies for everybody 
Social: education for all 
levels 
  -
.80  
 .65 
6 My religious community should support 
equal access for everybody to every level of 
education 
Social: education for all 
levels 
  -
.74  
 .61 
15 My religious community should recognize 
the contribution of all religious values in 
society 
Cultural: different values   -
.62  
 .40 
7 My religion promotes respect for the values 
of all religions 
Cultural: different values   -
.55  
 .39 
13 My religion is willing to contribute to the 
education of everybody 
Social: education no 
segregation  
  -
.54  
 .44 
1 My religious community should stimulate a 
fair salary system for everybody, independent 
of their religion 
Economic: fair salary 
sytem 
   -
.69  
.58 
9 My religion should contribute to a better 
minimum income for all employees 
Economic: fair salary 
system 
   -
.64  
.50 
Cronbach’s Alpha .86 .59 .82 .69  
Number of valid cases 70
2 
70
0 
69
8 
70
4 
 
Total variance explained 49.6%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Economic-political trust ; F2 = tolerating hedonism; F3 = Socio-cultural trust; F4 = fair salary system 
 
For Christians, the factor analysis also reveals four factors (Table 4.3). Two 
factors are the same as those of the Muslims; two other factors have a different 
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content. The first similar factor consists of two items from the cultural domain 
(concerning different values – items 7 and 15), and three items from the social 
domains (regarding education – items 13, 6, and 14, about the issue of no 
segregation in education). The second factor that is the same for both 
Christians and Muslims consists of two items from the cultural domain 
(concerning tolerance of hedonism – items 8 and 16). The two other factors 
differ from those of the Muslims. One of these factors consists of two items 
from the economic domain, specifically concerning the issue of the salary 
system (items 1 and 9). The second differing factor consists of all the items 
from the political domain (items 3, 11, 4, 12), plus two items from the 
economic domain, concerning the issue of job opportunity (items 2 and 10), 
and one item from the social domain, regarding no segregation in education 
(item 5). This factor analysis has a total explained variance of 49.6%. 
 Efforts to filter out the differences in factor structure between the two 
religious groups leads to the elimination of many items. Since the results from 
the free-factor solution show good factor loadings and communalities for both 
groups, we decided take different factors among Muslims and Christians for 
granted. This means that not all our measurements of religiously-inspired trust 
are (cross-religiously) comparative. The differences between the two religious 
groups also reflect the typical situations and understandings of the respondents. 
We will therefore pay attention separately to the different concepts found in the 
factor analysis among Muslims and Christians.  
We labelled the two specific scales among Muslims that are not 
comparative with those of Christians as ‘economic trust’ (items 1, 9, 2, 10) and 
‘political trust’ (items 3, 11, 4, 12 and 5) respectively (Table 4.2). Seemingly, 
the Muslim respondents considered item 5 to be a political issue as well. For 
Christians we labelled the first scale ‘fair salary system’ (items 1 and 9). Here 
Christians did not consider the issue of job opportunity (items 2 and 10) as part 
of the economic domain, but rather as an issue related to the political domain. 
The second ‘Christian’ scale consists of a combination of the political domain 
(items 3, 11, 4, 12), the economic domain (items 2 and 10) and the social 
domain (item 5). We labelled this new scale ‘economic-political trust’.  
Christians associate the issue of job opportunities with politics because 
political patronage and misuse of power create obstacles to finding a job. For 
example, in Ambon, government policies result in more job opportunities and 
business opportunities for (mainly Muslim) migrants. Christians may feel 
threatened by migrant communities, not only economically but also politically. 
Actually, this is a drastic change compared to Dutch colonial rule when, 
Christians profited from the good relations with the colonial government (see 
Chapter 1; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 2009). But in Yogyakarta too it seems to be 
easier for Muslims to develop a political career, or to find jobs that are highly 
politicised (e.g. civil servants on higher levels). In generalised trust among 
Christians, because social and political issues are mingled together with the 
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problem of job opportunity, we label this scale ‘economic-political trust’. For 
Christians, salary issues are seen as separate from job opportunities. They 
therefore form a factor on their own. Generally speaking, Christian respondents 
in our sample are from middle to upper socio-economic classes whose 
economic condition is relatively stable; especially those in Yogyakarta. These 
respondents seemingly do not associate salary with political issues. This is why 
we labelled this scale ‘fair salary system’. This is different from the Muslim 
respondents’ issues concerning salary and job opportunity, which are clustered 
in one factor called ‘economic trust’. 
Both religious groups also acknowledge that item 5 (no segregation in 
education) represents a special case. Item 5 is associated with the political 
domain among Muslims, and with the political-economic domain among 
Christians. Item 5 states: ‘My religious community should stimulate education 
for everybody, independent of the religion of the pupils or students’. 
Seemingly, this is interpreted in a political way, that religious communities 
should develop schools that are open to everybody – contrary to what most 
religiously-affiliated schools do. The government runs the state school system, 
while religious communities operate the religiously-affiliated schools. The 
latter are seen as the fulfilment of the duties of churches and Islamic 
organisations. The respondents agree that religion should contribute to and 
support education that is equally accessible by all people (items 13, 6, 14); 
however, not in the form of state schools. Item 5 may be associated with the 
political domain by our respondents. This is understandable, because 
government policies in Indonesia often address religious issues, and more 
specifically, religious issues concerning education.  
Table 4.4 presents the result of factor analysis in the so-called third 
step (see above). This factor analysis of data for Muslims and Christians 
together resulted in two cross-religious comparative scales. The explained 
variance is 44.8%. The first comparative factor of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust is ‘socio-cultural trust’. It is about respecting and recognising 
the different values of different religions, together with supporting access to 
education at all levels for everybody (items 7 and 15, and items 13, 6, 14). 
Both issues refer to a non-sectarian attitude and a sense of fairness in the social 
domain. For both Muslims and Christians, the emphasis is on encouraging 
access to education for everyone. In the second step of the factor analysis (cf. 
Table 4.3), we even found that the strongest factor loadings were on this issue 
– contrary to those for Muslims. Christian organisations have indeed founded 
many schools that are open to everybody, including non-Christian students. 
Unlike Muslim schools, Christian schools often have a mixed population. But 
this may also be explained by the fact that Muslims are a majority group.  
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Table 4.4: Factor analysis (Paf, Oblimin rotation), commonalities (h
2
), 
percentage of explained variance, and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
comparative understanding of religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Muslim and Christian students. 
 
 
Items 
 
Theoretical domain 
Factor 
h2 
F1 F2 
6 My religious community should support equal 
access for everybody to every level of education 
Social: education for 
all levels 
.77  .60 
14 My religion should promote further and higher 
studies for everybody 
Social: education for 
all levels 
.75  .56 
13 My religion is willing to contribute to the 
education of everybody 
Social: education no 
segregation 
.64  .41 
7 My religion promotes respect for the values of all 
religions 
Cultural: different 
values 
.58  .36 
15 My religious community should recognize the 
contribution of all religious values in society 
Cultural: different 
values 
.56  .35 
8 My religious community should respect those who 
are only interested in what gives them pleasure 
Cultural: tolerating 
hedonism 
 .72 .52 
16 My religion tolerates hedonistic behaviour, even 
when it is opposed to the own values 
Cultural: tolerating 
hedonism 
 .58 .34 
Cronbach’s Alpha .79 .60  
Number of valid cases 1480 1483  
Total variance explained 44.8%  
Scale: 1=Totally disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=not sure; 4=Agree; 5= Totally agree 
F1 = Socio-cultural trust ; F2 = tolerating hedonism 
 
The second comparative factor is labelled ‘tolerating hedonism’, and consists 
of items 8 and 16. These items clearly belong to issues related to the cultural 
domain. In Indonesia, hedonism is considered to be a specific lifestyle, which 
is negatively evaluated because many people live in poverty (cf. Kistanto 
2006).  
To conclude: our procedure of factor analyses has resulted in two 
cross-religious comparative scales of religiously-inspired generalised trust: 
socio-cultural trust and tolerating hedonism. Furthermore we have found two 
scales of religiously-inspired generalised trust that are specific to Muslim 
respondents: economic trust and political trust. And we have two scales of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust specifically for Christians: fair-salary 
system and economic-political trust. These six scales may be considered to be 
six different types of generalised trust.  
The different types of religiously-inspired generalised trust are also 
correlated with each other. Table 4.5 shows that among Muslims there are 
significant and strong correlations between three dimensions of religiously-
inspired generalised trust, namely socio-cultural trust, economic trust, and 
political trust. This result confirms our expectation that they are all expressions 
of religiously-inspired generalised trust within concrete domains. However, 
there is no correlation between tolerating hedonism and any other type of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust. Tolerating hedonism is seen as a 
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relatively independent notion, separate from other types of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust.  
 
Table 4.5: Correlations (Pearson’s r) among types of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust for Muslims. 
 
 
Socio-cultural 
trust 
Tolerating 
hedonism 
Economic trust Political trust 
Socio-cultural trust 1 -.03 .52** .51** 
Tolerating 
Hedonism 
 1 -.07 .03 
Economic trust   1 .49** 
Political trust    1 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
Table 4.6: Correlations (Pearson’s r) among types of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust for Christians. 
 
 
Socio-cultural 
trust 
Tolerating 
hedonism 
Fair salary 
system 
Economic-political 
trust 
Socio-cultural trust 1 .02 .42** .65** 
Tolerating Hedonism  1 -.02 -.06 
Fair salary system    1 .48** 
Economic-political 
trust 
   1 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
Table 4.6 shows that there are significant (positive) correlations among the 
Christian respondents; namely, between socio-cultural trust, trust in the fair-
salary system, and economic-political trust. Here, too, correlations are strong, 
which seems to confirm that the overall concept of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust can be specified in different specific domains. Once again, 
only tolerating hedonism has no correlation with any other type of trust.  
4.5.2 Agreement with religiously-inspired generalised trust 
To what extent do our respondents agree with the different types of religiously-
inspired generalised trust? And are there any significant differences between 
Muslims and Christians in their agreement with the comparative types of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust? We will first present the results for the 
comparative types for Muslims and Christians, namely ‘socio-cultural trust’ 
and ‘tolerating hedonism’. Next, we will present the results for the types that 
are different for both religious groups, namely ‘economic trust’ and ‘political 
trust’ among Muslim students, and ‘trust in the fair-salary system’ and 
‘economic-political trust’ among Christian students. 
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Table 4.7: Levels of agreement (mean and standard deviation) with regard to 
religiously-inspired generalised trust for Muslim and Christian students. 
 
 N Mean s.d. (t-value) 
Socio-cultural trust    
Muslims 790 3.98 .55 1.832 
Christians 705 3.93 .57 1.832 
Tolerating hedonism    
Muslims 789 2.70 .92 1.822 
Christians 704 2.61 .88 1.822 
Economic trust (Muslims) 756 4.06 .49 - 
Political trust (Muslims) 773 3.95 .51 - 
Fair salary system (Christians) 699 3.73 .77 - 
Economic-political trust (Christians) 687 3.89 .51 - 
Scale: 1(Totally disagree), 2 (Disagree), 3 (Not sure), 4 (Agree), 5 (Totally agree) 
t-values are significant at p<.00 (**) or p<.05 (*) level 
 
Table 4.7 shows that both Muslim and Christian students agree strongly with 
‘socio-cultural trust’. Muslim students accept this type of trust (m 3.98; s.d .51) 
slightly more than Christian students do (m 3.93; s.d .52), but the t-test shows 
that this difference is not significant (t 1.832, df 1493, p .067). For ‘tolerating 
hedonism’ we find different results: Muslim students show a negative 
ambivalence towards tolerating hedonism (m 2.70; s.d .92), while Christians 
reject it (m 2.61; s.d .88). But here, too, the t-test shows that the difference 
between the two groups is not significant (t 1.822, df 1491, p .069). The high 
standard deviation for both groups indicates that the distribution of the 
response is relatively large. The possible reasons for the rejection of socio-
cultural trust in the Indonesian context will be discussed later.  
With regard to the specific domains for Muslims, Table 4.5.2 shows 
that Muslims strongly agree with economic trust (m 4.06; s.d .49) and political 
trust (m 3.95; s.d .51). This is understandable, because economic issues are 
highly relevant for Muslims. As at September 2013, more than 28 million 
people in Indonesia are considered ‘poor’ (about 11% of the total population), 
and most of them are from provinces that are predominantly Muslim.
15
 Muslim 
respondents also emphasise that religiously-inspired generalised trust can and 
even should be realised through fair political policies (m 3.95; s.d .51). 
Although Muslims in Indonesia are considered to have fewer negative 
experiences with political discrimination than Christians do, they nevertheless 
agree with the idea that religious communities should stimulate political 
concern for everybody.  
                                                 
15
 http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek 
=23&notab=1. Accessed 1 September 2015. 
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With regard to Christians, the fair-salary system (m 3.73; s.d .77) and 
economic-political trust (m 3.89; s.d .51) are accepted. The highest mean score 
is for economic-political trust. The distribution of the responses regarding fair-
salary issues is relatively large (s.d .77). Apparently there are differences 
within the Christian community in how (un)fairness in salaries is experienced. 
Christian respondents agree more with economic-political issues, such as the 
conviction that the own religious community stands up for everybody's right to 
be elected without his or her religion affecting the outcome, or that religion 
should promote equal job opportunities for everybody. The standard deviation 
(.51) seems to reflect a coherent experience among the Christian minority 
group with regard to economic-political issues (see Introduction).  
4.5.3 Social location of types of religiously-inspired generalised trust 
We will now address the third research question, which concerns the 
correlations between religiously-inspired generalised trust in specific domains, 
on the one hand, and the background characteristics of the respondents, the 
intra-group beliefs and the inter-group beliefs on the other. We will first 
present the results for the two comparative types of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust among Muslims and Christians, namely socio-cultural trust 
and tolerating hedonism (4.5.3.1). Next, we will present the results for 
religiously-inspired generalised trust in specific domains for Muslims (4.5.3.2) 
and Christians (4.5.3.3). We expect that the social location of types of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust (through the correlations) will help us to 
formulate possible explanations for the significant differences we have found. 
For metric variables we show Pearson’s correlation (r), and for nominal 
variables (i.e. gender, university type and location) we show the measure of 
association eta. We categorise the findings into weak correlations (r < .15), 
moderate correlations (.15 ≤ r < .40) and strong correlations (r ≥ .40).  
4.5.3.1 Comparative types of religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Muslims and Christians 
Socio-cultural trust 
Among Muslims, within socio-cultural and economic characteristics, socio-
cultural trust shows the strongest correlation with location, i.e. the city where 
our student respondents live – either Ambon or Yogyakarta. We found 
considerable differences between the two. As explained previously, 
Yogyakarta is a rather peaceful location where Muslims are in the majority. 
Ambon, in contrast, is a conflictual area where Christians are the predominant 
group. Location therefore also says something about two other important 
characteristics: whether the respondent belongs to the religious majority or 
minority in this particular context, and the presence (or absence) of manifest 
conflict in the recent past. We found that levels of trust are higher on average 
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in Yogyakarta (4.08) than in Ambon (3.92). But this is true for both Muslims 
and Christians, suggesting that the specific history of conflict is related to the 
level of trust, rather than that the relative size of the religious group to which 
the respondent belongs relates to the level of trust. We further find that men 
(4.05) show significantly higher levels of trust than women (3.98). And socio-
cultural trust is higher among students whose parents have a higher educational 
level.  
Table 4.8: Social location of socio-cultural trust among Muslim and Christians 
students. Correlation between socio-cultural trust and background 
characteristics.
 16
 
 
 
Socio-cultural trust 
Muslims Christians 
Background characteristics 
  
Socio-cultural & economic characteristics 
  
 Age  .05 .07 
 Gender (eta) .08* .10** 
 Father’s education level .09* .11** 
 Mother’s education level .08* .06 
 University type (eta) .03 .02 
 Location (eta) .15** .13** 
Socio-religious characteristics 
  
 Father’s involvement in religious choice .09* .05 
 Mother’s involvement in religious choice  .06 .06 
 Father’s involvement in religious activities  .05 -.01 
 Mother’s involvement in religious activities  .06 .03 
 Religious organization involvement  .03 .01 
 Participation in religious service .06 .11** 
 Participation in religious activities .05 .09* 
 Frequency of praying .06 .02 
 Number of friends of the same religion .00 .06 
Perceived threat 
  
 Economic  .03 -.07 
 Political  -.09* -.01 
 Social  .01 .04 
 Cultural  .13** .10* 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
With regard to socio-religious characteristics, we can say that there are almost 
no significant correlations with socio-cultural trust, with the exception of the 
                                                 
16
 Eta for the nominal variables gender, university type and location; Pearson’s r for the 
all other, metric, variables. 
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father’s involvement in religious choice: more involvement relates to higher 
levels of socio-cultural trust. Meanwhile, with regard to perception of injustice 
and lack of solidarity in society, cultural issues and political issues show a low 
correlation. Cultural issues are about hedonistic lifestyle within society. The 
result indicates that only a low level of socio-cultural trust is found among 
Muslims who agree that the society is too supportive of a hedonistic lifestyle. 
Political issues indicate a feeling of being politically discriminated against and 
oppressed. A negative correlation shows that a low level of socio-cultural trust 
is found among Muslim students who disagree with discrimination within their 
family. 
 Among Christian students, within socio-cultural and economic 
characteristics, we find low significant correlations with location, gender and 
father’s educational level. Location shows the strongest correlation with socio-
cultural trust. Higher levels of socio-cultural trust are found in Yogyakarta 
(4.05) than in Ambon (3.91), again suggesting that Ambon’s specific history of 
conflict reduces the level of trust. Furthermore, men (4.02) show higher levels 
of trust than women (3.92). And among students whose fathers attained higher 
levels of education, the level of trust is stronger. When it comes to socio-
religious characteristics, participation in religious services and participation in 
religious activities is related to higher levels of socio-cultural trust among 
Christians. When we consider perception of injustice and lack of solidarity 
within society, we find that cultural issues correlate with trust to a certain 
extent, indicating that socio-cultural trust is slightly higher among Christians 
who agree that the society is too tolerant of a hedonistic lifestyle (see Table 
4.8). 
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Table 4.9: Social location of socio-cultural trust among Muslim and Christians 
students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between socio-cultural trust and religious 
intra-group beliefs. 
 
 
         Socio-cultural trust 
Muslims Christians 
Religious intra-group beliefs 
  
Holy Scripture and faith 
  
 Psychological interpretation -.07 -.21** 
 Historical interpretation -.08* -.05 
Concept of The Koran   
 A source of divine inspiration .19** - 
 The word of God  .18** - 
 Just a collection of cultural text written by men -.15**  
Concept of The Bible   
 A source of divine inspiration  - .19** 
 The word of God  - .08* 
 Just a collection of cultural text written by men  -.11** 
Image of God   
 Anthrpopmorphic .24** .28** 
 Non anthromophic .05 -.02 
Image of Muhammad    
 Prophet  .07.  
 Uniqueness .18**  
 Perfection .08*  
 Uswa 35**  
 Humanistic -.07  
Image of Jesus    
 Classical - 20** 
 Spirit-motivated - .22** 
 Model - .32**. 
 Humanistic - -.16** 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*) 
 
In Table 4.9: among Muslims, we find only one variable of Holy Scripture and 
faith that has a low negative correlation with socio-cultural trust, namely 
historical interpretation. Historical interpretation is about the interpretation of 
faith as contextually changeable. In this interpretation, faith must be examined 
against the background of the specific historical context in which it is revealed. 
We find that the level of socio-cultural trust is slightly negatively related to 
historical interpretation among Muslim students. With regard to the concept of 
the Koran, higher levels of socio-cultural trust may be found among Muslim 
students who see the Koran as a source of divine inspiration and the word of 
God, and among those who show relatively lower agreement with the Koran as 
(just) a collection of human and cultural texts. These are all moderate 
correlations.  
With regard to image of God, socio-cultural trust may be found among 
Muslims who believe in an anthropomorphic God, i.e. panentheistic and 
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theistic God images. With regard to images of Muhammad, we find that 
Muhammad as uswa (model) shows a relatively strong correlation with socio-
cultural trust. Muhammad as uswa indicates that people can learn from the 
figure of Muhammad how to grow in closeness to God, and how to live with 
and for others. Furthermore, we find that Muslims who believe in Muhammad 
as a unique person show relatively stronger levels of socio-cultural trust. 
Muhammad as a unique person is about his unique experience of seeing God 
during his ascension. And finally, the image of Muhammad as a perfect man in 
nature and moral qualities shows a weak but nevertheless significant positive 
correlation with socio-cultural trust. 
Among Christians, there is one belief related to Holy Scripture and 
faith that shows a moderate negative correlation with socio-cultural trust: 
psychological interpretation of the Holy Scripture. In the psychological 
interpretation, religion is seen as an expression of weak personality or human 
fears. Christian students who reject this belief are associated relatively more 
with higher levels of socio-cultural trust. With regard to the concept of the 
Bible we find the following correlations: the Bible as a source of divine 
inspiration and the word of God are associated with higher levels of socio-
cultural trust. But the view of the Bible as a collection of human, cultural texts 
is found among Christians who show lower levels of socio-cultural trust. With 
regard to image of God, belief in an anthropomorphic God, i.e. theistic and 
panentheistic God images, is related to higher levels of socio-cultural trust. 
When we consider the images of Jesus, relatively high levels of socio-cultural 
trust can be found among Christians who believe in Jesus as a model for caring 
and solidarity with others. We also find two significant moderate positive 
correlations between image of Jesus and socio-cultural trust, namely: spirit-
motivated Jesus and classical Jesus. Spirit-motivated Jesus is about the 
uniqueness of a Jesus who represents God’s spirit through his life. And the 
classical Jesus is about the existence of Jesus as God-man, who lived with the 
father from the beginning. There is also a moderate negative correlation 
between Jesus as humanistic and socio-cultural trust. This image indicates that 
Jesus is recognised only as a good and historical person who inspires people. 
Socio-cultural trust can be found among those Christians who disagree 
relatively more with this humanistic Jesus image (see Table 4.9) 
Among our Muslim respondents, with regard to attitudes towards 
religious plurality, there are two moderate positive correlations with socio-
cultural trust: monism and commonality pluralism. Monism entails the inter-
group belief that there is no religious truth outside the own religion. 
Commonality pluralism is the belief that different religious traditions are 
expressions of the same ultimate truth, or an identical ultimate liberation. 
Socio-cultural trust can be found among Muslims who agree relatively more 
with monism and commonality pluralism. Next, with regard to religiocentrism, 
Muslim students with positive attitudes towards their own Islamic tradition 
RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED GENERALISED TRUST IN INDONESIA 
 
189 
show higher levels of socio-cultural trust. When we come to attitudes towards 
religion-state relationship, we find a strong correlation between socio-cultural 
trust and the cooperation model. The latter indicates that the state should 
recognise, protect, and facilitate diverse religions. Muslim students who agree 
with this vision are associated with higher levels of socio-cultural trust. A weak 
positive correlation can be found between socio-cultural trust and state 
communitarianism, in which the state is based on the values and norms of a 
specific religious tradition. Autonomy liberalism, on the other hand, correlates 
negatively with socio-cultural trust. Autonomy liberalism indicates that 
religion and state should be strictly separated. Finally, socio-cultural trust can 
clearly be found among Muslim students who are of the opinion that Islam 
calls for solidarity with and justice for the other. 
 
Table 4.10: Social location of socio-cultural trust among Muslim and 
Christians students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between socio-cultural trust and 
religious inter-group beliefs.  
 
          Socio-cultural trust 
 Muslims Christians 
Religious inter-group beliefs 
  
Attitudes toward religious plurality 
  
 Monism  .18** .16** 
 Commonality pluralism  .17** .12** 
 Relativistic pluralism  .01 -.06 
Religion-centrism   
 Positive in-group .14** .29** 
 Negative out-group -.06 .05 
Attitudes toward religion-state relationship   
 Cooperation  .38** .40** 
 State communitarianism  .10** .10** 
 Autonomy liberalism  -.12** -.01 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice  .52** .45** 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
Among Christians, with regard to religious attitudes towards religious 
plurality we find significant positive correlations with monism and 
commonality pluralism. When it comes to religiocentrism, Christians who 
have positive attitudes towards their own religious tradition (positive in-group) 
show relatively strong association with socio-cultural trust. With regard to 
attitudes towards the religion-state relationship, strong associations with 
socio-cultural trust are found among Christian students who agree with the 
cooperation model, while state communitarianism shows only low correlation 
with socio-cultural trust. We find further that a religious vocation for solidarity 
with and justice for the other shows the strongest association with socio-
cultural trust. It means that relatively more socio-cultural trust is found among 
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Christians who believe that dedication to solidarity and justice is a religious 
vocation (cf. Table 4.10).  
 
Summary: social location of socio-cultural trust 
Many of the correlations that we found accorded with our expectations. Socio-
cultural trust correlates with background characteristics and religious (intra-
group and inter-group) beliefs among Muslims and Christians. For both 
Muslims and Christians, the strongest correlations are with religious inter-
group beliefs, specifically the religious vocation for solidarity and justice with 
others, followed by the cooperation model of religion and state. Among 
Muslims, socio-cultural trust is related to religious intra-group beliefs, such as 
the image of Muhammad as uswa. Among Christians, relatively strong socio-
cultural trust is found to be related to religious beliefs, specifically 
anthropomorphic God images, the image of Jesus as model, and positive in-
group attitudes. Moderate significant correlations are scattered within 
background characteristics and religious intra-group and inter-group beliefs, 
among both Muslims and Christians; among Muslims, monism and 
commonality pluralism (religious inter-group beliefs), anthropomorphic God 
image, image of Muhammad as unique person, the Koran as the word of God 
and a source of divine inspiration (religious intra-group beliefs), and location 
(background characteristics). Remarkably, for both religious groups there is 
only one moderate significant correlation between socio-cultural trust and 
background characteristics: location. The rest of the background characteristics 
show weak correlations. This means that socio-cultural trust is difficult to 
relate to background characteristics such as gender, age, parent’s education 
level, and religious practices.  
 
Tolerating hedonism  
Among Muslims, Table 4.11 shows that location (socio-cultural & economic 
characteristics) correlates weakly with tolerating hedonism. We found that 
levels of tolerating hedonism are higher in Ambon (2.82) than in Yogyakarta 
(2.62). We do not find any correlations between socio-religious characteristics 
and tolerating hedonism. With regard to perception of injustice and lack of 
solidarity within society, we found a weak association between tolerating 
hedonism and the social issue of segregation in education, in which people 
prefer to attend confessional schools based on their own religious background. 
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Table 4.11: Social location of tolerating hedonism among Muslim and 
Christian students. Correlation
17
 between tolerating hedonism and background 
characteristics.  
 
 
    Tolerating Hedonism 
Muslims Christians 
Background characteristics 
  
Socio-cultural & economic characteristics   
 Age  .05 .08* 
 Gender (eta) .02 .11** 
 Father’s education level -.02 .01 
 Mother’s education level -.03 .01 
 University type (eta) .04 .03 
 Location (eta) .11** .03 
Socio-religious characteristics   
 Father’s involvement in religious choice -.07 -.05 
 Mother’s involvement in religious choice  -.07 -.03 
 Father’s involvement in religious activities  -.02 -.06 
 Mother’s involvement in religious activities  -.00 -.00 
 Religious organization involvement  .07 .04 
 Participation in religious service .02 -.05 
 Participation in religious activities -.01 -.02 
 Frequency of praying .03 -.07 
 Number of friends of the same religion  .01 -.02 
Perceived threat   
 Economic  -.01 -.00 
 Political  .07 .00 
 Social  .07* .02 
 Cultural  -.05 .00 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
Among Christian respondents, only the socio-cultural and economic 
characteristics of gender and age have weak positive associations with 
tolerating hedonism. The levels for tolerating hedonism are slightly higher 
among men (2.67) than women (2.48), and among older students. With regard 
to socio-religious characteristics and perception of injustice and lack of 
solidarity within society, we do not find significant correlations with tolerating 
hedonism.  
 
  
                                                 
17
 Eta for the nominal variables gender, university type and location; Pearson’s r for the 
all other, metric, variables. 
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Table 4.12: Social location of tolerating hedonism among Muslim and 
Christian students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between tolerating hedonism and 
religious intra-group beliefs. 
 
 
        Tolerating hedonism 
Muslims Christians 
Religious intra-group beliefs 
  
Holy Scripture and faith 
  
 Psychological interpretation .11** .06 
 Historical interpretation .13** .09* 
Concept of The Koran   
 A source of divine inspiration -.07 - 
 The word of God  -.09* - 
 Just a collection of cultural text written by men .10**  
Concept of The Bible   
 A source of divine inspiration  - -.04 
 The word of God  - .01 
 Just a collection of cultural text written by men  .09 
Image of God   
 Anthrpopmorphic -.03 .02 
 Non anthromophic .05 .04 
Image of Muhammad    
 Prophet .03 - 
 Uniqueness -.04 - 
 Perfection .01 - 
 Uswa -.10** - 
 Humanistic .24** - 
Image of Jesus    
 Classical - -.02 
 Spirit-motivated - .04 
 Model - .01 
 Humanistic - .05 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*) 
 
Table 4.12 shows some significant correlations between religious-intra-group 
beliefs and tolerating hedonism among Muslims. With regard to Holy scripture 
and faith, we can say that tolerating hedonism is somewhat higher among 
Muslim students who agree with the ideas that faith is changeable through 
history (historical interpretation) and that faith is an expression of human 
weakness (psychological interpretation). In more abstract terms, these findings 
show that tolerating hedonism is associated with more liberal ideas of Holy 
Scripture and faith. Further, with regard to concept of the Koran, tolerating 
hedonism is positively related with the belief that the Koran is (just) a 
collection of human and cultural texts, but negatively related with the belief 
that the Koran is the word of God. Image of Muhammad as uswa (image of 
Muhammad) has a low negative correlation with tolerating hedonism. There is 
only one variable that has a relevant correlation with tolerating hedonism, 
namely the image of Muhammad as humanistic. This image indicates that 
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Muhammad is a historical and great person, but no more than that. Thus, 
tolerating hedonism can be found among Muslims who agree with the image of 
Muhammad as a humanistic figure.  
Among Christians, we do not find any relevant correlations between 
tolerating hedonism and intra-group beliefs. We find only a weak – though 
significant – correlation between historical interpretation (Holy Scripture and 
faith) and tolerating hedonism. This means Christian students who are more 
tolerant of a hedonistic lifestyle show association with the idea that Holy 
Scripture is changeable through society and history (see Table 4.12). 
 
Table 4.13: Social location of tolerating hedonism among Muslim and 
Christian students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between tolerating hedonism and 
religious inter-group beliefs.  
 
       Tolerating hedonism 
 Muslims Christians 
Religious inter-group beliefs 
  
Attitudes toward religious plurality 
  
 Monism  -.08* .04 
 Commonality pluralism  .04 .08* 
 Relativistic pluralism  .17** .05 
Religion-centrism   
 Positive in-group -.13** .01 
 Negative out-group .07 .03 
Attitudes toward religion-state relationship   
 Cooperation  .01 -.09* 
 State communitarianism  -.04 .08 
 Autonomy liberalism  .16** .12** 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice  .03 -.12** 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
Among our Muslim respondents, relativistic pluralism (attitudes towards 
religious plurality) shows moderate correlation with tolerating hedonism. 
Tolerating hedonism is found among Muslim students who are convinced that 
all religions are equally valid ways to the truth. Muslim students who agree 
that their own religion is the only truth (monism) are less convinced that their 
religious community should respect those who are only interested in what gives 
them pleasure. Positive in-group attitudes (religiocentrism) are related to lower 
levels of tolerating hedonism. Autonomy liberalism (attitudes towards 
religion-state relationship) is also influential among Muslims. There is 
moderate positive correlation between tolerating hedonism and those who 
agree with a separation between religion and state.  
Among Christian students too we find that autonomy liberalism 
(attitudes towards religion-state relationship) is positively correlated with 
tolerating hedonism. Is a religious vocation towards solidarity with and justice 
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for the other negatively correlated with tolerating hedonism? Christian students 
who believe that solidarity with and justice for the other is part of their 
religious vocation show slightly less tolerance towards hedonism (see Table 
4.13).  
 
Summary: social location of tolerating hedonism  
There are only weak – and a few moderately strong – correlations between 
tolerating hedonism, on one hand, and background characteristics, religious 
intra-group and inter-group beliefs on the other. Among Muslims, there are 
correlations between tolerating hedonism and the image of Muhammad as 
humanistic (religious intra-group beliefs) and autonomy liberalism (religious 
inter-group beliefs). Among Christians, we only find some weak correlations, 
which means that is difficult to create a profile for those who show more 
tolerance towards a hedonistic life style.  
 
4.5.3.2 Specific types of religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Muslims  
With regard to economic trust, Table 4.14 shows that there are only weak 
significant correlations between economic trust and background characteristics. 
Location (socio-cultural and economic characteristics) and cultural threat 
(perceived threat) show the highest score on economic trust. With regard to 
location, levels of economic trust are slightly higher in Yogyakarta (4.11) than 
in Ambon (3.97). Cultural threat indicates the opinion that society is too 
supportive of a hedonistic lifestyle. It is related to more economic trust. With 
regard to socio-religious characteristics, we find an even weaker correlation 
with economic trust. Parental involvement in religious choice and participation 
in religious activities is related to more economic trust.  
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Table 4.14: Social location of economic trust and political trust among Muslim 
students. Correlation
18
 between economic trust and political trust and 
background characteristics.  
 
 Economic trust Political trust 
Background characteristics 
  
Socio-cultural & economic characteristics   
 Age  .07 .04 
 Gender (eta) .07 .03 
 Father’s education level .05 .00 
 Mother’s education level .01 -.01 
 University type (eta) .00 .07* 
 Location (eta) .13** .05 
Socio-religious characteristics   
 Father’s involvement in religious choice .08* .09* 
 Mother’s involvement in religious choice  .09* .08* 
 Father’s involvement in religious activities  .03 .08* 
 Mother’s involvement in religious activities  .06 .08* 
 Religious organization involvement  .05 .02 
 Participation in religious service .07 -.03 
 Participation in religious activities .08* .01 
 Frequency of praying .04 .08* 
 Number of friends of the same religion  .06 -.05 
Perceived threat   
 Economic  .02 .11** 
 Political  -.02 -.07* 
 Social  .05 -.03 
 Cultural  .14** .12** 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
With regard to political trust, there are some low-significance correlations 
between socio-cultural economic characteristics and socio-religious 
characteristics and political trust. Parental involvement in religious choice, 
parental involvement in religious activities, frequency of praying, and 
university type show weak positive associations with political trust. University 
type indicates the difference between Muslims studying at a state university, 
Islamic university or Christian university. Here we find that Muslim students 
who study at a Christian university (4.37) are more significantly related to 
political trust than Muslims studying in a state university (3.97) or an Islamic 
university (3.93). It confirms the idea that more contact with other groups leads 
to more trust; but also that being in a minority (here, in the context of the 
institution where one is studying) is related to more trust. Students who are part 
of a religious minority at the university where they are studying (e.g. Muslim 
students at Christian universities) have more contact with Christians, which in 
turn leads to more trust. With regard to perceived threat, Muslim students who 
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 Eta for the nominal variables gender, university type and location; Pearson’s r for the 
all other, metric, variables. 
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feel that there are not enough job opportunities (perceived economic threat) 
show higher levels of political trust. But this is only a weak correlation, and 
difficult to interpret. Political trust can also be found among Muslim students 
who feel that society is too supportive of a hedonistic lifestyle (cultural issue) 
(see Table 4.14).  
 
Table 4.15: Social location of economic trust and political trust among Muslim 
students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between economic trust and political trust 
and religious intra-group beliefs. 
 
 Economic trust Political trust 
Religious intra-group beliefs   
Holy Scripture and faith   
 Psychological interpretation -.06 -.04 
 Historical interpretation -.06 -.06 
Concept of The Koran   
 A source of divine inspiration .11** .09* 
 The word of God  .12** .09* 
 Just a collection of cultural text written by men -.06 -.07 
Image of God   
 Anthrpopmorphic .17** .16** 
 Non anthromophic .03 .00 
Image of Muhammad    
 Prophet .02 .11** 
 Uniqueness .18** .14** 
 Perfection .05 .07 
 Uswa .28** .24** 
 Humanistic -.06 -.02 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
With regard to economic trust, Table 4.15 shows that the concept of the Koran 
is influential. Muslim students who agree that the Koran is a source of divine 
inspiration and the word of God show more economic trust. With regard to 
image of God, the anthropomorphic God has a moderate positive correlation. 
We can say that economic trust can be found among Muslim students who 
believe in a theistic or panentheistic God. Further moderate positive 
correlations with economic trust are found in image of Muhammad; namely 
image of Muhammad as uswa, and Muhammad as a unique person. It means 
that economic trust can be found among Muslim students who agree with 
Muhammad as a model from whom they can learn to be a good servant of God. 
Muslims who believe in Muhammad’s unique religious experience face-to-face 
with God also show stronger economic trust.  
 With regard to political trust, the concept of the Koran is remarkable. 
Political trust is found among Muslim students who agree that the Koran is a 
source of divine inspiration and the word of God; while for images of God, 
anthropomorphic God images among Muslims are related to more political 
trust. With regard to image of Muhammad, Muhammad as uswa shows the 
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strongest correlation. It means that Muslim students believing that they can 
learn from Muhammad how to be a servant of God show higher levels of 
political trust. Political trust is also found relatively more among Muslims who 
believe in a unique religious experience of Muhammad (Muhammad as a 
unique person), and Muhammad as the last prophet (see Table 4.15).  
 
Table 4.16: Social location of economic trust and political trust among Muslim 
students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between economic trust and political trust 
and religious inter-group beliefs.  
 
 Economic trust Political trust 
Religious inter-group beliefs 
  
Attitudes towards religious plurality   
 Monism  .17** .06 
 Commonality pluralism  .13** .24** 
 Relativistic pluralism  -.01 .20** 
Religion-centrism   
 Positive in-group .16** .12** 
 Negative out-group -.03 -.10** 
Attitudes towards religion-state relationship   
 Cooperation  .26** .41** 
 State communitarianism  .17** -.00 
 Autonomy liberalism  -.12** -.12** 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice  .40** .45** 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
Table 4.16 shows that strong economic trust is found among Muslim students 
who agree with monism or commonality pluralism (attitudes towards religious 
plurality). This means there is more economic trust among Muslims who make 
exclusivistic truth claims, and among those that are convinced that every 
religion shares the same ultimate truth. In religiocentrism, positive in-group 
attitudes also have moderate positive correlation with economic trust. With 
regard to attitudes towards religion-state relationship, we find two moderate 
positive correlations: the cooperation model, and state communitarianism. It 
means that economic trust can be found among Muslim students who agree 
with the cooperation model, in which the state recognises, protects and 
facilitates diverse religions. Although the correlation is lower than for the 
cooperation model, the moderate positive correlation between economic trust 
and state communitarianism is surprising. State communitarianism expresses 
the opinion that the state should be based on one specific religious tradition, 
which in the Indonesian context reads ‘should be based on Islamic values and 
norms’. Meanwhile, there is a negative correlation between economic trust and 
autonomy liberalism, indicating that separation between religion and state is 
related to lower levels of economic trust. But the most remarkable variable 
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among inter-group beliefs is religious vocation for solidarity and justice. 
Strong economic trust is found among Muslims who agree that their Islamic 
vocation is about solidarity with and justice for the other.  
 Table 4.16 also presents the correlations between political trust and 
religious inter-group beliefs. With regard to attitudes towards religious 
plurality, relatively more political trust can be found among Muslim students 
who agree with both pluralism beliefs, namely commonality pluralism and 
relativistic pluralism. With regard to religiocentrism, we find that political trust 
is related to both dimensions of religiocentrism, but in two different directions. 
Positive in-group attitudes are related to more political trust, negative out-
group attitudes relate to less political trust. With regard to attitudes towards the 
religion-state relationship, the variable cooperation model is again significant. 
This attitude shows a strong correlation with political trust. Muslim students 
who believe that diverse religions can cooperate positively with the state, while 
the state should protect and facilitate them, show an association with more 
political trust. But autonomy liberalism is related to lower levels of political 
trust. A religious vocation for solidarity and justice is the strongest variable 
that correlates with political trust. Strong political trust is found among 
Muslims who agree that their Islamic vocation is about solidarity with and 
justice for the other.  
 
Summary: social location of economic trust and political trust  
We found two types of religiously-inspired generalised trust that are typically 
related to Muslims: economic trust and political trust. Among Muslim 
respondents, we find many correlations between economic trust and political 
trust on the one hand, and background characteristics and religious beliefs on 
the other. Most of these correlations are in line with our expectations. The 
strongest correlation is found between either economic trust or political trust, 
and a religious vocation for solidarity and justice. There is only one correlation 
that is stronger, namely between political trust and the model of cooperation 
between religion and state. Relatively more economic trust is found among 
Muslims who agree with this cooperation model of the religion-state 
relationship, and with the image of Muhammad as uswa. We do not find strong 
correlations for political trust. Moderate significant correlations are scattered 
within religious intra-group and inter-group beliefs. Economic trust is found 
within the state communitarianism model of the religion-state relationship, 
positive in-group attitudes and monism (religious inter-group beliefs), the 
image of Muhammad as a unique person, and an anthropomorphic God image 
(religious intra-group beliefs). With regard to political trust, commonality 
pluralism and relativistic pluralism of religious plurality attitudes (religious 
inter-group beliefs), and the image of Muhammad as uswa (religious intra-
group beliefs) show moderate correlation with political trust. Here we find 
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hardly any relevant correlations between background characteristics and either 
economic trust or political trust.  
 
4.5.3.3 Specific types of religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Christians  
In Table 4.17, with regard to trust in a fair-salary system among Christians, we 
find one moderate correlation, namely location (socio-cultural & economic 
characteristics). There is a considerable difference between Yogyakarta and 
Ambon, with levels of trust on average higher in Yogyakarta (3.89) than in 
Ambon (3.63). We found this also among Muslims, which implies that the 
specific history of conflict in Ambon (compared to the relatively peaceful 
context of Yogyakarta) is seemingly more important for the levels of trust than 
the relative group size of either Christians or Muslims (i.e. majority versus 
minority status). Other significant correlations – age and father’s education 
level – are low, meaning that a fair-salary system is more likely to be found 
among older students, and among those whose fathers have higher educational 
levels. With regard to perceived threat, cultural and economic threat show 
weak correlations with support for a fair-salary system. More support for a fair-
salary system is found among those who evaluate the society as too supportive 
of a hedonistic lifestyle (cultural threat). More support for a fair-salary system 
can be found among those who experience more economic threat, i.e. those 
who have more difficulty in finding an appropriate job.  
With regard to economic-political trust among Christians (Table 4.17), 
we find low significant correlations with participation in religious service and 
activities, and number of friends of other religions (socio-religious 
characteristics). We can say that relatively more economic-political trust can 
be found among Christian students who are committed in religious services and 
activities, and have more friends of other religions. With regard to perceived 
threat, we see that there is more economic-political trust among those who 
perceive less economic threat, and among those who evaluate the society as too 
supportive of a hedonistic life style. 
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Table 4.17: Social location of fair-salary system and economic-political trust 
among Christian students. Correlation (eta for the nominal variables gender, 
university type, and location; Pearson’s r for the other, ordinal variables) 
between trust in a fair-salary system and economic-political trust and 
background characteristics. 
 Fair salary system Economic-political trust 
Background characteristics   
Socio-cultural & economic characteristics   
 Age  .13** .00 
 Gender (eta) .06 .01 
 Father’s education level .08* .00 
 Mother’s education level .03 -.04 
 University type (eta) .07 .05 
 Location (eta) .17** .02 
Socio-religious characteristics   
 Father’s involvement in religious choice .00 .04 
 Mother’s involvement in religious choice  .00 .01 
 Father’s involvement in religious activities  -.03 .04 
 Mother’s involvement in religious activities  -.02 .05 
 Religious organization involvement  .02 .06 
 Participation in religious service .06 .11** 
 Participation in religious activities .04 .08* 
 Frequency of praying -.01 .03 
 Number of friends of the same religion  -.01 .09* 
Perceived threat   
 Economic  -.09* -.09* 
 Political  .00 -.04 
 Social  .01 .05 
 Cultural  .12** .08* 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
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Table 4.18: Social location of fair salary system and economic-political trust 
among Christian students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between fair salary system 
and economic-political trust and religious intra-group beliefs.  
 
 Fair salary system 
Economic-political 
trust 
Religious intra-group beliefs   
Holy Scripture and faith   
 Psychological interpretation  -.15** -.13** 
 Historical interpretation .10** -.14** 
Concept of The Bible   
 A source of divine inspiration .09* .15** 
 The word of God  -.04 .10* 
 Just a collection of cultural text written by men -.01 -.12** 
Image of God   
 Anthrpopmorphic .07 .28** 
 Non anthromophic .03 -.03 
Image of Jesus    
 Classical .11** .23** 
 Spirit-motivated .05 .23** 
 Model .13** .35** 
 Humanistic -.12** -.07 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
In Table 4.18, we find significant correlations between a fair-salary system and 
Holy Scripture and faith, namely psychological interpretation (negative) and 
historical interpretation (positive). Psychological interpretation has a moderate 
negative correlation, indicating that support for a fair-salary system is more 
likely to be found among those who do not agree that faith and religion are 
indicators of human weakness. But Christians who think that faith is 
historically determined show more agreement with a fair-salary system. With 
regard to the concept of the Bible, the Bible as a source of divine inspiration 
has a significant but weak correlation with support for a fair-salary system. 
Furthermore, with regard to the image of Jesus we find two significant positive 
correlations (Jesus as a model, and the classical Jesus image), and one 
significant negative correlation (the humanistic Jesus). Here the support for a 
fair-salary system can be found among those who believe in Jesus as a source 
from whom they can learn about God (Jesus as a model) and in Jesus as the 
incarnation of God (the classical Jesus). Meanwhile, less support for a fair-
salary system is found among those who believe that Jesus was nothing more 
than a historical figure.  
With regard to economic-political trust, both psychological 
interpretation and historical interpretation (Holy Scripture and faith) show 
negative correlations. Economic-political trust is found among Christians who 
do not agree that faith is determined by the historical and societal context 
(historical interpretation); neither do they agree with the opinion that faith is an 
expression of human weakness (psychological interpretation). Concerning the 
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concept of the Bible, economic-political trust is positively correlated with the 
Bible as a source of divine inspiration and the word of God, but negatively 
correlated with the Bible as a just a collection of cultural text written by men. 
With regard to images of God, economic-political trust is found among 
Christians who believe in an anthropomorphic God; while with regard to 
images of Jesus, Jesus as a model shows the strongest correlation with 
economic-political trust, followed by the classical Jesus image and the spirit-
motivated Jesus image, which show moderate correlations.  
 
Table 4.19: Social location of a fair-salary system and economic-political trust 
among Christian students. Correlation (Pearson’s r) between a fair-salary 
system and economic-political trust and religious inter-group beliefs.  
 
 Fair salary system Economic-political trust 
Religious inter-group beliefs 
  
Attitudes towards religious plurality   
 Monism  -.01 .14** 
 Commonality pluralism  .20** .11** 
 Relativistic pluralism  -.01 -.01 
Religio-centrism   
 Positive ingroup .19** .31** 
 Negative outgroup -.02 .02 
Attitudes towards religion-state relationship   
 Cooperation  .26** .43** 
 State communitarianism  -.02 .08* 
 Autonomy liberalism  -.01 -.12** 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice  .37** .49** 
All correlations are significant at p<.00 level (**) or p<.05 level (*)  
 
A fair-salary system is also shown to be associated with inter-group beliefs. 
With regard to attitudes towards religious plurality, there is a moderate 
positive correlation between a fair-salary system and commonality pluralism. It 
means that support for a fair-salary system is more likely to be found among 
Christian students who believe that different religious traditions show aspects 
of the same ultimate truth or divine reality. When it comes to religiocentrism, 
the positive correlation between a fair-salary system and positive in-group 
attitudes indicates that Christians who support a fair-salary system can be 
found among those who have positive attitudes towards the own religious 
tradition. With regard to attitudes towards the religion-state relationship, 
support for a fair-salary system has a relatively strong correlation with the 
cooperation model. Christian supporters of a fair-salary system are more likely 
to agree that the state should recognise, protect and facilitate diverse religious 
traditions. But the strongest correlation between a fair-salary system and 
religious inter-group beliefs is with a religious vocation for solidarity and 
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justice. More support for a fair-salary system can be found among Christian 
students who agree that their religion calls for solidarity and justice.  
Economic-political trust is positively associated with monism and 
commonality pluralism (religious plurality). This type of trust is found more 
among Christians who agree that religious truth can only be found in the own 
tradition (monism), and among those who believe that diverse religious 
traditions are based on a common ultimate truth (commonality). When we 
come to religiocentrism, economic-political trust is relatively strongly 
correlated with positive in-group attitudes. With regard to attitudes towards the 
religion-state relationship, economic-political trust has the strongest 
correlation with the cooperation model. More economic-political trust is found 
among Christian students who agree that the state must recognise, protect and 
facilitate diverse religions. Economic-political trust is also (weakly) correlated 
with autonomy liberalism (negative) and state communitarianism (positive). It 
indicates that economic-political trust can be found among Christians who 
disagree with a strict separation of religion and state, and among those who 
support a religious state system. Finally, economic-political trust once again 
shows the strongest correlation with a vocation of solidarity and justice. We 
find that Christian students who strongly support economic-political trust are 
those who agree with a vocation of solidarity and justice as an essential part of 
their religion. 
 
Summary: social location of fair-salary system and economic-political trust  
There are two types of religiously-inspired generalised trust that are typically 
related to Christians: support for a fair-salary system, and economic-political 
trust. Many of the correlations we found accord with our expectations. There 
are significant correlations between a fair-salary system and economic-political 
trust on the one hand, and background characteristics and religious (intra-group 
and inter-group) beliefs on the other. What is remarkable is the very strong 
correlation between both a fair-salary system and economic-political trust, and 
a religious vocation for solidarity and justice (religious inter-group beliefs). 
Support for a fair-salary system is strongly associated with cooperation as the 
preferred model of the religion-state relationship. Meanwhile, economic-
political trust is strongly correlated with positive in-group attitudes (religious 
inter-group beliefs), the image of Jesus as a model, and the anthropomorphic 
God image (religious intra-group beliefs). There are some moderate significant 
correlations with a fair-salary system, such as commonality pluralism, positive 
in-group attitudes (religious inter-group beliefs) and location (background 
characteristics). With regard to economic-political trust, we also find some 
moderate correlations with the classical Jesus and the spirit-motivated Jesus 
images, and the Bible as a source of divine inspiration. Again, background 
characteristics show few relevant correlations with the types of trust typical for 
Christian respondents.  
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4.5.4 Predictors of types of religiously-inspired generalised trust 
To what extent are different types of religiously-inspired generalised trust 
influenced by background characteristics, religious intra-group beliefs, and 
religious inter-group beliefs? We will answer this fourth research question with 
the help of regression analyses (method: Enter). For each type of generalised 
trust we have distinguished, we will select the location (i.e. Yogyakarta versus 
Ambon), as well as religious intra-group beliefs and religious inter-group 
beliefs (independent variables) that yielded relevant (r≥.15) and significant (p≤ 
.00) correlations with the dependent variable concerned in at least one or both 
religious groups. In other words, we explain differences in the levels of 
generalised trust in terms of the location and the variety of religious beliefs of 
the students. For each type of religiously-inspired generalised trust, we 
distinguish three regression models to show the effect of location, religious 
intra-group beliefs, and religious inter-group beliefs. As explained above, the 
types of religiously-inspired generalised trust are distinguished according to the 
different societal domains, namely the cross-religious comparative measures of 
socio-cultural trust and tolerating hedonism among Muslims and Christians 
(section 4.5.4.1), economic trust and political trust among Muslims (section 
4.5.4.2), and a fair-salary system and economic-political trust among Christians 
(section 4.5.4.3).  
 
The first regression model estimates the effect of the location at which our 
respondents study (i.e. Ambon or Yogyakarta) on their levels of generalised 
trust. The location is not merely a geographical indication, but also informs us 
about two relevant issues. First of all, it indicates whether the respondent is 
part of a religious majority or minority in the specific research location. While 
Muslims are vastly in the majority on the national level, they are a local 
minority in Ambon. Muslims are predominant in Yogyakarta, while Christians 
are part of a local majority in the city of Ambon (see section 1.5.1). The 
location therefore informs us whether a particular religious group of 
respondents is a local majority or minority group. Relative group size (i.e. 
majority or minority status) may be considered a predictor of religiously-
inspired generalised trust. Belonging to a relatively small group may reduce the 
level of generalised trust, because minority group members may feel a greater 
need to support the interests of their group than majority group members do. 
When groups feel threatened, levels of out-group derogation are also higher 
(Stenhouse et al. 1982; Kanas, Scheepers & Sterkens 2015). Because minority-
group members are likely to perceive more threat than majority-group 
members – specifically in a context with ongoing tensions – we expect a 
difference within the group of Muslims and within the group of Christians, 
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depending on the relative group size in the research location.
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 We therefore 
expect that Muslim students in Yogyakarta will show more support of 
generalised trust than those in Ambon, while Christian students in Yogyakarta 
will show less support of religiously-inspired generalised trust than those living 
in Ambon (hypothesis 1). 
Secondly, location also informs us about another important issue: the 
history of conflict. Yogyakarta is a rather peaceful location, while Ambon has 
been (and still is) an area prone to conflict. Manifest conflict, in present or past, 
may not only reduce the quantity and quality of contact, but also induce 
negative attitudes towards out-groups in many forms (Abanes et al. 2014; 
Kanas et al. 2015). Because of the manifest interreligious conflicts (both past 
and present) in Ambon, we expect that overall the levels of generalised trust 
will be higher in Yogyakarta than in Ambon, for both Muslims and Christians 
(hypothesis 2). 
We expect that at least one of the elements of both religious groups 
related to location (i.e. relative group size and the particular history of conflict) 
will influence the levels of religiously-inspired generalised trust. For Christian 
respondents, the two hypotheses result in conflicting influences on the levels of 
generalised trust. It remains to be seen which one will be stronger. 
 
In the second regression model we add religious intra-group beliefs as 
independent variables. Here we examine the concept of interpreting religion 
(psychological interpretation of faith), the concept of Holy Scripture (a source 
of divine inspiration, the word of God, just a collection of cultural text written 
by men), the anthropomorphic God image, the images of Muhammad, and the 
images of Jesus. Previous studies have shown that religious denomination, 
religious attendance and participation have an impact on generalised trust 
(Uslaner 2002; Welch et al. 2004; Traunmüller 2010). But in this study we 
found that religious practices, more specifically religious attendance and 
participation in other religious activities, showed no or only weak correlations 
(i.e. < .15) with our different types of religiously-inspired generalised trust. We 
therefore examine religious intra-group beliefs as other possible religious 
predictors. We only include intra-group beliefs in the regression analysis when 
                                                 
19
 We may also expect a difference between Muslims and Christians in religiously-
inspired generalised trust based on the relative group size in each location. Following 
the premises of hypothesis 1, this would mean that Muslims (i.e. the local majority) 
show higher levels of trust than Christians in Yogyakarta, while Christians (i.e. the 
local majority) show higher levels of trust than Muslims in Ambon. However, the re-
gression analyses in this study aim at an explanation of the levels of religiously-
inspired generalised trust for Muslims and Christians separately. After all, this study 
focuses on the partial and differential influence of religious intra-group and religious 
inter-group beliefs on religiously-inspired generalised trust within each of the religious 
groups. 
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they show at least moderate correlations (r ≥ .15) with the dependent variable 
(i.e. different types of religiously-inspired generalised trust). 
First we examine whether the concept of interpreting religion, 
particularly a psychological interpretation of faith, will predict religiously-
inspired generalised trust. Psychological interpretation is the understanding that 
faith in God is only an expression of human weakness and fear. Faith in God is 
still considered relevant to modern life, but not in a positive way. In this 
particular attitude, faith in God is not positively valued. We expect that 
agreement with a psychological interpretation of faith will be a negative 
predictor of religiously-inspired generalised trust, because a positive attitude 
towards religion is a condition for religiously-inspired trust.  
How people think about the concept of Holy Scripture is also relevant. 
The concept of Holy Scripture is usually recognised as legitimising religious 
actions. In religiously-inspired generalised trust, religion is a resource for the 
values underlying trust, and we presume that a possible religious legitimisation 
comes from Holy Scripture. We think that the view that Holy Scripture is a 
source of divine inspiration and the word of God will contribute to religiously-
inspired generalised trust. But the concept of Holy Scripture as just a collection 
of cultural text written by men will not give religious legitimisation of trust, 
and will therefore reduce religiously-inspired generalised trust.  
The next possible predictor is religious images of God. We saw that 
the anthropomorphic God image is the only God image that significantly 
correlates with generalised trust. The idea of the anthropomorphic God image 
is that religious believers have a personal relationship with God, who is both 
transcendent and immanent. We presume anthropomorphic God images could 
legitimise generalised trust, and would therefore contribute to it. Because 
Christian respondents show more agreement with anthropomorphic God 
images than Muslim respondents, we also expect that these relationships will 
be more pronounced among Christians. 
We further expect that some images of Muhammad (for Muslims) and 
images of Jesus (for Christians) encourage civic engagement and the principles 
required by religiously-inspired generalised trust; more specifically, the 
religious images that call for inclusiveness, for solidarity with and justice for 
the other. 
In short, with the second regression model we answer the question of 
which intra-group beliefs either induce or reduce religiously-inspired 
generalised trust. We expect that the impact of these intra-group beliefs will be 
bigger than that of the research location (i.e. Yogyakarta versus Ambon). More 
specifically, we expect the following:  
a) A psychological interpretation of faith reduces religiously-inspired 
generalised trust (hypothesis 3).  
b) The view that Holy Scripture is a source of divine inspiration and the word 
of God will induce religiously-inspired generalised trust, whereas Holy 
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Scripture as just a collection of cultural text written by men will have no 
effect on or reduce the levels of religiously-inspired generalised trust 
(hypothesis 4). 
c) Anthropomorphic God images induce religiously-inspired generalised trust, 
and this effect will be stronger for Christians than for Muslims (hypothesis 
5). 
d) Images of Muhammad that support inclusiveness and immanency induce 
religiously-inspired generalised trust among Muslims (hypothesis 6). 
e) Images of Jesus that support inclusiveness and immanency induce 
religiously-inspired generalised trust among Christians (hypothesis 7). 
 
In the third regression model, we incorporate the potential effects of religious 
inter-group beliefs: attitudes towards religious plurality (i.e. monism, 
commonality pluralism and relativistic pluralism); positive in-group attitudes; 
the religion-state relationship (i.e. the cooperation model, state 
communitarianism and autonomy liberalism); and a religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice. In addition, for inter-group beliefs, we included specific 
beliefs in the regression on religiously-inspired generalised trust only when 
they showed at least a moderate correlation (r ≥ .15) with the dependent 
variable (i.e. the different types of religiously-inspired generalised trust).  
Attitudes towards religious plurality show how one’s own truth claim 
faces the truth claim of other religious traditions. We made a distinction 
between monism, commonality pluralism and relativistic pluralism (see 
Chapter 3). Understandably, adherents of religious traditions find it difficult to 
accept the truth claims of other traditions. However, not all religious believers 
hold orthodox, monistic truth claims. If religious believers have more open 
attitudes towards religious plurality, like commonality pluralism or relativistic 
pluralism, we think they will show higher levels of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust.  
Positive attitudes towards the in-group are one dimension of 
religiocentrism (i.e. the combination of positive in-group attitudes and negative 
out-group attitudes). In bivariate analysis we found that there is no correlation 
between negative out-group attitudes and religiously-inspired generalised trust 
among our respondents. While we would have expected a negative relationship 
between negative out-group attitudes and generalised trust, no correlation at all 
at least affirms that negative out-group attitudes are not combined with 
generalised trust. Trust presupposes inclusionary instead of exclusionary 
attitudes. But we have found a positive correlation between positive in-group 
attitudes and respondents’ agreement with generalised trust. Previous studies 
have shown that positive in-group attitudes are more likely to occur among 
minority groups, especially when they experience threat from majority groups. 
Experiences of discrimination by majority groups and the impact of inter-group 
conflict can induce ethnocentrism or religiocentrism (cf. Hadiwitanto 2002; 
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Capucao 2010). Within ethnocentrism (or religiocentrism), positive in-group 
attitudes can be seen as feelings of superiority towards others. In combination 
with negative out-group attitudes it is likely to lead to distrust of others, and 
treating others according to one’s own moral standards. But the positive 
correlation between positive in-group attitudes and generalised trust in this 
research questions the proposition that positive in-group attitudes always imply 
feelings of superiority. In our operationalisation, positive in-group attitudes can 
be understood as an indicator of religious commitment to one’s own group, 
without including negative evaluations of others (Anthony, Hermans & 
Sterkens 2015: 213f, 228). In this regard, positive in-group attitudes (i.e. 
religious commitment) may contribute to positive self-awareness, and 
inclusionary attitudes such as generalised trust. Since positive in-group 
attitudes are more likely to occur among minority groups, we also expect that 
positive in-group attitudes will induce religiously-inspired generalised trust, 
particularly among Christians.  
The religion-state relationship refers to the preferences of religious 
believers concerning the ideal relationship between religion and state. These 
preferences can be placed on a spectrum between two extremes. People may 
prefer strict separation between religion and state, which implies that religion 
should not be manifested in the public domain and should remain a strictly 
private affair. Others may think that a particular religion should inspire or 
define the legislative and regulative powers of the state. With both extremes 
there is almost no place for inclusive encounters between diverse religions. The 
result of no encounters between (ethnic or religious) groups will be lower 
levels of trust (Marschall & Stole 2004: 143; Kanas et al. 2015). We therefore 
expect that models of religion-state relationships that avoid contact between 
groups will have no effect (or a negative effect) on religiously-inspired 
generalised trust. But the model of cooperation between religion and state 
supports religious heterogeneity and encounters on an equal basis. This model 
is therefore likely to support generalised trust.  
The last predictor of generalised trust is a religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice. Generalised trust needs moral principles that encourage 
people to have a more positive view of different and unknown others. Moral 
principles help to maintain trust in strangers, even when one has had bad 
experiences with similar others. In this sense, trust requires a commonality of 
moral principles in order for one to accept everyone into one’s ‘moral 
community’. Sztompka (1999: 5) defines the moral community here as “a 
specific way of relating to others whom we define as us”. We understand that 
solidarity and justice are important shared principles of good inter-group 
relationships. They can help to establish generalised trust. The more that 
people support principles of solidarity and justice, the more likely they are to 
have trust in others (Uslaner 2002: 27). We have already seen, in Chapter 3, 
that our respondents from both religious groups strongly agree that their 
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respective religious traditions call for solidarity with and justice for the other. 
The bivariate analysis showed relatively strong correlations between a religious 
vocation for solidarity and justice and almost all types of generalised trust 
(tolerating hedonism being the exception). We therefore expect that identifying 
a religious vocation for solidarity and justice will predict more positive levels 
of religiously-inspired generalised trust. 
We expect the influence of religious inter-group beliefs on religiously-
inspired generalised trust to be greater than the effects of location and religious 
intra-group beliefs. In general we expect that open-minded and liberal religious 
inter-group beliefs will induce religiously-inspired generalised trust, while 
traditional and conventional religious inter-group beliefs will reduce 
religiously-inspired generalised trust. More specifically, we expect the 
following:  
a) Commonality pluralism and relativistic pluralism induce religiously-
inspired generalised trust (hypothesis 8). 
b) Positive in-group attitudes induce religiously-inspired generalised trust, 
and this effect will be greater among minority Christians than majority 
Muslims (hypothesis 9). 
c) The model of cooperation between religion and state induces religiously-
inspired generalised trust, while state communitarianism and autonomy 
liberalism reduce generalised trust (hypothesis 10). 
d) A religious vocation for solidarity and justice induces religiously-inspired 
generalised trust, and this effect is stronger than any other predictor 
(hypothesis 11). 
4.5.4.1 Comparative types of religiously-inspired generalised trust  
Two cross-religious comparative types of religiously-inspired generalised trust 
are socio-cultural trust and tolerating hedonism. We present the results of 
regression analyses of each type separately.  
 
Socio-cultural trust  
Table 4.20 below presents the regression analyses for socio-cultural trust 
among Muslim and Christian respondents. 
 
Prediction of socio-cultural trust among Muslim students 
In model 1 we find that the regression coefficients confirm hypothesis 1, 
namely that the local majority group (i.e. Muslims in Yogyakarta) support 
socio-cultural trust more than the local minority group (i.e. Muslims in 
Ambon) (β .15). This result also confirms hypothesis 2, that people in 
Yogyakarta (in which conflict has never occurred) show higher levels of trust 
than those in Ambon. The total explained variance of this model is only 2%, 
which makes it theoretically irrelevant. It indicates that socio-cultural trust 
should be explained mainly by other predictors (Table 4.20). 
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Table 4.20: Regression analyses for socio-cultural trust with weights (β) for 
each variable and total explained variance (R
2
, Adjusted R
2
, and R
2
 Change) 
for Muslims and Christians.  
 
   Muslims                                    Christians 
 1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 
Location 
      
 Ambon .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 Yogyakarta .15** .15** .15** .13** .13** .09* 
Religious intra-group beliefs  
      
Concept of Holy Scripture and faith       
 Psychological interpretation  -.01 -.05  -.14** -.10** 
 The Koran is a source of divine 
inspiration 
 .09* .06  - - 
 The Koran is the word of God   .10** .07*  - - 
 The Koran just a collection of 
cultural text written by men 
 .01 -.02    
 The Bible is a source of divine 
inspiration 
 - -  .09* .05 
Anthropomorphic God image  .02 -.05  .10* .01 
Image of Muhammad       
 Uniqueness  .08* .03  - - 
 Uswa  .29** .20**  - - 
Image of Jesus        
 Classical  - -  .09* .08* 
 Spirit-motivated  - -  .07 .07 
 Model  - -  .20** .05 
 Humanistic  - -  -.09* -.05 
Religious inter-group beliefs 
      
Attitudes toward religious plurality       
 Monism   .02   .07 
 Commonality pluralism   .05   .03 
Positive in-group attitudes    .00   .13** 
Attitudes toward religion-state 
relationship 
      
 Cooperation  model   .19**   .17** 
Religious vocation for solidarity 
and justice  
  .38**   .28** 
       
R-Square .02 .19 .40 .02 .20 .35 
Adjusted R-Square .02 .18 .39  .02 .19 .34 
R-Square-change  .16 .22   .17 .15 
Standardized regression coefficients (β) are significant at  p < .01 (**) or p < .05 (*) level. 
 
Model 2 shows evidence that religious intra-group beliefs have an impact on 
socio-cultural trust among Muslims. The total explained variance increased to 
18%. The variable contributing most to this explained variance is the image of 
Muhammad as a model (uswa) (β .29). The following intra-group beliefs 
further contribute to the prediction of socio-cultural trust: the concept of the 
Koran as the word of God (β .10), the Koran as a source of divine inspiration 
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(β .09), and the image of Muhammad as a unique person (β .08). These results, 
respectively, confirm hypothesis 6, that Muhammad images which support 
inclusiveness and immanency (i.e. Muhammad as model) have a positive effect 
on religiously-inspired generalised trust; and hypothesis 4, that a positive view 
of one’s own Holy Scripture induces socio-cultural trust. The addition of 
religious intra-group beliefs in the second regression model does not neutralise 
the influence of location (Yogyakarta versus Ambon) (β .15). Muslims in a 
majority situation (i.e. in Yogyakarta) show higher levels of socio-cultural trust 
(hypothesis 1), although this might also be because Yogyakarta has been far 
more peaceful than Ambon (hypothesis 2) (Table 4.20). 
 In model 3 we examine religious inter-group beliefs as predictors of 
socio-cultural trust among Muslims. We expected that more liberal religious 
inter-group beliefs would lead to higher levels of generalised trust. Hypothesis 
11 is confirmed in the result that a religious vocation for solidarity and justice 
is the strongest predictor of socio-cultural trust (β .38). The model of 
cooperation between religion and state relationship also has significant 
influence (β .19), which confirms hypothesis 10. In this regression model, the 
image of Muhammad as uswa (β .20), location (β .15) and the Koran as the 
word of God (β .07) remain significant. It shows that hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 6 
are still confirmed. The total explained variance of this model is 39% (Table 
4.20). 
 
Prediction of socio-cultural trust among Christian students 
Model 1 indicates that location influences socio-cultural trust. Christian 
students in Yogyakarta support socio-cultural trust more than those in Ambon 
(β .13). For Christians, this is a rejection of our hypothesis 1, that local 
majorities (i.e. Christians in Ambon) have more socio-cultural trust than local 
minorities (i.e. Christians in Yogyakarta). Seemingly, the influence of conflicts 
in the past is more decisive than relative group size. Levels of trust are lower in 
areas where there have been conflicts before, which confirms hypothesis 2 
(Table 4.20). 
Model 2 incorporates religious intra-group beliefs as possible 
predictors of socio-cultural trust. The total explained variance of regression 
model 2 is 19%. The strongest effect is from the image of Jesus as model (β 
.20), while the anthropomorphic God image (β .10), the Bible as a source of 
divine inspiration (β .09), and the classical Jesus (β .09) also contribute to trust. 
A psychological interpretation of faith (i.e. faith as an expression of human 
weakness) reduces the socio-cultural type of religiously-inspired generalised 
trust (β -.14), which confirms hypothesis 3. Concerning the concept of Holy 
Scripture, the positive effect of the concept of the Bible as a source of divine 
inspiration confirms our hypothesis 4. Christian respondents who believe that 
the Bible is a sacred scripture show higher levels of socio-cultural trust. The 
positive effect of the anthropomorphic God image on socio-cultural trust 
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affirms hypothesis 5. The image of Jesus as a model indicates that the more 
they learn from Jesus about God and how they should live with and care for 
others in solidarity and justice, the more they will support socio-cultural trust. 
The influence of Jesus as a model is much stronger than the influence of the 
classical Jesus. Jesus as a model is more applicative (showing Jesus’ 
inclusiveness and immanency) than classical Jesus in the sense of supporting 
socio-cultural trust. Finally, agreement with a humanistic image of Jesus 
reduces socio-cultural trust (β -.09). These findings related to Jesus images 
confirm our hypothesis 7, that religious images of Jesus which support 
inclusiveness and immanency contribute to religiously-inspired trust. In this 
regression model, location remains a predictor. Christian students in 
Yogyakarta show higher levels of trust than those in Ambon (β .13), which 
confirms hypothesis 2 but refutes hypothesis 1 (Table 4.20).  
In model 3 we add religious inter-group beliefs in the explanation of 
socio-cultural trust, resulting in a total explained variance of 34%. The 
following inter-group beliefs are positive predictors of socio-cultural trust: a 
religious vocation for solidarity and justice (β .28), the cooperation model of 
the religion-state relationship (β .17), and positive in-group attitudes (β .13). 
This result affirms hypothesis 11: religious vocation for solidarity and justice is 
the strongest predictor of the socio-cultural type of generalised trust among 
Christians. The model of cooperation between religion and state further 
induces socio-cultural trust. More contact opportunities between diverse 
religions under equal protection of the state seemingly induce religiously-
inspired trust, which confirms hypothesis 10. Positive in-group attitudes further 
contribute to socio-cultural trust among Christians. It appears that “positive in-
group attitudes are an indicator of religious involvement with and commitment 
to one’s own religious tradition, without including a negative evaluation of 
others” (Anthony et al. 2015: 228). Unsurprisingly, stronger religious 
involvement contributes to religiously-inspired generalised trust, confirming 
hypothesis 9. Furthermore, we draw attention to the fact that religious inter-
group beliefs in model 3 partly took over the contribution of religious intra-
group beliefs in model 2. The concept of the Bible as a source of divine 
inspiration, the image of Jesus as a model, and the anthropomorphic God 
image are neutralised. But the image of the classical Jesus (β .08), and the 
negative effect of psychological interpretation (β -.10) remain significant. Also, 
the influence of location (Yogyakarta β .09) remains. This means that 
hypotheses 2, 3, and 7 are still confirmed (Table 4.20).  
 
Comparison of the prediction of socio-cultural trust among Muslims and 
Christians 
The results for both groups of respondents (both Muslims and Christians) 
showed that socio-cultural trust is primarily predicted by a religious vocation 
for solidarity and justice, and preference for the model of cooperation between 
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religion and state relationship. Principles of solidarity and justice within the 
own tradition are important promoters of socio-cultural trust. We saw earlier 
that in Indonesia, the model of cooperation between religion and state is the 
preferred model among both Muslims and Christians. The state may not 
neglect religion, and should protect and support different religious groups. 
Socio-cultural trust seems to flourish best in Indonesia when religious groups 
can live together on an equal basis, supported by the state. 
We also found that among both Muslims and Christians, inter-group 
beliefs have more impact on socio-cultural trust than intra-group beliefs and/or 
research location. Still, location (i.e. Yogyakarta versus Ambon) is a decisive 
predictor. Among both Muslims and Christians, levels of socio-cultural trust 
are significantly higher in Yogyakarta. This means that relative group size on 
the local level has proved to be less influential than the particular histories of 
conflict in both locations. Since 1999, our respondents in Ambon have 
experienced massive and destructive conflicts between Muslims and 
Christians. While the most traumatic events may have happened when our 
respondents were children or teenagers (1999 to 2002), conflict between 
Muslims and Christians has flared up regularly since then. Nowadays there is 
strong residential segregation between Muslims and Christians in Ambon city 
and surroundings. Because of the seriousness of the conflicts and their impact 
on daily life, it is not very surprising that the influence of location should be 
seen from the perspective of the particular histories of conflict in both 
locations, rather than from the perspective of the relative group sizes of 
Muslims and Christians in both areas.  
We also found some differences between Muslims and Christians in 
the explanation of socio-cultural trust. For Muslim respondents, Holy Scripture 
(i.e. the Koran) as the word of God and as a source of divine inspiration are 
decisive predictors for level of socio-cultural trust, while this is not the case for 
Christians. The concept of the Koran as the word of God revealed to mankind 
through Muhammad is an important principle in Islam (cf. Calder et al. 2003). 
How Christians look at the Bible (in this sense) does not play a role in their 
level of religiously-inspired trust. Our Christian respondents put their attention 
more on the (negative) impact of the psychological interpretation of faith as an 
expression of human weakness. Furthermore, we find that positive in-group 
attitudes among the Christian minority group in Indonesia contribute to socio-
cultural trust, whereas this is not the case for Muslims.  
 
Tolerating hedonism  
The following table presents the regression analyses for tolerating hedonism 
among Muslim and Christian respondents separately. 
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Table 4.21: Regression analyses for tolerating hedonism with weights (β) for 
each variable and total explained variance (R
2
, Adjusted R
2
, and R
2 
Change) for 
Muslims and Christians separately. 
 
 Muslims  Christians 
 2 3 
 
3 
Religious intra-group beliefs    
Image of Muhammad    
 Humanistic .24** .20** - 
Religious inter-group beliefs    
Attitudes toward religious plurality    
 Relativistic pluralism  .09* .05 
Attitudes toward religion-state relationship    
 Autonomy liberalism   .09* .13** 
R-Square .06 .08 .02 
Adjusted R-Square .06 .07  .02 
R-Square-change  .01   
 
Prediction for tolerance of hedonism among Muslim students 
As stated above, we inserted independent variables in the regression analyses 
that yielded relevant (r≥.15) and significant (p≤ .00) correlations with the 
dependent variable. We found few variables that showed relevant correlations 
with tolerating hedonism among Muslims: the image of the humanistic 
Muhammad (religious intra-group beliefs) and relativistic pluralism and 
autonomy liberalism as a model of the religion-state relationship (religious 
inter-group beliefs). We therefore skipped the first regression model, and went 
straight to model 2 on intra-group beliefs.  
Model 2 shows that the humanistic image of Muhammad induces 
tolerance of hedonism (β .24), confirming hypothesis 6. This is the only 
predictor within the religious intra-group beliefs, resulting in a total variance of 
only 6% (Table 4.21). 
In model 3, the following inter-group beliefs are added: relativistic 
pluralism (attitudes towards religious plurality) and autonomy liberalism 
(religion-state relationship). Our hypothesis 8, that pluralistic attitudes support 
generalised trust, is confirmed (β .09). Also, the liberal model of religion-state 
relationships, autonomy liberalism, induces a higher level of generalised trust, 
understood as tolerating hedonism (β .09). The latter contradicts hypothesis 10, 
because the state is not supposed to be involved with religion in the radical-
liberal model of autonomy liberalism. Nevertheless, this result is 
understandable, because religious traditions often take a negative stance 
against a hedonistic lifestyle. When Muslims agree that the government should 
not deal with religion at all, which allows us to label them as rather 
progressive, it is not surprising that they have fewer problems with a hedonistic 
life style. Please note that the image of a humanistic Muhammad within the 
category of intra-group beliefs is still the highest predictor (β .20). Although 
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we have decisive predictors, the explained variance of regression model 3 is 
only 7%. 
 
Prediction of tolerating hedonism among Christian students 
Among Christians, tolerating hedonism only showed relevant correlations with 
inter-group beliefs, namely relativistic pluralism (attitudes towards religious 
plurality) and autonomy liberalism (religion-state relationships). We therefore 
turn immediately to model 3. The regression analysis shows that only 
autonomy liberalism (β .13) contributes to the prediction of tolerating 
hedonism, which contradicts hypothesis 10. However, the specific type of 
religiously-inspired trust (i.e. tolerating hedonism) makes this understandable. 
Among Christians, too, the total explained variance of tolerating hedonism is 
very limited (2%). We must conclude that tolerating hedonism cannot be 
explained comprehensively by this research, either among Christians or among 
Muslims. 
 
4.5.4.2 Specific types of religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Muslims 
For Muslims, two specific types of religiously-inspired generalised trust are 
economic trust and political trust. We present the result of the regression 
analyses of each type below.  
 
Prediction of economic trust among Muslims 
The following table presents the regression analyses for economic trust as 
religiously-inspired generalised trust. 
 
In model 1 we find that Muslim students in Yogyakarta show more support for 
economic trust than those in Ambon (β .13). This may be because they are a 
local majority in Yogyakarta (hypothesis 1), or because of the peaceful context 
of Yogyakarta (hypothesis 2). However, the total explained variance in this 
model is only 1% (Table 4.22). Model 2 incorporates religious intra-group 
beliefs, adding significantly to the total explained variance of economic trust, 
which goes up to 10%. First of all, some images of Muhammad induce 
economic trust. The biggest influence comes from the image of Muhammad as 
a model (uswa) (β .23). Also, the image of Muhammad as a unique person who 
met God during ascension contributes to economic rust (β .11). These positive 
influences of images of Muhammad supporting inclusiveness and immanency 
seemingly confirm hypothesis 6. The addition of religious intra-group beliefs 
does not neutralise the significance of location (β .14), and hypotheses 1 and 2 
remain confirmed (Table 4.22).  
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Table 4.22: Regression analyses for economic trust with weights (β) for each 
variable and total explained variance (R
2
, Adjusted R
2
, and R
2
 change) for 
Muslim students. 
 
 1 2 3 
Location  
   
 Ambon .00 .00 .00 
 Yogyakarta .13** .14** .13** 
Religious intra-group beliefs    
Anthropomorphic God image  .03 -.01 
Image of Muhammad    
 Uniqueness  .11** .07 
 Uswa  .23** .10* 
Religious inter-group beliefs    
Attitudes toward religious plurality    
 Monism    .00 
 Commonality pluralism    .03 
 Relativistic pluralism   -.02 
Positive in-group attitudes   .04 
Attitudes toward religion-state  relationship    
 Cooperation    .16** 
 State communitarianism   .12** 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice    .30** 
    
R-Square .02 .11 .24 
Adjusted R-Square .01 .10 .23 
R-Square-change  .09 .13 
Standardized regression coefficients (β) are significant at  p< .01 **) or p < .05 (*) level. 
 
Model 3 further includes religious inter-group beliefs as predictors of 
economic trust, resulting in a total explained variance of 23%. A religious 
vocation for solidarity and justice is the strongest predictor (β .30) in this 
model, confirming hypothesis 11. Two models of religion-state relationships 
further contribute to economic trust: the cooperation model (β .16), and state 
communitarianism (β .12). The cooperation model gives an opportunity for 
diverse religions to encounter each other on an equal basis, and it is therefore 
not surprising that this model induces economic trust – as expected in 
hypothesis 10. However, the positive effect of state communitarianism on 
economic trust is remarkable. We did not expect that state communitarianism 
would contribute to religiously-inspired trust; in fact, we expected the opposite. 
How may we then explain that state communitarianism among Muslims 
induces economic trust? Economic trust is about the ‘fairness’ of salaries, and 
about enough job opportunities for everyone. These are two common and 
much-debated problems in Indonesia. Some scholars, in a critical reflection on 
these economic problems, have pointed to the contribution of the Islamic faith 
system. Some Indonesian orthodox Muslims are convinced that Islam can 
contribute to economic justice; and indeed, contemporary Islamic thought 
RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED GENERALISED TRUST IN INDONESIA 
 
217 
offers many clues as to how this may be accomplished (Kuran 1989; Davis & 
Robinson 2006). From this perspective, more involvement of Islam in the state 
apparatus would not hinder economic trust, but rather contribute to it. Finally, 
the following variables remain in regression model 3: Muhammad as uswa (β 
.10), and location (β .13); so hypotheses 6, and 1 and 2 are still confirmed 
(Table 4.22).  
 
Prediction of political trust among Muslims 
The following table presents the regression analyses for political trust as 
religiously-inspired generalised trust among Muslim respondents. 
 
Table 4.23: Regression analyses for political trust with weights (β) for each 
variable and total explained variance (R
2
, Adjusted R
2
, and R
2 
Change) for 
Muslim students. 
 
 1 2 3 
Location     
 Ambon .00 .00 .00 
 Yogyakarta .05 .04 .05 
Religious intra-group beliefs    
Anthropomorphic God image  .05 -.04 
Image of Muhammad    
 Uniqueness  .07 .00 
 Uswa  .18** .13** 
Religious inter-group beliefs    
Attitudes toward religious plurality    
 Monism    .01 
 Commonality pluralism    .07 
 Relativistic pluralism   .11** 
Positive in-group attitudes    .03 
Attitudes toward religion-state relationship    
 Cooperation    .21** 
 State communitarianism   -.01 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice    .28** 
    
R-Square .00 .06 .27 
Adjusted R-Square .00 .06 .25 
R-Square-change  .06 .19 
Standardized regression coefficients (β) are significant at  p< .01 **) or p < .05 (*) level. 
 
In model 1 we found that location has no effect on political trust among 
Muslims. The regression analysis therefore does not confirm our expectations 
regarding the influence of relative group size (hypothesis 1) or history of 
conflict (hypothesis 2) on political trust (Table 4.23).  
Model 2 only includes the image of Muhammad as a model (uswa) as 
intra-group belief. This model does indeed contribute to political trust (β .18), 
confirming hypothesis 6. The total explained variance of model 2 is 6% (Table 
4.23).  
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Model 3 further includes religious inter-group beliefs, leading to a total 
explained variance of 25%. Among religious inter-group beliefs, the strongest 
predictors are a religious vocation for solidarity and justice (β .28), and the 
model of cooperation between religion and state (β .21). Another positive 
effect is relativistic pluralism, in which all religions are seen as equally valid 
ways to ultimate truth (β .11). These findings confirm hypotheses 11, 10 and 8 
respectively. The contribution of Muhammad as uswa remains in this model (β 
.13) (Table 4.23).  
 
4.5.4.3 Specific types of religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Christians 
For Christians, two specific types of religiously-inspired generalised trust are a 
fair salary system and economic-political trust. Below we present the result of 
regression analyses for each type.  
 
Prediction for a fair salary system among Christians 
The following table presents the regression analyses for a fair salary system as 
religiously-inspired generalised trust among Christian respondents. 
Model 1 confirms the expectation that location has an effect on a fair 
salary system. Christians living in Yogyakarta have significantly higher levels 
of trust concerning a fair salary system (β .17). This finding confirms 
hypothesis 2, that living in peaceful conditions contributes to levels of trust, 
while a history of interreligious conflicts reduces levels of religiously-inspired 
trust. However, this finding falsifies hypothesis 1, in which we postulated that 
a minority context would leads to less trust (Table 4.24).  
Model 2 adds religious intra-group beliefs as predictors; however, this 
leads to a total explained variance of only 6%. Jesus as a model for a good life 
(β .14) induces support of a fair salary system for everyone, while a 
psychological interpretation of faith reduces this type of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust (β -.10). These findings confirm hypotheses 7 and 3 
respectively. In Jesus as a model for a good life, believers can learn how they 
should live in solidarity with others. The more they agree with this Jesus 
image, the more they support a fair salary system. The influence of location 
(Yogyakarta) on a fair salary system remains decisive (β .16), adding to the 
evidence for hypothesis 2 (Table 4.24). 
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Table 4.24: Regression analyses for fair salary system with weights (β) for 
each variable and total explained variance (R
2
, Adjusted R
2
, and R
2 
Change) for 
Christian students.  
 
 1 2 3 
Location     
 Ambon .00 .00 .00 
 Yogyakarta .17** .16** .12** 
Religious intra-group beliefs    
Concept of Holy Scripture and faith    
Psychological interpretation  -.10* -.08* 
The Bible is a source of divine inspiration  .04 -.01 
Anthropomorphic God image  -.01 -.06 
Image of Jesus    
 Classical  .06 .05 
 Spirit-motivated  -.03 -.02 
 Model  .14** .02 
Religious inter-group beliefs    
Attitudes toward religious plurality    
 Commonality pluralism    .15** 
Positive in-group attitudes    .07 
Attitudes toward religion-state relationship    
 Cooperation    .10* 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice    .29** 
    
R-Square .03 .07 .21 
Adjusted R-Square .03 .06 .19 
R-Square-change  .03 .13 
Standardized regression coefficients (β) are significant at  p< .01 **) or p < .05 (*) level. 
 
In model 3, the inclusion of religious inter-group beliefs neutralises the 
influence of Jesus as a model. Among religious inter-group beliefs, again the 
strongest predictor is a religious vocation for solidarity and justice (β .29), 
followed by commonality pluralism (β .15) and a preference for cooperation 
between religion and state (β .10). These findings confirm our hypotheses 11, 8 
and 10. Location (β .12) and psychological interpretation of faith (β -.08) 
remain significant. This means that hypothesis 2 and 3 are still confirmed. The 
total explained variance of support for a fair salary system in this regression 
model is 19% (Table 4.24).  
 
Prediction of economic-political trust among Christians 
The following table presents the regression analyses for economic-political 
trust among Christian respondents. 
In model 1 we find that regression analysis does not confirm 
hypotheses 1 or 2. Location has no impact on economic-political trust among 
Christians (Table 4.25).  
In model 2 we test for the influence of religious intra-group beliefs on 
economic-political trust. The explained variance of this model is 15%. The 
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strongest significant positive predictor is the image of Jesus as a model for a 
good life (β .19), followed by a psychological interpretation of faith that 
reduces economic-political trust (β -.12), and the positive influence of 
agreement with the classical Jesus (β .10), and anthropomorphic images of God 
(β .10). The influence of the Jesus images is in line with what we postulated in 
hypothesis 7. The negative effect of a psychological interpretation of faith on 
religiously-inspired trust confirms our hypothesis 3. The positive effect of an 
anthropomorphic God image among Christians affirms our expectations in 
hypothesis 5 (Table 4.25).  
 
Table 4.25: Regression analyses for economic-political trust with weights (β) 
for each variable and total explained variance (R
2
, Adjusted R
2
, and R
2 
Change) 
for Christian students. 
 
 1 2 3 
Location  
   
 Ambon .00 .00 .00 
 Yogyakarta .02 .05 -.00 
Religious intra-group beliefs    
Concept of Holy Scripture and faith    
Psychological interpretation  -.12** -.07* 
The Bible is a source of divine inspiration  .06 .02 
Anthropomorphic God image  .10* .02 
Image of Jesus    
 Classical  .10* .09* 
 Spirit-motivated  .03 .03 
 Model  .23** .04 
Religious inter-group beliefs    
Attitudes toward religious plurality    
 Commonality pluralism    .06 
Positive in-group attitudes    .07 
Attitudes toward religion-state relationship    
 Cooperation    .18** 
Religious vocation for solidarity & justice    .34** 
    
R-Square .00 .16 .36 
Adjusted R-Square -.00 .15 .34 
R-Square-change  .15 .19 
Standardized regression coefficients (β) are significant at  p< .01 **) or p < .05 (*) level. 
 
In model 3 we test religious inter-group beliefs. We expect that inter-group 
beliefs would show greater impact on religiously-inspired generalised trust, 
and this expectation is confirmed. The total explained variance of regression 
model 3 is 34%. Among religious inter-group beliefs, the strongest predictor is 
a religious vocation for solidarity and justice (β .34), followed by the model of 
cooperation between religion and state (β .18). This is a confirmation of our 
hypotheses 11 and 10. In model 3, the image of Jesus as a model and the 
anthropomorphic God images become insignificant, but the classical Jesus (β 
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.09) and the psychological interpretation of faith (β -.07) remain decisive. This 
adds to the evidence for hypotheses 7 and 3 respectively (Table 4.25). 
 
 
  
Chapter 5  
 
Summary, Theological Evaluation and Suggestions 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will recapitulate our findings on religiously-inspired 
generalised trust among Muslim and Christian students in Indonesia. Firstly, 
we will summarise the empirical findings on types of religiously-inspired 
generalised trust (5.1). Next, we will reflect on the question of how religious 
intra-group and inter-group beliefs that construct generalised trust may be 
evaluated theologically in the Indonesian context (5.2). Finally, we will offer 
proposals for practical applications of generalised trust within society (5.3), 
and give suggestions for further research (5.4).  
5.1. Summary 
We will summarise our findings from the previous chapters by answering the 
specific questions that were posed earlier.  
We defined the types of religiously-inspired generalised trust related to 
specific societal domains in the Indonesian context. Previous research has 
shown that religion influences generalised trust (Tan & Vogel 2008; 
Traunmüller 2010). In this study, we considered trust as a religious idea, i.e. 
generalised trust, which is part of the religious meaning system. There are two 
comparative types of religiously-inspired generalised trust among Muslim and 
Christian students in Indonesia, namely socio-cultural trust and tolerating 
hedonism. Additionally, for each religious group there are two other types that 
are exclusive. For Muslims, economic trust and political trust are significant; 
for Christians, support for a fair-salary system and economic-political trust. 
In the following sub-sections, we will recapitulate each type of 
generalised trust among Muslim and Christian university students based in 
Indonesia, and briefly mention the variables that either induce or reduce these 
types of trust. We will start with the cross-religious comparative types of socio-
cultural trust (5.1.1) and tolerating hedonism (5.1.2). Next, we will summarise 
the types that are specific to Muslims and Christians respectively, namely 
economic trust and political trust among Muslims (5.1.3), and support for a 
fair-salary system and economic-political trust among Christians (5.1.4). 
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Table 5.1 Influence of location, intra-group and inter-group beliefs on types of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust among Muslims 
 
 Muslims 
 Socio-
cultural 
trust 
Tolerating 
hedonism 
Economic 
trust 
Political 
trust 
Location (Yogyakarta) ++  ++  
Religious intra-group 
beliefs 
    
Psychological 
interpretation 
    
The Koran is a source of 
divine inspiration 
    
The Koran is the word of 
God 
+    
The Koran is a collection 
of human & cultural texts 
    
The image of an 
anthropomorphic God 
    
The image of Muhammad 
as uswa 
++  + ++ 
The image of Muhammad 
as a unique person 
    
The image of a humanistic 
Muhammad 
 ++   
Religious inter-group beliefs     
Monism     
Commonality pluralism     
Relativistic pluralism  +  ++ 
Positive in-group attitudes     
Cooperation model ++  ++ +++ 
Autonomy liberalism  +   
State communitarianism   ++  
Religious vocation for 
solidarity & justice 
++++  +++ +++ 
Legend: + = positive effect 
β ≤ .10 (+); .11 ≤ β ≤.20 (++); .21≤ β ≤.-.30 (+++), β ≥ .31 (++++) 
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Table 5.2 Influence of location, intra-group and inter-group beliefs on types of 
religiously-inspired generalised trust among Christians 
 
 Christians 
 
Socio-
cultural 
trust 
Tolerating 
hedonism 
Fair 
salary 
system 
Economic-
political 
trust 
Location (Yogyakarta) +  ++  
Religious intra-group 
beliefs 
    
Psychological 
interpretation  
-  - - 
The Bible is a source of 
divine inspiration 
    
The image of an 
anthropomorphic God 
    
The image of Jesus as a 
model 
    
The classical image Jesus +   + 
The image of a spirit-
motivated Jesus 
    
The image of a 
humanistic Jesus 
    
Religious inter-group 
beliefs 
    
Monism     
Commonality pluralism   ++  
Relativistic pluralism     
Positive in-group attitudes ++    
Cooperation model ++  + ++ 
Autonomy liberalism  ++   
Religious vocation for 
solidarity & justice 
+++  +++ ++++ 
Legend: + = positive effect; - = negative effect 
β ≤ .10 (+); .11 ≤ β ≤.20 (++); .21≤ β ≤.-.30 (+++), β ≥ .31 (++++) 
 
5.1.1 Socio-cultural trust among Muslims and Christians 
 
In Tables 5.1 and 5.2 we see that both Muslim and Christian students recognise 
socio-cultural trust as religiously-inspired generalised trust. This type of trust 
contains the idea that religious community supports access to adequate 
education for all people, as well as respect for everyone, regardless of 
differences in religious background. For both religious groups, educational and 
cultural experiences in a plural society are a source of theological reflection in 
developing generalised trust. They agree that their own religious communities 
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should support and contribute to equal educational access for everybody, and 
respect all people and religions.  
For both religious groups, religious inter-group beliefs are stronger 
predictors for socio-cultural trust than religious intra-group beliefs. This 
finding indicates that socio-cultural trust is less influenced by self-images than 
by attitudes towards others. This is something one can understand from the fact 
that trust deals with one’s relationships with others. 
 Among inter-group beliefs, the most important predictor of socio-
cultural trust – for both religious groups – is religious vocation for solidarity 
and justice. Generalised trust is strongly connected to a religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice in both religious groups. This influence can be explained 
by an orientation towards all people in society who are in need of help 
(solidarity) and who need to be treated fairly, based on their rights. In Islamic 
and Christian tradition, religious vocation for solidarity and justice is a core 
idea; and the influence of this religious vocation supports the idea that socio-
cultural trust for both religious groups belongs to the religious meaning system. 
Next to the vocation for solidarity and justice, another set of inter-group beliefs 
induces socio-cultural trust among both religious groups: namely, the 
cooperation model of the religion-state relationship. The religion-state 
relationship must incorporate state protection of all religious groups. 
According to both religious groups, generalised trust seems to flourish best in 
this condition. 
 There was a specific finding about inter-group beliefs among Christian 
students. Positive in-group attitudes influence socio-cultural trust. We did not 
see this influence among Muslims. One explanation might be that in a minority 
group, positive in-group attitudes are not necessarily including negative 
evaluations of other religious groups – as is the case with Christians in 
Indonesia. We will return to this finding in our theological reflection in section 
5.2. 
 Socio-cultural trust is also influenced by several intra-group beliefs: 
notably, religious images – of Muhammad for Muslims, and Jesus for 
Christians – and the concepts of the Holy Scriptures and faith for both groups. 
Among Muslim students, the image of Muhammad as uswa (a model) is 
followed by the Koran as the Word of God in terms of inducing a higher level 
of socio-cultural trust. How do we understand the fact that the image of 
Muhammad as uswa is the strongest predictor for socio-cultural trust? This 
image provides a Muslim with a very concrete model of his or her faith: of how 
to lead a good life with and for others, and how to be grateful to God. The 
Koran as the Word of God – which also induces socio-cultural trust – clearly 
stresses the importance of the authority of the scriptures. But this idea is not as 
strong as the image of uswa.  
Among Christian students, a psychological interpretation (models for 
interpreting Holy Scripture and faith) and a classical image of Jesus are the 
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significant predictors. For Christians, psychological interpretation reduces 
socio-cultural trust. If religion is understood as nothing more than 
psychological phenomena, the result will be a lower level of socio-cultural 
trust. Among Christians, we also found that socio-cultural trust is predicted by 
the attitude towards Jesus, who is seen as the pre-existent Son of God (classical 
Jesus).  
Finally, for both religious groups, location also affects socio-cultural 
trust. This predictor explains generalised trust more from the history-of-
conflict perspective than the relative-group-size perspective. When people – as 
either a majority or a minority group – live in a social condition of public 
violence (as in Ambon), they have a lower level of socio-cultural trust 
compared to believers living in a non-violent situation (such as Yogyakarta). A 
non-violent location supports socio-cultural trust among religious groups. 
 
5.1.2 Tolerating hedonism among Muslims and Christians 
 
Tolerating hedonism is a type of religiously-inspired generalised trust that is 
recognised by both Muslim and Christian students. This type is directed 
towards persons who are only interested in what gives them pleasure. This idea 
clearly runs against some of the values of most members of both Christian and 
Muslim religious communities in Indonesia. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
there was little support among either Muslim or Christian students for 
supporting tolerating hedonism. There were no significant differences between 
Muslim and Christian students regarding this type of trust. Tolerating 
hedonism is not associated with any of the other types of generalised trust. In 
the religious mindset of both Christian and Islamic students, this idea is 
different from all the other religious ideas of generalised trust. This difference 
can be understood if one sees what ideas support tolerating hedonism (see 
Table 5.1 and 5.2).  
Among both religious groups, inter-group beliefs – especially the 
autonomy liberalism model of religion-state relationship – support tolerating 
hedonism. In this model there is a total separation between religion and state; 
the state cannot interfere in society by imposing religious values. For 
Christians, autonomy liberalism is the only variable that predicts tolerating 
hedonism; while among Muslims, we found that the relativistic pluralism 
model (religious plurality), in which there are valid paths to ultimate truth in all 
religions, also predicts attitudes towards tolerating hedonism.  
With regard to religious intra-group beliefs, we found that the 
humanistic image of Muhammad is the only predictor among Muslims. This 
religious image refers to the recognition of Muhammad as only a historical 
figure. We found no intra-group beliefs that influence tolerating hedonism 
among Christians. Support for tolerating hedonism challenges believers beyond 
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what the majority of their religious community accepts. Support for tolerating 
hedonism requires predictors that support the freedom of individuals to choose 
what they consider to be best (cf. Sofyan 1999: 6). This seems to suggest that 
tolerating hedonism is supported by religious believers who have a more liberal 
profile. 
 
5.1.3 Economic trust and political trust among Muslims 
 
Economic trust and political trust are recognised as types of religiously-
inspired generalised trust only among Muslims. In these two types, Muslim 
students agree that their own religious community inspires them to trust 
everybody when people apply for jobs and seek fair salaries (economic trust), 
and that everybody is eligible for political office and should be treated fairly as 
citizens (political trust) (see Table 5.1). 
Religious inter-group beliefs have a stronger influence on economic 
trust and political trust than religious intra-group beliefs. Both types of 
generalised trust are strongly influenced by inter-group beliefs: religious 
vocation for solidarity and justice, and the cooperation model between religion 
and state. As we found in the case of socio-cultural trust, religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice is the strongest predictor for both types of trust. For 
Muslims, all types of trust are predicted by this particular belief, except for 
tolerating hedonism. The prediction of religious vocation for solidarity and 
justice on generalised trust reflects an important process that is part of doing 
theology in society. It indicates that for Muslims, the inspiration to trust others 
can be obtained strongly from the theological understanding of others.  
Another predictor of inter-group belief is the cooperation model 
between religion and state. Muslims agree that economic trust and political 
trust require a relationship between diverse religions and the state, in which the 
state should guarantee the freedom of all religious groups on an equal basis. 
Under these conditions, religions can also play a role and contribute value in 
the public sphere. It is no surprise that the cooperation model gives more 
support to political trust than economic trust, since this predictor relates to 
political issues. 
The predictor of religious intra-group beliefs on economic trust and 
political trust among Muslims is the image of Muhammad as a model (uswa). 
Muhammad is the central figure of Islam, and he is the prime model for how to 
live in accordance with God’s will. Muhammad inspires Muslim students 
towards all types of generalised trust (except support for tolerating hedonism). 
It is a powerful religious image, which encourages Muslims to trust everyone 
in society. One sometimes hears in debates that when religion is involved in 
societal matters, it causes conflict. Here we clearly see the reverse: in the heart 
of the Islamic tradition, seeing Muhammad as uswa inspires Muslims to trust 
others.  
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The image of Muhammad as uswa has a stronger influence on political 
trust than on economic trust. This result is interesting given the political 
background of Indonesia, especially among Muslims. In the past, some leaders 
of Islamic groups argued that Islamic ideology should be the foundation of the 
Indonesian constitution, while Christians and nationalists promoted a form of 
nationalism that is not religiously inspired. Also, in Indonesia today some 
Muslims still claim that only Muslims have the right to lead a country in which 
the population is predominantly Muslim.
72
 Following vigorous debate, the 
nationalism model was adopted. However, tension and anxiety among both 
Muslims and Christians has occasionally re-surfaced (cf. Mujiburrahman 2006; 
Sidel 2008). Obviously, the paradigm of political trust is the opposite of this 
particular situation. In fact, our findings show how the image of Muhammad as 
uswa, in which Muhammad is an example of how people live together within 
society, leads to political trust as religiously-inspired generalised trust. 
We also found three specific different predictors of economic trust and 
political trust. The first is the influence of location (Yogyakarta) which is 
strong on economic trust (and socio-cultural trust) but not on political trust. 
Again, we think the explanation relates to the peaceful situation in Yogyakarta. 
In a peaceful context, Muslim students show a higher level of economic trust. 
However, this does not affect the level of political trust. So we can conclude 
that a non-violent location is not a predictor for all types of trust among 
Muslims. 
The second difference is about the religion-state relationship. The 
cooperation model is the predictor for both types of trust. Again, as for socio-
cultural trust, the religion-state relationship must include state protection of all 
religious groups on an equal basis. We can conclude that religiously-inspired 
generalised trust among Muslims obviously flourishes under this condition.  
Meanwhile, the model of state communitarianism that supports 
economic trust results in a remarkable finding. In this model, the state bases the 
entire society on the values of one religion – notably, in Indonesia, the majority 
religion of Islam. It seems that Muslims rely on the role of the state to support 
their economic life. They believe that economic trust can be inspired when the 
state has a strong role in developing values. In this case, Muslim students 
believe that the values should be rooted in Islam. This may be influenced by 
the economic position of the Muslim group in Indonesia, which is generally 
lower than that of the Christian group. The economic growth of Catholics and 
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 The claim from some Muslims that as a majority group, they should be state leaders, 
is actually against the law. See Indonesian Constitution Chapter X Article 28D:3: 
“Setiap warga negara berhak memperoleh kesempatan yang sama dalam pemerin-
tahan” (every citizen has equal rights and opportunities in government). The state 
regulation about presidential elections, Law No. 42/2008, also does not mention a 
particular religion as a requirement for candidacy. 
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Protestants in Indonesia per year is believed to be higher than that of Muslims 
(Santoso 2000: 119).  
However, this finding can also be connected to theological reasons, 
especially regarding the economic domain. It confirms the opinion that from a 
Muslim perspective, religious economics requires individuals to be accountable 
to the nation at large, with Islam as the medium (Rudnyckyj 2009). According 
to Davis and Robinson (2006), based on their research, the implementation of 
sharia in relation to economic reform is important for more than 50% of 
Muslims in Indonesia. We will discuss this further from a theological 
perspective in Section 5.2.  
The last different finding is the prediction of relativistic pluralism on 
political trust. This confirms our hypothesis that the pluralistic model of 
attitude towards religious plurality will lead religious believers to support 
generalised trust. However, this influence occurs only with political trust, and 
not with economic or socio-cultural trust. It seems that Muslim students 
believe that political trust requires a more open attitude towards valid truths of 
other religions. We propose that these results are related to the political-
religious situation in Indonesia. In the typical political situation, where a 
majority religious group tends to dominate other religions politically, attitude 
towards valid truths of other religions can induce generalised trust.  
 
5.1.4  Fair-salary system and economic-political trust among Christians  
 
Fair-salary system and economic-political trust were two types of religiously-
inspired generalised trust identified specifically by Christian students. The 
agreement by Christian students with these types of trust indicates that their 
own religious community supports trusting everybody to obtain a fair salary 
(support for a fair-salary system), rejecting political discrimination and 
supporting equal job opportunities, regardless of religious background 
(economic-political trust). The issue of job opportunities is connected to the 
political issue, while the issue of salary system is regarded as separate. In this 
respect, Christians ‘break’ our theoretical conceptualisation. This finding 
should be understood in terms of the economic-political experience in the 
Indonesian context, in which the issue of discrimination in job opportunities is 
seen as a political issue – and more especially, a power issue – by Christian 
students. We will further reflect on this finding in section 5.2.2.1. Table 5.2 
shows that in general, supporting a fair-salary system and economic-political 
trust have almost the same predictors as socio-cultural trust. Religious inter-
group beliefs seem to have more predictors than intra-group beliefs.  
Among inter-group beliefs, we found that religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice has the strongest influence on all types of trust. Again we 
notice that religiously-inspired generalised trust can be developed, as long as 
the religious community itself lives the theological value of justice and 
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solidarity. Another predictor is the cooperation model between religion and 
state, in which diverse religions can thrive under the protection of the state, on 
an equal basis. This is also a strong predictor. Christians believe that religion 
offers moral principles that support trust, as long as the state recognises and 
protects religions on an equal basis. Or, formulated in reverse: according to 
Christian students, there can be no generalised trust (support for a fair-salary 
system, economic-political trust, and also socio-cultural trust) when there is 
only one particular religion given preference by the state.  
The separation of religion and state clearly does not support 
religiously-inspired generalised trust. The influence of the cooperation model 
is slightly stronger for economic-political trust than for a fair-salary system. 
This is understandable, because the cooperation model in which the state 
embraces all religions is related to political issues. 
Among intra-group beliefs we found psychological interpretation to be 
a negative predictor. Psychological interpretation (religion as an expression of 
human weakness) reduces both support for a fair-salary system and economic-
political trust. Since a psychological interpretation does not consider religion as 
a spiritual resource, it is no surprise that agreement with it is negatively related 
to religiously-inspired generalised trust (cf. Uslaner 2002; Welch et al. 2004).  
Table 5.2 shows us that there are some different results between fair-
salary system, economic-political trust, and socio-cultural trust. Firstly, the 
effect of location was positive on support for a fair-salary system. In this case, 
the Christian students in Yogyakarta support a fair-salary system (and socio-
cultural trust) more than the Christian students in Ambon do. Again, we 
interpret this finding from the perspective of the history of conflict in Ambon. 
It has influenced the level of trust among Christian students. But seemingly, 
this is not the case for economic-political trust.  
Secondly, the classical image of Jesus – which portrays Jesus as the 
incarnation of God, or so-called ‘God-man’ – influences economic-political 
trust, but had no effect on support for a fair-salary system. We shall discuss 
this finding further in Section 5.2. This finding confirms for Christians that the 
religious idea of generalised trust is connected to some core ideas of the 
Christian mindset. Thirdly, we found that commonality pluralism (religious 
plurality) supports a fair-salary system and not economic-political trust (and 
also not socio-cultural trust). Commonality among diverse religions points to 
convergence between religions, as they refer to the same ultimate reality. It 
requires the bridging of differences that exist between religious groups. For 
Christian students this kind of attitude is apparently connected with a higher 
level of trust regarding support for a fair-salary system.  
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5.2 Theological evaluation  
 
In this section we will reflect on three issues of our study on religiously-
inspired generalised trust among Indonesian Muslim and Christian university 
students. First, the religious meaning system approach (5.2.1). Second, 
generalised trust, experience and public theology (5.2.2). And finally, the role 
of religious authority in generalised trust (5.2.3). 
 
5.2.1 Generalised trust and a religious meaning system approach 
 
According to our study, generalised trust is an idea supported by both the 
Islamic and the Christian communities in Indonesia, each with their own 
theological perception. In the dictionary of Christian ethics (Childress 1986: 
632f), actions of trust are underpinned by various beliefs about human nature, 
such as non-violent ideas. ‘Trust’ is understood as a socio-ethical concept, and 
not as a religious idea. There is no further explanation of how trust is 
understood in the theological structure of religious people. In the social-
scientific study of generalised trust, too, this idea is not considered a religious 
idea. Some studies only suggest the influence of religion on trust (cf. Uslaner 
2002; Traunmüller 2010). Our research shows that trust among believers can 
be regarded as a religious idea, in which theological convictions inform a 
specific way of living with others in the public domain. This mindset of 
religious people with regard to generalised trust is developed through the 
process of doing the theology of everyday life. In other words, generalised trust 
is a form of lived religion, in which generalised trust is part of the religious 
meaning system.  
In this section we shall reflect theologically on types of generalised trust 
through the religious meaning system approach, in which we can view the map 
of religious thought developed by religious people. We would not include the 
toleration of hedonism in our reflection, because of the limited understanding 
our data offers on this idea.  
The main question is: theologically, how can we understand 
religiously-inspired generalised trust in relation to other religious ideas within 
the religious meaning system? Firstly we will explain the idea of a religious 
meaning system (5.2.1.1). Next we will reflect on generalised trust in a 
religious meaning system among Muslims (5.2.1.2) and among Christians 
(5.2.1.3).  
 
5.2.1.1 Religious meaning system 
A meaning-system approach is based on the idea that in daily life, every 
individual operates on the basis of personal beliefs about themselves, about 
others, and about their specific situation. Silberman (2009: 644) states that 
“these beliefs form meaning systems that allow individuals to give meaning to 
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the world around them and to their experiences, as well as to set goals, plans, 
activities, and order their behaviour.” A meaning system influences self-
regulation, and affects an individual’s emotions and behaviour.  
According to Silberman (2009), religion can be perceived as a source of 
meaning that can influence society as a whole. As a meaning system, religion 
is unique, because it puts our understanding of our self and the world in the 
perspective of transcendence. In this respect, religion as a meaning system 
shows a strong correlation between people’s understanding about this world 
and their experience of the sacred. Silberman (2009: 645ff) describes specific 
characteristics of a religious meaning system: A religious meaning system 
“centres on what is perceived to be the sacred and are related to beliefs about 
the nature of humanity, the self, this world, and what is beyond this world. It 
also embraces beliefs about contingencies and expectations of outcomes, and 
encourages connection with or adherence to the sacred.” A religious meaning 
system provides a description of the sacred and the profane, and prescribes 
actions that are considered to be religiously appropriate. Religion as a meaning 
system infers that religion is a source of beliefs that gives meaning, 
theologically, to believers; about their own lives, and the lives of others. In this 
respect, theology reflects not only attitudes about faith in God, but also about 
public life. Tacey (2004: 143), in the context of modern spirituality, confirms 
this thought. According to him, religion is a response to spirituality in which 
the awareness of the sacred brings an imperative to go outside of ourselves and 
serve others and the world. The understanding of ‘who’ is in line with the 
meaning of ‘what one should do’.  
Generalised trust in a religious meaning system can be regarded as a 
prescription for religious believers to live and act with others in society. Based 
on our empirical investigation, we found that each type of generalised trust as a 
religious attitude is founded upon two groups of religious ideas, namely 
religious intra-group and religious inter-group beliefs. Intra-group beliefs, 
which are the concepts of religious images, models of interpreting Holy 
Scriptures and faith, and the concept of Holy Scripture, contain religious 
descriptions of the sacred, the self, and others. Inter-group beliefs, which 
include interaction between religious plurality, positive in-group attitudes, the 
religion-state relationship, and religious vocation for solidarity and justice, 
refer to prescriptions of religious action towards others. Prescriptive beliefs are 
about what to do, what to feel, and how to act. The religious meaning system 
shows two clusters of ideas that are related to each other: first, a description of 
the self, the world, and their relation to God; and second, prescriptions of 
actions that are considered to be religiously appropriate.. 
Our research has produced religious mind maps of the lived religion of 
Islamic and Christian students in Indonesia. From a theological perspective, 
these mind maps are quite interesting. To what extent do the religious 
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descriptions and prescriptions that we found in religious intra-group and inter-
group beliefs construct religiously-inspired generalised trust in practical 
implications? How can we understand the map of religious ideas in generalised 
trust as a religious meaning system? How can a theological perspective be used 
to evaluate the map of religious ideas of generalised trust in this religious 
meaning system? To answer these questions, we will focus on several issues 
concerning the process of doing theology in daily life that encourage 
generalised trust among Muslims and Christians.  
 
5.2.1.2 Generalised trust in the religious meaning system of Muslims 
 
General theological construction 
How do we understand generalised trust within the religious meaning system 
of Muslims? What is the ‘folk theology’ of ordinary Muslims in Indonesia on 
generalised trust? We would like to answer these questions, starting with 
religious intra-group beliefs, and then continuing with religious inter-group 
beliefs. What is Muslim folk theology with regard to religiously-inspired 
generalised trust? 
For Muslims, Muhammad – as the central religious figure – has an 
important role, through which Muslims can learn about the Koran and about 
practical-living issues such as trust. Muslims recognise this particular image 
through Muhammad as a model (uswa). Muhammad as uswa is perceived not 
just as a person promoting the teachings of Islam, but also as the manifestation 
of the values that fit with the moral principles required by generalised trust. In 
‘folk theology’ this image of Muhammad as uswa is a source of spirituality, 
and it leads to a way of seeing, doing and being in terms of social 
responsibility.  
What values and attitudes bequeathed by Muhammad do Muslims have 
to know with regard to generalised trust? In Muslim ‘folk theology’, 
generalised trust needs a religious vocation for solidarity and justice. This 
seems to suggest that in Islamic ‘folk theology’, trust is experienced as based 
on a religious vocation. God calls the believers to live well in daily life, with 
and for others (Tacey 2004). A life of trusting others can be seen as a source of 
spirituality. Tacey (2004: 137) states, “The hard bits of spirituality would 
include sacrifice, discipline, commitment and dedication to the other.” A 
fundamental understanding of spirituality that brings God – the Sacred – to 
human beings never ends just with the individual. Spirituality always leads to 
social responsibility and commitment, because God as the Spirit is the fount of 
human creation and the core of the natural world; and religion should not be 
self-centred, but God and human-centred (Tacey 2004: 143; cf. Balasuriya 
2000). With regard to generalised trust, Muslims have a prescriptive idea to 
trust others in society, and they can learn it from the figure of Muhammad as 
the concrete model.  
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Furthermore, in the mindset of Muslims, the cooperation model of 
religion-state relationships is crucial in their theological understanding of trust. 
The existence of religions (not only one religion) in the state and the 
experience of religious plurality in life is part of generalised trust. This is quite 
interesting, in light of the idea sometimes expressed in Islamic theology that a 
theocratic model should be the basis of the state in which Islam is considered 
to have a complete concept of all the needs of life (cf. Wahid 1999: 56ff). In 
the ‘folk theology’ of ordinary Muslims in Indonesia, this seems to be absent. 
Generalised trust is possible when every religion fulfills its public role without 
the dominance of one particular religious group. In terms of religious diversity, 
the cooperation model is a theological reflection about how diverse religious 
believers learn about and from each other, and nurture respect for each other 
within the state. Increasing numbers of encounters between religiously diverse 
people shape experiences that can be productive for establishing generalised 
trust. The state does not represent a particular religion, but a place where all 
religions can live within the public domain.  
 
Specific theological construction on particular types of trust 
In this section we discuss the differences between each type of trust in the ‘folk 
theology’ of Muslim students.  
Firstly, the only socio-cultural trust in the mindset of Muslims is 
connected with the belief that the Koran is the Word of God (Kalām Allah), as 
revealed by Muhammad (Schimmel 1985; Khan 1986; Renan 2000; Haleem 
2008). By believing in the Koran as the Word of God, Muslims put themselves 
under the authority of God. A remarkable finding in our research was that this 
concept of the Koran as the Word of God plays no role in the ‘folk theology’ of 
Muslims in the economic and political domain; though it does in socio-cultural 
trust. How can we understand this? Theologically, socio-cultural trust among 
Muslims is based on a strong conviction; of the absolute truth of God’s 
revelation in the Koran. Living with people who have different values, and 
supporting equal access to education, are both supported by a stronger belief in 
the authority of the Koran. In the Islamic ‘folk theology’ of the students, an 
openness to the presence of other values and cultural traditions in the public 
domain (ad extra) seems to be connected with a stronger belief in the absolute 
truth of the Koran (ad intra). One can live well within cultural diversity, 
because it does not challenge the truth of one’s own belief.  
Secondly, with regard to economic trust, we found a connection to 
state communitarianism. What does this mean theologically, in the context of 
Indonesian Muslims? Some Muslims are convinced that social problems, 
including the economic crisis in 1997, were caused by the neglect of religious 
(Islamic) education and moral values. With regard to the economic domain, 
“Islam (in Indonesia) serves as a medium through which subjects of religious 
CHAPTER 5 
 
236 
reform are made accountable to themselves, their families, their work, and the 
nation at large.” (Rudnyckyj 2009: 118). Economic trust requires the individual 
to be accountable to the nation at large, with Islam as the medium (Rudnyckyj 
2009; Rivai & Usman 2012: 331ff). Based on these findings, the ‘folk 
theology’ of Muslims shows that they believe that the state should provide the 
biggest venue to Islam for disseminating religious values that can deliver 
credible truth, and for the public good. For Muslims, Islamic values oppose the 
economic liberal value system in which the individual is at the centre (cf. 
Michel 2004: 311f; Rivai & Usman 2012: 330). The question is: does this lead 
to conflicts with other religious groups? And the answer is ‘no’; because the 
normative role of Islamic values is connected with the cooperation model. It 
seems to suggest that Islam can be the medium for accountability in the 
economic domain, if this does not lead to a conflict with other religious groups, 
as is supposed by the cooperation model. An example of this is sharia-based 
banking, which in Indonesia was enacted by Law No.21/2008. There was no 
protest at this policy, because most people are convinced that sharia-based 
banking can be used by all citizens. Its presence provides an alternative method 
of financial transaction (Cholil; Bagir; Rahayu; Asyhari 2010: 24f; cf. Rivai & 
Usman 2012)  
Thirdly, in the ‘folk theology’ of Muslims, political trust is connected 
to relativistic pluralism. Theologically, relativistic pluralism is a perspective 
employed to show the differences between religions and to accept the equality 
and validity of these religions. Equality is an important condition of 
generalised trust, because it is through equality that the principles of solidarity 
and justice will flourish (Milton-Edwards 2005; cf. Ichwan 2006; Harris 2008). 
Muslims who recognise religious plurality and the equality of diverse religious 
traditions are more open to other people of other faiths. Relativistic pluralism 
extends the Muslim concept of the moral community to include people of other 
faith communities. Political trust in which everybody is eligible for political 
office and should be treated fairly as citizens demands the equality of all 
religious groups in the political domain. In Islamic ‘folk theology’, this is 
expressed in the idea of relativistic pluralism.  
 
5.2.1.3 Generalised trust in the religious meaning system of Christians 
 
General theological construction  
What is the ‘folk theology’ of ordinary Christians with regard to trust in 
society? Again, we answer the question starting with religious intra-group 
beliefs, and then continue towards religious inter-group beliefs. What is 
Christian folk theology with regard to religiously-inspired generalised trust? 
In the first place, the classical image of Jesus plays an important role in 
understanding the meaning of ‘trust’ for ordinary Christians. Jesus as the 
incarnating God represents a divine presence in the human world. The 
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transcendence of God in Jesus’ life places more emphasis on the divinity of 
Jesus (cf. Haight 2001; Zaccaria 2010). This is an image of the divinity and the 
eternity of Jesus, as well as of his oneness with God (Macquarrie 1990; 
Bennett 2001; Barth 2003).The image of the classical Jesus is close to the idea 
of God’s solidarity and justice according to the liberation theologians (Boff 
2000; cf. Song 1980; Greene 2003). In the classical image of Jesus, his life and 
mission are inseparable from compliance with the will of the Father. God’s will 
with regard to His incarnation is His solidarity with humanity. Boff (1987: 91) 
states, “Liberation consists precisely in Jesus Christ’s substitution for human 
beings – Jesus Christ’s effectuation of what human beings ought to have done 
in terms of satisfaction and had been unable to do.” Solidarity in this respect is 
the central meaning of God’s incarnation. The image of the classical Jesus 
expresses a kind of (and what Boff calls) divine justice.  
The image of the classical Jesus is in line with the religious vocation 
for justice and solidarity. This combination helps Christians to see others in a 
theological perspective, e.g. as God’s creations, who can live together in a 
community without fear, suppression, or discrimination. Christian theology 
emphasises justice and solidarity as the main principles of human existence 
(Sobrino 1985; Balasuriya 2000). Every single human being is considered to be 
God's precious creation. We agree with Min (2004: 141) that solidarity is “a 
form of concrete universality of togetherness of others without totalisation.” 
Solidarity is to be understood as interdependence within diversity. In 
interdependency, religions can find a way to engage in dialogue and develop 
justice, as a necessity in a modern and diverse world (Min 2004: 173ff). In this 
sense, religious vocation for solidarity and justice encourages Christians to 
trust others in accordance with God’s principles.  
It is interesting to see that the cooperation model between religion and 
state is connected to trust in the ‘folk theology’ of Christians. Theologically, 
the cooperation model excludes not only a wall of separation but also a 
theocratic model. Religion should not be reduced to a personal matter that is 
separated from public life. Religion is not a private matter; religious 
communities act in the public domain, in full view, for the well-being of all. 
For Christians, generalised trust is possible when all religions contribute to the 
nurturing values of togetherness. Here, religion is regarded as a spiritual force 
that links the understanding of God as sacred with life goals in the community 
(Fuliga 1987). Religion should view the public domain as a locus in which 
religious values can make a positive contribution to the well-being of members 
of all religious groups. And the state should recognise existing religions on an 
equal basis and encourage them to live together. The theological basis here is 
the acceptance of differences, not the separation.  
In Christian ‘folk theology’, religion is regarded not just as human 
‘authority’. In a psychological interpretation, religion is seen as an expression 
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of a weak personality, which fulfils personal needs and fancies. This idea 
contrasts with the religious idea that the the gift of faith opens a deep personal 
vocation towards the well-being of others. In other words, faith is precisely the 
opposite of the focus on personal needs and fancies. Faith in God can reorient 
people to what is ultimately important in life, for example religious values such 
as solidarity and justice. In this perspective, faith in God cognitively and 
emotively gives people the capability to live with and for others. Emmons 
(2005: 739) states, “Religion has the potential to invest human existence with 
meaning by establishing goals and value systems that pertain to all aspects of a 
person’s life with the potential to confer unity upon disparate experiences.” In 
this respect the believer has a kind of spiritual praxis of trusting oneself to God, 
which encourages him or her to develop particular values that engender trust in 
others in the public domain.
73
  
 
Specific theological construction on particular type of trust 
In this section we discuss two specific findings among Christians. The first is 
commonality pluralism, which relates only to support for a fair-salary system. 
The second is positive in-group attitude, which relates only to socio-cultural 
trust.  
First, the commonality pluralism model (attitudes toward religious 
plurality) is based on commonality within diversity. In this model, differences 
between faiths and traditions are not regarded as obstacles in the process of 
building relationships, because of the commonalities in the truth and reality of 
God that are acknowledged between different traditions. The relationship 
between religions is an important issue among Christians in Indonesia (cf. 
Ichwan 2006). Trust is possible only when there is recognition of truth and 
divine reality in other religions. This seems to suggest that for Christians, trust 
in a fair-salary system for all religious groups in Indonesia is connected in ‘folk 
theology’ to the idea that there is a strong common ethical truth in both 
traditions.  
Second, among Christian students, the support for positive in-group 
attitudes towards socio-cultural trust is remarkable. The assumption that 
positive in-group attitudes embrace a perspective of inequality and superiority 
does not fit with the theory that proposes that as inequality grows, trust 
declines (cf. Uslaner 2002). So why do positive in-group attitudes support 
socio-cultural trust? We think that this can be explained with the help of the 
ideas of a positive self-concept, and religious inclusion. In the context of 
Christians as a minority group, in-group favouritism reflects a positive self-
concept, which helps Christians to become a community with a strong sense of 
identity. The conception of identity itself is established by the synthesis of 
                                                 
73
 We view spirituality as an intrinsic function of religion, and do not separate religion 
and spirituality (cf. Marler and Hadaway 2002; Emmons 2005). 
SUMMARY, THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
 
239 
theological understanding of values, particular context and experience 
(Hendriks 2002: 173ff).  
In the case of Christians in Indonesia, we think that all three elements 
are imported to support socio-cultural trust. In the socio-cultural domain in 
Indonesia, Christians have undergone both inclusion and exclusion, and have 
witnessed the eruption of prejudice. The problems that Christians experience in 
the socio-cultural domain include an inadequate number of schools, high fees 
and poor management, segregation based on religious values, and the power 
constellation in the state administration based on particular religious values 
(Ichwan 2006; cf. Beeby 1979; Pradipto 2007; Ricklefs 2008).
74
 These 
experiences, together with a theological understanding of solidarity and justice, 
produce a conception of identity for the Christian community that supports 
trust towards socio-cultural issues.  
To put it differently, the generalised trust in the socio-cultural domain 
is based on a strong sense of identity as a Christian community, combined with 
the mixed experience of exclusion and inclusion and a strong religious 
vocation for solidarity and justice. In the case of a minority group such as the 
Christian community in Inonesia, all three elements probably need to be 
present. If the support of a sense of a strong identity was missing, it is likely 
that there would be less support for socio-cutural trust.  
 
5.2.2 Generalised trust and public theology 
 
Generalised trust in a religious meaning system is actually reflected through 
the ‘folk theology’ about experiences in the different public domains. Earlier, 
we mentioned that experiences are deeply involved in the process of doing 
theology. We agree with a basic understanding of public theology as a 
dialectical process between theological understanding and public discourse 
(Smit 2007; Fourie 2012). ‘Public discourse’ here is defined as the polyphonic 
voices of ordinary men and women expressing their experiences of acting and 
suffering in the historical reality of social life. In line with this idea, we think 
that religiously-inspired generalised trust among religious believers is 
constructed in the process of doing theology in dialogue with public discourse. 
We will now examine the extent to which generalised trust as a religious idea 
is recognised in the perspective of public theology.  
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5.2.2.1 The role of experience 
Generalised trust in the religious meaning system of Muslims and Christians 
reflects the specific experience of each religious group in Indonesia. In the 
following discussion, we evaluate two specific findings related to the particular 
experience of generalised trust of each specific group in Indonesia. We want to 
show the importance of including the dimension of experience in public 
theology. Or to put it differently: theological ideas are never abstract and a-
historical, but always (partly) the result of people’s concrete, historical 
experiences. 
First we will reflect on the difference between Muslims and Christians 
in the typology of generalised trust. We know that among Christians, the issue 
of job opportunity is connected with political issues, while the issue of a fair-
salary system is seen as separate. For Muslims, trust in the economic domain is 
something different to political trust. This finding should be understood in 
terms of the economic-political experience in the Indonesian context. The 
economic domain, including concepts such as business development and job 
opportunities in Indonesia, is closely related to the political domain. The 
practice of discrimination against or partiality towards small business groups 
by the government is common (Röpke 1988: 247f). The government is viewed 
by Christians in Indonesia more as an authoritarian ruler with the power to 
control employment and business development. As a consequence, the 
practices of corruption and bribery have become entrenched. And there is a 
common understanding that only those who have large capital and strong 
connections with the government will enjoy a profitable business situation, 
including job opportunities (Röpke 1988: 245ff).  
The situation becomes even more complex when the political power in 
Indonesia also tends to side with the major religious or ethnic group. Hence, 
there is competition between majority and minority groups related to 
economic-political domain (cf. Jones 2012). For example, it is common 
practice in Indonesia that the government discriminates against Chinese-
Christians as a religio-ethnic minority group, so that Muslims can get more 
opportunity to develop their businesses and provide job opportunities (cf. 
Röpke 1988: 242f, 296f). Recently there was a series of protest rallies held by 
the hardliner Islamic group the Islam Defenders Front (FPI: Front Pembela 
Islam) against the appointment in 2014 of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Chinese-
Christian officer and Jakarta deputy governor, as a new governor of Jakarta. 
Formally, the FPI argued that they rejected the appointment of Purnama as a 
governor because he was insensitive regarding ethnicity, religion and some 
other social issues. However, it was obvious that the real reason for the FPI’s 
rejection was Purnama’s religion and ethnicity.75 Also in 2014, a comparable 
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situation occurred when locals in Lenteng Agung sub-district in Jakarta 
demanded that the Jakarta administration dismiss their newly-installed sub-
district head, Susan Jasmine Zulkifli, simply because she was a Christian. The 
reason given was that the majority of residents were Muslims, so they had the 
right to have a Muslim sub-district head.
76
 For Christians in Indonesia there is a 
strong association between the problems in the economic domain (especially 
job opportunities) and political structure and power (cf. Röpke 1988: 241ff). In 
the mindset of Christians, the salary system is not associated with the political 
system. An explanation for this can be, that Christians consider it to be less 
influenced by the political system and more in the hands of employers.  
The second example is about geographical location. Both Muslim and 
Christian students who study in Yogyakarta support generalised trust more 
than their counterparts in Ambon. Disregarding the hypothesis of relative 
group size, we understand that both religious groups view the locations 
(Ambon and Yogyakarta) through the perspective of their collective 
experience. The major socio-religious riots in Ambon (that to date have not 
occurred in Yogyakarta), and social segregation that has occurred in several 
areas as a consequence of religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians, 
form an important part of the collective experience of Muslim and Christian 
students, particularly those who are from Ambon (Sterkens & Hadiwitanto 
2009). Until 1999, Muslims and Christians in Ambon lived relatively 
harmoniously. However, between January and April 1999, riots seemingly 
related to economic and social disparities between indigenous Moluccans and 
migrants erupted. The majority of indigenous Moluccans are Christians, while 
migrants in that area are predominantly Muslim. The riots escalated in the early 
2000s. The differences between co-religionists became peripheral, while 
similarities between members of the same group were highlighted (Tanamal & 
Trijono 2004; Noorhaidi 2005; ICG 2000; 2007). Generalised trust is promoted 
under conditions of tolerance and participation in civic life. Negative 
experiences of trust influence an individual’s willingness to participate in civic 
life (cf. Uslaner 2004). This collective negative experience is the reason our 
respondents from Ambon – both Muslim and Christian – have on average a 
lower level of generalised trust (both socio-cultural and economic) than the 
students from Yogyakarta.  
In consideration of religious experience, there should be a process of 
doing theology to daily life to give it meaning. According to some theologians, 
theology focuses not only on the spiritual and individual soul, but also reflects 
upon what humans experience (Metz 1969; Schillebeeckx 2014-VII; Anderson 
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1998; Boeve 2004: 201f). Theology, it is said, should reflect the concrete 
praxis of faith and the religious community’s life (Schillebeeckx 2014-VII; cf. 
Metz 1969; Pieris 1992; Moltmann 1984; Boeve 2004). The validity of 
religious tradition and revelation can be found in concrete experience. 
According to Schillebeeckx, in religious experiences there are 
interpretive elements that relate the understanding of revelation to the reality of 
the material world. Hence, he states (2014-VII: 34): “The gift, or God’s grace, 
is not revealed either from above or from below, but horizontally, in the 
encounter of human beings with one another within our human history.” In 
this sense, religious tradition is the history of both experience and 
interpretation of fundamental religious group experiences (cf. Boeve 
2004: 213). The praxis of the life of the religious community represents 
encounters between present-day experiences and the interpretation of 
faith. Through both forms of praxis, ‘doing theology’ in daily life becomes a 
correlation between the fundamental experience handed down by a particular 
religious tradition and the experience of the current situation (Boeve 2004). 
The awareness of experience in the process of doing theology suggests 
that theology is never private. Metz (1969) criticises theologies that do not 
place attention on experience and social life. He sees this as symptomatic of 
privatisation in the life of faith, and argues that those theologies must be 
confronted with what he calls deprivatisation. Theological concepts such as 
salvation, redemption, liberation, etc. should not be confined to the private 
level; they must be publicly proclaimed. In other words, theological concepts 
should be met with what Schillebeeckx (2014-VII) called ‘the reality of the 
world’. Metz (1969: 111) proposes that the aim of theology is political, i.e., to 
bridge religion and society, church and societal ‘publicness’, eschatological 
faith and societal life. In concrete experience, theology is developed not just as 
a doctrine, but also as a social critique (Metz 1969: 120ff).  
We can find strong agreement with this perspective of making concrete 
experiences and community life integral elements in doing theology among 
some Asian theologians (Pieris 1992; Amaladoss 2006; Min 2004). For 
example, Pieris (1992) proposes that Asian theology places more importance 
on praxis than on theory. Spirituality, he argues, is not a practical result of 
theology, but a radical involvement in human experience – such as poverty and 
suppression – upon which religious people reflect. Doing theology, which 
embarks from an awareness of and reflection on experience, has also 
developed strongly in Latin America, where it is called ‘liberation theology’ or 
‘theology from below’ (Sobrino 1985; Pico 1989; Boff 1987). Thus we can see 
that in many contexts, experience becomes an important part of the process of 
doing theology, providing a very strong influence on religious attitudes in 
society.  
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5.2.2.2 Religiously-inspired generalised trust as the product of public 
theology 
Theology must be willing to depend more on its compatibility with widely 
shared public interests and values, so that it will be related to human 
experience and foster change in society. We agree with Anderson (1998: 117) 
that the public significance of theological ideas in social life is “the openness 
toward the transcendent potentialities for the fulfilment of moral ends and 
values which are necessary for human flourishing”. Transcendence can be seen 
as an attempt to hold in balance human limits and openness in experiences with 
others, differences, and valuable relationships (cf. Thomas 1998: 201). In this 
respect, theology has a responsibility to develop its internal languages and to 
communicate with human experience.  
Smit (2007: 443ff) explains that the ‘public’ in public theology can be 
viewed from several perspectives. It may refer to a public sphere in the sense 
of a normative vision, such as democratic life, general humanity and society; or 
to a specific public discourse within theological activities. We can see that the 
perspective of public theology comes from the standpoint of collective 
experiences and public needs. Through these experiences, people connect their 
religious beliefs with their concrete life in society. This is in line with 
Anderson (1998: 132), who states that public theology talks about the extent to 
which theological interpretation of public life is being heard in the public 
arena. This means that there is a need for a particular language that can address 
concrete issues in the context of Indonesian society.  
Public theology is an opening up to experiences in correlation with 
religious traditions, so that concrete experiences in the light of faith can inform 
theological ideas. In this respect, we could say that generalised trust is a 
theological idea when religious believers are doing public theology. This 
confirms the writings of Schillebeeckx (2014-VII), who proposes that a serious 
handling of concrete experience acquires the concrete form of an ethical sense 
of values in modern society; and that moral principles, such as solidarity and 
justice, will emerge as a consequence. Through public theology, transcendence 
is no longer separated from issues of human immanence. Transcendence is 
applied directly to human needs and issues (cf. Anderson 1998).  
According to the public theology perspective, religiously-inspired 
generalised trust reflects theological responses to the experience of plurality 
and experiences of threats to humanity, such as disintegration, discrimination, 
poverty, etc. Generalised trust in which religious believers are paying attention 
to and are open to human experience becomes a creative transformation to 
broaden inclusiveness in society. In this sense, generalised trust of Christian 
and Muslim believers in Indonesia supports the processes of healing and 
human integrity based on the theological language of religious traditions. 
Theology is relevant to public needs because it fits into the context of social 
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and moral meanings (cf. Anderson 1998; Boeve 2004: 211). We understand 
that generalised trust here is one of the products of public theology that binds 
lives together and creates – as Pieris (1992: 126) describes – basic human 
communities wherein both Christian and Muslim believers strive together for 
the dawn of full humanity. Generalised trust can be seen not only as a social or 
ethical attitude, but also theological language that reflects the needs and 
experiences of Indonesian people, and generates relationships between diverse 
people. 
In this study, including the theological evaluation in section 5.2.1, we 
found that theological understanding about relationships with others exists 
within economic, political, social and cultural experience.
77
 The key is that 
diversity should not be regarded as an obstacle to unity, but should rather be 
seen as a challenge: to transcend differences, with the purpose of establishing 
coexistence. The real obstacles are attitudes of exclusiveness, fear of 
differences, and discrimination against religious communities in society. The 
moral principles of solidarity and justice find strong support in religions in 
Indonesia, especially Islam and Christianity. According to liberation 
theologians, the diversity of humanity is the creation of God, and God does not 
want to see His creations suffer. When people live in conflict, it can be a 
source of great suffering. God calls people to live in solidarity and justice (cf. 
Sobrino 1985; Pico 1989; Boff 1987; Pieris 1992; Min 2004). This religious 
vocation plays a very strong role among the Christian and Muslim students in 
this research.  
Generalised trust in the religious meaning system reflects a theological 
stance in public discourse about living in trust within a diverse society. 
Religion and theology play a vital role in the society, as a meaning system – in 
shaping human behaviour, and in developing social cohesion to support 
generalised trust. In this respect, religions do not necessarily lead to conflict 
between groups of people with different values and beliefs; they could help to 
reduce injustice and repression and build a culture of peace (cf. Appleby 2000; 
Herbert 2003). Since Islam and Christianity are missionary religions (Husin 
1997: 12), this positive contribution of religions in public invites us to reflect 
on the understanding of proselytizing by religious communities in modern 
society.  
The traditional understanding of ‘da’wah’ (Islam) or ‘mission’ 
(Christianity) is proselytizing (Husin 1997: 12; Banawiratma 2006: 66ff; 
Wijsen & Husein 2009: 142). However, ‘da’wah’ and ‘mission’ also evolve 
dynamically, along with the development of theology. In Islam, da’wah is 
basically understood to be a call or invitation from God to His people to have 
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faith (Islam) which is based on the Koran (Sura 10:25; 16:125; 57:8; Husin 
1997: 13ff). Without intending to eliminate differences of definition, the 
relevant meaning of da'wah in modern society is a call for people to direct 
themselves to God and His will (cf. Husin 1997: 234ff; Banawiratma 2006: 
70ff). In the context of a pluralistic society such as Indonesia, the latter 
meaning of da’wah relates closely to encounters with various experiences and 
groups of people. The issues of social justice, egalitarianism, democratisation, 
etc. are always relevant (Husin 1997: 269ff).  
In the context of today's Christianity on the other hand, the Church is 
encouraged to understand ‘mission’ as essentially a Missio Dei; God alone has 
a mission – to humankind. In this sense, the Church is not itself the sender or 
even the goal of the mission. The Church is sent by God to live and illuminate 
the living world (Bosch 1999: 571ff; Prasetyo 2008: 103). The Church mission 
is a process of interpreting the world. Or in other words, ‘mission’ is about 
doing theology within the social experience of communities in Indonesia (cf. 
Jongeneel & Van Engelen 1995: 456f; Bosch 1999: 618ff; 756ff). It is also 
oriented in a variety of experiences, such as oppression, violence, poverty, 
plurality, etc. There should be a dialogue between mission from above and 
mission from below; between the understanding of the history of salvation 
understood in traditional theology, and contemporary experience. 
According to this contemporary understanding of ‘da’wah’ and 
‘mission’, the process of doing theology within social experience is the main 
basis of public theology. We can conclude that ‘da’wah’ or ‘mission’ reflects 
the sense of how a religious group can live, meet and communicate with other 
people in the social context of society, with its problems. From this position, 
people can depart to understand God’s will (cf. Bosch 1999: 575; Prasetyo 
2008: 106, 111; Wijsen & Husein 2009: 148ff). We can see that the definition 
of such a religious mission is very close to how generalised trust is constructed. 
We can conclude that religiously-inspired generalised trust, in which there is a 
process of doing public theology by religious groups in their own experiences, 
has basically had a missionary perspective. Here, generalised trust is not 
merely a tool for the establishment of a mission; generalised trust itself can be 
regarded as a form of religious mission in modern society, which helps 
religious groups to develop an open and positive attitude in a pluralistic society 
(cf. Thomas 1998: 204).  
 
5.2.3 Generalised trust and religious authority 
 
Religiously-inspired generalised trust in ‘folk theology’ is embedded in 
religious beliefs about the self, others and God, and prescriptive beliefs about 
the right actions towards others. Generalised trust is a result of how ‘ordinary 
believers’ in Indonesia evaluate religious understanding and instructions 
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regarding injustice and lack of solidarity, and relationships between diverse 
peoples and religions. Again, generalised trust is not just a social attitude that is 
needed in the generalised exchanges of modern society (cf. Sztompka 1999), or 
just an ethical attitude (cf. Seligman 1997; Uslaner 2002, 2008; Hooghe 2007). 
For believers, it is first and foremost a religious attitude that orients the actions 
of believers towards others in a concept of unconditional trust and 
trustworthiness towards diverse people.  
As part of the religious meaning system, generalised trust requires a 
kind of spiritual authority to justify people’s beliefs, as a prescriptive force (cf. 
Silberman et al. 2005; Proctor 2006). According to our findings the spiritual 
authority supporting generalised trust can be found in two things. First, 
spiritual authority emerges from the authority of the religious community. 
Religious communities have a very strong potential to demonstrate their 
authority in moving people because they are linked to a sense of self and the 
relation towards ‘others’, and they provide a theological ideology and powerful 
institutional structures (Wilson 2008: 148). Believers are profoundly 
influenced by taking part in  community life, in a religious vocation for 
solidarity and justice. In this respect, the authority of the religious community 
emerges in relation to the process of ‘doing theology’ to understand what 
people require in modern society (cf. Metz 1974). Both Islamic and Christian 
religious communities believe that people are called by God to live together 
and to create a harmonious home.  
Second, spiritual authority is also rooted in the belief that the existence 
of a religious group is founded in the sense of the sacred. Theological 
understanding and religious prescriptions produced by any religious group 
reflect the process of ‘doing theology’ to manifest God’s will in society. In this 
sense, members of a particular religious community recognise God’s authority. 
The understanding of the will and the existence of God as a spiritual authority 
are supported primarily by the spiritual examples of Mohammad and Jesus. 
The image of Muhammad as uswa (a model) for Muslims and the image of 
classical Jesus as the incarnating God not only help to construct moral 
principles that support trust, but also form a picture of the spiritual authority 
needed in a religious meaning system. The figure of Muhammad as uswa 
encourages Muslims to get closer to and understand the authority of the word 
and the will of God, about life with and for others. Muhammad as uswa is 
based on the fact that he was the last one (al-Mustafa), and brought God’s 
message to the world. Muslims who want to obey God’s rule are asked to 
imitate Muhammad (cf. Sura 4:80). Muhammad’s reputation, which is 
reflected through his deeds, presents the authority of God’s will. In this 
particular type of trust we also find the role of the Koran for Muslims, as the 
Word of God. It represents how central the existence of God is, as the ultimate 
source of religious justification for religiously-inspired generalised trust among 
Muslims. In Christianity, Jesus – as the incarnate son of God – is recognized as 
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a God-man. In the life and death of Jesus Christ, human beings can learn to 
know and meet God. The image of classical Jesus among Christians in the 
constructing of generalised trust provides a concrete description of God 
himself as the spiritual authority justifying generalised trust.  
 
5.3 Practical applications  
 
Based on our study of religiously-inspired generalised trust among Muslim and 
Christian students in Indonesia, we can recommend some practical suggestions. 
First, to support different forms of generalised trust as a religious idea, 
Muslims and Christians in Indonesia need to pay more attention to religious 
inter-group beliefs rather than only to religious intra-group beliefs. Religious 
inter-group beliefs offer strong support for generalised trust among Muslims 
and Christians. Prescriptive beliefs about contingencies and outcome 
expectations need to be connected to experiences of living together with other 
religious groups. In concrete terms, both major religious groups in Indonesia 
need to develop a spirituality and practice that supports living in a diverse 
society. According to Banawiratma (2005) this can happen when religious 
groups are willing to develop a theology and spirituality that are open to 
diversity. Banawiratma (2005: 73ff) states that particularly in the context of the 
Church, the spirituality of openness can be realised only when the Church can 
be a communion of contextual communities.  
Religious groups should always be in dialogue with their context, if a 
religious vocation for justice and solidarity is expected to grow in the spiritual 
life of the people. This can go hand-in-hand with the development of inclusive 
relations with religions, in a state-religion relationship that gives equal right to 
every religion. Inclusive theological understanding and anti-fundamentalist 
thought are essential requirements. Different religious groups should be 
perceived as equal. Muslims and Christians in Indonesia need to create 
concrete programmes to teach young people about faith within a religious 
plurality and the religion-state relationship, and at the same time draw them 
into situations in which they can have positive experiences related to these 
themes. For example, religious groups could develop activities involving 
young people from each religious group in interfaith meetings. This is in line 
with the spirit of generalised trust, which overlooks outward differences, and 
regards all people – even those unknown – as trustworthy. 
Second, religious images as a spiritual model play an important role in 
encouraging generalised trust. Religiously-inspired generalised trust requires a 
strong immanent perspective on religious beliefs. Spiritual examples that 
address the needs and experiences of human beings are very relevant to 
generalised trust. These images should be an important element of the religious 
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education curriculum, the catechism curriculum, sermons in the worship 
services, and other programmes. 
Third, this study shows that generalised trust as a religious idea is 
strengthened when theology is willing to address human experiences in public 
life. Therefore, in order to strengthen generalised trust, both Muslims and 
Christians should execute the process of ‘doing theology’ within a historical 
context of concrete human experiences. Theology as a dogmatic discourse 
(theology ‘from above’) that is not open to public needs and experiences will 
not contribute significantly to generalised trust. Generalised trust is possible 
when theologians and religious people are willing to evaluate their theological 
discourse ‘from below’, i.e. from the experiences of living together in 
diversity, and being called by God to live according to the principles of 
solidarity and justice (cf. Banawiratma 2005: 76). This confirms the function of 
public theology that gives voice to religious commitments within public 
discourse (Anderson 1998: 110f). 
Fourth, public theology should not just be a theological discourse in a 
theological class, or in different forms of worship. Ordinary believers require 
support in terms of what it means to live together with other religious 
communities based on trust, and not only to know theologically about the 
principles of solidarity and justice. Believers begin to question the lack of 
relationships and experiences in which they should be able to live out core 
Church principles (Cole 2010). Indonesia's religious life seems so lively; but 
the separation between the ritual and the ethical occurs among religious people 
and groups also (Banawiratma 2005: 78ff; cf. Singgih 1999). There are many 
people who are diligent in worship, but lack sensitivity on many public issues, 
such as questions of justice, humanity, pluralism, interfaith dialogue – even 
social and religious conflicts, etc. Therefore, as a concrete measure, Muslims, 
Christians, and other religious groups in Indonesia should start doing their 
public theology through speaking and acting publicly, in the midst of people's 
experiences, to construct religiously-inspired generalised trust in specific 
domains, both local and national. In other words, religious groups must 
perform praxis-based and praxis-oriented action (cf. Banawiratma 2005: 80). In 
what follows, we suggest some practical actions based on specific experience 
in a specific domain, and repeat the need for dialogue between theology and 
experience.  
The issue of job opportunity and a fair-salary system in the economic 
domain cannot simply be dictated by religious groups. But religious groups can 
influence their members who are agents in the economic domain. Muslim and 
Christian believers can be agents who promote the very real application of 
solidarity and justice for all people, in order for people to be able to gain 
employment or a fair salary. Religious-groups should align with those less 
fortunate in accessing work and earning a fair salary can be a real experience 
for religious people, ecouraging them to appreciate life with generalised trust.  
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With regard to the political domain, religious communities and leaders 
in Indonesia still have a strong impact on their members, including those 
involved in politics. Political education, and the principles of opposing power 
abuse and the patronage system, should be part of religious education in 
religious communities. Instead of bringing a new experience of fairness and 
openness to political life, religious groups get caught up in political life 
experiences that do not support trust. Politicians who come from specific 
religious groups often uphold narrow and exclusive political attitudes that only 
satisfy their own interests, and win the support of their own religion. Obviously 
this kind of thing does not support generalised trust in the political domain. 
There is a great need for politicians from religious groups to fight for 
theological principles supporting openness, solidarity, and justice – and finally, 
generalised trust.  
In the social domain, too, the education system is worth discussing. 
There are many educational institutions founded by religious groups in 
Indonesia. The question is whether they have satisfied the great need for free 
access of education and reduce educational segregation based on religion. 
Religious groups should realise that education should be understood to be an 
open service to humanity rather than a religious strategy for indoctrinating 
people with their own religion. Religious institutions should start to develop 
curricula that encourage students not only to know their own religion, but to 
recognise different religions.  
Respect for different values can be developed through collective and 
concrete actions undertaken by religious groups in the cultural domain. Actions 
and programmes involving interfaith groups have been started in Indonesia; 
however, most of them have involved religious elites or academia, and have 
not really reached grassroots level (Singgih 2000b: 102). Religious 
programmes should create interfaith life experiences that build generalised 
trust, and not be only an exchange of thoughts. For example, Church and 
Mosque together could design social activities for youth members that instil 
feelings of solidarity and justice. Christiani (2009: 191) calls the use of this 
kind of programme “forming basic interfaith communities”. In a concrete way 
they help religious people learn to live in diversity in the public domain. 
Through such experiences, we can expect that differences in value and faith 
will no longer be seen as a threat, but as facts that support trust. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
 
Our study is the first on religiously-inspired generalised trust. We think that 
this concept should be developed further, because it is highly relevant for 
religious people in plural contexts.  
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Firstly, research on generalised trust should be done in other contexts. 
This will help to determine whether the logic of generalised trust that is 
understood by Muslims and Christians in Indonesia has anything in common 
with that of believers in other countries. Indonesia is a very religious country 
compared to many countries in Western Europe. Do Europeans – who tend to 
be more secular than people in Indonesia – recognise generalised trust as a 
religious idea? Islam and Christianity, as ‘religions of the book’, are in some 
respects alike. How would generalised trust appear in countries with a large 
Hindu or Buddhist population? Is religiously-inspired generalised trust the 
same in a society with high religious segregation, such as India, with its caste 
divisions? We believe that caste differences will influence and add variation to 
how religious people build generalised trust. For example, we might examine 
the extent to which there are differences between high and low castes in 
understanding generalised trust as a religious idea, and which variables 
encourage or discourage generalised trust.  
Secondly, since this study was limited to only Christian and Muslim 
students from six universities in two cities in Indonesia, further studies could 
be developed to examine the diversity of regions and religions in Indonesia – 
including Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism, all religions officially 
recognised in Indonesia. It would be interesting to see if their understanding of 
religious intra-group and inter-group beliefs regarding religious ideas would 
produce different results. Our respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta were 
limited to the Maluku and Java areas. There are many other areas in Indonesia, 
presenting myriad experiences and unique situations. It would be a great 
challenge to investigate religiously-inspired generalised trust among more 
university students, with more varied religious affiliations, from different cities 
in Indonesia. Thus, we recommend expanding the study through comparative 
research on a larger scale. Another recommendation would be to conduct 
comparative studies between residents in urban and rural areas, or between 
fundamentalist and liberal groups.  
Thirdly, when we operationalised generalised trust in specific domains 
we assumed that we must talk about trust in terms of concrete experience. 
Trust is understood in concrete, action-related attitudes and specific domains, 
such as the economic, political or socio-cultural domain. Muslims and 
Christians have a different understanding of the economic and political 
domains based on the experiences in their religious groups. Christians 
distinguish between support for a fair-salary system and economic-political 
trust. We interpret this result as meaning that each religious group can 
recognize trust in specific domain differently, influenced by collective 
experiences. However, a question should be raised here: is it really the case 
that economic trust and political trust are not the same for different religious 
groups in Indonesia? Or is this result specifically for Muslims and Christians in 
the regions we have researched? If the logic is correct that religious groups 
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have different concepts of trust according to their different experiences in the 
public domain, we should find similar results in other countries with different 
religious communities. For the development of theory on religiously-inspired 
generalised trust, this should be tested.  
Fourthly, we hypothesised that relative group size, as shown in the 
attribute of location, can be a predictor of religiously-inspired generalised trust; 
because smaller-sized groups might feel the higher need to nurture their own 
group for the sake of survival and growth (Stenhouse et al. 1982). However, 
this hypothesis is not confirmed in our research, because of the selection of 
locations. Ambon is a location that has experienced violence attributed to 
religious differences, while Yogyakarta is a city with no experience of 
religious violence. In this study, we found that the different experiences in each 
location obscured the question of relative group-size. When people in either a 
majority or a minority group live in a social condition of public violence (as in 
Ambon), they do not show a higher level of generalised trust. Conversely, a 
non-violent location demonstrates strong support for generalised trust. Hence, 
we recommend that the problem of relative group-size be examined further, by 
selecting locations that are of similar size, but are also similar to each other in 
terms of the nature of their experiences. For instance, the city of Manado in 
North Sulawesi has a majority of Christians in its population – as does Ambon; 
but Manado has not undergone the eruptions of violence that Ambon has. In 
such a study, we could examine the extent to which relative group size 
influences the development of generalised trust in the two cities.  
Fifthly, support for tolerating hedonism as religiously-inspired 
generalised trust in Indonesia is problematic among the religious groups in our 
research. In general, religious people in Indonesia perhaps suspect that 
tolerating hedonism may counteract the moral principles of solidarity and 
justice. We realise that there is a specific cultural understanding of this term. 
Hedonism in Indonesia is seen as a lifestyle that is very individualistic, or ego-
centric. From the dominant communal perspective in Indonesia, individual 
hedonism is seen as unsuitable. The hedonistic lifestyle goes against the spirit 
of solidarity and communal justice in Indonesian society. Western people who 
live in more a individualistic paradigm would certainly react differently to 
hedonism. Hence we recommend further examination and discussion of the 
toleration of hedonism in other cultural contexts, notably in the Western 
hemisphere. Support for tolerating hedonism as generalised trust was explained 
by only seven percent of total variance among Muslims, and two percent of 
total variance among Christians. These results are not theoretically relevant. 
The question, however, is what result we would see if we included other 
variables expected to support tolerating hedonism in the religious mindset; for 
example, hospitality, love and forgiveness. New research should help us to 
understand whether support for tolerating hedonism can be found in the 
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religious meaning systems of believers from different religions in different 
countries.  
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Appendix A 
 
Questionnaire (English version) 
 
 
A.1 Questions on background characteristics 
 
First we would like to know some things about your background: 
 
1. What is your gender?  
(1 = male; 2 = female) 
 
2.  How old are you?   
(........ years old) 
 
3. What is the name of your university / institution and the program you 
follow? 
 My university / institution is :  
1 =  Pattimura University (Unpatti: Universitas Pattimura – Ambon).  
2 =  State Islamic Institute (IAIN: Institut Agama Islam Negeri – Ambon).  
3 = Indonesia Maluku Christian University (UKIM: Universitas Kristen 
Indonesia Maluku - Ambon). 
4 = Gadjah Mada University (UGM: Universitas Gadjah Mada – 
Yogyakarta).  
5 = State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga (UIN: Universitas Islam 
Negeri Sunan Kalijaga – Yogyakarta).  
6 =  Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW: Universitas Kristen Duta 
Wacana - Yogyakarta) 
 
 Program / department of my study is : 
 (1 = Shariah / law; 2 = Dakwah / mission; 3 = Adab / philosophy; 4 = 
Ushuludin / Theology; 5 = Philosophy; 6 = Sociology; 7 = Economy or 
management; 8 = Information technology; 9 = Electrical engineering; 10 = 
Science and technology; 11 = Other, namely :…) 
 
4.  What language do you speak at home? 
(1 = Bahasa Indonesia; 2 = Bahasa Indonesia with Ambon dialect; 3 = 
Bahasa Jawa; 4 = other, namely: ....) 
 
5.  What is the highest school level your father and your mother reached? 
Please answer this question for your father and your mother separately. 
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(1 = SD or lower / Ibtidaiyah [primary education or lower]; 2 = SMP / 
Tsanawiyah [junior secondary education]; 3 = SMA / SMK / Aliyah 
[senior secondary education]; 4 = Diploma [vocational education]; 5 = S1 
[bachelor program]; 6 = S2 [master program]; 7 = S3 [doctoral program]) 
 
6.  Could you indicate to which extent you or your parents are involved in 
politics? Please answer this question separately for yourself, your father 
and your mother. Leave this question open if you, your father or your 
mother are not active in any political party. 
(1 = member of a political party; 2 = Active in a political party) 
 
7.  Which party does come closest to your political conviction?  
1 = National Mandate Party (PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional) 
2 = Reform Star Party (PBR: Partai Bintang Reformasi) 
3 = Crescent Star Party (PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang) 
4 = Prosperous Peace Party (PDS: Partai Damai Sejahtera) 
5 = Democratic Party (PD: Partai Demokrat) 
6 = Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP: Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan) 
7 = The Party of Functional Groups Party (Golkar: Partai Golongan 
Karya) 
8 =  Prosperous Justice Party (PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) 
9 =  National Awakening Party (PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) 
10 = The Party of Indonesian Nahdlatul Ummah United (Partai Persatuan 
Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia) 
11 = United Development Party (PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) 
12 = Other, namely ... 
 
8.  How important is it to your father and to your mother that you adopt their 
values or faith? Please answer this question for your father and your 
mother separately. 
(1 = not important at all; 2 = not important; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = 
important; 5 = very important) 
 
9.  How important is it to your father and to your mother that you participate 
in religious services? Please answer this question for your father and your 
mother separately. 
(1 = not important at all; 2 = not important; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = 
important; 5 = very important) 
10.  How would do you see yourself? Please, make sure that you mark only one 
answer.  
(1 = Muslim; 2 = Catholic; 3 = Protestant; 4 = Pentecostal; 5 = Other, 
namely ....) 
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11.  How would you consider yourself? Please, make sure that you mark only 
one answer.  
 (1 = Conservative (or orthodox); 2 = Liberal; 3 = Other, namely ....) 
 
12.  We would like to know how important your religion is to you. Please 
indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements by marking 
the appropriate box. 
(1 = not important at all; 2 = not important; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = 
important; 5 = very important) 
 
1. My religion has great influence on my daily life 
2. My religion plays an important role in decisions in my life 
3. My life would be quite different, had I not my religion 
 
13. Student organisations sometimes relate to religious communities. Please 
indicate if you belong to one of the organisations below. (If you are related 
to more than one organization, only indicate the one you consider most 
important). 
1 =  The Islamic Students Association (HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Indonesia) 
2 =  Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa 
Islam Indonesia) 
3 =  Indonesian Students Action Forum (KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia) 
4 =  Indonesian Christian Students Movement (GMKI: Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia)  
5 =  Catholic Students Association of the republic of Indonesia (PMKRI: 
Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia) 
6 =  Christian Students Communion (PMK: Persekutuan Mahasiswa 
Kristen) 
7 =  Others, namely : … 
8 =  I am not a member of any of these organizations 
 
14.  How many of your best friends consider themselves members of the same 
religion as you? 
(1 = now; 2 = some; 3 = relatively many; 4 = most; 5 = all) 
 
15. How often do you go to regular religious services in mosque or church? 
(1 = never; 2 = on feast days or special days; 3 = now and then; 4 = 
monthly or several times a month; 5=weekly or several times a week; 6 = 
every day) 
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16. How often are you involved as a volunteer in mosque or church? With 
voluntary work we refer to activities like as membership of DKM (Dewan 
Kesejahteraan Mesjid [the council of Mosque prosperous]), pemuda mesjid 
[Islamic youth], choir, etc.  
(1 = never; 2 = on feast days or special days; 3 = now and then; 4 = 
monthly or several times a month; 5 = weekly or several times a week; 6 = 
everyday) 
 
17. How often do you read in the Koran or the Bible? Please answer this 
question for the Koran and the Bible separately.  
(1 = never; 2 = occasionally; 3 = weekly; 4 = daily) 
 
18.  How often do you pray? 
 (1 = never; 2 = occasionally; 3 = weekly; 4 = daily) 
 
19.  Do you belief in the existence of God? 
(1 = I am absolutely sure about the existence of God; 2 = I am inclined to 
belief in the existence of God, although I have some questions about it; 3 = 
I doubt about the existence of God; 4 = It is difficult for me to belief in the 
existence of God; 5 = I do not belief in the existence of God; 6 = I cannot 
say anything about that). 
 
A.2 Questions on perceived threat 
 
The next questions refer to your personal context, more specifically about how 
you experience your economic, political, social and cultural context. We would 
like to know how you look at your economic and political situation, and what 
your opinions are about education and values.  
Please indicate in how far you agree with the statements below.  
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree)
 78 
 
Economy – salary 
1. Daily living is too expensive for my family.
 
9. The income of my family is sufficient. 
 
Economy – job opportunity 
2. There are enough job opportunities for my family. 
10. It is easy for my family members to find a good job. 
 
Politic – power 
3. My family is discriminated by the government. 
                                                 
78
 Items no. 2, 4, 6, 9 and 10 were recoded (values of answering categories reversed). 
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11. Members of my family feel oppressed by those who have political power. 
 
Politic – patronage system 
4. My family has good relations with people in local government. 
12. I worry about the abuse of political power in my environment. 
 
Social – segregation in education 
5. I prefer to attend confessional schools of my own religious background.  
13. It is the preferred choice of my family to study in confessional schools. 
 
Social – access to all levels of education 
6. Members of my family have free access to all levels of education. 
14. Indonesia has accessible education for everybody.  
 
Culture – different values 
7. The values of my religion are not enough respected in society. 
15. There is a lack of respect for religious values in our society. 
 
Culture – hedonistic lifestyle 
8. Too many people are only interested in what gives them pleasure. 
16. The society is too supportive of a hedonistic lifestyle. 
 
A.3 Questions on models for interpreting Holy Scripture and faith 
 
Next you will find statements related to the way in which people approach the 
Sacred Scriptures of their religion (like the Koran or the Bible) and their faith. 
What do you think about these statements? Please indicate the extent of your 
agreement according to the following:  
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Literal interpretation 
2. God has been defined for once and for all and therefore is immutable. 
5. Even though this goes against modern rationality, religious wonders are 
possible. 
8. Only specific religious traditions guarantee admittance to God. 
10. Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious question. 
15. I think that stories in the Sacred Scriptures should be taken literally, as they 
are written. 
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Hermeneutical interpretation 
1. The Sacred Scriptures hold a deeper truth which can only be revealed by 
personal reflection. 
4. The Sacred Scriptures are a rough guide in the search for God, and not a 
historical account. 
7. Even though the Sacred Scriptures were written a long time ago, it retains a 
basic message. 
16. Despite the injustices caused by my religion, its original message remains 
valuable to me. 
 
Historical interpretation 
6. Each statement about God is a result of the time in which it was made. 
9. The manner in which humans experience God will always be coloured by 
society. 
13. God grows together with the history of humanity and therefore is 
changeable. 
14. My beliefs are only one possibility among many others. 
 
Psychological interpretation 
3. Faith turns out to be an illusion when one is confronted with the harshness of 
life. 
11. The world of stories from the Sacred Scriptures is so far removed from us, 
that it has little relevance. 
12. Science has made a religious understanding of life superfluous. 
17. In the end, faith is nothing more than a safety net for human fears. 
18. Faith is an expression of a weak personality. 
 
A.4 Questions on concepts of the Koran and the Bible 
 
What is the Koran [for Muslim respondents] and the Bible [for Christian 
respondents] for you? Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the 
statements below, according to the following:  
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
1. A source of divine inspiration. 
2. The word of God. 
3. Just a collection of cultural text written by men. 
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A.5 Questions on images of God 
 
The following statements are about God. Would you please indicate to what 
extent you agree with these statements, according to the following: 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Iconic anthropomorphic 
Theism 
1. God set the world in motion and left it to humans to take care of it. 
7. God got the world going and left the responsibility for it to humans. 
 
Individual panentheism 
2. I trust God never to abandon me. 
6. God knows and understands me. 
 
Social panentheism 
3. When people are friends that is God’s love at work. 
5. When people live in friendship, God’s love is present. 
 
Cosmic panentheism 
4. I experience God’s goodness in the peace of nature. 
8. I experience God’s presence in the beauty of nature. 
The above were all statements about God. However, some people rather speak 
of ‘something higher’ instead of ‘God’. What do you think of the following 
statements about something higher?  
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Iconic non-anthropomorphism 
Deism 
1. There is Something higher, through which the world originated. 
3. There is Something higher, through which the cosmos and nature came into 
being. 
 
Pantheism 
4. There is Something higher, with which people and the world form a perfect 
unity. 
6. There is Something higher that ties people and the world together in perfect 
oneness. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
260 
Metatheism 
2. There is Something higher, which we cannot name at all. 
5. There is Something higher that we cannot even imagine. 
 
A.6 Questions on images of Muhammad 
 
The following statements are about Muhammad. Would you please indicate to 
what extent you agree with these statements?  
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Muhammad as a prophet 
1. Muhammad received God's revelations in word. 
8. Muhammad is called as Prophet to preach God’s word. 
15. Muhammad is sent by God to proclaim the revelations in word. 
 
Muhammad is unique in his closeness to God 
2. Muhammad’s journey to face God in the ascension [mi' raj] is absolutely 
unique. 
9. Muhammad is unique in being face to face to God. 
16. Nobody has seen God face to face but Muhammad. 
 
Perfection 
7. You cannot touch Muhammad because of his perfectness. 
14. It is not allowed to criticize Muhammad. 
21. There is no position from which one can challenge Muhammad. 
 
Model of spiritual development 
3. By following Muhammad, I grow near to God. 
10. Through imitation of Muhammad, I come closer to God. 
17. Following Muhammad, I grow in closeness with God. 
 
Model for a good life 
4. Muhammad teaches me to live rightfully with and for others. 
11. Through Muhammad I learn to live according to God's plan. 
18. Through Muhammad, I learn the right way to live with and for others. 
 
Model of gratefulness towards God 
6. Through Muhammad I learn to thank God for everything. 
13. Muhammad shows me that I have to be grateful to God. 
20. Muhammad teaches me to be a grateful servant of God. 
 
 
Humanistic Muhammad 
APPENDIX 
 
 
261 
5. Muhammad is no more than a good person in history. 
12. Muhammad was just a historical person, no more. 
19. Muhammad is no more than a great figure in human history. 
 
A.7 Questions on images of Jesus 
 
The following statements are about Jesus. Would you please indicate to what 
extent you agree with these statements, according to the following: 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Classical Jesus 
1. God sent his son Jesus to earth. 
6. Jesus is the God-man who existed with the father from the beginning. 
14. Before Jesus came to earth he had lived with the father from the beginning. 
 
Spirit-motivated Jesus 
2. Jesus was a unique prophet, as God’s Spirit of mercy directed his work and 
deeds. 
10. Jesus was a unique servant, as God’s Spirit of compassion animated his life 
and words. 
15. Jesus was a unique teacher, as God’s Spirit of love was in him. 
 
Society-related Jesus 
3. Jesus works among the marginalized in their struggle for liberation. 
8. Jesus guides the oppressed to the land of justice and peace. 
17. Jesus supports the poor by liberating them from injustice. 
 
Jesus in solidarity 
4. Jesus has shown us how to live in solidarity with others. 
9. Through his life Jesus showed us what it is to care for everybody. 
13. Jesus was a real example of caring for everybody in need. 
 
Model for a good life 
7. Jesus teaches me to live rightfully with and for others. 
12. Through Jesus I learn to live according to God's plan. 
18. Through Jesus, I learn the right way to live with and for others. 
 
Humanistic Jesus 
5. Jesus is no more than a good person who inspires peoples how to live well. 
11. Jesus was just a historical person, no more. 
16. Jesus is no more than a great figure in human history. 
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A.8 Questions on attitudes towards religious plurality 
 
The following questions are about the relation between religious communities. 
A central question is whether they are different or essentially the same?  
Authentic life means: an authentic relationship with oneself, other human 
beings, society, nature, and an ultimate reality, e.g. God or mankind. Please 
indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Replacement monism 
1. Only through my religion people can attain true liberation. 
4. Eventually my religion will replace other religions. 
6. Other religions do not offer a true experience of God. 
19. The truth about God, human beings and the universe is found only in my 
religion. 
 
Fulfilment monism 
3. Compared with my religion, the other religions contain only partial truths. 
5. Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to 
liberation. 
8. Other religions will eventually find their fulfilment in mine. 
10. Other religions do not offer as deep a God-experience as my religion. 
 
Commonality pluralism 
7. Different religions reveal different aspects of the same ultimate truth. 
9. Different religions present different paths to the ultimate liberation. 
12. The similarities among religions are a basis for building up a universal 
religion. 
14. Different aspects of the same divine reality are experienced in different 
religions. 
 
Differential pluralism 
11. Differences between religions are an opportunity for discovering truth. 
13. Differences between religions are part of God’s plan to save the world. 
16. Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment and growth. 
18. Differences in God-experience (anubhava) made possible by various 
religions challenge the idea that God is one. 
 
Relativistic pluralism 
2. All religions provide an equally profound experience of God. 
15. All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth. 
17. All religions are equally valid paths to liberation. 
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20. Although there are many religions, at the deepest level there are no real 
differences. 
 
A.9 Questions on religiocentrism 
 
The following questions are about Christianity and Islam in general. We would 
like to know how you think in general about Christians and Muslims. Please 
indicate in how far you agree with the following statements.
 
 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Positive in-group attitudes 
1. Muslims
79
 respond to God most faithfully. 
3. Thanks to their religion most Muslims are good people. 
7.  Because of their religion, Muslims are spiritually rich. 
9.  Muslims’ religion prompts them to live better lives. 
11. Their belief gives Muslims a strong virtuous character. 
 
Negative out-group attitudes 
2. Christians are often the cause of religious conflict. 
4. Christians may talk about doing good deeds, but they do not practice them. 
6. When it comes to religion, Christians are intolerant. 
8. Because of their religion Christians lack a sense of national belonging. 
10. Christians treat other people without respect. 
 
Response set breakers 
5. Christians are sincere in their own religion. 
12. Thanks to their religion most Christians are good people. 
 
A.10 Questions on religion-state relationships 
 
People can think different about the relation between the state and different 
religions. In the following section we propose some statements about this 
relation. Please indicate the extent of your agreement according to the 
following: 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
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 The indicated group is different for Muslim and Christian respondents. Here you see 
the items listed for Muslim respents. For Christian respondents the positive in-group 
attitudes obviously refers to ‘Christians’ and the negative out-group attitudes and the 
response set breakers to ‘Muslims’. 
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Autonomy liberalism 
1. The state and religious traditions should be totally independent from each 
other. 
5. The government should not interfere with religion at all. 
9. The state and religion should be completely separated. 
13. The state should not deal with religious matters at all. 
 
Diversity liberalism 
2. The state should protect all religions in society without any distinction. 
6. The state should protect all religious communities for the sake of diversity. 
10. The state should guarantee the freedom and rights of all religious groups on 
equal basis. 
14. The state should protect all religions to flourish in society. 
 
Group communitarianism 
3. The state should facilitate religious communities to flourish. 
7. The state should support different religious communities to transmit their 
values. 
11. The state can benefit from the promotion of religious values. 
15. The state should promote religious traditions to transfer their values. 
 
State communitarianism 
4. The state should base the whole society on the values of my religion. 
8.  Politics should be inspired by specific religious ideas. 
12. The state should be based on the values and norms of my religion. 
16. The government should be inspired by values and norms of my religious 
tradition. 
 
A.11 Questions on religious vocation for solidarity and justice 
 
Religion can have a positive effect on the society when it stimulates trust 
between people of different cultures and religion. Religion can stimulate 
cooperation and solidarity in the economic, political, social and/or cultural 
domain. We would like to know in how far you agree with the opinion that 
religious groups establish trust between different people in the society. What do 
you think of the statements below? 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement according to the following: 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
17. I belief and support the idea that God created human beings to live together 
in harmony. 
18. I belief that love and solidarity among diverse people is the prime command 
of God. 
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19. The Holy texts stimulate me to strive for justice and fairness for everybody, 
irrespective their religion. 
20. I belief that showing solidarity with everybody is God's wish. 
 
A.12 Questions on religiously-inspired generalised trust 
 
Religion can have a positive effect on the society when it stimulates trust 
between people of different cultures and religion. Religion can stimulate 
cooperation and solidarity in the economic, political, social and/or cultural 
domain. We would like to know in how far you agree with the opinion that 
religious groups establish trust between different people in the society. What do 
you think of the statements below? 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement according to the following: 
(1 = I totally disagree; 2 = I disagree; 3 = I am not sure; 4 = I agree; 5 = I fully 
agree) 
 
Economic domain – salary system 
1. My religious community should stimulate a fair salary system for everybody, 
independent of their religion. 
9. My religion should contribute to a better minimum income for all employees. 
 
Economic domain – job opportunity 
2. My religious community supports programs that defends everybody's right to 
get a job. 
10. My religion promotes equal job opportunities for everybody. 
 
Political domain – fair-use power 
3. My religious communities should stimulate political leadership with concern 
for everybody, independent of their religion. 
11. My religion should contribute to fair political leadership with concern for 
everybody. 
 
Political domain – no patronage system 
4. My religious community stands up for everybody's right to be elected without 
relationship to his or her religion. 
12. My religion promotes the best candidate in a position, also when he or she 
does not belong to my religion. 
 
Social domain – no segregation in education 
5. My religious community should stimulate education for everybody, 
independent of the religion of the pupils or students. 
13. My religion is willing to contribute to the education of everybody. 
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Social domain –access to all levels in education 
6. My religious community should support equal access for everybody to every 
level of education. 
14. My religion should promote further and higher studies for everybody. 
 
Cultural domain – respecting different values 
7. My religion promotes respect for the values of all religions. 
15. My religious community should recognize the contribution of all religious 
values in society. 
 
Cultural domain – tolerating hedonism 
8. My religious community should respect those are only interested in what 
gives them pleasure. 
16. My religion tolerates a hedonistic lifestyle, even when it is opposed to the 
own values. 
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Appendix B  
 
Questionnaire (Indonesian version) 
 
 
B.1 Pertanyaan tentang karakteristik latarbelakang responden  
 
Pertama-tama kami ingin mengetahui beberapa hal tentang latar belakang anda: 
  
1. Apa jenis kelamin anda?  
(1 = laki-laki; 2 = perempuan) 
 
2. Berapa usia anda?   
  (........ tahun) 
 
3. Apa nama universitas/institusi pendidikan yang anda ikuti? 
 Universitas/institusi saya adalah :  
 (1 = Universitas Pattimura – Unpati - ambon; 2 = Institut Agama Islam 
Negeri – IAIN - Ambon; 3 = Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku – UKIM 
- Ambon; 4 = Universitas Gadjah Mada – UGM - Yogyakarta; 5 = 
Universitas Islam Negeri- (UIN - Sunan Kalijaga – Yogyakarta; 6 = 
Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana – UKDW - Yogyakarta) 
 
 Fakultas / program studi saya adalah: 
 (1 = Shariah / hukum; 2 = Dakwah / misi; 3 = Adab / filsafat; 4 = Ushuludin 
/ teologi; 5 = Filsafat; 6 = sosiologi; 7 = ekonomi manajemen; 8 = teknologi 
informasi; 9 = teknik elektronika; 10 = sains dan teknologi; 11 = lain-lain, 
yaitu :…) 
 
4.  Bahasa apa yang Anda pakai di rumah? (Pilih atau tuliskan satu bahasa yang 
paling sering digunakan oleh Anda). 
 (1= Bahasa Indonesia; 2 = Bahasa Indonesia dengan dialek Ambon; 3 = 
Bahasa Jawa; 4 = lainnya, yaitu: ....) 
5. Apa pendidikan tertinggi yang dicapai oleh ayah dan ibu anda? Silahkan 
berikan jawaban secara terpisah untuk ayah dan ibu anda. 
 (1= SD/ibtidaiyah atau lebih rendah; 2 = SMP / Tsanawiyah; 3 = SMA / 
SMK / Aliyah; 4 = Diploma; 5 = program S1; 6 = program S2; 7 = program 
S3) 
 
6.  Seberapa jauhkah Anda dan orang tua Anda terlibat dalam politik? Silahkan 
beri jawaban secara terpisah bagi Anda, ayah Anda dan ibu Anda. Abaikan 
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pertanyaan ini jika Anda, Ayah Anda atau Ibu Anda tidak aktif dalam partai 
politik manapun. 
(1 = anggota partai politik; 2 = aktif di partai politik) 
 
7. Partai manakah yang paling mendekati keyakinan politik anda?  
1 = PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional 
2 = PBR: Partai Bintang Reformasi 
3 = PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang 
4 = PDS: Partai Damai Sejahtera 
5 = PD: Partai Demokrat 
6 = PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
7 = Golkar: Partai Golongan Karya 
8 = PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
9 = PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
10 = Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia 
11 = PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
12 = Lainnya, yaitu: ... 
 
8. Seberapa pentingkah bagi ayah dan ibu Anda bahwa Anda memiki 
keyakinan atau nilai-nilai yang sama dengan mereka?  
Silahkan beri jawaban secara terpisah bagi ayah dan ibu Anda. (1 = sama 
sekali tidak penting; 2 = tidak penting; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 = penting; 5 = 
penting sekali) 
 
9. Seberapa pentingkah bagi ayah dan ibu Anda bahwa Anda terlibat dalam 
pelayanan keagamaan?  
Silahkan beri jawaban secara terpisah bagi ayah dan ibu Anda. 
 1 = sama sekali tidak penting; 2 = tidak penting; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 = 
penting; 5 = penting sekali) 
 
10. Bagaimana Anda memandang diri anda? Pastikan bahwa Anda hanya 
menandai satu jawaban saja. (1 = Muslim; 2 = Katolik; 3 = Protestan; 4 = 
Pentakostal; Lainnya, yaitu ....). 
 
11. Bagaimana Anda menganggap diri Anda sendiri dalam tradisi keagamaan 
Anda? Pastikan bahwa Anda hanya menandai satu jawaban saja.  
(1 = Konservatif (atau tradisi ortodoks); 2 = Tradisi liberal; 3 = Lainnya, 
yaitu: ....) 
 
12.Kami ingin mengetahui seberapa penting agama bagi Anda. Mohon nyatakan 
tingkat persetujuan Anda terhadap pernyataan-pernyataan berikut ini dengan 
menandai kotak yang sesuai. 
(1 = sama sekali tidak penting; 2 = tidak penting; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 = 
penting; 5 = penting sekali) 
APPENDIX 
 
 
269 
 
1. Agama saya berpengaruh besar terhadap kehidupan sehari-hari saya. 
2. Agama saya memegang peranan penting untuk pengambilan keputusan 
dalam hidup saya. 
3. Hidup saya akan berbeda, jika saya tidak memeluk agama saya. 
 
13.Kadang-kadang organisasi kemahasiswaan terkait dengan komunitas agama 
tertentu. Mohon beri tanda jika anda menjadi anggota salah satu organisasi 
berikut ini (Tolong pilih atau tuliskan satu saja dari organisasi yang Anda 
ikuti dan yang Anda rasa paling penting) :  
1 = HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia 
2 = PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia 
3 = KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia 
4 = GMKI: Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia 
5 = PMKRI: Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia 
6 = PMK: Persekutuan Mahasiswa Kristen 
7 = Lainnya: yaitu: … 
8 = Saya tidak tergabung dalam organisasi kemahasiswaan apapun 
 
14.Berapa banyak teman baik Anda yang beragama sama dengan anda?  
(1 = tak seorangpun; 2 = beberapa; 3 = relatif banyak; 4 = sebagian besar; 5 
= semua) 
 
15.Seberapa sering Anda menghadiri ibadah di masjid atau gereja? 
(1 = Tidak pernah; 2 = pada hari-hari perayaan atau istimewa; 3 = kadang-
kadang; 4 = bulanan atau beberapa kali sebulan; 5 = Mingguan atau 
beberapa kali seminggu; 6 = setiap hari) 
 
16.Sebera sering Anda terlibat sebagai sukarelawan di masjid atau gereja, 
misalnya dalam aktivitas menjadi anggota DKM (Dewan Kesejahteraan 
Masjid), Pemuda Masjid, paduan suara gereja, sukarelawan dalam aksi sosial 
yang dikoordinir oleh masjid atau gereja, dsb.? 
(1 = tidak pernah; 2 = Pada hari-hari perayaan atau istimewa; 3 = Kadang-
kadang; 4 = Bulanan atau beberapa kali sebulan; 5 = Mingguan atau 
beberapa kali seminggu; 6 = Setiap hari)  
 
17.Seberapa sering Anda membaca Al-Qur’an dan Alkitab? Mohon berikan 
jawaban untuk keduanya (Al-Qur’an dan Alkitab) secara terpisah. 
  (1 = tidak pernah; 2 = kadang-kadang; 3 = mingguan; 4 = harian) 
 
18. Seberapa sering anda berdoa? 
(1 = tidak pernah; 2 = kadang-kadang; 3 = mingguan; 4 = harian) 
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19. Apakah Anda percaya akan keberadaan Tuhan. Pilih satu dari pilihan 
jawaban di bawah ini.  
1 = Saya benar-benar yakin akan keberadaan Tuhan 
2 = Saya cenderung untuk percaya akan keberadaan Tuhan walaupun saya 
memiliki beberapa pertanyaan tentang hal itu 
3 = Saya ragu tentang keberadaan Tuhan 
4 = Sulit bagi saya untuk mempercayai keberadaan Tuhan 
5 = Saya tidak percaya akan keberadaan Tuhan 
6 = Saya tidak bisa mengatakan apapun tentang Tuhan 
 
B.2 Pertanyaan tentang persepsi ancaman 
 
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut mengacu pada konteks pribadi Anda, secara 
lebih spesifik tentang pengalaman Anda dalam konteks ekonomi, politik, sosial 
dan budaya. Kami ingin mengetahui pandangan Anda tentang situasi ekonomi 
dan politik, dan apa pendapat Anda tentang pendidikan serta nilai-nilai yang 
berlaku. 
Seberapa jauh Anda setuju dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut ini: 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya)
80
 
 
Ekonomi - upah 
1. Kebutuhan sehari-hari terlalu mahal bagi keluarga saya. 
9. Pendapatan keluarga saya cukup. 
 
Ekonomi – kesempatan kerja 
2. Ada cukup kesempatan kerja bagi keluarga saya. 
10. Mudah bagi anggota keluarga saya untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan. 
 
Politik - kekuasaan 
3. Keluarga saya mendapat perlakuan diskriminatif dari pemerintah. 
11. Anggota-anggota keluarga saya merasa ditekan oleh para pemehang 
kekuasaan politik.  
 
Politik – sistem 
4. Keluarga saya memiliki hubungan baik dengan tokoh di pemerintahan lokal. 
12. Saya kuatir mengenai penyalahgunaan kekuasaan politik dalam lingkungan 
saya. 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 Nilai jawaban dalam item no. 2, 4, 6 dan 10 dibalik. 
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Sosial – pemisahan dalam pendidikan 
5. Saya memilih untuk belajar di sekolah berbasis agama yang sesuai dengan 
latar belakang agama saya.  
13. Merupakan pilihan bagi keluarga saya untuk belajar di sekolah berbasis 
agama tertentu. 
 
Sosial – akses pada seluruh level pendidikan 
6. Anggota keluarga saya dapat mengakses secara bebas semua jenjang 
pendidikan.  
14. Indonesia memiliki sistem pendidikan yang dapat diakses oleh semua orang. 
 
Kultur – nilai-nilai yang berbeda 
7. Nilai-nilai dari agama saya tidak cukup dihormati dalam masyarakat. 
15. Terdapat kekurangan untuk menghormati nilai-nilai religius di tengah 
masyarakat kita. 
 
Kultur – gaya hidup hedonis  
8. Banyak orang hanya tertarik pada apa yang membuat mereka senang. 
16. Masyarakat terlalu mendukung gaya hidup hedonistis (hidup berorientasi 
pada kesenangan). 
 
B.3 Pertanyaan tentang model-model interpretasi Kitab Suci dan iman  
 
Selanjutnya Anda akan melihat pernyataan-pernyataan yang berkaitan dengan 
bagaimana orang-orang melakukan pendekatan pada Teks-teks Suci (seperti 
Al’Quran dan Alkitab) dalam agama dan iman mereka. Apa pendapat Anda atas 
pernyataan-pernyataan ini? Mohon nyatakan tingkat persetujuan Anda dengan 
menandai kotak yang sesuai. 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Interpretasi harafiah 
2. Tuhan telah didefinisikan sekali dan untuk semua, dan tidak lagi dapat 
diubah. 
5. Meskipun hal ini melawan rasionalitas cara berpikir orang modern, hal-hal 
yang aneh dalam agama itu mungkin. 
8. Hanya tradisi-tradisi religius tertentu / spesifik yang menjamin pertemuan 
dengan Tuhan. 
10. Hanya ada satu jawaban yang benar untuk setiap pertanyaan yang berkaitan 
dengan agama. 
15. Saya pikir cerita-cerita dalam Teks-teks Suci seharusnya dibaca secara 
harafiah sebagaimana yang tertulis. 
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Interpretasi hermeneutis 
1. Teks-teks suci menyimpan sebuah kebenaran yang lebih dalam, yang hanya 
dapat dinyatakan melalui refleksi / perenungan pribadi. 
4. Teks-teks Suci adalah sebuah panduan umum dalam upaya mencari Tuhan, 
dan bukan sebuah masalah sejarah / historis. 
7. Meskipun Teks-teks Suci ditulis pada masa lalu, Teks-teks Suci ini tetap 
menyimpan sebuah pesan mendasar. 
16. Meskipun beberapa ketidakadilan disebabkan oleh agama saya, tetapi pesan 
intinya tetap berharga untuk saya. 
 
Interpretasi historis  
6. Setiap pernyataan mengenai Tuhan adalah sebuah hasil dalam proses waktu, 
di mana pernyataan itu dibuat. 
9. Cara manusia mengalami Tuhan akan selalu diwarnai oleh masyarakat. 
13. Tuhan tumbuh bersama dengan sejarah kemanusiaan dan kemudian dapat 
berubah. 
14. Kepercayaan saya adalah salah satu kemungkinan di antara banyak 
kemungkinan lain. 
 
Interpretasi psikologis  
3. Iman dapat menjadi sebuah ilusi ketika seseorang diperhadapkan dengan 
kehidupan yang tidak berbelas kasihan. 
11. Dunia cerita-cerita dalam Teks-teks Suci jauh dari kita, karena itu hal 
tersebut hanya memiliki sedikit relevansi / hubungan bagi kita. 
12. Sains sudah membuat pemahaman religius mengenai hal-hal yang tidak 
dibutuhkan. 
17. Pada akhirnya, iman tidak lain dari sebuah jaring pengaman untuk rasa takut 
manusia. 
18. Iman adalah ekspresi dari sebuah kepribadian yang lemah. 
 
B.4 Pertanyaan tentang konsep-konsep Al-Qur’an dan Alkitab  
 
Apa makna Al-Qur'an (bagi umat Islam) dan Alkitab (bagi umat Kristen) bagi 
Anda? Mohon nyatakan tingkat persetujuan Anda terhadap pernyataan-
pernyataan di bawah ini, sesuai dengan tingkatan-tingkatan berikut :  
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
1. Sebuah sumber inspirasi Ilahi.  
2. Firman Tuhan. 
3. Hanyalah sebuah kumpulan teks-teks budaya manusia. 
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B.5 Pertanyaan tentang gambar-gambar Allah  
 
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut di atas adalah pertanyaan tentang agama secara 
umum. Sekarang, kami ingin mengetahui pendapat Anda terhadap beberapa 
pernyataan tentang Tuhan, Yesus dan Muhammad secara lebih khusus. 
Pernyataan-pernyataan berikut adalah tentang Tuhan. Mohon nyatakan tingkat 
persetujuan Anda terhadap pernyataan-pernyatan tersebut, sesuai dengan 
tingkatan-tingkatan berikut:  
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Ikonik-antropomorfisme  
Teisme 
1. Tuhan menciptakan dunia dan segala isinya serta menyerahkan pada manusia 
untuk mengelolanya. 
7. Tuhan membuat dunia terus berjalan dan menyerahkan tanggung jawab 
pengelolaannya pada manusia. 
 
Panenteisme individual  
2. Saya percaya Tuhan tidak pernah meninggalkan saya. 
6. Tuhan tahu dan mengerti saya. 
 
Panenteisme sosial 
3. Saat manusia saling bersahabat, kasih Tuhan sedang bekerja. 
5. Ketika manusia hidup dalam persahabatan, kasih Tuhan hadir. 
 
Panenteisme kosmis 
4.Saya mengalami kebaikan Tuhan dalam kedamaian alam. 
8. Saya merasakan kehadiran Tuhan dalam keindahan alam. 
 
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut di atas semuanya mengenai Tuhan. Akan tetapi, 
beberapa orang lebih memilih untuk berbicara tentang “Sesuatu yang lebih 
tinggi”, yang tidak personal, daripada berbicara tentang Tuhan secara personal. 
Apa pendapat Anda tentang pernyataan-pernyataan tentang “Sesuatu yang lebih 
tinggi” berikut ini : 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Ikonik non-antropomofisme 
Deisme 
1. Ada Sesuatu yang Lebih Tinggi, yang dari padaNyalah dunia berasal. 
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3. Ada Sesuatu yang Lebih Tinggi, yang dari padaNyalah dunia dan alam 
semesta terwujud. 
 
Panteisme 
4. Ada Sesuatu yang Lebih Tinggi, dengan siapa manusia dan dunia membentuk 
kesatuan yang sempurna. 
6. Ada Sesuatu yang Lebih Tinggi, yang menyatukan manusia dan dunia dalam 
kesatuan yang sempurna. 
 
Metateisme 
2. Ada Sesuatu yang Lebih Tinggi, yang sama sekali tidak dapat kami sebut. 
5. Ada Sesuatu yang Lebih Tinggi, yang bahkan tidak dapat kita bayangkan. 
 
B.6 Pertanyaan tentang gambar Muhammad  
 
Pernyataan-pernyataan berikut adalah tentang Muhammad. Mohon nyatakan 
tingkat persetujuan Anda terhadap pernyataan-pernyatan berikut ini:  
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Muhammad sebagai nabi 
1. Muhammad menerima pewahyuan Tuhan dalam wujud kata-kata. 
8. Muhammad dipanggil sebagai nabi dan rasul untuk mewartakan Firman 
Tuhan. 
15. Muhammad is sent by God to proclaim the revelations in word. 
 
Muhammad yang unik dalam kedekatan dengan Tuhan 
2. Perjalanan Muhammad menemui Tuhan [mi' raj] adalah benar-benar unik. 
9. Muhammad adalah unik dalam keberadaannya berjumpa langsung dengan 
Tuhan. 
16. Tidak ada seorang pun yang sudah melihat Tuhan langsung selain 
Muhammad. 
 
Sempurna 
7. Kamu tidak dapat menyentuh / mengkritik Muhammad karena 
kesempurnaannya. 
14. Tidak diijinkan untuk mengkritik Muhammad. 
21. Tidak ada suatu bentuk apapun di mana seseorang dapat menentang 
Muhammad. 
 
Model pembangunan spiritual 
3. Dengan mengikuti Muhammad, saya tumbuh dekat dengan Tuhan. 
10. Dengan meniru Muhammad, saya menjadi lebih dekat dengan Tuhan. 
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17. Dengan mengikuti Muhammad, saya tumbuh dalam kedekatan dengan 
Tuhan. 
 
Model hidup yang baik 
4. Muhammad mengajarkan hidup benar dengan dan untuk orang lain. 
11. Melalui Muhammad saya belajar untuk hidup sesuai rencana Tuhan. 
18. Melalui Muhammad, saya belajar cara yang benar untuk hidup dengan dan 
untuk orang lain. 
 
Model hidup yang bersyukur pada Tuhan 
6. Melalui Muhammad saya belajar bersyukur kepada Tuhan untuk segala 
sesuatu. 
13. Muhammad menunjukkan kepada saya bahwa saya harus bersyukur kepada 
Tuhan. 
20. Muhammad mengajar saya untuk menjadi hamba Tuhan yang bersyukur. 
 
Muhammad sebagai manusia biasa 
5. Muhammad tidak lebih dari seorang yang baik dalam sejarah. 
12. Muhammad tidak lebih dari seorang tokoh sejarah. 
19. Muhammad tidak lebih dari tokoh besar dalam sejarah umat manusia. 
 
B.7 Pertanyaan tentang gambar Yesus  
 
Pernyataan-pernyataan berikut adalah tentang Yesus. Mohon nyatakan tingkat 
persetujuan Anda terhadap pernyataan-pernyatan berikut ini, sesuai dengan 
tingkatan-tingkatan berikut: 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Yesus klasik 
1. Tuhan mengirim putraNya, Yesus, ke dunia. 
6. Yesus adalah Allah-manusia yang telah ada sejak semula bersama Bapanya. 
14. Sebelum Yesus datang ke dunia, dia telah tinggal dengan Bapanya sejak 
semula. 
 
Yesus yang dimotivasi oleh Roh 
2. Yesus adalah nabi yang unik, karena roh cinta kasih Tuhan mengarahkan 
karya dan perbuatannya. 
10. Yesus adalah hamba yang unik, karena Roh Belas Kasih Tuhan menjiwai 
hidup dan kata-katanya. 
15. Yesus adalah guru yang unik, karena Roh Kasih Tuhan ada di dalamnya. 
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Yesus dan masyarakat 
3. Yesus berkarya di tengah-tengah kaum tersisih yang berjuang untuk 
memperoleh pembebasan. 
8. Yesus menuntun orang-orang yang tertindas ke tanah yang adil dan damai. 
17. Yesus mendukung orang-orang miskin dengan membebaskan mereka dari 
ketidakadilan. 
 
Yesus dan solidaritas 
4. Yesus telah menunjukkan pada kita bagaimana hidup dengan solidaritas pada 
orang lain. 
9. Melalui hidupnya, Yesus menunjukkan pada kita bagaimana peduli pada 
setiap orang. 
13.Yesus adalah contoh nyata tentang kepedulian pada orang yang dalam 
kesusahan. 
 
Model untuk hidup yang baik 
7. Yesus mengajar saya untuk hidup benar dengan dan untuk orang lain. 
12. Melalui Yesus saya belajar untuk hidup menurut kehendak Tuhan. 
18. Melalui Yesus, saya belajar cara yang benar untuk hidup dengan dan untuk 
orang lain. 
 
Yesus sebagai manusia biasa 
5. Yesus tidak lebih dari orang baik yang mengilhami orang untuk hidup baik. 
11. Yesus tidak lebih dari tokoh sejarah. 
16. Yesus tidak lebih dari tokoh besar dalam sejarah umat manusia. 
 
B.8 Pertanyaan tentang sikap pada pluralitas agama  
 
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut ini menyangkut tentang hubungan antara 
komunitas religius. Pertanyaan sentralnya adalah apalah mereka berbeda atau 
pada dasarnya sama.  
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Monisme penggantian 
1. Hanya melalui agama saya, orang dapat mencapai pembebasan sejati. 
4. Pada akhirnya agama saya akan menggantikan agama-agama lain. 
6. Agama-agama lain tidak menawarkan pengalaman sejati tentang Tuhan. 
19. Kebenaran tentang Tuhan, manusia dan alam semesta hanya ditemukan 
dalam agama saya. 
 
Monisme pemenuhan 
3. Dibandingkan dengan agama saya, agama-agama lain hanya mengandung 
kebenaran parsial / sebagian. 
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5. Dibandingkan dengan agama-agama lain, agama saya menawarkan jalan 
pembebasan yang paling pasti. 
8. Agama-agama yang lain pada akhirnya akan menemukan kesempurnaannya 
dalam agama saya. 
10. Agama-agama lain tidak menawarkan pengalaman dengan Tuhan sedalam 
agama saya. 
 
Pluralisme kesamaan 
7. Agama yang berbeda mengungkap aspek yang berbeda dari kebenaran hakiki 
yang sama. 
9. Agama-agama yang berbeda menghadirkan jalan yang berbeda pada 
pembebasan sejati. 
12. Persamaan-persamaan antar agama adalah dasar untuk membangun suatu 
agama universal. 
14. Aspek yang berbeda dari kenyataan Ilahi yang sama dialami dalam agama 
yang berbeda-beda. 
 
Pluralisme perbedaan 
11. Perbedaan-perbedaan antar agama adalah kesempatan untuk menemukan 
kebenaran. 
13. Perbedaan-perbedaan antar agama adalah rencana Tuhan untuk 
menyelamatkan dunia. 
16. Perbedaan-perbedaan antar agama adalah dasar untuk saling memperkaya 
dan menumbuhkan. 
18. Perbedaan dalam pengalaman akan Tuhan (anubhava) yang dialami oleh 
berbagai agama mempertanyakan ide mengenai Tuhan yang adalah satu. 
 
Pluralisme relatifistis 
2. Semua agama menyediakan pengalaman yang mendalam tentang Tuhan. 
15. Semua agama adalah jalan menuju kebenaran hakiki. 
17. Semua agama adalah jalan menuju pembebasan. 
20. Walaupun ada banyak agama, pada level terdalam sesungguhnya tidak ada 
perbedaan. 
 
B.9 Pertanyaan tentang religiosentrisme  
 
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut ini adalah tentang kekristenan dan keislaman 
secara umum. Kami ingin mengetahui pandangan umum Anda tentang umat 
Kristen dan umat Muslim. Mohon nyatakan sejauh mana anda setuju dengan 
pernyataan-pernyataan berikut (hanya diisi oleh umat Muslim). 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
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Positive in-group 
1. Umat Muslim
81
 paling taat pada Tuhannya. 
3.Terimakasih untuk agama Islam, kebanyakan umat Muslim adalah orang baik. 
7. Karena agama mereka, Umat Muslim kaya secara spiritual. 
9. Agama Islam mendorong umatnya untuk menjalani hidup yang lebih baik. 
11. Iman mereka memberikan umat Muslim sebuah karakter kesalehan yang 
kuat. 
 
Negative out-group 
2. Orang Kristen seringkali menjadi penyebab konflik antar agama. 
4. Orang-orang Kristen mungkin berbicara tentang melakukan perbuatan baik, 
tetapi mereka tidak mempraktekkan perbuatan baik tersebut. 
6. Jika menyangkut masalah agama, orang-orang Kristen tidak mengenal 
toleransi. 
8. Karena agama mereka, orang-orang Kristen kurang memiliki jiwa 
nasionalisme. 
10. Orang-orang Kristen memperlakukan orang lain tanpa rasa hormat. 
 
Response set breaker 
5.  Orang-orang Kristen bersikap tulus dalam agama mereka. 
12. Terimakasih untuk agama Kristen, kebanyakan orang Kristen adalah orang 
baik. 
 
B.10 Pertanyaan tentang hubungan agama-negara  
 
Orang dapat memiliki pemikiran yang berbeda tentang hubungan antara negara 
dan agama. Pada bagian berikut kami mengajukan beberapa pernyataan tentang 
hubungan ini. Mohon nyatakan tingkat persetujuan anda sesuai tingkatan-
tingkatan berikut : 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Liberalisme otonomi 
1. Negara dan tradisi religius seharusnya saling berdiri sendiri dan tidak saling 
mencampuri. 
5. Pemerintah seharusnya tidak mencampuri urusan agama sama sekali. 
9. Negara dan agama seharusnya dipisahkan secara total. 
13. Negara seharusnya tidak berhubungan dengan urusan-urusan keagamaan 
sama sekali. 
 
                                                 
81
 Nama kelompok agama dalam bagian ini diganti ketika disampaikan untuk responden 
Kristen. 
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Liberalisme kepelbagaian 
2. Negara seharusnya melindungi semua agama dalam masyarakat tanpa 
membeda-bedakan. 
6. Negara seharusnya melindungi semua komunitas agama demi terciptanya 
keanekaragaman. 
10. Negara seharusnya menjamin kemerdekaan dan hak-hak semua kelompok 
agama secara adil. 
14. Negara seharusnya melindungi semua agama untuk berkembang di 
masyarakat. 
 
Komunitarianisme kelompok 
3. Negara seharusnya memfasilitasi komunitas-komunitas agama agar 
berkembang. 
7. Negara seharusnya mendukung komunitas agama yang berbeda-beda dan 
meneruskan nilai-nilai mereka. 
11. Negara dapat memperoleh keuntungan dari mempromosikan nilai-nilai 
religius. 
15. Negara seharusnya mempromosikan tradisi-tradisi keagamaan dan 
menggunakan nilai-nilai mereka. 
 
Komunitarianisem negara 
4. Negara seharusnya menjadikan nilai-nilai agama saya sebagai dasar seluruh 
kehidupan masyarakat. 
8. Politik seharusnya diinspirasi oleh ide-ide religius tertentu yang spesifik. 
12. Negara seharusnya didasarkan pada nilai dan norma-norma agama saya. 
16. Pemerintah seharusnya diinspirasi oleh nilai dan norma-norma tradisi 
religius saya. 
 
B.11 Pertanyaan untuk panggilan religius tentang solidaritas dan keadilan  
 
Agama dapat memiliki efek positif pada masyarakat ketika agama tersebut 
mendorong terciptanya rasa percaya antara orang-orang yang berbeda budaya 
dan agama. Agama dapat mendorong terciptanya kerjasama dan solidaritas 
dalam ranah politik, sosial, dan budaya. Kami ingin mengetahui seberapa jauh 
Anda setuju dengan pendapat bahwa kelompok-kelompok agama membentuk 
kepercayaan di antara orang-orang berbeda dalam masyarakat.  
Mohon nyatakan tingkat persetujuan anda sesuai dengan tingkatan-tingkatan 
berikut: 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
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17. Saya percaya dan mendukung pendapat bahwa Tuhan menciptakan manusia 
untuk hidup bersama secara harmonis. 
18. Saya percaya bahwa solidaritas dan cinta di antara orang-orang yang 
berbeda-beda adalah perintah utama Tuhan. 
19. Kitab suci mendorong saya untuk berjuang demi keadilan bagi setiap orang 
tanpa memandang apa agamanya. 
20. Saya percaya bahwa menunjukkan solidaritas bagi setiap orang adalah 
merupakan keinginan Tuhan. 
 
B.12 Pertanyaan untuk konsep percaya yang terbuka dan diinspirasi oleh 
agama 
 
Agama dapat memiliki efek positif pada masyarakat ketika agama tersebut 
mendorong terciptanya rasa percaya antara orang-orang yang berbeda budaya 
dan agama. Agama dapat mendorong terciptanya kerjasama dan solidaritas 
dalam ranah politik, sosial, dan budaya. Kami ingin mengetahui seberapa jauh 
Anda setuju dengan pendapat bahwa kelompok-kelompok agama membentuk 
kepercayaan di antara orang-orang berbeda dalam masyarakat.  
Mohon nyatakan tingkat persetujuan anda sesuai dengan tingkatan-tingkatan 
berikut: 
(1 = Saya sama sekali tidak setuju; 2 = Saya tidak setuju; 3 = Saya ragu-ragu; 4 
= Saya setuju; 5 = Saya setuju sepenuhnya) 
 
Domain ekonomi – sistem upah 
1. Komunitas agama saya seharusnya mendorong terciptanya sistem pemberian 
gaji yang adil bagi setiap orang tanpa membeda-bedakan agamanya. 
9. Agama saya seharusnya memberikan kontribusi bagi terciptanya pendapatan 
minimum yang lebih baik bagi setiap karyawan. 
 
Domain ekonomi – kesempatan kerja 
2. Komunitas agama saya mendukung program-program yang membela hak 
semua orang untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan. 
10. Agama saya mendorong terciptanya kesempatan kerja yang sama bagi setiap 
orang. 
 
Domain politik – penggunaan kekuasaan yang adil 
3. Komunitas agama saya seharusnya mendorong terciptanya kepemimpinan 
politik yang peduli pada setiap orang tanpa membeda-bedakan agamanya. 
11. Agama saya seharusnya mendorong terciptanya kepemimpinan politik yang 
adil bagi setiap orang. 
 
Domain politik – tidak ada perkoncoan 
4. Komunitas agama saya membela hak-hak setiap orang untuk dipilih secara 
politis tanpa memandang apa agamanya. 
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12. Agama saya mempromosikan calon yang paling tepat untuk duduk dalam 
satu posisi di pemerintahan walaupun orang tersebut tidak seagama dengan 
saya. 
 
Domain sosial – tidak ada segregasi dalam pendidikan  
5. Komunitas agama saya seharusnya mendorong tersedianya pendidikan bagi 
setiap orang tanpa membeda-bedakan agamanya. 
13. Agama saya bersedia memberikan kontribusi / bantuan bagi pendidikan 
untuk setiap orang. 
 
Domain sosial – akses pada semua level pendidikan  
6. Komunitas agama saya seharusnya mendukung tersedianya akses yang 
merata bagi setiap orang untuk memasuki setiap jenjang pendidikan. 
14. Agama saya seharusnya mendukung pendidikan lebih lanjut dan lebih tinggi 
bagi setiap orang. 
 
Domain budaya – hormat pada nilai-nilai yang berbeda  
7. Agama saya mempromosikan rasa hormat pada nilai-nilai dari semua agama. 
15. Komunitas agama saya seharusnya mengenali kontribusi / sumbangan dari 
semua nilai-nilai religius dalam masyarakat. 
 
Domain budaya – toleransi pada hedonism 
8. Komunitas agama saya seharusnya menghargai orang-orang yang hanya 
tertarik pada apa yang membuat mereka senang. 
16. Agama saya mentoleransi gaya hidup hedonistis walaupun bertentangan 
dengan nilai-nilai religius saya. 
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 SAMENVATTING (Dutch summary) 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 1: Inleiding 
Sinds haar onafhankelijkheid op 17 augustus 1945 heeft Indonesië al veel 
grootschalige conflicten gekend waarin etniciteit, religie, ras en andere 
groepsonderscheidingen een belangrijke rol speelden. Hoewel er talrijke 
groepsconflicten zijn geweest langs religieuze scheidslijnen, proberen religieuze 
groepen ook bij te dragen aan meer sociale cohesie, en dit zowel op lokaal als 
nationaal niveau. De algemene probleemstelling van dit onderzoek luidt: in 
hoeverre versterken of verzwakken religieuze overtuigingen de vertrouwensre-
latie tussen mensen met verschillende achtergronden, met name tussen moslims 
en christenen in Indonesië? 
In de zoektocht naar een antwoord op dit algemene probleem hebben 
we op basis van eerder onderzoek een aantal theoretische veronderstellingen 
geformuleerd. We gaan er vooreerst van uit dat percepties van (groeps-)dreiging 
binnen specifieke maatschappelijke domeinen (i.e. economie, politiek, het so-
ciale en culturele leven) een negatieve invloed hebben op de vertrouwensrelaties 
tussen mensen behorend tot verschillende religieuze tradities. Daarnaast 
verwachten we dat belangrijke religieuze overtuigingen (‘intra-religious 
beliefs’) binnen islam en christendom de vertrouwensrelatie tussen verschil-
lende groepen kunnen versterken of verzwakken. We besteden ook ruimschoots 
aandacht aan religieuze overtuigingen die betrekking hebben op de relaties tus-
sen verschillende groepen (‘inter-religious beliefs’) en hun relevantie voor het 
vertrouwen tussen moslims en christenen.  
Vertrouwen is binnen een pluriforme samenleving een belangrijke 
component om de toekomst actief en constructief tegemoet te kunnen zien. 
Vertrouwen stelt individuen en groepen in staat om goed om te gaan met 
complexe sociale relaties, en kan bijdragen aan het vermijden van sociale 
conflicten. Maar wat voor soort vertrouwensrelatie is er nodig? Hoe kunnen we 
vertrouwen definiëren zodat het operationeel kan worden gemaakt voor 
empirische studie? In ons onderzoek richten we ons op gegeneraliseerd 
vertrouwen (‘generalised trust’). Dit gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen is een vorm 
van sociaal vertrouwen dat zich uitstrekt naar anderen die in bepaalde opzichten 
van ons verschillen. Gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen is zowel gebaseerd op 
(persoonlijke) ervaringen uit het verleden als op het idee dat we waarden en 
normen met elkaar delen in een steeds groter wordende morele gemeenschap. 
Religie kan zowel een negatieve als een positieve rol spelen met betrekking tot 
vertrouwen. Religie kan vertrouwen bevorderen, maar het kan ook bijdragen tot 
wantrouwen ten opzichte van andere groepen. In het bijzonder kan men 
sceptisch staan tegenover het leggen van een positief verband tussen religie en 
vertrouwen, omdat al vaak empirisch is bewezen dat religie juist leidt tot 
exclusieve onderscheidingen en negatieve attitudes ten opzichte van leden van 
andere religies. Leidt religie dan noodzakelijk tot minder vertrouwen? Er zijn 
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echter ook argumenten om aandacht te schenken aan de mogelijk positieve 
bijdrage van religie aan sociale samenhang: religieuze overtuigingen worden 
veelal gezien als belangrijke bronnen voor en aanmoedigingen tot meer 
vertrouwen tussen mensen; religieuze tradities zijn belangrijke socialiserende 
instanties voor alomvattende waarden en normen; en religieuze tradities bieden 
ook potentieel een voedingsbodem voor solidariteit met anderen. Tegen de 
achtergrond van het feit dat religie uiterst relevant is in het dagelijkse leven van 
Indonesiërs, bestuderen we in hoeverre religie (al dan niet) een bijdrage levert 
aan gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen. Meer specifiek stellen we de volgende 
onderzoeksvragen: 
1. Zijn de belangrijkste religieuze overtuigingen (‘intra-religious beliefs’) 
onder islamitische en christelijke studenten in overeenstemming met 
theoretische modellen, en is het mogelijk om crossreligieus vergelijkbare 
begrippen van deze intra-religieuze overtuigingen vast te stellen nadat 
groepsspecifieke verschillen zijn vastgesteld? (Hoofdstuk 2) 
2. Zijn de religieuze overtuigingen aangaande verhoudingen tussen groepen 
(‘inter-religious beliefs’) onder islamitische en christelijke studenten in 
overeenstemming met theoretische modellen, en is het mogelijk om 
crossreligieus vergelijkbare begrippen van deze inter-religieuze 
overtuigingen vast te stellen nadat groepsspecifieke verschillen zijn 
vastgesteld? (Hoofdstuk 3) 
3. Wat voor soorten gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen worden er door onze 
islamitische en christelijke respondenten onderscheiden? Verschijnt er een 
crossreligieus vergelijkbaar begrip van gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen bij 
christenen en moslims nadat groepsspecifieke verschillen zijn vastgesteld? 
En in hoeverre correleren en beïnvloeden achtergrondkenmerken, intra- en 
interreligieuze overtuigingen het gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen? (Hoofdstuk 
4) 
4. Tot slot: kan religieus geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen theologisch 
worden geëvalueerd als een religieuze overtuiging? (Hoofdstuk 5) 
 
Deze vragen zijn beantwoord met behulp van een enquête die werd verspreid 
onder universiteitsstudenten in twee steden in Indonesië: Ambon en 
Yogyakarta. Ambon, in het oostelijk deel van Indonesië in de provincie de 
Molukken, is gedurende een lange tijd sterk beïnvloed en gedomineerd door het 
christendom. Yogyakarta, in Centraal Java in het westelijk deel van Indonesië, 
heeft een ruime meerderheid van islamitische inwoners. Op deze twee plaatsen 
zijn drie categorieën van universiteiten geselecteerd: staatsuniversiteiten 
(Ambon: Pattimura universiteit; Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Universiteit); 
islamitische universiteiten (Ambon: Islamitische Staatsinstituut; Yogyakarta: de 
Islamitische Staatsuniversiteit Sunan Kalijaga) en christelijke universiteiten 
(Ambon: Christelijke Universiteit van de Molukken, Indonesië; Yogyakarta: de 
christelijke Duta Wacana universiteit). In totaal hebben 1.499 respondenten 
onze vragenlijst ingevuld, waarvan 51,6% vrouwen en 46,6% mannen (1,8% gaf 
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geen antwoord op de vraag naar geslacht). De meeste instrumenten om de 
achtergrondkenmerken en religieuze overtuigingen te meten werden reeds 
eerder gevalideerd, ten dele ook in Aziatische en/of Indonesische context. 
Andere meetinstrumenten, zoals gepercipieerde dreiging in specifieke 
maatschappelijke domeinen in de Indonesische context en ‘gegeneraliseerd 
vertrouwen’ werden speciaal voor deze studie ontwikkeld. 
In dit onderzoek hebben we gebruik gemaakt van vier soorten statische 
analyses. (a) Factoranalyses stelden ons in staat om vast te stellen in welke mate 
onze theoretische concepten en ideeën terug te vinden zijn bij de respondenten. 
Omdat dit onderzoek moslims en christenen wil vergelijken, hebben we middels 
factoranalyses crossreligieus comparatieve schalen nagestreefd. Dat wil zeggen: 
we hebben zo veel als mogelijk gestreefd naar gemeenschappelijke 
meetinstrumenten voor moslims en christenen. (b) Middels beschrijvende 
statistiek hebben we de mate van instemming met de afzonderlijke schalen 
resulterend uit de factoranalyses beschreven, en hebben moslims en christenen 
vergeleken op significante verschillen. (c) Bivariate analyses (hetzijnde 
correlatiematen Pearson’s r en eta) hebben de samenhang bepaald tussen de 
onafhankelijke variabelen (achtergrondkenmerken en intra-religieuze 
overtuigingen), de intermediaire variabelen (inter-religieuze overtuigingen) en 
de afhankelijke variabelen (diverse vormen van religieus geïnspireerd 
gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen). De sociale locatie van intra-religieuze 
overtuigingen (Hoofdstuk 2) en inter-religieuze overtuigingen (Hoofdstuk 3) is 
bepaald door deze te correleren aan de achtergrondkenmerken. (d) Tot slot zijn 
multivariate analyses uitgevoerd. Middels regressieanalyses hebben we 
onderzocht in hoeverre religieus geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen kan 
worden verklaard vanuit de invloed van achtergrondkenmerken, intra-religieuze 
overtuigingen en inter-religieuze overtuigingen. Voor alle statistische analyses 
hebben we gebruik gemaakt van het softwarepakket SPSS 21. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2: Zijn de belangrijkste religieuze overtuigingen (‘intra-religious 
beliefs’) onder islamitische en christelijke studenten in overeenstemming met de 
theoretische modellen, en is het mogelijk om crossreligieus vergelijkbare 
begrippen van deze intra-religieuze overtuigingen vast te stellen nadat 
groepsspecifieke verschillen zijn vastgesteld? 
 
Binnen de groep van intra-religieuze overtuigingen hebben we vier groepen van 
geloofsopvattingen besproken. De eerste groep betreft de beelden van God. Op 
basis van onze empirische toets hebben we ontdekt dat zowel moslims als 
christenen twee soorten Godsbeelden onderkennen: een antropomorfe God en 
een niet-antropomorfe God. De antropomorfe God is een persoonlijke God met 
menselijke kenmerken. Dit godsbeeld wordt, gemiddeld gesproken, duidelijk 
geaccepteerd door onze Indonesische respondenten. Het niet-antropomorfe 
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godsbeeld verwijst naar voorstellingen waarin God geen persoonlijke 
kenmerken heeft. Bij onze islamitische en christelijke respondenten is er een 
aanzienlijk verschil tussen hen die deze niet-antropomorfe Godsbeelden 
accepteren en diegenen die deze afwijzen.  
Als tweede onderzochten we religieuze beelden van Mohammed onder 
moslims en beelden van Jezus onder christenen. We kozen hiervoor omdat 
respectievelijk Mohammed en Jezus de centrale ‘stichtings’-figuren zijn binnen 
islam en christendom. Moslims belijden het grote belang van de positie van 
Mohammed en zijn profeetschap: hij is de grootste en de laatste profeet van de 
Abrahamitische godsdiensten. Uit ons empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat moslims 
bijna alle theoretische beschreven beelden van Mohammed onderscheiden en 
deze ook accepteren: Mohammed als een profeet, Mohammad als uniek 
vanwege zijn nabijheid met God, Mohammed als volmaakt, als uswa (een 
model voor goed leven), en een ‘humanistisch’ beeld van Mohammad. Hoewel 
dat laatste beeld ook door moslims wordt onderscheiden, is men niet zeker van 
instemming met dit beeld. De theologische beelden van Jezus zijn het resultaat 
van dialectische processen die de figuur van Jezus bekijken vanuit het 
perspectief van de vier evangelies, vanuit de traditie en de kerkelijke 
gemeenschap. De dominante christologie gaat uit van het idee dat Jezus God is 
of God-mens. Gebaseerd op onze empirische toets hebben we ontdekt dat het 
beeld van Jezus als een model om goed te leven, gevolgd wordt door het beeld 
van Jezus als geïnspireerd door de Geest en het klassieke Jezusmodel. De 
christelijke respondenten kunnen met al deze modellen in meer of mindere mate 
instemmen. Maar het (louter) humanistische beeld van Jezus kan niet op 
instemming van onze christelijke respondenten rekenen. 
De derde groep intra-religieuze overtuigingen betreft de interpretatie 
van de Heilige Schriften en geloof. De wijze waarop mensen religieuze teksten 
en geloof interpreteren weerspiegelt hun idee over wat religieuze teksten en 
geloof uitdrukken. De empirische toets laat zien dat onze respondenten twee 
soorten interpretaties huldigen, namelijk een psychologische interpretatie en een 
historische interpretatie. In de psychologische interpretatie waarin hun geloof de 
uitdrukking is van hun vrees en de noodzaak voor veiligheid; in de historische 
interpretatie wordt het geloof in God zoals die wordt bepaald in de Heilige 
Schrift, als veranderlijk en onbestendig gezien. Moslims wijzen een 
psychologische interpretatie niet helemaal af. Christelijke studenten daarentegen 
laten een negatieve ambivalentie zien voor een psychologische interpretatie. De 
historische interpretatie wordt door zowel door islamitische als christelijke 
studenten afgewezen.  
De vierde groep intra-religieuze overtuigingen betreft het concept van 
de Koran en de Bijbel. Hier identificeren we het karakter van de Koran en de 
Bijbel. Wat brengen de teksten van de Koran en de Bijbel tot uiting voor 
respectievelijk moslims en christenen? Het resultaat daarvan is het volgende. 
Moslims zijn het eens met de opvatting dat de Koran het Woord is van God als 
een directe goddelijke openbaring via Mohammed. Moslims accepteren ook dat 
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de Koran een bron is van goddelijke inspiratie, maar in mindere mate dan de 
Koran als het Woord van God. Moslims verwerpen de aanduiding dat de Koran 
een verzameling van (slechts) culturele teksten geschreven door mensen. 
Christelijke respondenten accepteren de Bijbel als een bron van goddelijke 
inspiratie evenals het begrip van de Bijbel als het Woord van God. Met 
betrekking tot de opvatting dat de Bijbel een verzameling is van culturele 
teksten geschreven door mensen, is er een relatief groot meningsverschil binnen 
de groep van christenen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3: Zijn de religieuze overtuigingen aangaande verhoudingen tussen 
groepen (‘inter-religious beliefs’) onder islamitische en christelijke studenten in 
overeenstemming met de theoretische modellen, en is het mogelijk om 
crossreligieus vergelijkbare begrippen van deze inter-religieuze overtuigingen 
vast te stellen nadat groepsspecifieke verschillen zijn vastgesteld?  
 
De inter-religieuze overtuigingen die we bij onze respondenten hebben getoetst 
zijn: houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit; religiocentrisme; 
houdingen ten opzichte van de verhouding tussen religie en staat; en religieuze 
roeping tot solidariteit en gerechtigheid.  
Binnen de houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit maken we 
na empirische toetsing een onderscheid tussen monisme (‘monism’), pluralisme 
met nadruk op gemeenschappelijkheden (‘commonality pluralism’) en 
relativisme (‘relativistic pluralism’). Deze classificatie laat een spectrum zien 
meer gesloten tot meer open (theologische) houdingen ten opzichte van 
andersgelovigen. De meeste islamitische respondenten stemmen in met 
monisme, gevolgd door gemeenschappelijk pluralisme en relativisme. De chris-
telijke respondenten scoorden het hoogst op relativisme, gevolgd door gemeen-
schappelijk pluralisme en monisme. 
Religiocentrisme wordt begrepen als de combinatie van positieve 
attitudes ten opzichte van de eigen religieuze groep en negatieve attitudes ten 
opzichte van andere religieuze groepen. De oorsprong en inhoud van deze 
attitudes hebben we besproken vanuit de zogenaamde sociale identiteitstheorie. 
Empirisch kwamen we tot de bevinding dat moslims positieve in-group attitudes 
accepteren, terwijl christelijke respondenten hierover (positief) ambivalent zijn. 
Beide religieuze groepen wijzen negatieve out-group attitudes af.  
Met betrekking tot de relatie tussen religie en staat herkennen onze re-
spondenten na empirische toetsing drie modellen: het samenwerkingsmodel 
(‘cooperation model’); het staatscommunitarisme en het autonomieliberalisme. 
In het eerste model komt samenwerking tussen religie en staat ondermeer tot 
uitdrukking in de feitelijke erkenning van religieuze tradities door de overheid, 
alsook in de bescherming, steun en facilitering van deze tradities. In het 
staatscommunitarisme is er een erg hechte relatie tussen een particuliere godsdi-
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enst en de overheid. In het autonomieliberalisme is er een absolute scheiding 
tussen religie en staat en worden de vrijheden van het individu benadrukt. Em-
pirisch gezien is het samenwerkingsmodel zeer acceptabel voor moslims en 
christenen in Indonesië. Men is het minder eens met het staatscommunitarisme. 
Christenen zijn geneigd het af te keuren, terwijl moslims er onzeker over zijn. 
Het autonomieliberalisme wordt zowel door moslims als christenen verworpen.  
De laatste groep van interreligieuze overtuigingen betreft de religieuze 
roeping tot solidariteit en gerechtigheid. Ook hier gaat het om een persoonlijke 
overtuiging op individueel niveau, maar één die toch consequenties heeft voor 
de relaties tussen groepen. Het gaat hierbij om de overtuiging van individuele 
respondenten dat ze op religieuze gronden, specifiek geïnspireerd door teksten 
uit de Heilige Schriften en vanuit hun geloof in God, zijn geroepen tot 
solidariteit en gerechtigheid. Zowel moslims als christenen stemmen er mee in.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4: Wat voor soorten gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen worden door onze 
islamitische en christelijke respondenten onderscheiden? Verschijnt er een 
crossreligieus vergelijkbaar begrip van religieus geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd 
vertrouwen bij christenen en moslims nadat groepsspecifieke verschillen zijn 
vastgesteld? En in hoeverre correleren en beïnvloeden achtergrondkenmerken, 
intra-religieuze overtuigingen en interreligieuze overtuigingen enerzijds het 
gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen anderzijds? 
 
Wij concentreren ons in deze studie op gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen als een 
vorm van sociaal vertrouwen ten opzichte van mensen die we niet persoonlijk 
kennen. We doen dit omdat gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen noodzakelijk is voor 
het vreedzaam samenleven van individuen die behoren tot verschillende 
groepen, terwijl ze zich toch blijvend identificeren met een specifieke religieuze 
groep. In een moderne samenleving zijn relaties tussen mensen die elkaar niet 
persoonlijk kennen onvermijdelijk en zelfs noodzakelijk. En in een plurale 
samenleving overschrijden deze relaties tussen individuen en groepen 
vanzelfsprekend de grenzen van religie en etniciteit. Religie is van groot belang 
in het dagelijks leven van Indonesiërs. Het speelt een belangrijke rol in zowel de 
openbare en persoonlijke sfeer. In een dergelijke context is religie 
waarschijnlijk niet alleen een bepalende factor voor gegeneraliseerd 
vertrouwen, maar is het waarschijnlijk een deel van ‘het vertrouwen’ zelf. 
Overeenkomstig deze bijzondere context bewerken we de relatie tussen religie 
en vertrouwen door te spreken over ‘religieus geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd 
vertrouwen’. Hier wordt vertrouwen begrepen als een element binnen het 
religieuze betekenissysteem. We beschouwen gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen als 
een religieuze houding ten opzichte van mensen buiten de eigen religieuze 
gemeenschap. 
Vertrouwen is altijd contextueel. Het is gerelateerd aan specifieke 
personen en groepen in specifieke omstandigheden. De mate van vertrouwen 
kan verschillen naargelang het maatschappelijke domein waarin dat vertrouwen 
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al dan niet aanwezig is. Daarom hebben we het concept van religieus-
geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen geoperationaliseerd binnen specifieke 
maatschappelijke domeinen. Hoewel mensen een hoog niveau van vertrouwen 
kunnen laten zien op een bepaald terrein (bv. gezondheidszorg of onderwijs), 
kunnen ze minder vertrouwen hebben op een ander terrein (bv. politiek). Na 
empirische toetsing onder onze respondenten ontdekten we twee crossreligieus 
comparatieve types van religieus-geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen. 
Zowel islamitische als christelijke studenten in Indonesië herkennen sociaal-
cultureel vertrouwen en het tolereren van hedonisme. Aanvullend vonden wij 
voor elke religieuze groep twee types van vertrouwen die specifiek zijn voor 
hun religieuze groep: voor moslims gaat het om economisch vertrouwen en 
politiek vertrouwen; voor christenen steun voor een billijk salarissysteem en 
economische-politiek vertrouwen.  
Sociaal-cultureel vertrouwen bij moslims en christenen bevat het idee 
dat een religieuze gemeenschap steun verleent aan toegang tot geschikt 
onderwijs voor iedereen evenals respect voor iedereen, ongeacht verschillen in 
religieuze achtergrond. Moslims en christenen zijn het erover eens dat hun 
respectievelijke religieuze gemeenschappen een bijdrage moeten leveren aan 
gelijke toegang tot onderwijs voor iedereen, en respect voor alle mensen. Voor 
zowel moslims als christenen zijn inter-religieuze overtuigingen sterkere 
indicators voor sociaal cultureel vertrouwen dan intra-religieuze overtuigingen. 
De religieuze roeping voor solidariteit en gerechtigheid is daarbij de 
belangrijkste voorspeller van sociaal-cultureel vertrouwen, naast het 
samenwerkingsmodel in de verhouding tussen religie en staat. Bij christenen 
vinden we een specifiek resultaat: positieve in-group attitudes dragen bij aan 
sociaal-cultureel vertrouwen. We kwamen deze invloed niet tegen bij de 
moslims. Sociaal cultureel vertrouwen wordt bij beide groepen ook beïnvloed 
door verschillende intra-religieuze overtuigingen: met name beelden van Mo-
hammed onder moslims en beelden van Jezus onder christenen; modellen voor 
de interpretatie van Heilige Schriften en geloof; en het concept van de Heilige 
Schrift. Bij islamitische studenten zijn de volgende religieuze overtuigingen van 
belang voor meer sociaal-cultureel vertrouwen: het beeld van Mohammed als 
uswa (model); de Koran als het Woord van God. Bij christelijke studenten zijn 
een psychologische interpretatie van Heilige Schrift en geloof en het klassieke 
Jezusmodel de belangrijkste indicatoren, terwijl psychologische interpretatie 
van het geloof het sociaal-cultureel vertrouwen vermindert. Ook zien we dat in 
Ambon minder sociaal-cultureel vertrouwen is dan in Yogyakarta. De invloed 
van locatie op gegeneraliseerd vetrouwen valt beter te verklaren vanuit het per-
spectief van de geschiedenis van conflicten dan vanuit het perspectief van de 
relatieve groepsomvang van moslims en christenen op deze locaties.  
Het tolereren van hedonisme is een type van gegeneraliseerd vertrou-
wen dat weliswaar als door moslims en christenen een afzonderlijke schaal 
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wordt herkend, maar door geen van beide groepen écht wordt geaccepteerd. Het 
tolereren van hedonisme is blijkbaar in strijd met een aantal waarden van de 
islamitische en christelijke gemeenschappen in Indonesië. In beide religieuze 
groepen draagt instemming met autonomieliberalisme bij aan het tolereren van 
hedonisme. Onder christenen is autonomieliberalisme de enige voorspeller van 
het tolereren van hedonisme. Bij moslims komen daar ‘relativisme’ en het 
humanistische beeld van Mohammed als voorspellers bij. 
Economisch vertrouwen en politiek vertrouwen bij moslims laat zien 
dat islamitische studenten worden geïnspireerd door hun religieuze 
gemeenschap om anderen te vertrouwen, met name bij sollicitaties en het 
nastreven van billijke salarissen (economisch vertrouwen), bij het op gelijke 
wijze verkiesbaar zijn voor politieke functies en bij het verlangen naar gelijke 
behandeling voor alle burgers (politiek vertrouwen). Wij vonden dezelfde 
indicatoren voor economisch vertrouwen en politiek vertrouwen. Interreligieuze 
overtuigingen hebben daarbij een sterkere invloed dan intra-religieuze 
overtuigingen. Zowel economisch vertrouwen als politiek vertrouwen worden 
sterk beïnvloed door zogenaamde interreligieuze overtuigingen: de religieuze 
roeping tot solidariteit en gerechtigheid; en het samenwerkingsmodel tussen 
religie en staat. Moslims zijn het er mee eens dat voor economisch vertrouwen 
en politiek vertrouwen een samenwerking tussen religie en staat nodig is, 
waarbij de staat de vrijheid voor alle religieuze groeperingen op basis van 
gelijkheid zou moeten garanderen. Onder moslims is verder het beeld van 
Mohammed als model voor goed leven (uswa) is een indicator voor economisch 
vertrouwen en politiek vertrouwen. We kwamen ook drie voor moslims 
specifieke indicatoren voor economisch vertrouwen en politiek vertrouwen 
tegen. Indicatoren voor economisch vertrouwen zijn de verblijfplaats 
(Yogyakarta) en instemming met staatscommunitarianisme, terwijl religieus 
relativisme een voorspeller is van politiek vertrouwen.  
Een billijk salarissysteem en economisch-politiek vertrouwen waren 
twee typen van religieus-geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen specifiek 
voor christelijke studenten. De instemming van christelijke studenten met deze 
typen van vertrouwen indiceert dat hun eigen religieuze gemeenschap hen 
ondersteunt om iedereen te vertrouwen om een billijk salaris te verkrijgen, 
politieke discriminatie te verwerpen en steun te geven aan gelijke kansen om 
werk te krijgen, los van de religieuze achtergrond (economisch-politiek 
vertrouwen). Het probleem van werkgelegenheid houdt verband met het politiek 
probleem, terwijl het probleem van van een billijk salaris er los van staat. Bij 
deze twee typen van vertrouwen vonden we dezelfde indicatoren. Bij 
interreligieuze overtuigingen ontdekten we dat de religieuze roeping tot 
solidariteit en gerechtigheid de sterkste invloed heeft op alle typen van 
vertrouwen. Een andere indicator is het samenwerkingsmodel tussen religie en 
staat. Bij intra-religieuze overtuigingen ontdekten we dat een psychologische 
interpretatie (godsdienst als een uiting van menselijke zwakheid) zowel de steun 
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voor een billijk salarissysteem als voor economisch-politiek vertrouwen 
vermindert. 
We kwamen ook verschillende voorspellers tegen tussen een billijk 
salarissysteem en economisch-politiek vertrouwen. Ten eerste gaven christelijke 
studenten in Yogyakarta meer steun voor een billijk salarsissyteem en sociaal-
cultureel vertrouwen dan de studenten in Ambon, maar de invloed van de 
locatie ontbreekt voor economisch-politiek vertrouwen. Ten tweede gaf het 
klassieke beeld van Jezus dat Jezus portretteert als de incarnatie van God 
aanleiding tot meer economisch-politiek vertrouwen, maar had dit geen effect 
op de steun voor een billijk salarissysteem. Ten derde kwamen we tot de 
bevinding dat pluralisme met nadruk op gemeenschappelijkheden 
(‘commonality pluralism’) steun verleent aan een billijk salarissysteem, maar 
niet aan economisch-politiek vertrouwen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5: Kan gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen theologisch worden geëvalueerd 
als een religieuze overtuiging?  
 
In het religieus betekenissysteem van moslims en christenen in Indonesië 
weerspiegelt gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen specifieke ervaringen van elke 
afzonderlijke religieuze groep. Zo is bijvoorbeeld vertrouwen binnen het 
economische domein iets anders dan vertrouwen binnen het politieke domein. 
En dit kan wederom verschillend zijn voor moslims en christenen. Voor 
christenen is er een sterke band tussen de problemen op economisch gebied 
(speciaal werkgelegenheid) en politieke macht. Zij zien de regering als een 
autoritaire bestuurder met invloed op het krijgen van een baan en zakelijke 
ontwikkelingen. De invloed van locatie (Yogyakartavversus Ambon) dient te 
worden bekeken vanuit (al dan niet aanwezige) ervaringen met geweld. 
Manifeste conflicten tussen (etno-)religieuze groepen en religieuze segregatie 
zijn belangrijke collectieve ervaringen van moslims en christenen in Ambon. 
Deze zijn niet of in veel mindere mate aanwezig in Yogyakarta.  
‘Theologiseren’ van het dagelijks leven wordt hier gezien als het 
verbinden van fundamentele ervaringen zoals die zijn overgeleverd door een 
particuliere religieuze traditie met de ervaringen in de huidige context. Ervaring 
wordt zo een belangrijk onderdeel het theologiseren, omdat het een sterke 
invloed heeft op religieuze houdingen in de samenleving. Theologie heeft de 
verantwoordelijkheid om zijn interne discours te ontwikkelen in dialoog met de 
contextuele ervaring van mensen in de samenleving. Deze verantwoordelijkheid 
krijgt in het bijzonder gestalte in publieke theologie. Publieke theologie is zich 
openstellen voor ervaringen in correlatie met religieuze tradities, zodat concrete 
ervaringen in het licht van het geloof theologische ideeën kunnen voeden. Op 
basis van ons onderzoek concluderen we dat gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen een 
idee is dat zijn plaats verdient in de publieke theologie.  
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Overeenkomstig het perspectief van de publieke theologie kan 
(religieus-geïnspireerd) gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen worden beschouwd als een 
theologisch concept dat kan worden verbonden met contextuele ervaringen van 
pluraliteit en de bedreigingen van desintegratie, discriminatie, armoede enz. 
Gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen is in dit licht een creatief veranderingsproces om de 
samenleving meer inclusief te maken. In deze zin ondersteunt het 
gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen van christelijke en islamitische Indonesiërs het 
proces van genezing en menselijke integriteit gebaseerd op de theologische taal 
van religieuze tradities. Theologie is relevant voor publieke behoeften omdat 
het past in de context van belangrijke maatschappelijke vragen in Indonesië. 
Wij begrijpen dat gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen hier één van de producten van de 
publieke theologie kan zijn dat levens met elkaar verbindt en solidaire 
gemeenschappen schept. Moslims en christenen kunnen hierdoor geïnspireerd 
samen streven naar de dageraad van een volwaardige menselijkheid.  
Religieus-geïnspireerd gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen weerspiegelt een 
theologische houding in het publieke discours van vertrouwvol leven in een 
etnisch en religieus diverse samenleving. Religie en theologie spelen een vitale 
rol in de samenleving van Indonesië als betekenissysteem – in het vormgeven 
van menselijk gedrag en in het ontwikkelen van sociale samenhang om 
gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen te ondersteunen. Gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen zelf 
kan worden beschouwd als een religieuze opdracht in de moderne samenleving. 
Het is een opdracht die gelovigen helpt om een open en positieve houding te 
ontwikkelen in een pluralistische samenleving. Dit vertrouwen ligt in 
‘volkstheologie’ ingebed in religieuze overtuigingen rond de eigen persoon, de 
anderen en God, en de normatieve overtuigingen over de juiste handelswijze ten 
opzichte van anderen. Gegeneraliseerd vertrouwen is het resultaat van een 
proces waarin ‘gewone gelovigen’ een religieus begrip evalueren in een context 
van ongerechtigheid en gebrek aan solidariteit. Daarbij is het eerst en vooral een 
religieuze houding van een onvoorwaardelijk vertrouwen ten opzichte van 
mensen en groepen in een samenleving die wordt gekenmerkt door diversiteit. 
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